


INSTITUTE OF JESUIT HISTORY PUBLICATIONS

CRUSADERS
OF THE
RÍO GRANDE


J. MANUEL ESPINOSA





F799
.E77


CRUSADERS OF THE RÍO GRANDE





Don Pedro de Vargas
Capata de San Pedro de los Rios

INSTITUTE OF JESUIT HISTORY PUBLICATIONS



CRUSADERS OF THE RÍO GRANDE

THE STORY OF DON DIEGO DE VARGAS AND THE
RECONQUEST AND REFOUNDING OF NEW MEXICO

By

J. MANUEL ESPINOSA, PH. D.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY (CHICAGO)

CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ROYAL
SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY

CHICAGO
INSTITUTE OF JESUIT HISTORY
1942

TO AURELIO M. ESPINOSA AND HERBERT E. BOLTON

CONTENTS

PREFACE	xiii
PROLOGUE	1
I VARGAS THE RECONQUEROR.....	25
II ON TO SANTA FÉ.....	49
III PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT SANTE FÉ.....	60
IV SPAIN RECLAIMS NEW MEXICO.....	72
V SUBMISSION OF THE WESTERN PUEBLOS.....	88
VI THE COLONIZING EXPEDITION OF 1693.....	112
VII DEFECTION OF THE PUEBLOS.....	136
VIII THE BATTLE OF SANTA FÉ.....	151
IX CONTINUED HOSTILITIES	163
X MEETING THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM.....	177
XI PACIFICATION OF THE PUEBLOS.....	199
XII REBUILDING MISSIONS AND SETTLEMENTS.....	209
XIII THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE.....	228
XIV THE PUEBLO REVOLT OF 1696.....	244
XV INDIAN WARFARE	272
XVI THE ROAD TO FINAL VICTORY.....	289
XVII BORDER POLITICS	307
XVIII THE RETURN OF VARGAS.....	341
EPILOGUE	363
BIBLIOGRAPHY	374
INDEX	391

ILLUSTRATIONS

DON DIEGO DE VARGAS.....	Frontispiece
MAPS	
THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF NEW SPAIN IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	7
VARGAS' FIRST EXPEDITION INTO NEW MEXICO.....	55
SCENE OF VARGAS' COLONIZATION 1693 FROM BARREIRO MAPS	125
ROUTE OF THE VARGAS EXPEDITION INTO COLORADO	195
SITES OF MISSIONS AND TOWNS REESTABLISHED 1694-1695	223

PREFACE

The Royal City of Santa Fé, at the end of the old Santa Fé Trail, stands today a living tribute to Don Diego de Vargas. For ever since he hoisted the Spanish flag over its thick ramparts, and established himself in the Palace of the Governors in the ancient capital of the province, even then hoary with age, its existence as a part of Christendom has been continuous.

Twenty-two years before the Pilgrim Fathers planted their colony in New England, Spain had conquered and settled New Mexico. However, in the great Pueblo Indian Revolt of 1680 the work of three-quarters of a century was virtually wiped out. The northern frontier of New Spain was violently hurled back over three hundred and fifty miles at a single stroke, and New Mexico again became the undisputed land of hostile Indians. Then, in the last decade of the seventeenth century the region was won back under the leadership of the bold frontier captain Don Diego de Vargas, whose name will live as long as men record the full story of the Winning of the West. Spain's earlier pioneer efforts left their indelible imprint, and that of the later Anglo-American conqueror becomes more evident each day; but as a determining factor in the evolution of the peculiar social, cultural, religious, and economic patterns of the region, which is still nearly half Spanish in population, language, and culture, the reconquest of New Mexico stands out as one of the most important chapters in the whole history of Spanish colonial enterprise within the limits of the present United States.

No complete history of the reconquest of New Mexico could be written without correlating a great mass of widely scattered manuscript materials. Among other things, it was the rule during the period of Spanish domination in America to have every document of official importance executed in triplicate, one copy remaining at the seat of local government, another going to the viceregal authorities, and the third to the royal administrators in the mother country. Consequently copies of the most important official New Mexican records were filed in the government archives of Santa Fé, Mexico

City, and Madrid and Seville, Spáin. These original documents, most of which have survived, are now preserved in the State Museum and in the Office of the Surveyor General in Santa Fé, the Archivo General y Público de la Nación in Mexico City, the Archive of the Indies in Seville, and the Biblioteca Nacional and Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid. Since New Mexico was a Franciscan mission field, the Franciscan records of New Mexico and New Spain constitute another group of important materials for the period. Most of the original local mission documents, formerly scattered throughout the missions, are now filed in the Cathedral Archive of Santa Fé, while other important official Franciscan reports and correspondence may be found in the Biblioteca Nacional in Mexico City. The above sources duplicate one another in part; they also complete one another for the documents on the local activities of the various administrative units are filed only in the archives of the particular jurisdiction concerned. In addition there are many documents pertaining specifically to the Vargas family in various archives of Spain and Spanish America. From these original sources in some half a dozen depositories of several nations, the narrative of the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico had to be written.

The history of investigations thus far made is a fascinating yet little known chapter in American historiography. The first secondary work on the subject appeared as a pamphlet, in eighteen folio pages, published in Mexico in 1693, telling of Vargas' preliminary expedition into New Mexico in the previous year.¹ Written by Don Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora in fine journalistic style after a hasty perusal of reports sent to the viceregal authorities by Vargas, it has little value today

¹ *Mercurio Volante, con la noticia de la recuperación de las provincias del Nuevo México conseguida por D. Diego de Vargas Zapata y Luxán Ponce de León, governador y capitan general de aquel reyno.* It was reprinted in Mexico in 1900 as a fourth appendix to Luis González Obregón's edition of Villagrà's *Historia de la Nueva México*. Benjamin M. Read translated it in his *Illustrated History of New Mexico*, Santa Fe, 1912, 273-294. A translation accompanied by a photographic reproduction of the original was published by Irving A. Leonard in 1932. See also Chapters II, note 1, and VI, note 26.

to the student of the reconquest, even though Sigüenza was royal cosmographer of New Spain. He placed all emphasis on rhetorical forms and embellishments, becoming unreliable in details. The sole value of his account lies in the part it played in the early history of Mexican journalism. More important, when voluminous reports of continued success in New Mexico accumulated in the government offices of Spain, its dramatic import stirred the pen of Juan de Villagutierre y Sotomayor, *relator* of the Council of the Indies. He thereupon wrote a massive two volume *Historia* of New Mexico in chronicle fashion, devoting the second half of his 880 folio pages to Vargas' feat of reconquest and refounding.² This notable work, written about 1703-1704, was intended for publication, but actually remained unknown and hidden away in the archives of Madrid until it came to light some thirteen years ago. Next, in 1740, an elaborate genealogy of the Vargas family was published in Madrid by the Reconqueror's grandson; witness his proud display of family names: Don Diego José López de Zárate Vargas Pimentel Zapata y Luján Ponce de León Cepeda Alvarez Contreras y Salinas, Marqués de Villanueva de la Sagra y de la Nava de Barcinas. No less formidable is the title of his work, which begins with *Breve descripción*, and ends twenty-three lines below. The last important source of the colonial period is Fray Silvestre Vélez de Escalante's survey of the government archives of Santa Fé, written in 1778. The part dealing with the reconquest is brief, but it is generally reliable, and is based upon local documents many of which have since been lost. Although a complete copy of the manuscript may be found in the Biblioteca Nacional in Mexico City, it long has been known only through an incomplete version in the Archivo General of Mexico, with the first part missing, including the title page, and therefore it has been referred to as anonymous. This incomplete and so-called "anonymous" copy of the manuscript was published in Mexico in 1856.³

The first notices in English worthy of mention date from

² "Historia de la conquista pérdida y restauración de la Nueva México en la América septentrional." See Bibliography.

³ See Bibliography.

the United States' occupation of New Mexico in 1848, and the invaders' discovery of the early Spanish government documents in Santa Fé along with the equally ancient mission records scattered throughout the Pueblo Indian missions. The "new found" manuscripts were examined with emotion by early American visitors of an historical bent. James F. Meline, a military officer, after visiting the archives in 1866, wrote an enthusiastic letter in which he stated: "I have examined piles of documents belonging to the archives, and cannot but regret, for the sake of history, that some use is not made of them."⁴ Thoroughly impressed by what he had seen, he continued:

The startling discoveries we have from time to time, of late years, heard of passes and cañons hitherto unknown, would have been no news to the sons of Cortés . . . Before Plymouth Rock had a name, the Spaniards had reached the Rocky Mountains, penetrated its passes, and become familiar with the sources, fords, and cañons of the Gila and Colorado—rivers that within a few years only have attracted so much interest as geographical novelties. And I am inclined to believe that if the historic material, printed and manuscript, from Coronado down to Escalante, were collected and put into proper form, the Spanish, military, Franciscan, and Jesuit explorers of the deserts now called New Mexico, Arizona, and California, and Utah, would far outshine the English of Virginia and the Pilgrims of Plymouth in bravery, enterprise, daring, and fortitude.⁵

Several years later W. W. H. Davis, an able lawyer who had served as governor of New Mexico for a year, and who had become an enthusiastic student of New Mexico history, published an interesting book entitled *The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico*. His summary account of the reconquest, based only on the fragmentary Santa Fé Archives, which must have been badly jumbled at the time, is unreliable and of practically no value, but as a pioneer venture the effort is deserving of mention. In the 'eighties Charles F. Lummis, the great popularizer of "The Land of Poco Tiempo," and other kindred spirits appeared on the scene. The contributions of these writers to the reconquest bibliography amount to very little, but they represented an enthusiasm that was soon transmitted to better historical investigators.

⁴ James F. Meline, *Two Thousand Miles on Horseback*, New York, 1872, 137.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 138.

The early decades of the United States' occupation also had their dark side. Hundreds of documents were lost or badly damaged by the ravages of time and careless handling. But the greatest tragedy of all was the near destruction of the archives by Governor Pile. This episode is best told in the words of Samuel Ellison, territorial librarian, whose task it was to salvage the remains:

Under the adm. of Wm. A. Pile many of the archives were sold to merchants and grocers for wrapping paper, and only about one-fourth recovered . . . The deed of vandalism was found out the day after it was done, when some of the citizens met and appointed a committee who waited on the gov. and requested him to have the papers returned. Then he sent out the librarian Bond and had them brought back, a cartload of them, and dumped into the back room. Wendell Debus kept ordinary goods, Indian antiquities & pottery. He bought one lot for about \$30, & had the money refunded to him, when he returned most of them, but not all. Others bought smaller portions. The gov. was partly fool and partly knave . . . They were placed in a room loosely and remained there with the chickens roosting on them & the drippings from the house falling on them till Gov. Wallace employed Ellison to gather them up and place them in a room adjoining his parlor.⁶

Pile was not the only early territorial governor of New Mexico who contributed to the diminution of the local archives. A section of Vargas' original journal, formerly a part of the Santa Fé Archives, and translations of other documents from the same source (made by Samuel Ellison), were recently acquired from the estate of William G. Ritch, governor of New Mexico in 1875, by the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, where they now constitute a part of the Ritch Collection.

The first serious study of the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico in the modern period appeared with the publication of H. H. Bancroft's *History of Arizona and New Mexico* in 1889. This account, with its copious notes, served as a starting point for further investigations which were to be carried forward in the United States. Bancroft was not a professional historian, but he was the first to make good use of the local Santa Fé Archives, which constituted his basic

⁶ *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIII (January, 1938), 10-11.

original source. He also relied heavily on Sigüenza y Góngora's pamphlet, the incomplete published Escalante manuscript, and miscellaneous documents from the Mexican archives now in the Bancroft Library, University of California.⁷ Bancroft's sources were indeed fragmentary, but he corrected most of Davis' errors. Later writers such as Prince, Read, and Coan added nothing new. Colonel Ralph E. Twitchell, a soldier and lawyer of an historical bent, by persistent ransacking of the local New Mexico materials expanded on Bancroft, and brought to light some new details; but his sources were essentially the same: the badly damaged and incomplete Santa Fé Archives. Twitchell continued writing on the subject until the 1920's, but he, like Bancroft, was blind to the importance of foreign archives, and from the point of view of scholarship he was living in the age and spirit of his predecessor. These pioneer efforts, which represented the piecing together of a few scattered fragments, lacked the broader documentary basis necessary for a complete presentation and evaluation of the facts involved.

By the second decade of the present century a more scientific and scholarly approach to the problem was ushered in. Professor Herbert E. Bolton, who among twentieth-century professional historians pioneered in the exploration of the Mexican archives, uncovered important reconquest materials there.⁸ Meanwhile, as a result of investigations in the Spanish archives, Otto Maas, O.F.M., in 1929 published a documentary volume entitled *Misiones de Nuevo Méjico*, in which some Vargas documents and the table of contents of the Villagutierre manuscript appeared. Two years later Don José Pérez Balsera, a

⁷ As Bolton has aptly written, "Bancroft was a wizard for collecting in the old book market and in family garrets. But he had one blind spot. The importance of foreign archives seems never to have dawned upon him . . ." Herbert E. Bolton, *Outpost of Empire*, New York, 1931, xiii.

⁸ These are listed in his *Guide to Materials for the History of the United States in the Principal Archives of Mexico*, Washington, D. C., 1913. At the Archivo General in Mexico City, Bolton obtained copies of *Provincias Internas*, tomo 35, and *Historia*, tomos 37-39, typed in triplicate. One set of these transcripts forms a part of the Bolton Collection, in the Bancroft Library; the second set was deposited in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; and the third set was turned over to Professor Charles W. Hackett of the University of Texas.

descendant of Vargas, published privately a family genealogy in which many important documents and rare paintings were reproduced. On the basis of the above documentation the present writer began his study of the subject as a member of Professor Bolton's history seminar, "The Round Table," at the University of California, and wrote an unpublished doctoral dissertation there in 1934 entitled "Don Diego de Vargas and the Reconquest of New Mexico, 1692-1704."⁹

This brings us to the present status of reconquest studies. About twelve years ago films and photographs of the all-important but hitherto unutilized documents in the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, and the Biblioteca Nacional, Mexico City, were obtained by the Library of Congress. More recently the Coronado Library, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, obtained films and photostats of most of these as well as other related documents from Spain and Mexico. Copies of additional hitherto unutilized original records from Spanish and Mexican archives are in the possession of the writer. The mass of documents uncovered during the last dozen years, which constitutes over half of the essential source material, has made possible a number of special studies by the author. Otherwise, with the exception of Lansing B. Bloom's recent article on "The Vargas Encomienda," published in the *New Mexico Historical Review*, much of this material has remained almost entirely unexploited, and hence the need for the present work. In preparing this

⁹ In 1940 a thesis with the identical title, by Jessie B. Bailey, prepared at the University of Southern California, but based for the most part on secondary materials, despite the claims of its author, was privately published. A sort of historical anachronism, it is uncritical, adds nothing new, and continues traditional errors and major omissions which date back to the age of Bancroft. The scholarship of the book is open to especially severe criticism in that numerous passages, most of the legible translations, and even descriptive notes accompanying an otherwise incomplete bibliography, are taken with little or no change of wording from the previously written dissertation mentioned above, which was merely a preliminary study (on file in the University of California library, Berkeley), as well as from several previously published articles by the present writer, all without due acknowledgment. To quote a competent reviewer's comment on Bailey's book, "We regret that we cannot commend this book on Vargas to serious students of Southwestern history," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVIII (June, 1941), 81.

study only original manuscripts, certified copies of the originals, or photographs of them, have been used. Needless to say, the writer has spent many years of residence and travel directly acquainting himself with the geography of the region involved. Some minor details undoubtedly will be further clarified by continued rummaging in the archives of Spain and Mexico, but all of the documentation essential to the story is now known.

In writing this book the author is indebted to many persons: to Professor Herbert E. Bolton, under whose inspiring direction this study was begun some years ago; to the staffs of the Library of Congress, the Coronado Library, the Bancroft Library, the Newberry Library, and the Huntington Library, for many kindnesses; to colleagues who assisted in copying and photographing documents in the archives of Mexico and Spain; to many others for their helpful criticism and encouragement; and, especially, to Fr. Jerome V. Jacobsen, S.J., of the Institute of Jesuit History, Loyola University, Chicago, for invaluable help and guidance.

J. M. E.

Chicago, Ill.

PROLOGUE

Conquest and Crusade. The spirit of Spanish American frontier policy, which had taken on a more or less fixed pattern by the seventeenth century, stemmed from forces which pulsed from the Age of Discovery and the Counter Reformation. When Spain discovered America, Europe, Roman in civilization and Catholic by conviction, was in a highly important sense one. "The crusading spirit governed men's minds and the conversion of the heathen and the infidel was still a duty resting upon the human soul."¹ The crusading spirit was of centuries' old growth on the Iberian peninsula. In 711 the rush of Mohammedanism engulfed Iberia, and pushed Christianity north to the Pyrenees in a widespread conquest. The Christian groups then for seven centuries were slowly reconquering the land, motivated by a staunch crusading zeal. By 1253 Portugal had emerged as a kingdom, and in 1400 had risen to prominence under King John I. She was prepared at length to assume an offensive and to carry the crusade overseas. Portugal set the stage for the extension of conquest and crusade to Africa, India, and America. Of the kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula she was the first to undertake voyages of any distance into the Atlantic. King John and Prince Henry in 1415 took Ceuta, a vital Moorish stronghold across from Gibraltar. Then, as Andrews writes, "a movement was begun which was destined to become continuous and permanent. The popes, Martin V and Eugenius IV, following the precedent set by their great predecessor Urban II, the spiritual promoter of the First Crusade, issued bulls in 1418 and 1436, calling on the sovereigns of Christendom to aid the Portuguese . . . But these entreaties met with no response . . . The Portuguese, seeking religious conquest in northern Africa instead of the Holy Land, united the medieval enthusiasm of the crusader with the secular ambitions of a young monarchy looking for territorial enlargement and opportunity for trade and

¹ Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History*, New Haven, 1934, I, 12.

profit."² Crusading zeal, spirit of conquest, and desire for gold, trade, and knowledge, led Portugal down the coast of Africa and finally to India by 1500.

When Spain embarked on bold overseas ventures, the spirit of conquest and crusade was still strong. The last of the Moorish strongholds on the peninsula had fallen in 1492, and the Cross appeared triumphant over the Crescent. The discovery of a New World at the time when the heroic efforts of Spanish Christians to suppress the Moorish infidel had been crowned with success, appeared to the Spaniards as an act of Divine Providence enjoining upon them the duty of extending the benefits of the true faith. Thus it was natural that the occupation and exploration of America should assume, to a certain extent, the character of a crusade. In the sixteenth century Spain's militant religious spirit was further manifested in the part she played in the Counter Reformation. In America the Spanish crown became the champion of the enlightenment and the protection of the Indians; and through the agency of the Church the heritage of European culture was transmitted to half of the New World and its uncivilized inhabitants.

Spain's action in America was, therefore, not limited to conquest, but was also a work of colonizing and civilizing. In the work of colonization, the aims were settlement and the exploitation of natural resources, carried forward by agriculturists, industrial workers, merchants, and artisans. In the work of civilization, the aims were the Christianization of the aborigines, and the extension, to both the white settler and to the Indian, of the best in culture that Spain possessed, in both of which the various religious orders played the leading rôle. Altamira writes: "The Spanish concept of culture with regard to America was understood in the broad sense, which made it an obligation to extend it to the Indians, who were recognized as free men. For this reason, all means of culture . . . were extended not only to the European colonists (Spaniards and those of other races), as was the general practice of the non-Spanish colonizing nations in America, but also to the in-

² Andrews, I, 6-8.

digenes.”³ Less than twenty years after the conquest of Mexico City, and a century before a printing press was established in New England, catechisms of Christian doctrine for use among the Indians were among the first works that issued from the press in New Spain.

The evolution and application of Spanish frontier administration and Indian policy was the work of three centuries in America. Subsequent to the Spanish occupation of the West Indies, which was the first European frontier in America, the history of the Spanish frontier falls into three major periods: first, the fifty years after the discovery, which were years of conquest, exploration, and experimentation in the application of frontier institutions; secondly, the great seventeenth century: the age of the spread of settlement, the flowering of a great Spanish American civilization, and the establishment of defensive frontiers; and thirdly, the eighteenth century “defensive-offensive,” and the trend toward secularization. Catholic orthodoxy and the crusading spirit continued on the frontiers until the close of the seventeenth century. Under the Bourbons, however, secular interests assumed a more dominant importance, and as the eighteenth century advanced the crusading spirit of the Spanish Crown gradually lapsed on the frontiers. Notable indications of this eighteenth century political and religious trend were the expulsion of the Jesuits and the policy in Spanish Louisiana.⁴

Most of the early writers in English on the extent, purpose, and nature of Spain’s action in America were more preoccupied with the romantic age of the early conquerors and explorers, or with emphasizing wrongs done to the native races,

³ Rafael Altamira, *Manual de historia de España*, Madrid, 1934, 434-435. For a correct statement of the Catholic viewpoint toward the conversion of uncivilized peoples, see Jerome V. Jacobsen, S.J., *Educational Foundations of the Jesuits in Sixteenth Century New Spain*, Berkeley, 1938, 70-71.

⁴ We are speaking here of general trends which were governed by many conflicting political, economic, and intellectual forces. The missions, of course, continued to play an important rôle on the Spanish frontiers. Contemporaneous with the developments in eighteenth century Louisiana, for example, and also on the northern frontier of New Spain, was the Franciscan advance into upper California. This phase of mission history is well treated in P. J. López Alijarde, “Carlos III de España y las misiones,” *Bibliotheca Hispana Missio-num*, I, Barcelona, 1930, 95-130.

than in searching for tangible results. They attempted to interpret Spanish American colonial history on the basis of the first fifty years, for the relatively meager source material which they had at hand dealt primarily with that period. Spanish American colonial policy was presented either in the spirit of Gage, or as depicted by Las Casas in his highly exaggerated *Brevisima Relación*, which deals with the early experimental period before Spain had fully evolved a policy, and when all of Spanish America was as yet a raw frontier. As MacLeod points out, "The *Brevisima Relación* . . . is the story of horrors which rank in the history of human cruelty with the story of the equally brutal massacres committed by the Dutch in New Amsterdam and the Puritans in New England or with the story of the massacres of Indians by the memorable 'forty-niners' of California. It makes the hair stand on end. . ."⁵

Through the Laws of the Indies, historians have long been familiar with the underlying policy of the Spanish Crown in America; but the basis for a serious investigation and comparative study of the application of that policy throughout the entire colonial period for the most part lay hidden in foreign archives until the twentieth century. A number of excellent studies have appeared in recent years, but much spade work remains to be done.

It is true, of course, that Spanish colonial development cannot be fully understood without viewing it within the imperial pattern; but it is also true that a knowledge of the independent development of the colonies themselves is equally important. Only in this light can one fully appreciate the reasons for the vitality of the Hispanic culture which not only survived Spain's darkest days, but is alive today in half the Western Hemisphere, including several independent republics which are almost entirely native Indian in population, and including, also, a part of our own Southwest.

⁵ William C. MacLeod, *The American Indian Frontier*, New York, 1928, 343. An objective evaluation of Las Casas, whose belated popularity outside of Spain was not based on altruistic motives, but was propagandistic in character, may be found in L. B. Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain*, Berkeley, 1929, Introduction. The best recent analysis of the *encomienda* system in the Spanish colonies is Silvio A. Zavala, *La Encomienda Indiana*, Madrid, 1935.

The conquest and founding, and the reconquest and re-founding of New Mexico, in the first and last decades of the seventeenth century, are chapters in the history of Spanish American frontier administration and Indian policy. They are also phases of a Christian crusading spirit that was old in Spain before New Mexico was occupied.

New Mexico: Discovery and Settlement. After Cortés and Pizarro conquered the glamorous Aztec and Inca Empires, adventurous Spaniards hastened in search of "another Peru," and "another Mexico." It was in this generation that New Mexico came into history. Cabeza de Vaca, and later Friar Marcos, paved the way with stories which led to believe that to the north lay a land of seven cities named Cibola, rich in wealth and with many souls to be saved. With high hopes, the viceroy of New Spain sent Coronado in search of Cibola. He blazed new trails over a wide area of the Spanish Southwest. But his heroic marches were in vain, and he returned to Mexico empty handed, disillusioned, and discredited. The extravagant tales of great cities in the north were blasted, and the adventurers settled back on the established frontiers, or turned to new fields to conquer. After Coronado, New Mexico was unvisited for four decades.⁶

Meanwhile, rich mines, settled Indians to convert, new opportunities for farmers and ranchers, and Indian trade were attractive forces which pulled the frontier of settlement northward. The founding of new colonies was largely the work of enterprising frontier captains who undertook the "pacification" of certain regions by virtue of special contracts with the Crown. These men bore variously the titles of *adelantado*, and governor and captain general. They were men of means who bore most of the expense of taming and peopling the wilderness in return for extensive semi-feudal powers. This was true on the frontiers until the end of the sixteenth century. Thus the provinces of New Galicia and New Vizcaya were

⁶ Recent lists of published Coronado material may be found in Arthur S. Aiton, "Coronado's First Report on the Government of New Galicia," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, XIX (August, 1939), 306, note 1; and George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey, *Narratives of the Coronado Expedition*, Coronado Historical Series, I, Albuquerque, 1940, *passim*.


founded. By 1580 the northern frontier of settlement of New Spain had reached the head of the Conchos River, and from then on expeditions farther to the north became more frequent. Toward the close of the century the search for souls to save and mines to be exploited brought on a cycle of renewed activity. New reports of rich mines stirred up an enthusiasm on the northern frontier much like that which preceded the Coronado expedition.

All the while the rest of Europe was watching with envious eyes the rich Spanish harvest in America. Every Spanish frontier in America became a danger point. The colonization of New Mexico was only partially defensive in origin; but it was foreign danger which finally nerved Spain to take the deep plunge into the distant wilderness, for Queen Elizabeth of England was casting an envious eye on this vast and little-known region. This, combined with new flights of fancy encouraged by time and distance, and the fact that in the upper Río Grande lived sedentary Indians to convert and exploit, caused the frontier of settlement to leap eight hundred miles into the wilderness, from southern Chihuahua to the upper Río Grande.

In 1595 Juan de Oñate was awarded a royal contract for the conquest and settlement of New Mexico, and in 1598 he set out for the north with a large colonizing expedition, including one hundred and thirty soldier-settlers, most of them accompanied by their families, a band of Franciscan friars, and seven thousand head of stock. Setting up temporary headquarters at San Gabriel, in the heart of the Pueblo Indian country, Spanish sovereignty was established in what became "the kingdom and provinces of New Mexico," the boundless area extending from the Colorado River eastward to the Great Plains, and from the northern frontier of the province of New Vizcaya northward to the "Strait of Anián."

Oñate, hearkening to perennial tales of wealth "más allá," spent much of his time looking for mines, while the colony languished, and although he did not find much he perpetuated and complicated the vagaries of the northern mystery. A tradition purporting the existence of rich mines in the interior was by now well established. Out of a confused notion of these and other accounts evolved such legends as those of

The
NORTHERN FRONTIER
of NEW SPAIN
in the
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY



Sierra Azul and Gran Teguayo, which were to persist for several centuries in the lore of the frontier. All of these legends represented a populous land, ripe in wealth and ripe for Christianization, which continued to be rarely visited and hence ever clothed in mystery. In the heart of this land of mystery, a lusty Spanish colony had been planted.⁷

The Pueblo Indians. New Mexico, the home of the Pueblo Indians, in ancient times teemed with people. In 1540 Castañeda, chronicler of the Coronado expedition, listed seventy-one inhabited pueblos: fifty-seven in the Río Grande basin, seven in Zuñi, and seven in Moqui (Hopi). The area of the sedentary Pueblos in Oñate's time was in the form of a cross, extending from Taos in the north to the region of the Piro pueblos in the Saline province, and from Moqui in the west to the eastern Piro pueblos in the Saline province. The Pueblo Indians were surrounded by the warlike, incorrigible Apaches, who lived on rapine and plunder, and who were the scourge of the Pueblos as well as of the Spaniards, except during the trading season.

At the time of the coming of the Spaniards, the material culture, political organization, and nature worship of the Pueblo Indians were those of the Stone Age. They lived in large communal dwellings, frequently from three to seven stories high, built of adobe mortar and stone, with walls several feet thick, and roofs reinforced with heavy beams. The present pueblo of Taos, with its two five-story communal village-houses, is the best existing example of their abodes. Some of these dwellings had as many as six hundred apartments, and could easily accommodate one thousand or more persons. Often there were three or more such buildings so arranged as to leave one or two squares or open courts between them, in the center of which were underground *estufas*, or kivas, the religious and social meeting place of the tribe.

Each pueblo, or village, constituted an independent communal unit, in which the clan was the basis of the social struc-

⁷ For the story of the founding of New Mexico see George P. Hammond, *Don Juan de Oñate and the Founding of New Mexico*, Santa Fé, 1927, and Gilberto Espinosa, trans., *History of New Mexico by Gaspar de Villagrà, Alcalá, 1610*, Quivira Society, IV, Los Angeles, 1933.

ture. A clan comprised all the descendants of a traditional maternal ancestor. Each independent pueblo was ruled by a cacique, who combined both religious and civil authority, a council of elders, a public crier who announced the religious and civil functions, and captains of war and the chase. The natives dressed in animal skins and blankets. They were a sober and hardy race. They did not practice cannibalism, as did some of the native American tribes. The Pueblo Indians planted maize, squashes, melons, and cotton. The women made pottery, and the men wove blankets, which they used for their own household needs and which they exchanged with the Apaches for buffalo meat, buffalo skins, and other pelts.⁸

The Golden Age of the Franciscan Missions. As was the case in the outlying pagan lands throughout all of Spanish America, the mission was chosen as the effective instrument of culture on the New Mexican frontier. Men of the Cross, aided by the strong arm of zealous frontier captains, who were indeed scarce on the New Mexico frontier, were the crusaders of the Rio Grande.

The first decade of the seventeenth century was for New Mexico a period during which the newly established Spanish settlements and missions were on trial. Oñate appeared to be primarily in quest of mines, and the missionaries and colonists complained that their interests were being neglected. Indeed, the viceregal government and the Council of the Indies discussed the advisability of abandoning the province. But during the winter of 1608-1609, Franciscan missionaries arrived in Mexico City with happier news: at last missions had been established among the Tewa pueblos, work was progressing in other villages, and several thousand converts were reported. In 1609 the government of the province, and full responsibility

⁸ The most useful general works on the New Mexican Indians are: Adolf F. A. Bandelier, "Final Report of Investigations among the Indians of the Southwestern United States, carried on mainly in the years from 1880 to 1885," *Papers of the Archaeological Institute of America, American Series*, III, IV, Cambridge, 1890-1892; F. W. Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 30, parts I-II, Washington, D. C., 1907-1910; A. V. Kidder, *An Introduction to the History of Southwestern Archaeology*, Andover, 1924; Edgar L. Hewitt, *Ancient Life in the American Southwest*, New York, 1930; Elsie Clews Parsons, *Pueblo Indian Religion*, 2 vols., Chicago, 1939.

for the support of the missions, were taken over by the Crown. The reports concerning the success of the missions probably saved the province from total abandonment, and henceforth the mission phase of New Mexican life was the most significant.⁹

Bolton has brilliantly described the mission system as it was applied on the New Mexico frontier. From the standpoint of the Church the principal work of the missionaries was to spread the Faith. However, the missions were also agencies of the State, and were supported by the State to serve its purposes. As viewed by the government, the work of the missionaries was to assist in extending, holding, Christianizing, and civilizing the frontiers. But the Spanish policy looked to the civilizing of the Indian as well as to the holding of the frontier, and "since Christianity was the basic element of European civilization, and since it was the acknowledged duty of the State to extend the Faith," it saw in the mission the best possible agency for bringing this about.

The central feature of every successful Spanish mission was the Indian pueblo, or village. If he were to be disciplined, the Indian must be kept in a definite spot where the discipline could be imposed upon him. The settled Indians, such as the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, could be instructed in their native towns, but the wandering or scattered tribes must be assembled and established in pueblos, and kept there by force if necessary. To make the Indians self-supporting as soon as possible, and to afford them the means of discipline, the missions were provided with communal lands for gardens, farms, and ranches, and with workshops in which to practice the crafts . . . Religious instruction and industrial training were imparted by a definite routine of tasks, prescribed by the superior authorities but administered with much practical sense and regard for local circumstances. To aid the missionaries in keeping good order, and, indeed, to give the Indians training in civil life, the mission villages were organized into communities with limited self-government, modelled in form on the Spanish town, but closely supervised, of course, by the Spaniards."¹⁰

⁹ France V. Scholes, "The Supply Service of the New Mexican Missions in the Seventeenth Century," *New Mexico Historical Review*, V (October, 1930), 83; *Idem*, *Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650*, Albuquerque, 1937, 28.

¹⁰ Herbert E. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, Berkeley, 1915, 10-12. See also "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," in *Idem*, *Wider Horizons of American History*, New York, 1939, 107-148.

The success of the New Mexico missions was assured when Fray Alonso Peinado arrived with eight additional missionaries and supplies in 1609-1610. A convent and church were built at Santa Fé, and missionary activity soon took in the Keres pueblos (especially Santo Domingo, which became the ecclesiastical capital of the province), the Tanos, and the Río Grande Tiwas. The missionaries were enthusiastic over the increasing inclination of the natives toward conversion and their abandonment of superstition and idolatry. Some time between 1617-1623, New Mexico was organized into a Franciscan Custodia.¹¹ In 1625 Fray Alonso de Benavides arrived with twenty-six new missionaries. In 1628 Fray Estévan de Perea brought thirty more missionaries to extend the work of conversion. From their humble convents the Franciscan friars went forth virtually scouring the region for souls. While Fray Estévan de Perea was establishing missions in Ácoma, Zuñi, and Moqui, Benavides was establishing his "tenth and last" convent and mission in Santa Clara, and was winning the friendship of the Navaho Apaches. Benavides was soon to leave New Mexico never to return, an event which evoked the following comment from a recent historian: "Perhaps it is idle speculation, but how different later history might have been had Benavides been permitted to follow up his missionary efforts with the various Apache tribes which hemmed New Mexico in on all sides! He might have become 'the apostle to the Apaches'."¹²

The famed incident of the *Lady in Blue* revealed the faith of the frontier and led the New Mexico missionaries to Texas. A large number of pagan Indians of a tribe never before seen by the missionaries of New Mexico arrived in 1629 at Isleta, on the upper Río Grande, asking for missionaries to baptize them and instruct them in the gospel. They reported that many days past a woman was in their "kingdom" of Texas preaching

¹¹ In the Franciscan organization a custodia is a small province. The Custodia of the Conversion of San Pablo, in New Mexico, was under the jurisdiction of the Province of Santo Evangelio in Mexico. See France V. Scholes, "Problems in the Early Ecclesiastical History of New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, VII (January, 1932), 32-74; Lansing B. Bloom, "Fray Estévan de Perea's *Relación*," *ibid.*, VIII (July, 1933), 214.

¹² Bloom, "Fray Estévan de Perea's *Relación*," 222.

to them the teachings of Christ, and that she had told them to seek missionaries. Indeed, the natives were well versed in the teachings of the Faith. When the astonished friars asked the Indians to describe this woman, they had difficulty because they had never seen anyone else like her, but finally conveyed a general idea of her appearance. Several missionaries accompanied these natives, who were Jumanos, to their lands in western Texas, where they were well received and where thousands were baptized. The work of evangelization was carried forward with such remarkable success that Benavides was anxious to learn who this woman was who had miraculously prepared the way. A contemporary investigation identified her with the well known Spanish mystic Mother María de Jesús de Ágreda. Benavides made a special trip to Spain to visit her, and learned from her own lips how the miracle was performed. As she herself related, through frequent conversations with God she came to know all about the remote tribes of New Mexico and adjacent regions, and while in ecstasy she was carried in spirit or corporally to their lands, where she saw the natives, preached to them, and won many to the Faith. She said that she had beheld the Franciscans who were working in New Mexico, and had told the Indians to visit them and ask for missionaries. She had made over five hundred "flights" to these lands between the years 1621 and 1631. Before returning to America Benavides had the venerable lady write a letter of exhortation to the missionaries. It was later read to them, and it served as an incentive to fire their zeal and spur their activity. The memory of the *Lady in Blue* lingered for years on the whole northern frontier.¹³

In the 1630's there were fifty missionaries ministering to over 60,000 Christianized natives in more than ninety pueblos, not counting the conversions of Texas and other outlying regions. Had it not been for the epidemics of smallpox, and other diseases, the number would have been even greater. There were between twenty-five and thirty convents and missions in the custodia. Each mission and *visita* had its church or chapel,

¹³ Villagutierre, MS., fols. 250-259, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid. See also Carlos E. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas*, Austin, 1936, I, 195-203, and footnote citations.

in many of which services were accompanied by well trained choirs and organ music. At each mission there were a school and workshops, where the neophytes were taught Christian doctrine, reading, writing, music, and the manual arts. The mission was a well ordered community. The toll of the mission bell called the people to their various tasks and duties, religious celebrations and festivities. The natives were taught to live as civilized beings on a Utopian or idealized Christian European pattern, while at the same time their century-old attachment to the local native environment was respected. Where formerly there were only *estufas* of idolatry there were now Christian temples.¹⁴

So successful were the New Mexico missions that in 1637 a viceregal investigation was held to discuss the advisability of elevating New Mexico to a bishopric. Great progress, indeed, had been made. But the friars objected on economic grounds. This brings us to the character of the military defense of these frontier missions.

The New Mexico Indians, as vassals of the Crown, paid the *encomenderos*, to whom they were entrusted in *encomienda*, one fanega of maize and a cotton blanket six palms square per household annually. In return the *encomenderos* were obliged to give military protection to the Pueblos and the missionaries, especially on the frontiers where there was constant danger of attack by the Apaches. These soldier-*encomenderos* received no salary other than the tax obtained annually from their *encomiendas*. Thus, the missionaries pointed out, the natives were paying a tax equal to ten *reales*, which they considered no small amount among a people newly reduced to civilized life, whose only prosperity lay in what little maize they gathered for food, cotton to clothe themselves, and a few buffalo robes obtained in trade. They argued that it would not be well to burden the natives with additional tribute, unless the Crown should deign to abolish the self-sufficient *encomienda* system and assume the financial support of the military defense of the missions. Besides it would place the missionaries in the position of tax-gatherers, and the fickle

¹⁴ Alonso de Benavides, *Memorial*, trans. by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer, Chicago, 1916; Villagutierre, MS., fols. 259-260.

Indians already had shown much displeasure toward the *encomendero* tax-gatherers. If a bishopric were established the natives would be subject to the tithes as members of parishes. Now tithes were paid by the Spaniards of the colony to the custodian of the missions in the form of produce, which was used to support the mission establishments in sterile regions, and to help the poor in Santa Fé and surrounding settlements. The Indians were exempt by royal *cédula* from paying tithes on native products, but such payment was required for products introduced from Spain. This payment, made in labor on Spanish haciendas and missions, consisted in cultivating fields and tending cattle. Therefore the friars felt that the establishment of a bishopric was undesirable, and also unnecessary. The Franciscan prelate in New Mexico, with full papal authority, had semi-episcopal power to absolve and grant dispensation, and to administer the sacraments except confirmation and orders. Besides, a new ecclesiastical authority would cause the fickle Indians to lose confidence in the missionaries, for they would see in it a divided religious authority. As a result of these considerations the matter of the bishopric was permanently dropped, and no changes were made in the administration of the Pueblo Indians.¹⁵

The spiritual welfare of the natives was the dominant interest of the Spanish Crown in New Mexico in the seventeenth century. As Scholes writes, "the total cost of the missions must have been more than one million pesos" between 1609 and 1680. He adds:

The cost of the missions, as a charge on the treasury of New Spain, was much larger than that of the civil and military government of New Mexico during the same period, although it should be noted that the cost of military defense in New Mexico was largely taken care of by the use of the *encomienda*. That the Crown was willing to assume a considerable expense, especially for a province which returned little, if anything, to the treasury, is an excellent example of the effectiveness of the religious motive in Spanish colonial enterprise.¹⁶

¹⁵ Villagutierre, MS., fols. 260-266; Charles W. Hackett, trans. and ed., *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773*, Washington, D. C., 1937, III, 89-127.

¹⁶ Scholes, "Supply Service of the New Mexican Missions," 114.

Missionary success in the seventeenth century was also paid for with the blood of forty-nine martyrs. The work was not easy; mortality was high among these Franciscan pioneers, and bands of "replacements" had to be sent frequently to fill up their depleted ranks. The Franciscan missionary band in New Mexico usually numbered between thirty and fifty in the middle seventeenth century.

*Civil Government and Society.*¹⁷ The administration of the province, after Oñate's time, was based on general Spanish colonial legislation. The governor and captain general held virtually absolute authority in civil and military matters. He was subordinate to the viceregal government of New Spain, which in turn was subject to the Council of the Indies and to the king. His official term of office averaged three years. The *cabildo*, or municipal government, of Santa Fé, was the spokesman for the community, and served the governor in an advisory capacity. The local military force was composed of the soldier-citizens mentioned above, whose number was set at thirty-five, although other colonists were liable to such service. *Alcaldes mayores* administered limited police and judicial powers in the lesser administrative jurisdictions of the province.

The civil authorities were under obligation to cooperate with the missionary program in the spread of Christianity and in the stamping out of native ceremonialism; but certain of the governors were habitually negligent in this respect and, as on all frontiers, were often at odds with the local ecclesiastical authorities. The great distance between Mexico City and Santa Fé, some 1,500 miles, led to the persistence of many evils which might otherwise have been remedied. Despite Spain's humane Indian laws, many of the governors, instead of protecting the native royal subjects, as was their obligation, exploited them for their own profit.

During the seventeenth century the non-aboriginal population, made up of Spaniards, creoles, half-castes, and Mexican Indians, never exceeded some three thousand. The colony was small because there was little to attract colonists; agricultural

¹⁷ For a fuller discussion of this subject see France V. Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 71-111.

resources were limited, trade was small-scale barter, and rich minerals were not exploited. Local trade between the *estancieros* and the Indians was limited to an exchange of agricultural products, or the purchase of slaves and cattle, horses and other livestock. As the population slowly increased, new hamlets were formed and more farms were occupied at points where water, land, and labor were available. The most important rural areas were the valleys north of Santa Fé, in the vicinity of Santa Cruz de la Cañada, and the Río Grande valley between Santo Domingo and the Piro district. The economic life of the province was based on agriculture, stock raising, and primitive commerce.

The mission was closely bound up with the economic as well as with nearly every other phase of life in the colony. In the seventeenth century, the largest herds were owned by the mission fathers and were tended by Pueblo herdsmen. The *estancieros* liked to be near the missions in order to have a supply of Indian labor near at hand. This often resulted in bitter controversy between the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, for often the *estancieros* encroached on the communal holdings of the pueblos. The periodic supply trains from Mexico, the primary purpose of which was to supply the missions, became more and more important as the missions grew, and were an economic link between the New Mexico frontier and New Spain that was not without general economic significance.

The most important center of non-aboriginal population was the Villa of Santa Fé, which had been established as the capital of the province in 1610. Its population prior to 1680 was never more than a few hundred. "Santa Fé was a sprawling town like hundreds of others on the frontier,"¹⁸ yet whatever of elegance and luxury many citizens knew was found in the life of the villa. The governor, the clergy, and the professional *encomendero*-soldiers were the leaders in Santa Fé. Many of these soldier-citizens had *estancias* in the country, where they supplemented their *encomienda* revenues by agriculture and stock-raising. In addition to these citizens and their families, there were artisans, floaters who came and went

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 101-102.

with the mission supply caravans, a few mining prospectors, and many house servants, slaves, and Indians. Santa Fé was a cross section of the entire community. As for formal culture:

The friars were the one really learned class in the community, and in private conversations with these men and in the sermons which they preached, the people heard the best standards of speech in the province. A friar was usually a welcome visitor in the home, for he, like the governor, had seen other places and other lands. Some of them brought the solace of medical skill and knowledge . . .¹⁹

Troublous Times. In the middle seventeenth century, conflict between the missionaries and the secular authorities was the basis of the political history of the province. As we have seen, no rich mines or other resources were found in New Mexico, and as a result, in the eyes of the viceregal government and the Crown, the province became primarily a mission field. The conflict stemmed from the firm stand the missionaries took as defenders of the Indians against abuse and oppression, and as active critics of arbitrary government; and from problems which arose over ecclesiastical rights bestowed by the Pope, but which local civil authorities contested. The Inquisition, established in New Mexico in 1626, was an additional factor in political life. During the years 1639-1641, the political strife, unprecedented for its violence and persistency in any other frontier province of New Spain, nearly resulted in civil war. Scholes writes: "From 1659 to 1664 it caused such factional bitterness that the colony never fully recovered, and the events of these years were a factor in the general decline of the province prior to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680."²⁰

Spain Loses New Mexico. The New Mexico pueblos which had the most direct contact with Spanish culture were those with resident missionaries, and those immediately surrounding Santa Fé, where most of the Spanish settlements were located.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

²⁰ Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650," *passim*; *Idem*, "Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XII (January and October, 1937), 134-174, 380-452; XIII (January, 1938), 63-84; XV (July and October, 1940), 249-268, 369-417; XVI (January, April, July, 1941), 15-40, 184-205, 313-327.

The Pueblo Indians were soon speaking the language of their conquerors, and they absorbed much of what Europe, through the medium of Spain, had to teach them in industry, luxury, the art of war, and saner standards of living. But their "spiritual conquest" was not what it appeared to be, for now their most important pagan ceremonies were performed in their underground *estufas*, although in greater secrecy.

As a rule the Indians were easily controlled, and they paid tribute in maize and cotton, but there was growing discontent. The constant friction between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, combined with the horrible example set by many of the Spanish governors, had an evil effect on the efficiency of the provincial administration, and thereby added fuel to the flames of unrest. To express their resentment against existing conditions, the natives often gathered around their council fires and plotted how they might throw off the yoke of Spanish domination. Between 1645 and 1675 there were several attempts at armed rebellion, all of which were suppressed. Drouth and famine added to the general unrest. To make matters worse, the supply caravans were being administered inefficiently. The Pueblos grew more and more restless day by day. The influence of the Indian medicine-men increased, and the danger of revolt became greater and more menacing. Meanwhile, the Apaches intensified their guerrilla warfare. They made devastating raids on the Pueblo villages, and in the late 1660's these raids became still more frequent. The general condition of drouth urged the Apaches to even greater boldness. The three sections of the Pueblo area that suffered most were the Zuñi villages, the Tompiro or Saline villages, and the Piro towns on the lower Río Grande.²¹

In 1676 a real crisis was seen to be near, and help had to be sought in Mexico City. Supplies were sent, but they reached the frontier too late to be of aid. In the late summer of 1680, a revolt had been successfully put into operation. The belief that the Spaniards could be driven out of the country, prompted by the almost universal desire to return to their ancient religious customs, practices which the friars worked

²¹ Scholes, "Supply Service of the New Mexican Missions," 400-401.

zealously to stamp out by penance and punishment, accompanied by political vicissitudes, and economic exploitation under the *encomienda* system, combined to make the revolt of the Indians a general one. At this time there were approximately 2,800 Spanish people in New Mexico, living chiefly on the Río Grande and its tributaries in the region between Isleta and Taos. There were thirty-two Franciscans distributed throughout the province, ministering to some 35,000 Christianized natives.

The revolt did not take Governor Otermín entirely by surprise, but it had been well planned, and the Spaniards were greatly outnumbered. Most of the settlers took refuge at Santa Fé and Isleta. Those who were taken by surprise in the outlying settlements were massacred. Unable to cope with the problem, Otermín decided to abandon the province. In the uprising 400 persons, including twenty-one Franciscan friars, had been mercilessly slaughtered, and the Pueblo region was lost to Spain and to Christianity.²² The indecent manner in which the missionaries were murdered gave evidence of the contempt which many of the Indians had toward the Christian religion and the degree of paganism into which they had relapsed. At Jémez, for instance, the natives entered the room of Father Juan de Jesús in the night, seized him, stripped him of his garments, and in the light of burning candles they forced him to ride a pig through the cemetery, in the course of which he was beaten cruelly amid scoffing and ridicule. They then removed him from the pig, made him get down on his hands and knees, and took turns riding on his back, beating him mercilessly to prod him on. The missionary is reported to have told them, "Do with me as you wish, for this pleasure of yours will not last more than ten years, and after that you will consume yourselves in wars." This made them more furious, and they soon clubbed him to death. His body was finally thrown into the woods to the rear of the pueblo. The

²² The best accounts of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 are Charles W. Hackett's studies: *The Uprising of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico*, 1680-1682, Ph.D. dissertation, MS., University of California, Berkeley, 1917; "The Revolt of the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico in 1680," *The Quarterly* of the Texas State Historical Association, XV (October, 1911), 93-147; *The Pueblo Revolt of 1680*, Coronado Historical Series VIII-IX, Albuquerque, (in preparation).

Ácomas seized Fathers Juan Val and Lucas Maldonado, and subjected them to even more repellent treatment. Father Agustín de Santa María, of the Moqui pueblo of Oraibi, was waylaid near Zuñi. Seeing himself about to be overpowered, he dismounted from the horse he was riding, and kneeling upon the ground, his hands clasped in prayer, he prepared himself for death. The Indians brutally clubbed him to death, pierced his body with lances, and left his mangled corpse on the roadside.²³ It was much the same at all the missions. The clubbing, stoning, and lancing of the friars is a tale of horror, but yet a glorious page in the annals of the Franciscans.

Establishment of the Survivors in El Paso. The fugitives from New Mexico, many of whom had lost everything in the uprising, started life anew in the El Paso district. Many deserted for safer climes to the south, and when Otermín took muster after he had gotten almost to the site of the present El Paso, Texas, he counted 1,946 persons, including soldiers, servants, women, children, and Indian allies. Despite initial hardships, as well as the fact that the occupation of El Paso was only a temporary measure, through the untiring efforts of Father Ayeta the settlements soon assumed a fair degree of safety and permanency. These were, in reality, the first permanent beginnings of Spanish settlement in the region in any considerable numbers. For the accommodation of the some 370 Indian allies who had withdrawn from New Mexico with the Spaniards, the new pueblos of Senecú, Socorro, and Isleta, near the modern El Paso, were founded.²⁴

With the passing of the upper Río Grande occupation, El

²³ Testimony of the captive Bartolomé, El Paso, 1689, in Escalante's "Noticias," Biblioteca Nacional, Mexico City, hereinafter cited as B.N.M., legajo 3. Bartolomé had fought with great valor against the Spaniards during Cruzate's attack on Sia in 1689. Fearing death from wounds he gave himself up to the Spaniards, from whom he sought a priest to hear his confession. He lived, however, and thereafter became a loyal Christian. He is described as very intelligent, being able to speak, read, and write Spanish well, and as having a strain of Spanish blood. *Ibid.* This undoubtedly was Bartolomé de Ojeda, later Indian governor of Sia.

²⁴ The various settlements in the El Paso district were at this time on the south bank of the Río Grande, that is, in the present Mexican state of Chihuahua. Old El Paso, of course, was also located on the Mexican side of the river, where the town of Juárez now stands. It did not occupy its present site in Texas.

Paso assumed real importance as an outpost of frontier defense. The previously discussed plan of establishing a presidio at El Paso now became a reality. In 1683, a garrison of fifty soldiers was stationed there. El Paso also became the temporary capital of New Mexico and the headquarters for the *cabildo* of Santa Fé. One of the most important events during these dark days in the struggling settlements was the Mendoza-López expedition, which resulted in the establishment of mission beginnings among the Jumano Indians at distant La Junta, and the exploration of more than five hundred miles of western Texas. Harassed by Indian wars and troubled by a change of fortune in the failure of their crops, the citizens of the district continually petitioned to leave El Paso. Many left, some going as far as Mexico City. By 1684 the population of the region had dwindled to a total of 1,030. However, the El Paso settlements survived, and at the most critical period in the early history of New Mexico they became the bulwark of the New Mexican exiles, the safeguard of the frontier settlements of New Vizcaya, and made it possible eventually for Spanish arms to reconquer the lost province.²⁵

The Interlude of Pueblo Indian Independence. During the twelve years that the Indians held New Mexico as their own, nearly every vestige of Spanish influence was stamped out. At the time of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 the rebellious Indian leaders ordered the destruction of everything that smacked of Christianity and European civilization. Houses of the Spanish settlers were robbed and burned down, horses and cattle of the fields were confiscated. The mission churches, chapels, and living quarters of the missionaries were burned or demolished without exception. The charred frame of the church at Isleta was converted into a corral.²⁶ Sacred vessels, images, and

²⁵ See Anne E. Hughes, "The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement in the El Paso District," University of California Publications in History, I, Berkeley, 1914, 295-392, and Charles W. Hackett, "The Retreat of the Spaniards from New Mexico in 1680, and the Beginnings of El Paso," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XVI (October, 1912, January, 1913), 137-168, 259-276.

²⁶ Escalante's "Noticias"; *Autos* drawn up at the instance of Father Ayeta concerning the Pueblo revolt of 1680, n. p., n. d., Archivo General de Indias, Seville, hereinafter cited as A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139.

ornaments were in every way completely and foully desecrated. Church bells were destroyed or buried. Only a few articles secretly hidden by faithful Indians were saved. The official archives at Santa Fé were looted, and the records were piled up in the public square and burned. Those who had taken wives in Christian marriage were ordered to cast them off and live with others of their choosing. The names of God and Mary must never be mentioned. All crosses and rosaries were ordered destroyed. Names received in Christian baptism were ordered removed, and to cleanse themselves completely from Catholic baptism and confirmation the natives were ordered to bathe in the rivers with *amole* root. Those who dared to remain openly faithful to the religious teachings of the Spanish missionaries were punished by death.²⁷

Immediately following the withdrawal of the Spaniards, Popé, the principal leader of the revolt, made a tour of inspection. He was accompanied by the Taos leader Jaca, Don Luis Tupatú of Picuríes,²⁸ the Keres leader Alonso Catiti, and other lieutenants. Religious articles from the churches were distributed as booty. Then, at the pueblo of Santa Ana, a large feast was held, at which viands of the type the priests and governors were accustomed to eat were served on a long table in the Spanish manner. Popé took his place at the head of the table, with Catiti at the other end and the rest seated around. Two chalices were brought to Popé and Catiti, and both began to drink toasts ridiculing the Spaniards and scoffing at the Christian religion. Popé lifted his chalice and, as though addressing the Father Custodian, he said to Catiti, "To your health, your Paternal Reverence!" And the other answered, "The same to your lordship, Sir governor!"²⁹

New *estufas* were built, ceremonial masks and paraphernalia were made and again used in pagan religious dances in the open, and pagan rites were again freely performed in the pueblos. In the plaza of each pueblo was set up a stone en-

²⁷ *Autos* drawn up at the instance of Father Ayeta.

²⁸ The Picuríes chieftain referred to as Don Luis el Picurí in the documents of the Vargas period.

²⁹ Fray Silvestre Vélez de Escalante's *Carta*, Santa Fé, April 2, 1778, B.N.M., legajo 3. This letter has been published many times both in Spanish and English.

closure where ground maize, feathers, seeds, tobacco, and other objects were offered up for rain and other desired benefits.

Their independence achieved, the natives began to wage war among themselves. The Keres, Taos, and Pecos fought against the Tewas and Tanos, and these deposed Popé because of his despotic rule and the heavy tribute demanded of them on his frequent tours of inspection. In his place Don Luis Tupatú was elected. The latter governed the Tewas and Tanos until the year 1688, when Popé again was chosen. This second election was conducted only by the Tewas and Picuríes, and they alone rendered obedience to him. He died soon after, and Don Luis was chosen for a second time. Meanwhile, Catiti, the Keres chief, had also died, and thereafter each Keres pueblo governed itself independently.

According to information obtained by Cruzate in 1689, the Keres of Sia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, Cochití, and Santo Domingo, along with the Jémez, Taos, and Pecos, were constantly at war with the Tewas and Picuríes. Those of Ácoma were divided, some residing on the Rock, others having gone to Laguna, where they established themselves with some natives from Sia and Santa Ana. The faction at Laguna was continually at war with the natives of Sia and those of Ácoma who had remained on the Rock. The natives of Zuñi and Moqui were also enemies. Taking advantage of the civil strife, the marauding Apaches and Utes increased the violence of their incursions. The Apaches were friendly with some of the pueblos, but the Utes were at war with them all, and were especially hostile toward the Taos, Picuríes, Tewas, and Jémez. The Piros and Tiwas who had remained in New Mexico (many having withdrawn to El Paso in 1680) were accused of being friends of the Spaniards and were so cruelly persecuted by the Keres and Jémez that only a few dispersed tribesmen survived. Frequent famine and pestilence added to the general turbulence and disunity that existed in New Mexico during the twelve years of Pueblo Indian independence.³⁰

To reconquer the province of New Mexico from apostasy and paganism was a challenge to Spain's Christian spirit. It

³⁰ Escalante's *Carta*; testimony of the Indian captive Bartolomé, El Paso, 1689, in Escalante's "Noticias."

was a challenge Spaniards had been facing with crusading zeal for centuries. Spain herself had been lost to the Moorish infidel, and reconquered in a seven hundred years' struggle in which the Spanish spirit had been forged and from which the Spanish nation had emerged. After discovering the New World, "which revealed to Christendom millions of human beings without the means of salvation according to the Christian plan," Spain gained her first important victory on the mainland of North America under similar circumstances. Cortés conquered the capital of the pagan Aztec Empire, only to be driven out on the *Noche Triste*. But undaunted, and under the protection of Our Lady of the Conquest, he had reconquered Mexico. Temples smoking with human sacrifice and dripping with blood of victims were replaced by Christian churches. The reconquest of the villa of Santa Fé (the city of the Holy Faith), and of New Mexico, is one of the closing pages in that same magnificent chapter of Spanish history.

CHAPTER I

VARGAS, THE RECONQUEROR

Don Diego de Vargas was the hero of the reconquest. Through his exploits in New Mexico, he was destined to become one of the most able, and at the same time one of the most colorful, frontier captains of seventeenth century Spanish America. "This Fernando Cortés of these times," he was referred to with admiration by Fray Salvador de San Antonio, one of his contemporaries on the northern frontier.¹ Indeed, on a number of counts Vargas, the reconqueror of New Mexico, resembled Cortés, conqueror of Old Mexico. Vargas was New Mexico's "Great Captain."

He was the scion of an ancient noble house. Without exaggeration it may be said that no Spaniard ever set foot on our Spanish Borderlands who could claim a lineage more illustrious than that of the Reconqueror.² His family background, combined with the heritage which it represented, on the one hand, and the contrasting developments of the age in which he lived, on the other, explain much of his own life. The illustrious Vargas family was identified with most of the dynamic and spiritual forces which contributed to the making of Spain in her ages of greatness, notably, the Christian reconquest of Spain from the Saracen, the intense religious spirit that grew out of that long struggle, the leadership and military might through which Spain attained hegemony over continental western Europe for over a century, and the enterprise and action through which a New World of future Spanish commonwealths was created.

¹ Fray Salvador de San Antonio to the viceroy, Conde de Galve, El Paso, January 5, 1693, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139.

² Data on the lineage of Vargas may be found in Diego López de Zárate, *Breve descripción genealógica de la ilustre quanto anti-quíssima casa de los Vargas de Madrid . . .*, Madrid, 1740; José Pérez Balsera, *Laudemus viros gloriosos et parentes nostros in generatione sua*, Madrid, 1931; J. Manuel Espinosa, "Notes on the Lineage of Don Diego de Vargas, Reconqueror of New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 112-120; *Idem*, *First Expedition of Vargas into New Mexico, 1692*, Coronado Historical Series, X, Albuquerque, 1940, 19-27.

In the history of the reconquest of Spain numerous Vargases distinguished themselves. The Reconqueror descended in direct male line from the eldest of the three Vargas brothers who served under King Alfonso VI in the conquest of Madrid and Toledo in the years 1080 and 1085. Other Vargases equalled the valor of the three brothers by memorable deeds in the decisive battles of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: at Las Navas de Tolosa, Jerez, Córdoba, and Jaén. Garci Pérez de Vargas played such a notable part in the conquest of Seville during the important reign of the Saint King Ferdinand that the following inscription may still be seen on one of the gateways to the city: "Hercules built me—Julius Caesar surrounded me with high walls and towers—and the saint king conquered me—with Garci Pérez de Vargas." Because of his marvelous and almost incredible feats of valor on the field of battle, Garci Pérez de Vargas is frequently mentioned in the early Spanish historical chronicles, and is also the hero of many well-known old Spanish ballads. The parade of great soldiers continued through the succeeding centuries. Numerous prominent ancestors wore the honored robes of the semi-religious military orders. In the seventeenth century alone, thirteen members of the Vargas family belonged to the Order of Santiago, and two to the Order of Calatrava—crusaders all.³

The house of Vargas was closely identified with other than martial aspects of the religious spirit of Old Spain. The knight Juan de Vargas, wealthy landowner of Madrid at the turn of the eleventh century, was the master of San Isidro Labrador, patron saint of Madrid. The ancestral family chapel was built on the site of the saint's humble living quarters. A century later, when Saint Francis of Assisi was travelling in Spain, the place in Madrid where he was granted land on which to build a convent, near the Puerta de los Moros in the old part of the city, was Vargas property. It was much the same throughout the years that followed. The Reconqueror of New Mexico was closely related to Santa Teresa de Jesús, the famous Spanish mystic and celebrated literary figure of

³ Genealogical chart of the Vargas family, in Balsera, 135.

Spain's Golden Age. Her contemporary, Don Gutierre de Vargas, was Bishop of Plasencia. Licentiate Francisco de Vargas was one of the two outstanding lay doctors of theology and canon law at the Council of Trent. There were many prominent Churchmen in the Vargas line.

From the vast family estate, the accumulation of centuries,⁴ the Vargases contributed much to the Church: the maintenance of the Vargas altar, next to the main altar in the church of San Francisco el Grande in Madrid;⁵ the old family chapel off the Plaza Mayor in Madrid, later made a place of public worship; the patronage founded by Doña Inés Venegas Ponce de León for the purpose of providing dowries for orphans and food for students; the chaplaincy and patronage founded by Doña Aldonza de Luján, and many other notable charitable works and contributions to further the cause of their Faith.

In the overseas expansion of Spain, which had its first impulse during the reconquest of Spain from the Saracen, the Reconqueror could point with pride to the accomplishments of his ancestors. Of the more immediate ones, his grandfather Don Lorenzo de Vargas Zapata, of the Order of Santiago, fought in the Mediterranean area as an officer of the Spanish army for fifty years: in the galleys of Naples, at La Goleta, Tunis, protecting the isles of Gozo and Malta from the Turks, and in the Levant. His paternal grandmother was the daughter of Don Alonso Sánchez de Cepeda, of the Orders of Santiago and Calatrava, who served as governor and captain general of New Granada. On her mother's side she descended from Don Pedro Ponce de León, governor of Venezuela from 1565 to 1569. Other more distant relatives were among the first conquerors of that region. And if the Reconqueror's administrative ability could have been inherited, one could point especially to his forebear Don Francisco de Vargas, who was held in such confidence as a trusted councilor of the Catholic Kings and Charles V that the statement "Averígüelo Vargas"

⁴ See Balsera, 93, 99, 104.

⁵ "Inventory of the Vargas estate, September 23, 1719," quoted in Balsera, 71; *Expediente* of 1692 cited in Ralph E. Twitchell, *Old Santa Fe*, Santa Fe, 1925, 87-88, and his *The Spanish Archives of New Mexico*, Cedar Rapids, 1914, II, 133.

or "Ask Vargas," came to be a popular saying, and even the title of a play by the great dramatist Tirso de Molina.⁶

The Reconqueror was son and heir of Captain Alonso de Vargas Zapata y Luján, Knight of the Order of Santiago, and Doña María Margarita de Contreras y Arraiz. Don Alonso was born in Luggera de la Puglia, in the kingdom of Naples. In his youth he served for eight years as a noble page to Queen Isabel, the wife of Philip IV. On January 6, 1641, he married Doña María Margarita, who was seventeen years of age, in the Contreras chapel at Madrid. Her family was of a famous Segovian house, residing at Toledo. After serving for some time in Spain as captain of cavalry in the royal service, Don Alonso came to America, where he held various government posts until his death.

This was the house of Vargas. It was also the spirit of Spain. Although born in Old Castile, the heart of Spain, Vargas was really a child of the Spanish Empire. He was of Castilian and Andalusian stock, and the ancestral family residences were in Madrid and Granada, but his grandmother and great-grandmother were born in New Granada, in South America, and his father, as we have seen, was born in Naples and died in America.

Although we do not know the exact day of his birth, the Reconqueror was baptized in Madrid, Spain, on November 8, 1643, his full baptismal name being Diego José de Vargas Zapata y Luján Ponce de León y Contreras.⁷ Of his early life we know only a few scattered facts. He received his early education at the famous old University of Valladolid, which he proudly was to recall in later years.⁸ In his youth he fought for his king with the royal forces in Naples and other parts of Italy. On May 5, 1664, he married the wealthy Doña Beatriz Pimentel de Prado of Torrelaguna, whose father and three brothers were members of the Order of Santiago.⁹ On

⁶ See *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana* (Espasa-Calpe), LXVII, 2-3.

⁷ Baptismal record, reproduced in Balsera, 65.

⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, June 28, 1692, B.N.M., legajo 4.

⁹ Marriage record, reproduced in Balsera, 71. They were married by "Father Sebastian de Vargas, of the Society of Jesus, with the permission of Dr. Antonio de León, pastor of the parish of this Villa of Torrelaguna."

February 19 of the following year was born their only child, a daughter, María Isabel.¹⁰

The biographer of Vargas will perhaps never learn the exact personal reasons which impelled him to embark for America. However, it is not unreasonable to believe that among other things life in King Charles II's rapidly declining Spanish kingdom, with its hopeless impotence, intrigue, and instability, did not appeal to his enterprising nature. In general, conditions of life in seventeenth century Spain gave impetus to a great tide of immigration to America, whose very vastness made it a land of hope to men of enterprise. While Spain was in full decline Spanish America was growing. Some historians maintain that during the reign of Charles II at least 40,000 Spaniards left annually for America, Flanders, Africa, and Italy, the great majority of them crossing over to the American continent.¹¹ Many of these were sturdy colonists fleeing from a life of hardship and misery in Spain. Vargas, like his father before him, was undoubtedly drawn by the exotic attraction, the adventure, and the unlimited opportunities which Spain's vast empire in America offered. Ambitious and daring by nature, it is no wonder that he looked eagerly toward the New World, where many of his ancestors had won their spurs.

In the summer of 1672, Vargas, alone, was making preparations at Cádiz to sail for America. He had been appointed as a special courier of the king, to carry royal dispatches to the viceroy of New Spain in Mexico City.¹² At

¹⁰ Balsera, 65, 135. Doña María Isabel de Vargas y Pimentel married Don Ignacio López de Zárate, Knight of the Order of Santiago, Marquis of Villanueva de la Sagra, at Madrid on December 13, 1688. After the death of Don Diego de Vargas in 1704, she assumed the title of Marchioness of la Nava de Barcinas, the title of marquis having been bestowed upon her father for his services in New Mexico, and her husband took possession of the ancestral home in Madrid and the family estates by legal transfer in Madrid on February 21, 1705. *Ibid.*, 65, 87.

¹¹ Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, *Historia de España y su influencia en la historia universal*, Barcelona, 1927, IV, Part 2, 145.

¹² On January 1, 1673, Vargas wrote to the Council of the Indies requesting additional funds, stating that he had been awaiting his dispatches at Cádiz for six months ready to sail, and had used up not only his salary but all his private means at hand. The Council sent him money and a royal order for the payment of his expenses. Letter from Cádiz, January 1, 1673, A.G.I., *Mexico*, 276, cited by Lansing

about this point in Vargas' life we get our first view of his person, by way of a full-length portrait which, from all indications, was painted in Madrid in the summer of 1672 or thereabouts. The portrait represents Don Diego in his late twenties or early thirties. He is tall, dark, and slender, not broad shouldered yet giving a general appearance of athletic agility. His features are not handsome, but youthful and pleasing, with an air of dignity: a long, well shaped head; long straight black hair, parted toward the middle, hanging loosely to his shoulders; a low forehead; dark masterful eyes under thin, decisive brows; a fine aquiline nose, well shaped mouth; sallow complexion. He appears clean shaven except for two thin lines of black moustache, and an equally minute black goatee in the fashion of the period. He is fashionably dressed in the colorful trappings of a Spanish gentleman-soldier of the time.¹³

We have little evidence of Vargas' public life in America prior to 1679. According to a secondary, but generally reliable, late-eighteenth century source, he administered with credit the *alcaldía mayor* of Teutila during the viceroyalty of the Marquis of Mancera,¹⁴ who held office until December 8, 1673.¹⁵ This seems to fit in with the chronology, for it was probably in the spring of 1673 that Vargas arrived in Mexico City. A phase of Don Diego's private life is revealed by the fact that sometime between the years 1673 and 1679 he contracted an illicit marriage in New Spain; for on his death-bed, in 1704, he declared as his sons "although not by legitimate wife, Don Juan Manuel de Vargas of the age of twenty-four years, and Don Alonzo de Vargas of the age of twenty-three years, and their sister Doña María Theresa who is with her mother in the city

B. Bloom, "Notes and Reviews," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XI (April, 1936), 208-209; *Informe*, Don Francisco de Morales to the viceroy, Mexico City, October 2, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

¹³ For a detailed description of this portrait see the *Santa Fe New Mexican*, Santa Fe, September 1, 1934, 1, 6, and Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 25.

¹⁴ Escalante's "Noticias," B.N.M., legajo 3.

¹⁵ Vicente Riva Palacio, *México a través de los siglos*, Mexico, 1887-1889, II, 633-637. According to a letter from Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, April 29, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, Vargas makes vague reference that he entered the royal service in Mexico no earlier than 1676.

of Mexico of the age of nineteen years."¹⁶ He was faithful to this union until his death.

A few scattered facts have been found concerning Vargas during the next decade. In January, 1679, he was still serving as *alcalde mayor* of the pueblo of Teutila.¹⁷ In that year he was transferred to Talpujagua, at which time he was described by the viceroy as "a person of complete integrity, experience and intelligence."¹⁸ Vargas was appointed to the post of *justicia mayor* of the mining camp of Talpujagua, in the rich quicksilver section of Michoacán, in compliance with the request of the deputies and miners of the mining camp, so we are told.¹⁹ Always his services were described with high praise. In July, 1684, he was continued in the office by the Viceroy Conde de Paredes with the new title of *alcalde mayor*, "because I recognized in him a subject fitted for the post and very necessary for the development of these mines . . . through whose activity this mining camp has taken on new vigor, although when he took over it was in its last stages of deterioration."²⁰ In a letter to the king dated April 3, 1685, the viceroy wrote, "Keeping in mind the notorious quality and blood of Don Diego de Vargas, his many and visible merits, and since it has been recommended by your Majesty that he be given duties in your Royal Service, I have continued him, and shall continue him in other higher posts in keeping with his illustrious blood, for I find him very capable . . ."²¹

On June 18, 1688, Vargas received his royal appointment as governor and captain general of New Mexico for five years

¹⁶ Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 304.

¹⁷ A.G.I., *Contaduría*, legajo 776, cited in Bloom, "Notes and Reviews," 209.

¹⁸ The Conde de Paredes, viceroy of New Spain, to the king, Mexico City, April 3, 1665, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* Vargas was recommended to the viceroy of New Spain by King Charles II in a royal cédula of February 16, 1683, and thenceforth was given special consideration by all the viceroys; Escalante's "Noticias." This was especially true in the case of the Conde de Galve, viceroy during the critical early years of the reconquest, and a close friend of Vargas.

²⁰ *Ibid.*; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

²¹ *Ibid.*, *Idem* to *idem*, Santa Fé, April 29, 1697; *Idem* to *idem*, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696, *op. cit.* Vargas also served as administrator of the royal quicksilver supply at Talpujagua.

as successor to Governor Cruzate.²² This post presented a real opportunity, for the king and the viceroy had been urging the reconquest of the lost province ever since its abandonment.²³ Attempts had been made by Vargas' predecessors, but all had failed.²⁴ Vargas took over the government at El Paso on February 22, 1691.²⁵

As in the case of his predecessors he had been appointed as governor and captain general with special instructions to undertake the reconquest of New Mexico.²⁶ Full of enthusiasm, he planned to reconquer the lost province immediately and at his own expense. Such a task took superior military leadership and diplomacy, imagination, and loyalty to definite ideals. Vargas had all of these qualifications. His proved ability as

²² *Consulta* of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, February 25, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

²³ On September 25, 1690, the viceroy officially turned over to Vargas his new post, and on October 12 of the same year he received his first salary payment as governor of New Mexico. Vargas was paid 4,800 pesos at this time, by viceregal order of September 27: 4,000 pesos as two years' salary in advance, and 800 pesos in place of the wagons formerly provided for the governor's trip to New Mexico. *Informe*, Don Francisco de Morales to the viceroy, Mexico City, October 2, 1697, *ibid.*; "Reparos . . . de las quantas presentadas en el Real Tribunal de Quantas de esta Nueva España Por Don Diego de Vargas . . . 1702," A.G.N., *Vinculos*, tomo 14; A.G.I., *Contaduría*, legajo 780, cited in Bloom, "Notes and Reviews," 209.

²⁴ The first attempt was undertaken by Governor Otermín in the winter of 1681. The results of the costly expedition were the burning and sacking of ten abandoned pueblos, and the absolving of 511 Indians at Old Isleta. Otermín's lack of diplomacy in his dealings with natives was deplored by the missionaries, one of whom was confident that if he were permitted to enter New Mexico with four other friars as his only companions, he would have no difficulty in restoring the apostatized Indians to the Faith. The stage was set for the successful reconquest of New Mexico by the establishment of a number of new presidios along the frontiers of New Vizcaya, Sonora and Sinaloa in the period from 1685 to 1690. Meanwhile, several further efforts were made to reconquer the lost province. Governor Pedro Reneros de Posada made a foray as far north as Sia in 1688, but only succeeded in capturing a few horses and sheep. His successor in office, Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate, made an attempt at reconquest the following year, but also was unsuccessful. He attacked and destroyed Sia in a bloody battle; many natives were killed, four medicine-men were captured and shot in the pueblo square, and seventy were taken as captives to El Paso, where they were forced to serve for a period of ten years in *repartimiento* as punishment for their apostasy.

At this time mysterious Sierra Azul came forth in its most exaggerated form to bestir the royal authorities. In 1689, one Toribio de Huerta, a former resident of New Mexico, placed a memorial be-

a frontier administrator, combined with his great wealth, further warranted his enthusiastic offer. Vargas was spurred by his personal ambitions, for he had visions of glory and wealth to be gained in the north. He hoped that should he succeed in recapturing the vast New Mexico salient, where so many others had failed, such a feat would merit royal favor and justify asking for recognition in the form of new titles and higher appointment.²⁷

But Vargas' plan to reconquer New Mexico without delay was quickly shattered. He soon learned that the 1,000 Spanish inhabitants, and the equal number of Christianized Indians, in the El Paso settlements, were fighting against starvation and

fore King Charles II in which he volunteered to restore New Mexico at his own expense if his Majesty would grant him a marquisate over the land from El Paso to Taos, and temporary authority in Sinaloa and Sonora. His chief aim, so he said, was to save apostate souls, but between Zuñi and Moqui there was "a place called Sierra Azul, more than two hundred leagues long and full of silver." Nearby was "another mine of quicksilver . . . by which the entire realm and the rest of the provinces and kingdoms discovered might be supplied." The proposal was accepted by royal cédula on September 13, 1689, and the Conde de Galve, viceroy of New Spain, was ordered to render every possible assistance in the matter. Huerta outlined plans for a large and impressive expedition, but nothing materialized.

In 1690 Cruzate was preparing a second expedition but he was delayed by an uprising of the Sumas at El Paso. When the king learned belatedly of Cruzate's expedition to Sia, which had been highly magnified in importance, he instructed the viceroy to retain Cruzate in office if Vargas had not yet taken over the post. But by the time the instructions reached Mexico City, Vargas had already assumed the governorship of New Mexico by virtue of his earlier appointment.

Charles W. Hackett, "Otermín's Attempt to Reconquer New Mexico, 1681-1682," *Old Santa Fe*, III (January and April, 1916), 44-82, 103-132; *Idem*, "The Causes for the Failure of Otermín's Attempt to Reconquer New Mexico, 1681-1682," *The Pacific Ocean in History*, New York, 1917, 439-451; Fray Nicolás López, "Noticia cierta de lo que pasó en la entrada de la Nueva México . . .," n.d., B.N.M., legajo 4; Report of the Junta de Guerra, Mexico City, July 15, 1691, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141; Escalante's "Noticias."

²⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Galve, El Paso, April 19, 1691, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37; Maas, *Misiones de Nuevo Méjico*, 122-123; Vargas to the king, Zacatecas, May 16, 1693, 1, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139, hereafter cited as Vargas to the king, MS.; *Informe*, Don Francisco de Morales to the viceroy, Mexico City, October 2, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141. We have no record of Vargas' journey up to El Paso.

Unless otherwise specified, the original documents referred to in the following pages of this chapter may be found in A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37.

²⁶ Royal cédula, Madrid, September 4, 1693; Maas, 311.

²⁷ Vargas to the king, MS., 41-44.

costly Indian raids and were in no condition to extend the existing frontier of settlement at this time. On taking muster of the available forces at hand, he found that there were scarcely 300 men capable of bearing arms including Indian allies. Most of the soldiers of the presidio were without even swords or helmets. Among the soldiers and settlers of the five Spanish settlements and missions in the district there were scarcely 132 horses and about twenty-five mules.²⁸ These and other local problems were an important factor in delaying for almost a year and a half the extension of the existing frontier.

Outside of a few sallies against the Apaches and their allies,²⁹ whose raids were continuous, the economic problem occupied the new governor during his first six months at El Paso. For two months he was engaged in directing the repair of the ditches for irrigating the fields. The river was swollen by the melting snow in the mountains of Colorado and New Mexico, and this had caused it to shift its course from the main irrigation ditch. These ditches were essential to save the little wheat and maize which could be raised in May and June. There was such a scarcity of grain, that unless flour were obtained from Parral the people would be obliged to make their *tortillas* from the little maize that remained in store until the next harvest. There was virtually no livestock. The 600 sheep in the vicinity, mostly the property of the missionaries, were scattered throughout the various missions.³⁰ Every effort was made to secure an adequate supply of horses, mules, and cattle, and one hundred fanegas of wheat were soon under cultivation.

Next to the question of food supplies, the Indian problem was Vargas' greatest concern. In the vicinity of El Paso the Sumas, the *ranchería* of Mansos, under their captain who was called "El Chiquito," and the Apaches of the Sierra de Gila were the greatest trouble-makers. Horse stealing and cattle rustling were their great pastime. All were in communication with the Mansos. The latter had left when the presidio was established at El Paso in 1683, but had since been converted

²⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, April 19, 1691.

²⁹ *Idem* to *idem*, El Paso, March 30, 1692; Maas, 149-155.

³⁰ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, April 19, 1691.

through the efforts of the custodian, Father Francisco de Vargas, and settled near the church of San Francisco de los Manos. The Apaches often visited them in small groups, and it was quite customary for them to intermarry, as was also the case with the Sumas.³¹ The Sumas from Guadalupe and Ojito³² had become a scourge to the entire region. These three nations were a constant threat to the El Paso settlements.³³

Overcoming all obstacles with unusual energy and decision of character, Vargas carefully formulated his plans for reconquest. It was hoped that after the planting season, in the middle of October, the Indians and other settlers could gather their crops and go north to the villa of Santa Fé. This being the most severe time of the year, the Indians would be in their houses due to the cold weather, and not scattered in the fields and on the chase, and it would be easier to deal with them under such conditions.³⁴ But El Paso was the most northern outpost, was surrounded by hostile Indians, and did not have the protection of New Vizcaya and its many presidios. Thus in notifying the viceroy of his plans Vargas requested fifty additional soldiers, for all of the fifty presidial soldiers at El Paso and more would be necessary for the projected campaign in the north. With these reinforcements it would be possible to leave a small force at El Paso, otherwise dangerously exposed to Indian attack.

While the king had given specific instructions to reconquer New Mexico, the government of New Spain was at this time interested in more immediate frontier problems. The Junta de Hacienda or Treasury Committee, in Mexico City, politely answered Governor Vargas' demands with the decision that the time was not propitious for the reconquest of Santa Fé.³⁵ At the moment efforts must be centered elsewhere.³⁶ The problem which was confronting the government was the war against Indian conspiracies in New Vizcaya and Sinaloa, especially in

³¹ *Idem to idem*, El Paso, August 14, 1691; Maas, 130-133.

³² Ojito de Salamayuca, the site of the mission of Santa Gertrudis. Hughes, "The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement," *loc. cit.*, 329.

³³ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, March 30, 1692.

³⁴ *Idem to idem*, El Paso, June 30, 1691.

³⁵ Report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, August 3, 1691; Maas, 130, note 1.

³⁶ Maas, 124, note 2.

the Janos district. Soon Vargas himself was to be drawn into that war, delaying the expedition to Santa Fé for a whole year. Although he argued that this was not even within his jurisdiction, and against Indians who were no immediate danger to El Paso, in the minds of those who were directing things at the capital the reconquest of New Mexico, although important, was merely a part of a larger program involving the whole northern frontier. When more immediate obstacles were overcome, attention would be turned to that phase in which Vargas was primarily interested.

As for these Indian hostilities, shortly after his arrival at El Paso Vargas had received letters from the Jesuit missionaries at Chínapa asking for help to pacify the hostile Jocomes, Janos, and Sumas on the Sonora frontier. The Seris, Cocomatagues, Sobas, and Pimas had already been pacified. Fathers Marcos de Loyola and Juan María de Salvatierra had been working among the Indians of Chínapa for some time. Father Marcos de Loyola was now asking the governor of New Mexico for one or two Manso Indians³⁷ from El Paso. These had authority over the Janos and Jocomes. Two Spanish-speaking Mansos might be used to advantage on embassies of peace to negotiate with the enemy.³⁸ On March 20, six Mansos with provisions and beasts of burden were on their way to Chínapa.³⁹

With the assistance of these loyal Mansos, Juan Fernández de la Fuente, captain of the presidio of Janos, discovered that the Apaches of the Sierra de Gila, confederates of the Janos, Jocomes, Pimas, Sobas, and Sumas, were the trouble-makers. It was they who in the past two weeks had carried off at least one hundred beasts. Only a month before they had taken

³⁷ The Manso Indians lived in the region around El Paso, as already stated. They had been pacified in the middle seventeenth century, and although frequently identified with later Apache disturbances, they lived in relative peace with their Spanish neighbors.

³⁸ Father Marcos de Loyola's letter was written February 6; that of Father Salvatierra, February 8. Published in Maas, 124-125. These letters were sent by Vargas to the viceroy on June 20, 1691. Maas, 123-124.

³⁹ Vargas' journal, El Paso, March 20, 1691; Maas, 124-125. Chínapa, which was then on the northern edge of the frontier, between Sonora and New Vizcaya, is not to be confused with Chinipas, far to the south.

part in an ambush attack upon the pueblo of Bacuachito⁴⁰ in the jurisdiction of Father Marcos de Loyola. Here sixteen persons had been killed, eleven carried off as prisoners, and the priest's house set on fire and demolished. But the Mansos were unable to negotiate with the uncompromising Apaches, and the plan to use them as mediators was abandoned.⁴¹ Drastic action was necessary, and a relentless military campaign carried into the heart of the enemy territory appeared to be the only solution. Fernández now proposed to Vargas a union of the forces of Sonora, Sinaloa, and El Paso, in order to enter the Sierra de Gila and crush the Apaches in a decisive battle. At the same time Fernández wrote a similar letter directly to the viceroy. Vargas balked at such a plan. He not only lacked horses and provisions, but was surrounded by enemies himself. Besides, it would delay his expedition into New Mexico; the Sierra de Gila was seventy leagues from El Paso, and thirty leagues off the road to Santa Fé.⁴²

During the course of these negotiations with Fernández, a courier arrived at El Paso with a letter from the viceroy in Mexico City containing orders to obtain information about the reported quicksilver mine of Sierra Azul, which, according to oral tradition, lay beyond a large river a day's journey west of Moqui (in what is now northern Arizona). For Vargas, the revival of interest in this long-unvisited but reportedly rich mining region could not have occurred at a more opportune time. He immediately took advantage of this unforeseen enthusiasm in the capital to further his own plans. A prompt investigation into the matter might cause the viceroy to refuse to listen to Fernández at this time. He might not have to go to the aid of Fernández after all, and the entry into New Mexico would not be delayed. Vargas received the letter on August 1, and immediately carried out his instructions. The investigation lasted from August 3 to 12. Stories about the allegedly

⁴⁰ About ten miles north of Chínapa. See the map of this region in Herbert E. Bolton, *Rim of Christendom*, New York, 1936, 594.

⁴¹ Juan Fernández de la Fuente to Vargas, Janos, April 16, 1691; Maas, 126-128. Most of the correspondence on this question is published in Maas, 123-133.

⁴² Vargas to Juan Fernández de la Fuente, El Paso, April 29, 1691; Maas, 129-130.

rich quicksilver deposits of distant Sierra Azul (Blue Mountain) were well known among the older people in the colony, and many interesting accounts were gathered. Twelve former residents of New Mexico, three of the Franciscan fathers, and nine others, all directly familiar with the region, were consulted. Their information led Vargas to express the belief that the mines undoubtedly contained quicksilver.⁴³

But again Vargas' plans were frustrated. On August 16, 1691, before he had time to answer the viceroy's letter, he was notified that the proposal of Captain Fernández of the presidio of Janos had been accepted. The problems of the northern frontier were to be solved through cooperation. Vargas was to go to the aid of Fernández. When the Janos, Sumas, Pimas, and other hostile Indians on the frontier of Sonora were pacified, then Sonora and Sinaloa would go to the aid of the governor at El Paso that he in turn might stabilize the north-central frontier through the reconquest and reoccupation of upper New Mexico.⁴⁴ Vargas was greatly disappointed, for his latest plan had been to make the entry in October.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, on August 26 the results of the Sierra Azul investigation were sent posthaste to the viceroy. Vargas wrote:

I will take great pride in performing this service for his Majesty as the instrument of your Excellency, who is the moving force. And if it should be God's will to give me success in finding this hidden treasure, it would be due to your Excellency alone that such a benefit should be made known to all this New World. It will bring enormous additions to the royal fifth in profits from metals, for however great these may be, fine silver ores are not discovered and worked for lack of quicksilver . . .

I leave to your Greatness's judgment and decision the arrangement of the measures you decide to apply, and then I will carry them out without accepting for my camp the crust of a single broken biscuit, for I shall take necessary and sufficient provisions not only for myself and my family, but also for the army, and the religious who go as chaplains and as apostolic missionaries to convert the Indians,

⁴³ For the complete history of the fascinating legend of Sierra Azul, including the details of the Vargas investigation, see J. Manuel Espinosa, "The Legend of Sierra Azul," *New Mexico Historical Review*, IX (April, 1934), 113-158.

⁴⁴ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, July, 1691.

⁴⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, August 14, 1691.

with the authority of your support better to accredit and assure his Majesty's desire that they return to the yoke of our Holy Faith.⁴⁶

Complying with the recent viceregal orders, he then wrote a hasty note to Fernández notifying him that he would be ready on October 10, and requesting further particulars with regard to the strategy to be employed in the impending campaign.⁴⁷ But Vargas could not conceal his disappointment in having to suspend his entry into New Mexico. Several weeks later he wrote in a longer letter to the viceroy:

Every governor should be able to govern his own realm, and an inferior, as is Captain Fuente [Fernández], subject to his governor, should not be permitted to make the decisions. His Majesty has placed a governor in Sinaloa for that purpose . . . Solely with the desire to serve God and his royal Majesty, and without bothering anyone else, I desire to win back to the Faith the natives of Santa Fé. They are of greater consequence, since they have been left unpunished and as apostates continue to live in sin . . . In blind obedience, however, I shall carry out your orders . . . I will go myself at the head of my company with one hundred Indians.⁴⁸

On this same day he penned another letter to the viceroy accompanied by additional information he had gathered concerning Sierra Azul.⁴⁹

The winter campaign against the hostile Indians of the outlying frontiers of Sonora and Sinaloa was fairly successful. Governor Vargas personally led the united forces of the presidio of El Paso, a flying squadron under the command of Captain Francisco Ramírez de Salazar and soldiers provided by the governor of Sinaloa, against the Pimas, Jocomes, the Mansos captained by "El Chiquito," the Janos, and the Apaches of Chilmo and the Sierra de Gila in Sonora province. On this remarkable expedition Vargas claimed to have discovered over one hundred and fifty leagues of *terra incognita*. The trails, watering places, and eating places⁵⁰ of the remote frontier tribes of the Sobaipujares were discovered and reconnoitered.

⁴⁶ *Idem to idem*, El Paso, August 26, 1691.

⁴⁷ Vargas to Fernández de la Fuente, El Paso, September 9, 1691.

⁴⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 4, 1691.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ "Comederos."

The round trip distance from El Paso to these remote regions was estimated as over four hundred and eighty leagues.⁵¹

By the end of November, 1691, the Indian wars in Sonora and Sinaloa had quieted down, and the government of New Spain now focused its attention upon the reconquest of New Mexico. Official preparations were definitely under way, but the viceroy was still undecided as to whether or not it would be practical to send an expedition directly to the Sierra Azul before reconquering the lost province. On November 22, therefore, the royal fiscal was ordered to make a careful investigation of the evidence at hand.⁵² The Huerta documents and Vargas' reports were re-examined. The latter, which were the most recent, attested to the existence of quicksilver in the Cerro Colorado, and gold and silver in nearby Sierra Azul. The royal fiscal, however, displayed coolness in the matter. Although since early times many sacks of the "red earth" from the alleged mine had been obtained, no one had yet proved by experiment any actual quicksilver content. The expenses of an expedition would be a great price to pay for the discovery of an error, and even were the stories true, it would be necessary to double expenses in order to repopulate and defend a new mining area. The royal fiscal advised that Santa Fé be reoccupied first, and from there as a base Sierra Azul and Cerro Colorado could be reconnoitered later.⁵³ Cruzate and Otermín, former governors of New Mexico residing in the City of Mexico, were consulted on the matter.⁵⁴ The latter argued in favor of an expedition directly to the Moqui region before attempting to regain Santa Fé, but his view was discarded as impractical, and the fiscal's opinion prevailed.

Meanwhile, Vargas busily continued preparations for the expedition into New Mexico. There were still many thorny

⁵¹ Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Montezuma, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141; Vargas to the king, MS., 2. From the distances given, Vargas apparently explored some of the lands which were later the scene of activities of the Jesuit Kino, Apostle to the Pimas. See the map in Bolton, *Rim of Christendom*, 594.

⁵² Viceregal decree, Mexico City, November 22, 1691.

⁵³ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, November 24, 1691.

⁵⁴ Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate to the viceroy, Mexico City, December 1, 1691; Antonio de Otermín to the viceroy, Mexico City, December 22, 1691; abridgment in Maas, 145-147.

problems to overcome. In March, 1692, he found it necessary to make an expedition eastward across the Hueco Mountains, half the distance from El Paso to the Salado River, in search of the salt-licks and watering places of the Apaches, whose raids into the El Paso district had been continuous. The expedition was a complete success. Thirteen large salt beds were located near the Sierra Negra, and samples of the salt were carried back for remittal to the viceroy. In reporting this campaign to the viceroy Vargas wrote: "I send this little sack, but only wish, your Excellency, that it were from the vermilion mine [Sierra Azul], which is rich in quicksilver."⁵⁵ Other hostile Apache tribes also were pursued, and were defeated in the Sierra de los Organos, the Sierra Florida, and the Sierra Nevada, to the north and west. Measures also were taken to protect better the settlements of the Indian allies from the inroads of the Apaches. An uprising of 300 Sumas at Guadalupe was suppressed, and the natives were removed to a place two leagues from Socorro and seven leagues from El Paso. Here mission San Diego was built, and by the end of March, 300 Christianized Sumas were living there. They had been peacefully subdued, chiefly through the efforts of Fray Antonio Guerra.⁵⁶

Another task was the granting of official possession of missions and convents in the El Paso district to the missionaries. These were Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe at El Paso, Real de San Lorenzo, San Antonio de Senecú, Corpus Christi de la Isleta de Tigua, Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción de los Piros del Socorro, San Diego, and La Nueva Conversión de Nuestro Padre San Francisco de los Mansos.⁵⁷ Of these, the one erected for the Sumas in honor of San Diego had already been built during the administration of Vargas.⁵⁸ No mention of

⁵⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, April 7, 1692. The details of this expedition are set forth in this letter. See also Vargas to the viceroy, Don José Sarmiento de Valladares, Conde de Montezuma, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696, and the viceroy, Conde de Galve, to Vargas, Mexico City, June 1, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

⁵⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, March 30, 1692; report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, May 21, 1692; Maas, 149-155.

⁵⁷ Petition of Fray Francisco de Vargas, custodian of the custodia of New Mexico, to Governor Vargas, El Paso, August 30, 1691. Maas, 156-158.

⁵⁸ Vargas' journal, May, *passim*, 1692; Maas, 155-164.

any such act of possession could be found in the archives of the custodia. In late May, Vargas officially granted to the Franciscan fathers possession of the churches, convents, and sufficient surrounding lands necessary for planting, without specifying any definite limits. Then the custodian asked for a definite assignment of lands for the Indians under their charge, and also for copies of the documents granting such assignments. This Vargas refused, thereby bringing on a dispute with the ecclesiastical authorities. The litigation dragged on until August 8, 1692.⁵⁹ Vargas argued that the Spanish settlers were as much the protectors of the Indians as the missionaries, and that since the Spanish settlers and the Indians were living in close proximity the lands were common property. Thus no distribution of property should be officially made if it might encroach upon the property of Spanish settlers. For although the pueblos, in conformity with royal ordinances, were usually assigned definite lands, this had never been the practice in the El Paso district. The Spaniards from New Mexico were officially regarded as temporary settlers, expected to return to reconquer and reoccupy New Mexico, and they were permitted to plant their crops wherever they considered it most convenient. Under these conditions Indians and Spaniards had lived peacefully side by side since 1680.⁶⁰

Controversy between the civil authorities and the Franciscan fathers again arose in the summer of 1692, which was definitely to establish the supremacy of the civil power in the affairs of the province. It was but another incident in the long struggle between the Church and State which had originated with the grant of the *real patronato* in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. The problem arose when Fray Francisco Corvera, as apostolic notary, began a tour of the various localities of the district, where he questioned the local civil and military authorities regarding religious conditions, under threat of excommunication, without having obtained formal permission from Governor Vargas. The latter, claiming final authority in all such matters, by virtue of the *patronato* power, considered this as

⁵⁹ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, June 17, 1692; report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, August 7, 1692; Maas, 165-185.

⁶⁰ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, August 7, 1692.

meddling in affairs subject only to royal jurisdiction. The apostolic notary's tour of inspection, therefore, was brought to a halt by official order of Vargas. The missionaries protested. Fray Agustín de Colina, of the convent of El Paso, presented himself before Vargas with two books, which he said contained passages indicating that the governor had incurred the censure of the Church through his official order, which infringed upon the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Vargas waved the books aside, refusing to read them. Then, falling to his knees, he asked forgiveness for any censure of the Church he or his civil servants may have incurred without knowledge. This was granted. Diplomatically disarming the friar with suave words, the governor did not change his views in the matter one whit during the course of the discussion. They parted on the best of terms. Vargas' attitude was now clear to the religious, and in general it may be said that there was to be complete harmony between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in New Mexico throughout the remainder of his governorship. One thing was certain: under Vargas' rule there was to be no revival of the bitter conflict between Church and State such as had existed in the province prior to 1680. The controversy might have been avoided at this particular moment had the missionaries been more tactful, had they merely gone through the formality of obtaining the permission of the governor before conducting their inquiry. But even so, this probably would have merely postponed the issue, for perhaps both the religious and Vargas had been awaiting just such an incident as this in order to determine once and for all who was to be the final arbiter in the affairs of the province during the remainder of the latter's term of office.⁶¹

It was now possible to make ready for the reconquest. On April 17 Vargas wrote to the viceroy that with the provisions and equipment at hand he would send the first squadron into New Mexico on July 12.⁶² A week earlier, by viceregal orders, he had notified the governor and lieutenant governor of New

⁶¹ "Nueva México. Don Diego de Vargas, Gobernador, sobre la competencia de jurisdicción con los Religiosos," El Paso, June 23-28, 1692. B.N.M., legajo 4.

⁶² Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, April 17, 1692.

Vizcaya to prepare the former inhabitants of New Mexico residing in that province for the impending expedition. Similar notifications had been sent to the *alcaldes mayores* and other ministers of justice in New Vizcaya, to the *alcalde mayor* of Sonora, to the lieutenant and captain general at Casas Grandes, and to the officials at San Buenaventura, where twenty or thirty former New Mexicans were living.⁶³

Vargas was having great difficulty in his attempt to gather at El Paso the former inhabitants of New Mexico. Since 1680 many had left the El Paso district, and had established themselves in the older settlements of New Vizcaya, Sonora, and Sinaloa. A number of them were residing at San Buenaventura, Las Cruces, Casas Grandes, and Janos. Some were enlisted in the garrisons at Conchos, Janos, Cuencame, and Gallo. Others were working in mines and on haciendas. These people were relatively well off and were not desirous of starting life anew in the hostile wilderness, where many of them had lost their fortunes. Due to these difficulties the Junta de Hacienda in Mexico City ordered news to be spread in the region specified by the governor of New Mexico, to the effect that those persons who wished to repopulate the region would be rewarded with favors and lands and would be considered *hidalgos*. This had little effect, however, for it was not unusual to grant pioneer settlers such favors.⁶⁴ In spite of many inducements the former New Mexicans residing in New Vizcaya continued to ignore the royal orders. So Vargas again wrote to Governor Pardiñas, urging him to order these people to get ready.⁶⁵ This time he added that he would furnish arms, ammunition, and food to those who needed them. His inability to arouse their interest angered and surprised him. The viceroy finally sent a dispatch to El Paso stating that all those former residents of New Mexico who refused to return to Santa Fé would be considered unworthy for royal service.⁶⁶

⁶³ *Idem to idem*, El Paso, April 9, 1692.

⁶⁴ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, November 26, 1691; Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, governor of New Vizcaya, to the viceroy, Parral, November 23, 1691; report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, December 4, 1691.

⁶⁵ Vargas to Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, El Paso, April 9, 1692.

⁶⁶ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, May 22, 1692; viceregal decree, Mexico City, May 28, 1692. A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

Owing to a lack of available settlers willing to leave the El Paso region, Vargas stressed the necessity of more soldiers. With fifty men added to his forces he could go directly to Santa Fé, defeat the Indians there, and then reconquer all New Mexico. The additional fifty soldiers were deemed essential. With this exception he insisted that the undertaking was to be made at his own expense, without any cost to the viceroy. These proposals were soon in the hands of the viceregal authorities. The customary procedure upon receipt of provincial reports at the office of the viceroyalty was first to turn them over to the royal fiscal, who would examine them carefully and make a report to the Junta General de Hacienda. This was the supreme body in viceregal matters, a miniature Council of the Indies, and was in this particular instance composed of twelve members: namely, the Viceroy of New Spain, its presiding officer; two members of the royal audiencia; two *alcaldes* of the court of criminal law of Mexico City; three accountants of the royal tribunal of expenditures; two officials of the royal treasury of Mexico City; the accountant-general of tributes for New Spain; and the royal fiscal. The Junta General would read the suggestions of the royal fiscal; afterwards the records themselves would be re-examined, although often the fiscal's report alone was consulted before a final decision was made. Cases in which ultimate authority lay in the power of the king and the Council of the Indies in Madrid were referred thereto by the Junta General for final approval.

On May 28, 1692, all the demands were granted by the Junta de Hacienda in Mexico City.⁶⁷ Vargas' offer to reconquer New Mexico at his own expense was declared by the viceroy to be "not merely opportune, but rather of special divine providence," for the royal cédulas of September 4, 1683 and September 13, 1689, copies of which were before the viceregal authorities as they conferred on the matter, "ordered the reconquest of the said province, with special effort that it be restored with the greatest saving for the royal treasury." With

⁶⁷ Report of the Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, May 28, 1692; see also Maas, 187, note 1. A complete translation of the proceedings of this historic meeting may be found in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 43-47.

words of high praise Vargas was described as especially qualified to carry out the difficult undertaking:

The person being the said governor, who is of such excellent qualities, illustrious blood, and noble obligations, and whose advantages are far greater than those of the aspirant Don Toribio de la Huerta, who, from what we hear, could not live up so well to his promises in the undertaking: for these reasons one may count on the zeal of the governor; for by his valor and great nobility alone he could promise to carry out such a proposal . . . to all of which will correspond the rewards with which his Majesty, may God spare him, will honor him on receipt of news regarding his acts and wishes in his royal service.⁶⁸

It was decided that the additional soldiers requested should be sent up from the four presidios of the Parral district, fully equipped, and without delay. Vargas was thanked for his successful campaigns against the Apaches, and high praise was bestowed upon Fray Antonio Guerra for his successful work among the Sumas.

As for Sierra Azul, the royal fiscal proposed on January 5 that after the reconquest of Santa Fé a few soldiers should pass on to the Moqui country and obtain twelve loads of ore for assaying in Mexico City; but the Junta General of May 28 dismissed the plan with the suggestion that after Vargas had reconquered Santa Fé he should inquire into the matter, "acting in that manner which, as an expert on the subject, he thinks best." A cheaper source of quicksilver for working the mines of New Spain was greatly in demand at the moment, and both Vargas and government officials in Mexico City apparently had hopes that there might be some truth in the stories about Sierra Azul and Cerro Colorado. Yet Sierra Azul was not the hidden motive for the reconquest, as a recent writer has stated. This is sufficiently brought out from the official standpoint in the above report of the Junta. And it had no appeal to the popular imagination, nor did Vargas attempt to use it as an argument to attract a following. Popular tradition was glutted with such tales. The story was emphasized by Vargas in official circles as an additional incentive to reconquer New Mexico, above all to keep the whole question of the reconquest

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

in the limelight in Mexico City in the hope of preventing further delay, for there were other equally pressing problems of defense, not to mention serious social and economic disorders in Mexico City.⁶⁹ There was even some question as to the advisability of reoccupying New Mexico at this time, in view of more immediate Indian hostility in New Vizcaya, Sonora, and Sinaloa.⁷⁰ The significance of Sierra Azul in this connection, then, lies in the part it played as a factor in hastening the reconquest during this critical period, and in the progress of a frontier policy continuous since the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. After Vargas' successful campaign of 1692, the permanent reoccupation of New Mexico was to be assured, despite the subsequent discovery that the red earth from Sierra Azul did not contain quicksilver.

These were years of transition in international affairs, and the expanding spheres of interest of rival European powers in North America were eventually to bring the north-central area into the orbit of potential foreign danger. This, combined with the more immediate Indian danger, called for vigorous defensive measures and constant vigilance on the part of the Spanish government. New Mexico, an isolated frontier outpost prior to 1680, was from now on to play an increasingly important rôle on the vast northern frontiers of New Spain, extending from Florida to California. In the northwest no serious foreign danger as yet had appeared on the horizon. There the Jesuits were successfully winning the hostile tribes of Sonora and Pimería Alta. In the northeast, on the other hand, English traders were making serious inroads into western Georgia, where their raids had a disastrous effect on the Franciscan missions. In Texas, a French scare, the La Salle expedition, had just been dissipated. Vargas' task was to win back

⁶⁹ See "Letter of Don Carlos de Sigüenza to Admiral Pez Re-counting the Incidents of the Corn Riot in Mexico City, June 8, 1692," in Irving A. Leonard, *Don Carlos de Sigüenza*, Berkeley, 1929, 110-138, 210-277.

⁷⁰ See "Opinions of the captains of New Vizcaya given in fulfillment of an order by his Excellency the Count of Galve, viceroy of New Spain, concerning the reconquest of New Mexico as proposed by the governor and captain general of El Paso and the province of New Mexico, sent by the governor and captain general of New Vizcaya to his Excellency, 1692," and the report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, August 14, 1692, both in A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37.

upper New Mexico and close the dangerous breach on the north-central frontier, which lay open since 1680. In the eyes of the Spanish government the reconquest of the lost province was primarily a question of defending the northern frontier settlements and spreading the Faith. Vargas—loyal, able, brave, ambitious—exceeded the fondest hopes of his government.

CHAPTER II

ON TO SANTA FÉ

Vargas joyfully notified the viceroy on July 13, 1692, that he had received news of the decision of the Junta General de Hacienda. He thanked his Excellency for providing the fifty soldiers, gave an account of his subsequent preparations, and promised detailed reports and a diary of the impending entry. He had been awaiting the letter from the capital, and was already prepared to leave for the conquest of Santa Fé and its surrounding pueblos.¹ He planned two entries into the north: first, a preliminary visit to the revolted province in order to learn the general state of affairs there, and to reduce and conquer the apostate rebels, by force of arms if necessary, this to be followed up by a carefully organized colonizing expedition whereby, with additional soldiers, settlers, and missionaries, the New Mexican exiles of 1680 would be restored to their former homes, and Christianity would be reestablished there.²

Meanwhile, Governor Pardiñas of New Vizcaya wrote that upon receipt of official orders he would send the fifty recruits asked for. The sergeant of the El Paso presidio then was despatched to Parral to bring the soldiers, and the entry was temporarily suspended. But he returned alone, with the indefinite answer that they would be sent as soon as possible.³

All through the latter part of July and early August Vargas

¹ Unless otherwise specified, in telling the story of this expedition of 1692 the writer has relied on Vargas' own journal and related documents, as contained in A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139, and S.F.A. See also Vargas to the king (May 16, 1693), MS., which is an account of the expedition. The contemporary, but secondary, account written by the Mexican savant Sigüenza y Góngora in the latter part of 1693, heretofore used as a basic authority in the absence of the complete journal itself, garbles the facts and is often inaccurate in chronology and details. See Preface, above. The best edition of this work is that of Irving A. Leonard, *The Mercurio Volante*, Los Angeles, 1932, hereinafter cited as Sigüenza. The complete journal may be found in English translation in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 48-277.

² Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, October 31, 1692; Maas, 186-187.

³ Vargas' journal, El Paso, August 9, 1692.

restlessly awaited the reinforcements. Conditions were much more stable in the El Paso district than they had been the day Vargas first arrived there, but grave problems still existed. The most serious was that of irrigation. Until the day of his departure Vargas spent much time in the repair of the irrigation ditches, because many fields were being lost for lack of water. Indians from the pueblos of Isleta, Socorro, and Senecú were constantly at work at El Paso repairing the dams on the river and the main ditch so that sufficient water could reach the grain fields.⁴ Periodic Apache raids from the surrounding mountains continued, but otherwise the Indian problem was fairly well in hand. During Vargas' absence in the north the settlements were almost entirely entrusted to the good faith of Indian allies, and as it turned out they did not fail in their trust.

The governor of New Vizcaya, on August 3, finally wrote Vargas that he was sending the soldiers, and listed their names together with an inventory of their equipment.⁵ They were from the four presidios of Pasaje, San Pedro del Gallo, San Francisco de Conchos, and Cerro Gordo.⁶ But the first week and a half in August passed and they had not yet arrived. The season was getting late. On August 9, expecting them any day, Vargas designated the following Saturday, August 16, as the day of the departure of the vanguard. This first division of the expedition, under command of Maestre de Campo Roque Madrid, was to consist of three squadrons from the El Paso presidio, the pack animals, wagons, livestock, and one hundred Indian allies. At Robledo, twenty-nine leagues up the river, they were to stop and await Vargas, who would join them there with the fifty soldiers from Parral, the squadron left at the presidio as guard, the military leaders, and the others who might care to join him.⁷ The decision of the governor was publicly proclaimed August 10 by Sebastián Rodríguez, to the accompaniment of the martial strains of drum and trumpet.⁸

⁴ *Ibid.*, El Paso, July 30, 1692.

⁵ Juan Isidro de Pardiñas to Vargas, Parral, August 3, 1692.

⁶ Maas, 187, note 1.

⁷ Proclamation of Governor Vargas, in Vargas' journal, El Paso, August 9, 1692.

⁸ Testimony that the proclamation was made publicly known, El Paso, August 10, 1692.

The day of departure already having been announced to the Spanish residents, Vargas now ordered the Alcalde Mayor and Captain of War José Padilla, his lieutenant Juan de Valencia, and Captain Diego de Luna, of the pueblos of Isleta, Socorro, and Senecú, to repeat the order in their pueblos. The one hundred Indian allies were to be ready in the military square on the day designated, at eight o'clock in the morning.⁹

At ten in the morning, August 16, the soldiers and Indian allies were ready in the military square with their horses, mules, livestock, and food supplies. The provisions had been loaded into two ox carts, and the cannon piece and large bronze *pedrero* in wagons drawn by mule team. At two o'clock the little band started across the Río Grande. The transit took all the afternoon, and since it was too late to go much farther that day, they spent the night in a ravine on the north side of the river.¹⁰ Next day they went four leagues to La Salineta,¹¹ where Roque Madrid and his contingent had orders to spend the night.

Several days passed and the fifty recruits had not yet arrived, so Vargas, tired of waiting, decided to go on ahead without them. A letter was penned to Madrid on August 19 telling him to wait at Robledo.¹² Before leaving, Vargas left a letter with Captain José Padilla, alcalde mayor of Senecú, to be sent on to the viceroy, in which he spoke of the inexcusable delay in the arrival of the fifty soldiers, and his decision to leave without them, along with a report of his activities since August 16.¹³

Lieutenant Governor Luis Granillo was left temporarily in charge at El Paso, and Alférez Juan Páez Hurtado, Vargas' civil and military secretary, was appointed captain in charge of the reinforcements from Parral. On the day of their arrival Hurtado was to cross to the north side of the river with the entire camp and spend the night there. From there Granillo should accompany him as far as Estero Largo.¹⁴ Hurtado

⁹ Vargas' journal, El Paso, August 14, 1692.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, El Paso, August 16, 1692.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, October 13, 1693. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

¹² *Ibid.*, El Paso, August 19, 1692.

¹³ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, August 21, 1692.

¹⁴ Between 12 and 13 leagues north of El Paso. Vargas' journal, October 14, 1693. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

was to plot out his daily marches so that he would reach Santo Domingo in from twelve to fifteen days. On his arrival there he was to notify Vargas without fail, so that the forces might be joined as soon as possible for better operation against the enemy.¹⁵ The following provisions were left for the Parral contingent: a box full of chocolate and sugar (the key to which was left in the possession of Hurtado), *pinole*, hard tack, ten handfuls of tobacco, soap, and two fat beeves to be converted into dried beef for the journey.¹⁶

On August 21, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the military leaders, Franciscan missionaries (Father President Fray Francisco Corvera, Fray Miguel Muñiz, and Fray Cristóbal Alonso Barroso), soldiers, and ten other male residents gathered in the military square.¹⁷ In all solemnity, to the beat of the drum and the blare of the trumpet, the royal standard was hoisted,¹⁸ and the men got in line for the march. Vargas then mounted his steed and led the way. The Río Grande was crossed without accident, although the current was swift, and the night was spent on the edge of the river at Ancón de Fray García, five leagues north of El Paso.¹⁹

After threading the steep mountain passes north of El Paso, the scene changed. They now followed along the river, which was shaded by the green cottonwood trees that marked its course. Over this stretch travel was slow and hard, for the earth was loose and rough, and they became accustomed to skirting washouts and ploughing through marshes. On either hand ran ranges of barren hills, and when they reached their tops they looked out upon a broad expanse of desolate plains, edged on the east by the rugged peaks of the Sierra de los Organos.

¹⁵ Vargas' journal, August 21, 1692; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, October 16, 1692.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Vargas' journal, Mejía, September 10, 1692.

¹⁸ The royal standard Vargas carried with him on both of his entries into New Mexico was the same one that Juan de Oñate had with him when he conquered the province a century before. The revered old standard had been preserved at Santa Fé and had been saved in 1680. On one side it had the royal coat of arms, and on the other the figure of the Virgin of Remedies. Vargas to the king, MS., *passim*.

¹⁹ Vargas' journal, Ancón de Fray García, August 21, 1692.

At six o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th, Vargas joined forces with Madrid at Robledo.²⁰ Fearing a shortage of water from here to Fray Cristóbal, thirty-six leagues away, the camp was again divided, so that the water holes might be used to the greatest advantage, especially those of El Perrillo, Las Peñuelas, and Paraje del Muerto. Madrid, with a squadron as guard, went ahead with the various livestock, followed at a safe distance by Vargas leading the others. The march continued in this fashion beyond Paraje del Muerto, when again forces were joined, this time as a precautionary measure, for they were now in the heart of the Apache country. Recent rains provided an abundance of water all the way—unusual luck, for this is barren country, with scarce vegetation and very little water beyond the course of the Río Grande itself.²¹ The combined forces arrived on August 30 without accident at Fray Cristóbal, near the present village of San Marcial.²²

The eight days' march from Fray Cristóbal to the abandoned *estancia* of Juan de Valencia was slow and uneventful.²³ The road was rough, and at times so steep that the wagons had to be unloaded from time to time and the baggage carried on the backs of the pack animals. Numerous bends in the river helped to slow up travel. Fair pasture land was found in the vicinity of the Valencia ranch. From here the governor went ahead with two squadrons, the military leaders, and six of the residents from El Paso, to see if any of the rebel Indians were in the vicinity. They examined the abandoned pueblo of Isleta, on the west side of the river, and the former haciendas along the road to that of Juan Domínguez de Mendoza. The highway, or Camino Real, showed tracks several

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Robledo, August 24, 1692; Sigüenza, 5.

²¹ Vargas' journal, Peñuelas, August 28, 1692.

²² Vargas left Robledo on August 26, camped that night at El Perrillo. Here the camp separated for the first time. They planned to rejoin at Peñuelas, but Vargas overtook Madrid on the way, August 28. After spending the night at Peñuelas, Madrid again went ahead. Vargas overtook him and joined forces just beyond Paraje del Muerto. The combined forces spent the night of August 29 at a place near some dried out marshes called La Cruz de Anaya. *Ibid.*, August 26 to 29, 1692.

²³ For the itinerary from August 31 to September 7, 1692, see Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 64-67.

days old leading to a fruit orchard on the abandoned hacienda of Mendoza. Here Vargas camped, after an inspection tour which carried him some eight or nine leagues up the river valley.²⁴ They were now in the heart of New Mexico.

On the following day Vargas moved on to the former hacienda of Mejía, twenty-eight to thirty leagues south of Santa Fé, in the vicinity of the present city of Albuquerque. The remainder of the army arrived a few hours later. Camp was pitched near water and green pastures, in a level opening in the midst of forest and piñon covered mountains, where most of the impedimenta was left to facilitate a rapid advance to Santa Fé. With a small party, lightly equipped, he would go on to Santa Fé "in order to carry out the operations in accord with the daring which my eagerness demands, and in spite of the small number of men for such a great enterprise."²⁵

Much anxiety was felt concerning possible Apache attacks because smoke signals were seen repeatedly in the hills;²⁶ consequently the camp was left especially well protected. Rafael Téllez Jirón was left as captain in charge at Mejía, with fourteen men armed and fully equipped, there to await the arrival of the fifty soldiers from Parral; Vargas was taking with him forty Spanish soldiers, the ten residents from El Paso, fifty well armed Indian allies, and two of the three missionary fathers.²⁷ However, Jirón might move over to the former hacienda of Doña Luisa nearby if its pastures were considered more suitable.²⁸ On the arrival of the soldiers from Parral, about whom Vargas had grave doubts, ten were to be left with Jirón, and forty were to go ahead to join Vargas at Santa Fé.²⁹

These preparations made, Vargas set out for Santa Fé at about three o'clock in the afternoon of September 10. He went ahead with most of the soldiers, while Sergeant Major

²⁴ Vargas' journal, in front of the former hacienda of Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, September 8, 1692.


²⁵ *Ibid.*, Mejía, September 9, 1692.

²⁶ Vargas to the king, MS., 5.

²⁷ Vargas' journal, Mejía, September 10, 1692.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Mejía, September 8, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 6.

²⁹ On September 8, Governor Pardiñas of New Vizcaya was sending a message to Vargas notifying him that the fifty soldiers were on their way to El Paso.



Cristóbal de Tapia and the captain of artillery, Francisco Lucero de Godoy, followed with the Indian allies, the ten residents, and six soldiers to guard the convoy of supplies, horses, mules, and pack animals. Vargas meant first to conquer Cochití, believed by all to be the most populous and best fortified of the rebel strongholds, Santa Fé notwithstanding. From there he would pass on to San Felipe and Santo Domingo.

The General's strategy was carefully planned. On reaching Cochití he would lay siege to the pueblo and prevent the escape of its inhabitants. No one should fire on the enemy without Vargas' orders on penalty of death. Then he would order everyone to sing praise to the Blessed Sacrament and the Blessed Virgin five times. After this the two missionaries, through interpreters, would exhort and try to persuade the apostate Indians to reenter the Catholic fold, and again become vassals of the Spanish Crown. Should this be of no avail, then Vargas would order the attack by voice of Adjutant General Diego Varela.³⁰

At daybreak, having travelled without stop from Mejía, a journey of from sixteen to eighteen leagues, Vargas approached Cochití. On the way they passed by the abandoned pueblos of Puaray and Sandía. The road was poor, and the Río Grande, which was almost fordless, was crossed twice. Just before entering Cochití they passed a large field of maize, melons and squash, the sight of which led all to believe the pueblo occupied. But on entering the square they found it to their surprise wholly deserted, and the living quarters already deteriorating.³¹

Since there was no reason to tarry here, the soldiers were ordered to change mounts and continue to Santo Domingo. Twice more the Río Grande was crossed, and after three leagues travel Santo Domingo was reached. The walls of the pueblo were high and strong. Siege was laid to the place, but it also was abandoned. About ten o'clock in the morning, while inspection was being made of the deserted houses, the sergeant major and the captain of artillery arrived. Two soldiers had

³⁰ Vargas' journal, Mejía, September 10, 1692.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Cochití, September 11, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 7.

been sent back to notify them of the condition of Cochití, and to order them to go directly to Santo Domingo.³²

They brought important news. On the way they had sighted the Indians of San Felipe, who had withdrawn to the mesas from their former pueblo on the edge of the river, and who fled from their newly built homes when they were discovered, taking with them their sheep, horses, and all their belongings. Sergeant Major Fernando de Chávez and Captain Antonio Jorge, who as scouts had gone ahead, caught up with one of the Indians and told him to call back the others, and to rest assured that the Spaniards had not come to fight or punish them. The Indian answered in Spanish that his people also wanted peace, and then disclosed the following valuable information. The Tewas and Tanos, who both spoke the same tongue, were at war with them, the Keres, and were doing them much harm.³³ For this reason, he added, he was overjoyed at learning the sentiments of the Spaniards; together they could exterminate the enemy. He then set off toward the mesas with the promise that he would bring back the fleeing residents of San Felipe. But the Indian Estévan, whom Vargas sent to the hills and mesas to follow up this information, said that no one could be found in the vicinity.³⁴

As a result of Estévan's report the General decided to continue the march to Santa Fé without delay. The vanguard, led by Vargas himself, set out at five o'clock that same afternoon, rode on about one league, and reached a steep and difficult mountain pass. The road was broken and strewn with boulders as a result of recent storms and lack of use, so they were

³² Vargas' journal, Santo Domingo, September 11, 1692. According to Sigüenza, 5a, the majority of the dwelling places at Santo Domingo were in a state of complete ruin, and showed no sign of recent occupancy. The seventeenth century pueblo of Santo Domingo did not occupy its present site.

³³ At this time the Tewa pueblos were San Juan, Santa Clara, San Idelfonso, Nambé, Tesuque, Pojoaque, Jacona, in the vicinity of Santa Fé, and Hano in the Moqui country since 1680. The occupied Tano pueblos were Santa Fé, composed chiefly of the Tanos of Galisteo, and San Lázaro and San Cristóbal to the north.

The Keres pueblos were Santo Domingo, Cochití, San Felipe, Santa Ana, Sia, and Ácoma far to the west. The Jémez were their allies. All these pueblos except Ácoma were abandoned at this time, their inhabitants having established new pueblos atop nearby mesas.

³⁴ Vargas' journal, Santo Domingo, September 11, 1692.

literally forced to blaze a new trail. From the summit they looked down into a fertile valley, streaked with arroyos, the hills dotted with piñon trees. On the northern rim, at the foot of the Sangre de Cristo Range, lay Santa Fé. The descent was equally difficult, and after a march of three leagues Vargas camped for the night at Las Bocas, a place on the plain below, where the rest of the camp caught up with them after vespers.³⁵

On Friday, September 12, Vargas went three leagues to La Cieneguilla, on the Santa Fé River. Here they rested till sundown. Before prayers the General led his men to an open space where in a pious harangue he told them to keep their courage; the enterprise at hand was an obligation, for as Catholics it was their duty to defend the Holy Faith, and as vassals of his royal Majesty to uphold the reputation of his arms. In response all pledged a glorious victory. After this dramatic gesture, evidence of the determination of the men, and Vargas' full knowledge of the seriousness of the enterprise, they went on.³⁶

At about eleven o'clock the thickness of the woods and the darkness of the night prevented further progress, so they made camp on the edge of the Arroyo Seco, in which a thread of clear water was trickling. Here the guards were ordered to watch the stars carefully in order that the camp might be aroused at three o'clock the next morning.³⁷ At about two Madrid ordered the soldiers to get ready, and a little after three Vargas mounted and led the vanguard down the Camino Real.³⁸

In the shelter of a broken-down hacienda, which Madrid said was formerly his, they stopped to await the others out along the road. All was forest, dark and deathly silent; it was

³⁵ Vargas' journal, Las Bocas, September 11, 1692. Vargas hit the rough stretch of road within a league from the pueblo of Santo Domingo. This would indicate that he turned up the Galisteo River to the present Domingo Station, then north, up and over the mountain trail, to Las Bocas, at the foot of the later La Bajada trail. Until 1932 the highway from Santa Fé to Albuquerque ascended this range at La Bajada. Since the construction of the new highway some five miles to the southwest, La Bajada has returned to its former state of ruin.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Arroyo Seco, Friday, September 12, 1692.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Santa Fé, September 13, 1692.

safer to be together. A little farther on a second stop was made for the same purpose; there they received the blessing of Father Corvera. A quarter of a league from the villa of Santa Fé, on the edge of a meadow, Vargas called a final halt, and gathering his men about him he outlined his plans. As they approached the villa everyone was to cry out five times in unison, "Glory to the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar"; the natives would then be officially summoned to submit peacefully to the two Majesties;³⁹ no one should fire a shot until Vargas so ordered;⁴⁰ should it be necessary to storm the place, Vargas would give the signal by unsheathing his sword.

³⁹ For a discussion of Spanish policy with regard to the winning of native tribes to "the Holy Catholic Faith, or to obtain their obedience," in such circumstances as these, as contained in the Laws of the Indies (*Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, Madrid, 1756, II, fols. 24-25), see Chapter XVI, below. A description and analysis of the famous Spanish law of *requerimiento*, or summons, may be found in Lewis Hanke, "The 'Requerimiento' and its interpreters," *Revista de Historia de América*, No. 1 (March, 1938), 1-10; *Idem*, "A aplicação do Requerimento na America Hespanhola," *Revista do Brasil*, III (September, 1938), 231-248.

⁴⁰ Vargas was so determined on this point that he had interpreters repeat the order to the Indian allies, although many of them understood Spanish. Vargas' journal, September 13, 1692.

CHAPTER III

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT SANTA FÉ

About four o'clock in the morning the Spaniards reached cultivated fields, and shortly after the walled city of Santa Fé came in view. The cry in praise of the Blessed Sacrament was made, but the enemy had already sounded the alarm, and as the darkness of dawn cleared away, Indian warriors could be seen in great numbers peering down from the ramparts. Suddenly the whole city came to life; men, women, and children swarmed to the roof tops, while the warriors among them emitted frightful whoops to encourage one another. They were hostile from the start. When interpreters spoke to them in their native Tano and Tewa tongues,¹ they answered that these visitors were no Spaniards, but disguised Pecos and crafty Apaches, their enemies. Vargas attempted to convince them otherwise by saying that he was a Catholic, and asking them to wait until sunrise when they could behold for themselves the figure of the Blessed Virgin on his banner. Doubting, they sardonically asked that the trumpet be played in Spanish fashion, and this was done to satisfy them.

As the soldiers were getting restless Vargas was obliged to repeat the order that no one fire on the enemy. He then placed a guard of ten soldiers at each corner of the stronghold, and ordered Captain Roque Madrid to make a circuit of the walls in order to see if there was any means of escape other than by the main entrance. Meanwhile he remained there, at what proved to be the only entrance, with a guard composed of the military leaders and six of the men. The Indians could be heard singing war songs within; those on the ramparts cried out that they were ready to fight for five days, until the

¹ The principal interpreters of the campaign were the Spaniards Pedro Hidalgo, Sergeant Major Juan Ruiz de Casares, Sebastián de Monroy Mondragón, and Pedro de Tapia. Pedro Hidalgo served as interpreter most of the time among the Tewas and Tanos.

Vargas' journal for the period covered in this chapter may be found in A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139, and S.F.A.; English translation in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 80-114.

Spaniards were all exterminated; they would not be able to get away as they had done before; the battle would be preceded by a furious war whoop that would last over an hour, during which time the Spaniards could make up their minds to leave. During this time Indians were carrying up beams, metate stones, boulders, and other objects to be hurled at the Spaniards. When told to stop preparing for battle, they answered in insulting terms.²

After sunrise Vargas approached to some twenty steps from the walls, accompanied by three others, and pleaded with the hostile Tanos.³ He had been sent, he said, by the King of Spain to pardon them and restore them to the Catholic fold; he raised the royal standard, showing them the figure of the Virgin on one side and the royal device on the other. If all this be true, they answered, he must take off his helmet that they might better see his visage. This Vargas did, removing a kerchief from his head as well, and drawing nearer. Since they could no longer dispute the fact, they turned to another argument: when the Spanish were in New Mexico before, they made peace with the Apaches and then killed them; they had no assurances that they would not be treated in a like manner. Vargas, admitting the charge, retorted that Apaches were the scourge of the Pueblo Indians as well as of the Spaniards. He again showed them the figure of the Virgin on his banner as sufficient guarantee of his sincerity, and then drew a rosary from his pocket, saying that with these two as witnesses he promised pardon to all the Indians of Santa Fé, and that missionaries had been brought for this purpose. But the rebels answered that they knew only too well what this would mean; they would be ordered to rebuild the churches and the houses for the Spaniards, and would be whipped if they did not do as they were told, just as some of them had been treated before. They named Xavier, Quintana, and Diego López as Spaniards who had whipped their servants in the days of Spanish rule. They asked Vargas if these were among his men.

² Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, September 13, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 6-7.

³ An interpreter, Captain Roque Madrid, and the civil and military secretary, Alfonso Rael de Aguilar. *Ibid.*

His response was that they were not, and he promised, moreover, that they would never again return.

At this point one rebel, named Antonio Bolsas, appeared defiantly on the large intrenchment above the main entrance, apparently to speak for his people. Bracing him were warriors, holding ready their lances, and their bows and arrows, watching every movement of the Spaniards, as if hoping for a cause to open battle. At this opportune moment the rest of the camp arrived with the food supplies, and Vargas ordered them to stop on a level spot beyond the cultivated fields, about a musket shot from the villa. Then he had the two cannons placed in position, the blacksmiths prepare their tools, and a squad of soldiers with some Indian allies stationed. These preparations threw fear into the hearts of the rebellious enemy, who perhaps anticipating the arrival of other parties of Spaniards began to act a little less defiantly.

The large wooden doorway in the wall was drawn open from within, and an Indian warrior, somewhat afraid, came forth, lance in hand, and provided with darts, a bow, and arrows, as if to say that his people were unafraid and ready. He then asked the missionaries to enter. Another Indian spoke to him from above and he reentered the walls. Father Barroso and Father Corvera, brave men, had already dismounted from their horses and were ready to follow the Indian, when Vargas, who feared treachery, ordered them back.

The sentinels stationed at the corners of the city now saw a number of Indian warriors swiftly riding in from the surrounding pueblos, armed with long iron-tipped lances.⁴ Two squads, one under Roque Madrid, were immediately ordered to go and meet them to prevent a joining of forces with those within the city. Vargas remaining behind with the rest continued his exhortations. He asked the Tanos to stop greasing themselves with war paint, and disclosed to them what soon was to be one of the principal causes leading to their ultimate submission. He had noticed many small water tanks near the doorway, reservoirs from which water was sluiced into the

⁴ As Vargas later learned, the Tewas had an Indian blacksmith who made these lances for them.

pueblo, and he had cut off this water supply by obstructing the ditch which served as a water line.⁵

By eleven o'clock, after hours of futile persuasion, Vargas prepared for battle. With the forty soldiers stationed at strategic points, and some fifty Indian allies on hand, in the form of an ultimatum he gave the natives one hour in which to submit; otherwise he would destroy them with fire and sword. Thereupon the Spaniards returned to camp for a bite to eat. Each soldier was given chocolate and a biscuit. The General then ordered the soldiers to prepare powder and bullets, and the captain of artillery to set up the large *pedrero* and the bronze cannon in front of the walls. The squadrons were sent back to their posts.

Two hours passed and still Vargas' threat was unanswered. Suddenly the sergeant approached with three Indians from the nearby mesa, two on horseback and one on foot, all armed with bows, arrows and darts. They were from Tesuque, Santa Clara, and San Lázaro, hastening in answer to the call of the besieged residents of Santa Fé. They had been notified of the coming of the Spaniards by some Santa Fé men attending a dance at Santa Clara. A Tewa leader named Domingo was their spokesman.⁶ Vargas used every device to win him over. He repeated his usual pious speech: he had come to pardon and convert them, for which reason he brought missionaries; they must again become loyal Spanish vassals; they must not leave their pueblos; he came with peaceful intentions, and not to remove their governors and captains, whom he would leave in office. Vargas then sent Domingo to the villa to notify the enemy that the hour had long passed, and that if they had no answer the storming of the city would begin. Domingo, unlike the others, was friendly and submissive.⁷

Meanwhile the captain of artillery began to plant the cannons at strategic points; the two boxes of powder were prepared for quick breach, so that at the specified time the few

⁵ Vargas' journal, September 13, 1692.

⁶ Governor of Tesuque. *Ibid.*, Tesuque, September 29, 1692. Sigüenza, 6a, erroneously states that he was the governor of Santa Fé, an error repeated by later authors. The governor of Santa Fé was named José. Vargas' journal, September 17, 1692.

⁷ *Ibid.*, September 13, 1692.

men could advance in all directions to the assault. The plan to capture the populous city of Santa Fé, walled and fortified, with only a handful of men, was one of the most daring enterprises in the annals of the region. For the surrounding pueblos knew of their arrival and were pouring in on foot and on horseback, well armed, from every direction. On the mesa at the right-hand corner of the stronghold a squad of some forty or fifty Indian soldiery was already stationed. Two squads of Spanish soldiers were sent to prevent its advance. And when the cannons were placed in position the rebels began to station themselves on the walls, hitherto only partly guarded.

Presently Domingo came out amid the jeers of the infuriated Indians on the walls above. He had spoken to them, recalling to their memory the burning of Sia by Governor Cruzate in 1689, but this did not frighten them. With firm courage Vargas now dismounted. Standing before the gateway accompanied only by the royal *alférez* and his secretary, in a loud voice he made one last harangue. He again showed them the Virgin and the Cross. He told them: their city was in a state of siege, their water supply cut off, and they would soon perish; but he would be willing to listen if one of them should come out with an official answer.

The natives were suddenly filled with dread. If the Spaniards would clear the square in front of the city they would come out and make a statement. The entreaties continued until finally two Indians emerged, unarmed, to sue for peace. Vargas met them with affection and kindness, and the other Spaniards took advantage of the opportunity to act quickly. Father Corvera entered the walls into the patio followed by Captain Madrid and Father Muñiz. Other Indians gradually began to come out, somewhat frightened, to make peace. Vargas, on foot, greeted and embraced them all, and spoke to them with affection. Even some of those who had been looking on from behind thickets and from the hills also came forward.⁸

Then, in the company of Madrid, the civil and military secretary, and a squadron of twelve soldiers, Vargas went to the mesa to speak to the Indians there. After rendering praise to the Blessed Sacrament he spoke to them essentially as he had

⁸ *Ibid.*; Vargas to the king, MS., 8.

spoken to those in the city. They likewise laid down their arms in submission. Leaving them apparently satisfied, Vargas returned to the square. Here the people were told to hang crosses at their necks, and to set up a large cross in the middle of their patio. It was now between four and five in the evening, so Vargas retired to the encampment for dinner. The Indians from the nearby mesa moved about in small groups satisfying their curiosity. Some went in and out of the city, causing the General no little anxiety. But satisfied with the victory already achieved, he made no move to prevent it, deciding rather to trust in Divine Providence. The cannons were carried away on mule carts and the siege was raised.

The Spaniards camped for the night at the foot of the mountain an arquebus shot from the plaza, or open square of the city, there to await further developments. Two squadrons were designated to guard the horses and mules; the other two were ordered to saddle fresh mounts, and be armed in readiness for battle. This last order was passed on to the entire camp. Thus the whole night was spent on guard. All night long Indians did not cease to go in and out of the city, as was clear from the continual thud of horses' hooves and the barking of dogs.⁹

The next day, which was the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, Vargas dressed in his gala finery in order to assist the missionaries in the absolution of the Indians, despite the advice of his lieutenants to the effect that he change to armor. Thus attired, he rode out toward the city to the music of the band, accompanied by the alférez carrying the royal banner, by Madrid and the other military leaders, by the missionaries and the six residents from El Paso.¹⁰

The Indians were visibly frightened. Only about eight or ten were in sight, and these told the Spaniards not to enter, for the women and children were afraid and weeping. When the Spaniards entered some of the residents began to close the gate behind them. Vargas paid no heed, and won them over through his very boldness. A large five-foot cross had been

⁹ Vargas to the king, MS., 9.

¹⁰ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, September 14, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 9.

planted in the patio. Vargas dismounted, approached it, fell to one knee, and kissed it. Thus assured, the people began to climb down from the roof tops, some of which were quite high, by means of wooden ladders.¹¹ When they all had come down the men and women divided into separate groups.¹² General Vargas strode through their midst with the royal standard raised in one hand. He then addressed them, through an interpreter, as he had done on many previous occasions, asking them to be peaceful and happy to be pardoned; he wished them again to become vassals of the Spanish king and good Christians. Both demands were granted. Then the soldiers stood in line with swords unsheathed¹³ as Vargas took formal possession of the villa of Santa Fé. The royal standard was raised three times, and each time Vargas cried out:

Long live our king, Carlos the Second! May God spare him! King of Spain and of all this New World, and of the realm and provinces of New Mexico, and of these subjects newly won and conquered!¹⁴

Each time his men answered, "May he live many years and rule happily!" In joy they tossed their hats into the air, while the missionaries fell to their knees and thanked God for their good fortune. Father Corvera intoned the *Te Deum Laudamus*. Then he spoke to the assembled Indians through an interpreter, blessed them with holy water, and absolved them of their apostasy. This was followed by the singing of the *alabado*, or "praise be to God," which many of the women and children repeated with them. Vargas and his men now mingled

¹¹ *Ibid.* After use these ladders were lifted up and placed inside the raised edges of the roof in the form of palisades. In this way the natives were assured that no one could gain access from the outside. There were four large living quarters around the city square, the three rear ones being taller than the other. Rooms had been built over the old governor's palace, which ran along one side of the front patio, of which there were two. Some idea of the size of these communal dwellings may be gathered from the record that when they were inspected for occupation in the following year it took twenty soldiers and thirty friendly Indians a whole day to do so. It was estimated at that time that there were sufficient rooms to house over a thousand people easily. *Ibid.*; Vargas to the king, MS., 10; the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January, 1694, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

¹² Vargas' journal, September 14, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 10.

¹³ Vargas' journal, Tesuque, September 29, 1692.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Santa Fé, September 14, 1692.

amicably with the Indians, finally returning to their camp beyond the square. As a precautionary measure no shots had been fired during the celebration. General Vargas had won his first victory.¹⁵

Others quickly followed. About noon Domingo came to notify the General that all the Tewa and Tano pueblos had promised their allegiance, and that Don Luis Picuríes, also known as Tupatú, still the principal leader of the Tewas, Tanos, and Picuríes, would arrive shortly. He had not come before because he had been called away by the Navahos.¹⁶ Later in the afternoon, at about four, some Indian leaders from San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, and Tesuque came to Vargas' camp also to pledge allegiance.¹⁷

On the following morning Vargas sent the Indian Antonio Bolsas to Tesuque, there to await Don Luis, who was on his way to Santa Fé.¹⁸ Meanwhile the General with his men entered the city, and before a crude altar which had been erected, Father Corvera told the Indians to bring their children, grown up during the absence of the Spaniards, that they might be baptized. Then Mass was said, followed by prayers and a pious instruction in which Vargas told them to pray every morning and evening before the holy cross in the patio, as the

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Vargas later wrote that when he first approached the villa of Santa Fé on September 13, the Tanos were so infuriated, and so numerous and well protected, that he lost all hopes of ever conquering them. Aware that he was rashly endangering both himself and his people, he delayed as long as possible. But the enemy was so hostile that he probably would have attacked them if the soldiers of Parral had been with him, an action which might very easily have ended in disaster. It was only a series of unforeseen developments, then, coupled with Vargas' patience, faith, and courage, that caused the natives finally to submit without his having to strike a single blow. Vargas to Juan Pérez Hurtado, Santa Fé, September 20, 1692, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37.

¹⁶ Vargas' journal, September 14, 1692.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Santa Fé, September 15, 1692. At sunrise Antonio Bolsas had arrived at Vargas' tent with the information that Don Luis Picuríes was now at pueblo San Juan, having arrived late after visiting the Navaho Apaches. He was happy to hear of the arrival of the Spaniards, and the peaceful return of the natives of Santa Fé to Christianity. But he was afraid that he would be seized and punished, for the rumor had spread among the Indians (Vargas later heard the story repeated on many occasions), that the Spanish king had ordered General Vargas to capture and carry off those Indians who had been the principal leaders during the period of independence. Vargas explained that this was not true.

Spaniards were accustomed to do. Almost all of the Indians were wearing crosses, as Vargas had ordered. To all admonitions they nodded in assent. Due to the stormy weather, however, the baptism of the children was postponed, and the Spaniards returned to the shelter of their encampment.¹⁹

About five o'clock a large band of Indians, some three hundred in all, was seen emerging from the dense forests to the north, and making its way down the main road from Tesuque. Warriors on foot led the way, followed by a cavalry contingent, most of them clothed in leather jackets. Vargas immediately placed a guard around his tent. In sight of the city they halted for a moment to await several Indians who had gone out to meet them.²⁰ Then, in a most formal fashion, an Indian captain and two others, sent by Don Luis, went to Vargas' tent and asked for an audience in the name of their leader. It was readily granted. Don Luis now dismounted and walked to Vargas' tent. He was "dressed in the customary manner, in skins of animals." Around his head he wore a band made of palmilla fibre woven into a cord, and above his forehead was a shell the shape of a heart, all of which gave the appearance of a crown.²¹

He stopped about twenty steps from the Spanish General's tent, at which point the latter ordered the *alférez* to raise the royal standard. From here the chieftain greeted Vargas with three sweeping bows, each time falling upon one knee. At the doorway of his tent Vargas received him in a friendly embrace. Don Luis produced a number of religious articles which Vargas examined with due respect,²² whereupon they went inside and had a cup of chocolate in the company of the priests and attendants. Here it was learned definitely that the pueblos

¹⁹ *Ibid.* The prayers they were told to recite twice daily, after blessing themselves, were the Ave Maria, the Pater Noster, the Salve, and the *alabado*.

²⁰ They stopped on the north side of an arroyo some seventy paces from Vargas' tent. *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1692. According to Sigüenza, 9a, he carried a musket, a pouch of powder, and lead.

²² Among these were a small silver crucifix, a small piece of silk upon which was stamped the visage of the Virgin of Guadalupe, a purse full of relics, and a religious medal which Don Luis said he was accustomed to wear. About his neck Don Luis wore the rosary Vargas had sent him. Vargas' journal, September 15, 1692.

of the upper Río Grande were at odds and divided into two camps. Don Luis, formerly the leader of all the pueblos, was now the leader of the Tewas, Tanos, and Picuríes, and resided at San Juan. Pecos, Taos and its allies, the Faraon Apaches, Jémez, and the Keres pueblos of San Felipe, Santo Domingo, and Cochití were all his enemies.²³ Vargas promised Don Luis that he would be left as governor of the Indians so long as he endeavored to bring all back to the Catholic fold and to allegiance to Spain.²⁴ The Spanish general presented him with one of his best riding horses, for which he showed great pleasure, protesting his warm friendship and responding with a gift of animal skins.²⁵ Don Luis left saying that he would return the following day in order to talk things over in greater detail.²⁶

Next morning the chieftain appeared with the captains and leaders of the pueblos that recognized his authority: namely, the Tewas, Tanos, and Picuríes.²⁷ It was an impressive gathering. After breakfast Vargas reiterated his peaceful intentions, and to be sure of the sincerity of the Indian chiefs he asked all to accept absolution. In obedience they knelt down, and Father Corvera, taking his manual, and assisted by the two other missionaries, absolved them. Now, placing full trust in their loyalty, Vargas seated himself among them, and there in his tent he made known to them his plans.

He would visit all the pueblos in order to carry out the royal orders; the priests would go with him to pardon and absolve the people; those who had been married in the church and had left their wives must return to them; all the children born and raised during the absence of the missionaries must be baptized; all who refused to bow to his authority would be destroyed. Don Luis indicated how difficult it would be to carry out this program at present, as most of the people had deserted their pueblos and had fled to the mesas and mountains

²³ *Ibid.*, September 16, 1692.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1692.

²⁵ *Ibid.* These consisted of "various elk and buffalo hides, and seal skins" ("diferentes pieles de antas, sybolas y lobos marinos"), according to Vargas to the king, MS. The word "Dantas" instead of "de antas," or "elk," in Sigüenza, is obviously a misprint.

²⁶ Vargas' journal, September 15, 1692.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, September 16, 1692.

for safety. Since the villa of Santa Fé had already submitted, he argued, Vargas might return with the missionaries the following year, and by that time he would find all in their pueblos. The Spanish General informed Don Luis of his obligation to report to the king that he had visited all the pueblos and revalidated Spain's title to them, and consequently he had outlined the following plan of campaign. He would first visit Pecos and the Faraon Apaches. If successful he would go from there to Taos, and on the way back from there to Santa Fé he would visit the Jémez and the Keres of San Felipe. In the meantime the Tewas, Tanos and Picuríes could reoccupy their pueblos. They would have nothing to fear during his absence, as he was going to send for more men whom he had left behind.²⁸

Don Luis and his captains agreed to everything. During the rest of the afternoon the Indians traded their goods with the Spaniards. When Don Luis left at sundown, he took with him the sergeant major Juan Ruiz de Casares and his brother-in-law Miguel Luján, who had relatives at San Juan. He promised to return with a small army to accompany Vargas on his northern campaign.

On the following morning, August 17, Mass was again celebrated in the patio of the villa, and 122 children were baptized.²⁹ Later in the afternoon Governor Lorenzo, of Picuríes, arrived. He was informed essentially of everything told to the other chiefs the day before. He also brought animal skins as gifts, and was presented in turn with a horse. The Picuríes Indians who had come with Don Lorenzo spent the next day trading with the Spaniards. At sundown the two soldiers who had accompanied Don Luis to San Juan returned

²⁸ *Ibid.* This was a clever piece of stratagem on the part of the Spanish general, for the small party that had been left at Mejía was only a drop in the bucket, and he had absolutely no news as yet with regard to the fifty soldiers from Parral.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, September 17, 1692. The Spaniards served as godfathers. This came to be the practice in all the other pueblos visited. Father Corvera, president of the missionaries, listed the baptisms in a record book that he had for the purpose.

Here we hear for the first time of Don José, designated as the captain and leader of the villa of Santa Fé, and of his wife Doña Juana, whose three daughters were baptized at this time, Vargas serving as godfather.

with valuable observations. The residents of the pueblos passed on the way had all moved to the mesas; but on Don Luis's orders they had returned to their homes. The same had been the case at San Juan.³⁰

Meanwhile final preparations were made for the northern expedition. Tewa Indian scouts who had been sent out into the mountains to spy on the movements of the enemy saw about twenty tracks from the direction of Santo Domingo. As a result the guard was strengthened at every point and everyone was ordered to be on the alert. And in case the soldiers from Parral should arrive during his absence, of whom he had not yet heard a word, Vargas left a note at Santa Fé addressed to their leader, Juan Páez Hurtado, telling him to follow.³¹

³⁰ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1692. During this time a soldier named Francisco Márquez discovered a bronze cannon which had been buried by the Spaniards when they fled from New Mexico in 1680. It was not found in the place where it had been left. It was about seven spans long, and the touch hole was blown open and partially obstructed. *Ibid.*, September 20, 1692.

³¹ Vargas to Juan Páez Hurtado, Santa Fé, September 20, 1692.

CHAPTER IV

SPAIN RECLAIMS NEW MEXICO

At sundown, September 20, the Indian chiefs Luis, Lorenzo, and Domingo, with their captains and warriors were welcomed heartily at Vargas' tent, just outside the walls of Santa Fé. Chocolate was served, and the friendly guests were told that since it was late the expedition would set out the following day.¹

On Sunday morning, September 21, after Mass, Father Muñiz absolved the new arrivals and the joint expedition set out for Pecos.² Galisteo was designated as the first stop. Indian scouts were sent ahead to see if any of the enemy were in the vicinity, and to examine the water holes and some water tanks built there by the Tanos before they moved to Santa Fé. They found the place deserted and without water, and hence Vargas camped on the edge of the Arroyo de Galisteo close by, after a march of eight leagues.

Next morning, just before sunrise, two shots were heard. Of a sudden Captain Hurtado appeared. At last the reinforcements from Parral had arrived!³ Hurtado had reached Santa Fé at sundown the day before, and having read Vargas' message he had hastened on ahead with six soldiers. The others resting at Santa Fé would join up in the afternoon. On this account the march to Pecos was temporarily postponed. Swift Indian scouts continued to comb the surrounding hills and mesas. One of them, an Indian named Nicolás, discovered some fresh tracks, and following up his observations, came

¹ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, September 20, 1692. According to Sigüenza, 10, they brought with them over 300 well armed Indians.

Unless otherwise specified the documents cited in this chapter are from A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139, and S.F.A.

² Vargas' journal, September 21, 1692. They left at about 9 A. M.

³ *Ibid.*, September 22, 1692. The fifty soldiers had arrived at El Paso on September 5, at 9 A. M. They were well equipped, armed, and with horses, and presented a list of their equipment to Lieutenant Governor Luis Granillo on their arrival. Certification of the arrival of the fifty soldiers at El Paso, Friday, September 5, 1692.

upon a horse apparently too tired to keep pace with the fleeing enemy.

Later in the day a march until ten o'clock in the evening, about three leagues, brought them to camp in a small ravine on the edge of the mountains. According to the scouts this was the place nearest to Pecos where there was plenty of pasture and the camp would not be noticed. The following day the march was continued, and after travelling about a league they came upon fresh tracks leading toward Pecos. Ascending a hill and a barranca they came in view of the pueblo. A moment later they saw smoke rising from the roof tops in two different spots. The Spanish forces split into three groups to facilitate the proposed siege. Captain Madrid led the soldiers of the El Paso presidio, Captain Hurtado those from Parral, and the General took with him the other military leaders and the six residents of El Paso.⁴

The Indian allies out ahead reported that the Pecos Indians were coming forth on horseback to meet them. Vargas ordered Varela to have a volley fired immediately upon the arrival of the enemy. The Spaniards then sped toward the pueblo at full gallop. But the rambling open pueblo was deserted. The two riders whose fresh tracks had been seen on the way must have notified the people, the Spaniards thought, for the houses were well supplied with maize and vegetables, and showed other signs of recent occupation.⁵ The soldiers were ordered to follow the tracks of the fugitives, and due to the many breaks, ascents, and barrancas, they were soon stretched out over the mountain range that edged the river opposite the pueblo.⁶

Vargas and his attendants entered a deep ravine where they saw children's foot prints. Then a shot was heard that echoed from cliff to cliff, and in a moment a soldier rode up leading an old Indian woman. On inquiry she said that the younger people had left the pueblo six days before, on the arrival of the Spaniards at Santa Fé, despite the protests of

⁴ Vargas' journal, Pecos, September 23, 1692.

⁵ *Ibid.* From the size of the dwellings Vargas estimated that the population of Pecos was about 1,500. *Auto de remisión*, Vargas to the viceroy, October 16, 1692.

⁶ Vargas' journal, September 23, 1692.

the elders. A few of the older people had remained behind, but had fled that very morning on news of the Spanish approach. Soon another soldier brought in an old Indian about sixty years of age, stark naked. Vargas had him clothed in some of the skins worn by the old woman before questioning him. His story was the same. Vargas told him the object of his visit, and then sent him to call back his people. A rosary had been placed about his neck, and he was given a cross, about a span in length, on which was affixed a letter. Gradually a number of men, women, and children were assembled, twenty-seven in all. Also many skins of animals left by the fast fleeing rebels were found under trees and bushes along the gulches.

In the middle of the afternoon another old Indian appeared with the cross which Don Diego had sent by the first *viejo*. He corroborated the story of the others, adding that only eleven had remained in the fields with their wives and children when notified early that morning of the coming of the Spaniards; the others had fled pell-mell into the mountains. It would take time to bring them all back. The old man, he revealed, whom Vargas had sent with the cross was the governor of the pueblo. The old fellow was told to call back the people, and to give them the message that he, Vargas, and the Tewas and Tanos as well, had come to make friends. The old Indian understood everything and left fully satisfied.

The Spanish soldiers made headquarters in the abandoned houses of the pueblo. The next morning several other Pecos Indians were brought in or made their appearance voluntarily. Among them was an old man sent by his governor to report that the people were being assembled, and would soon return. On learning this, several of the captives were sent out in unsuccessful attempts to reach the fugitives. The last mentioned old Indian was first ordered to deliver the message, but since he was old and infirm an Indian woman offered to go in his stead. She was the daughter of a former governor of Pecos. A rosary was placed about her neck, and she left with four Indians, leaving her daughter and mother behind. Twice she went through the mountains crying out to the people, but no one answered. Then a Pecos Indian youth was sent, likewise

to no avail. Finally a few more of those who apparently had strayed off by themselves were captured. Among these was a Spanish youth who had been held captive at Pecos since 1680, the son of Cristóbal de Anaya, who had been slain at that time. He happened to be the nephew of Vargas' captain of artillery, Francisco Lucero de Godoy, who immediately took him under his charge.⁷

From the scouting party led by the Tewa captain Domingo, the intractability of the younger Pecos Indians was definitely learned. They approached three of them on the summits, and when asked to come down and make friends they replied that the Spaniards were liars, and those Indians who had befriended them were fools. They then fled into the mountains uttering loud and piercing war whoops. After five days of peaceful effort to negotiate with the Pecos, Vargas decided to return to Santa Fé.⁸ The twenty-eight captives were set free and their houses restored.⁹ As a sign of peace a cross was set up in the square, and others were painted on the walls of the houses. A note was left consisting of a cross drawn on a piece of white paper; the people were informed that whenever the pueblo wished to make peace the Spaniards would be ready to acknowledge it. No one had been harmed, nor had any property been damaged. Of the liberated captives, eight returned to Santa Fé with the camp of their own accord.¹⁰ After a continuous march over eight leagues of steep and difficult road through the piñon covered mountains southeast of Santa Fé, Vargas reached his encampment in front of the villa.¹¹

He now prepared the stupendous task of completing the

⁷ Vargas' journal, September 25-27, 1692.

⁸ *Ibid.*, September 26, 1692. In order to prevent the Keres of Santa Ana from preparing for resistance under their leader Antonio Malacate, a Keres Indian brought up from El Paso was sent to the mesas of Santa Ana and Cerro Colorado, where they were gathered, with a message of friendship, a rosary, a note, and a cross. He was ordered to tell Malacate to meet Vargas at Santo Domingo. The Keres Indian messenger was the instigator of this move, for he had another object in mind—his wife was residing at Santa Ana. *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, September 27, 1692.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.* The main body reached Santa Fé at 3 P. M. The captain of artillery spent the night in the mountains with a squad of ten soldiers, due to the difficulty in transporting the cannon, and entered the camp the following day.

reconquest before the close of the year. He planned first to embark upon the systematic conquest of the upper Río Grande pueblos. He would make the circuit by visiting the Tewa pueblos north of Santa Fé, namely, Tesuque, Cuyamungué, Nambé, Pojoaque, Jacona, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, and San Juan, and the nearby Tanos pueblos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal. Then, with San Juan as a base, he would visit Picuríes and Taos. This would be followed by forcing the Pecos, Jémez, and Keres to reoccupy their abandoned pueblos, and the reconquest of the upper Río Grande would be complete. The reconquest of the outlying provinces to the west, including Ácoma, Zuñi, and the Moqui pueblos, would terminate the campaign.

On the feast of San Miguel, after Mass, Vargas left with great pomp for Tesuque, three leagues north of Santa Fé.¹² He was welcomed there by Governor Domingo, who led him into the square.¹³ The natives were formed in two lines and at the head of one of them a youth was holding a cross. The Spaniards intoned the *Te Deum*, to which the natives responded wholeheartedly, after which Vargas greeted the people and then took formal possession for Spain, just as he had done at Santa Fé. The priests absolved the people, and seventy-four children were baptized. In his speech to the natives, after they had been absolved, Vargas set down the same rules as those promulgated at Santa Fé under similar circumstances. The Indians were ordered to wear crosses about their necks, and say morning and evening prayers, while those who had been married in the Church and later left their wives must return to them, and leave those with whom they were now living. These same rules were laid down at every other pueblo visited.¹⁴

On the following day Vargas revalidated the possession of the pueblos of Cuyamungué, Nambé, and Pojoaque.¹⁵ In

¹² Vargas' journal, Tesuque, September 29, 1692.

¹³ Around the square there were three *cuarteles*, or communal dwellings, two of which were quite tall. *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, September 30, 1692. Cuyamungué, two leagues north of Tesuque; Nambé, two leagues northeast of Cuyamungué, four communal dwellings; Pojoaque, one league west of Nambé, two communal dwellings.

each place he was well received by the governor and the people.¹⁶ A total of 129 were baptized.¹⁷ On October 1, after spending the night at Pojoaque, the same success was achieved at Jacona and San Ildefonso.¹⁸ At the little pueblo of Jacona, where the people lived in a single communal dwelling, eighteen were baptized.¹⁹ The larger pueblo of San Ildefonso had four dwellings, and here 101 were baptized.²⁰

The night was spent at San Ildefonso, before Vargas moved on to Santa Clara and San Juan.²¹ Eighty-nine children were baptized at Santa Clara.²² On approaching San Juan, Don Luis, the governor and leader of the Tewas, came out to meet him in the company of his brother Antonio. They carried a cross and a curious Indian banner. At the entrance of the pueblo the natives had placed many crosses, and a larger one was standing in the square. Here the Indians had built a room with a corridor, decorated with branches, for Vargas and the missionaries. After Vargas had made his customary speech before the assembled people, he took formal possession, and seventy-six were baptized. The reunion of old acquaintances and relations added romance to the scene. One woman, the wife of a certain Cristóbal Nieto of Sonora, was recognized by relatives. Vargas served as godfather to a girl of mixed blood named Juana de Arzate, and a captive Spanish girl, still single, the daughter of a soldier named Nevares of the presidio at Janos. A Tiwa girl, originally from Isleta, joyously embraced her brother Juan Moro, one of the Indians in Vargas' party.²³

With San Juan as headquarters, Vargas next day made a

¹⁶ The captains and governors were Juan at Cuyamungué, Alonso at Nambé, and Gregorio at Pojoaque. *Ibid.*

¹⁷ 30 at Cuyamungué, 51 at Nambé, and 48 at Pojoaque. *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, October 1, 1692. Jacona was one league west of Pojoaque, and San Ildefonso one league further west.

¹⁹ Diego was the name of the captain of Jacona. *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.* The captain, Francisco, went out to greet Vargas with all the people who happened to be there. The others were peacefully at their work in the fields and gathering wood. Shortly all gathered in the square and Vargas took formal possession.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Santa Clara, October 2, 1692. Santa Clara, two leagues north of San Ildefonso, four dwellings; San Juan, not quite four leagues north of Santa Clara.

²² The captain of the pueblo was named Domingo.

²³ *Ibid.*

rapid trip to the Tano and Tewa pueblos of San Cristóbal and San Lázaro.²⁴ He took with him the military leaders, interpreters, Fathers Corvera and Barroso, his secretary, and two military squadrons. They were well received at both pueblos. Sixty-six were baptized at San Cristóbal. Here again families were reunited. One of the Tewa warriors in Vargas' camp found his wife, with two children, and she was happy to join him; another was joined by his wife, of the Piro nation, and her small son. At San Lázaro eighty-nine were baptized. Vargas was asked to dinner, and after an enjoyable repast he returned to San Juan.²⁵

At two o'clock in the afternoon of October 4 Don Diego left with a small party for Picurías and Taos, some twenty-one leagues to the northeast. The road passed through difficult mountain country, rugged and heavily wooded, and cut by numerous running streams, of which Don Diego was fully aware through the information of Indian guides. Furthermore the rigors of winter were fast setting in. Under such circumstances it was felt advisable to leave the cannon at San Juan, with a small contingent consisting of the captain of artillery, ten soldiers fully equipped, and those who were too tired to make the trip north.²⁶

Vargas went to Taos with the purpose of either pacifying or destroying the pueblo. The Taos were the arch-enemies of the Tewas, Tanos and Picurías, who had asked that the place be burned and consumed.²⁷ The first night was spent at a bend three leagues up the Santa Cruz River; and Picurías, eight

²⁴ *Ibid.*, San Juan, October 3, 1692. San Cristóbal, three long leagues southeast of San Juan; San Lázaro, one league farther. Each of these pueblos had four community dwellings, and in the latter, one was situated in the center of the square. These pueblos were located southwest of Santa Fé originally, where their ruins still stand. After the revolt of 1680, due to the hostility of the Apaches, Pecos, and Keres, they moved to the vicinity of San Juan, as already indicated, the newly established pueblos taking over the same names. Some of their allies, the Tewas, were living with them here in 1692. *Ibid.*; *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, 3rd series, Mexico, 1856, 122. These two pueblos were on the site of the present town of Santa Cruz de la Cañada and its surrounding ranches. Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, April 19, 1695, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

²⁵ Vargas' journal, San Juan, October 3, 1692.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, October 4, 1692.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Paraje de Miranda, October 7, 1692.

leagues beyond, was entered the following day. For a quarter of a league before the entrance of the pueblo arches had been placed over the road, with crosses on them. At the pueblo Vargas was received by Don Lorenzo, the governor, his two brothers Luis and Antonio, and the inhabitants. The pueblo had four large community dwellings, divided, of three and four stories, with adobe walls, long corridors, and palisaded windows. One of the dwellings was decorated with green boughs, and had been prepared for Vargas and the missionaries. With the usual formalities, possession was taken, and eighty-six children were baptized.²⁸

It snowed all that night; nevertheless, Vargas went on to Taos, accompanied by the Picuríes leaders, at noon of October 6. The bad weather continued, and the road was seriously damaged. After marching four leagues the party made camp for the night at a place called Paraje del Muerto. Next morning, a gallop of four leagues brought the brave little band in sight of Taos. In a level meadow Vargas and his soldiers received absolution from Father Barroso, and prepared for battle. The three squadrons laid siege to the two large communal dwellings, which were well protected by adobe walls and earthworks. But they were both deserted.²⁹

Smoke rising from the tree tops to the east caused Don Luis and Don Lorenzo to reconnoiter the mountain side, later to be followed by Vargas on a fresh mount. An hour later it was discovered that the residents of Taos were gathered in a ravine³⁰ at the entrance of the Taos Mountains, and were watched over by sentinels stationed on the surrounding peaks. Vargas went posthaste to where they were, and an Indian named Josefillo, who said he was called "the Spaniard," came out to greet him. The General, delivering his wonted message, sent him with a rosary to call back the others out of the snow. He then dismounted, laid down his arms, and went to the foot of the mountains. After several missions had been sent to exhort them they began to return in large numbers, among them their governor Francisco Pacheco.³¹

²⁸ Vargas' journal, Picuríes, October 5, 1692.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Taos, October 6, 1692.

³⁰ "Embudo," a canyon shaped like a funnel.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Taos, October 7, 1692.

Vargas persuaded all to return to their homes, and even succeeded in getting them to make friends with the Picuríes, Tanos, and Tewas, their former enemies. In the middle of the afternoon other Indians appeared with their wives and children. By nightfall all had returned, and on the following day Vargas took formal possession; ninety-six were baptized.³² At about four o'clock that afternoon, Pacheco and Josefillo visited Vargas' tent. They said that since they were now brothers in the faith, they had come to warn the General of a dastardly plot against the Spaniards. This was their story:

Two Taos youths had just returned from the province of Zuñi, and on their way back, near Ácoma, they noticed a great council being held for three days and three nights. It was attended by the captains of the Zuñi, Moqui, Jémez, Keres, Pecos, Faraon Apaches, Conina Apaches of Cerro Colorado, and many others. These had been informed that the Spaniards were in the vicinity of Taos and would be there long enough to permit them to gather their provisions and make careful plans to ambush Vargas and his company on the way back from the north.³³

Vargas acted without delay. Luis and Lorenzo were ordered to prepare the swiftest and most valiant warriors of their respective pueblos to accompany him on a campaign straightway into the Keres country. If the Keres should promise allegiance as the Taos had done, they would be pardoned, otherwise they would be brought to submission by force, in order to assure the safety of those pueblos already under royal protection. Messengers were sent to Pecos with notices that the Spaniards would soon be at its gates demanding a definite answer. Within nine days the allied forces were to be at Santa Fé ready to leave for Pecos.³⁴

On October 9 Vargas left Taos peacefully conquered and reduced.³⁵ The first night was spent at Paraje de Miranda. From there he went on to Picuríes.³⁶ The Spaniards reached San Juan on the 11th, by way of the perilous road through

³² Vargas' journal, Taos, October 8, 1692.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Taos, October 9, 1692.

³⁵ From Taos Vargas removed ten Piro and Tiwa captives.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Picuríes, October 10, 1692.

Atajo del Embudo.³⁷ Here Vargas was joined by the rest of his forces. During his absence there had been no acts of hostility of any kind on the part of the pueblos which had already submitted. On October 14 he passed through San Ildefonso in all his glory, and the following day was back in Santa Fé.³⁸

Here Vargas penned a letter to the viceroy in which he gave a brief account of his activities to date, sending a copy of his campaign journal, or *autos de guerra*. Between September 13 and October 9, he reported, thirteen pueblos had been restored to Spanish authority and reduced to the Holy Faith, including the villa of Santa Fé. In these pueblos 969 persons born and raised during the period of Pueblo independence were baptized. All the pueblos for thirty-six leagues, Vargas boasted, had pledged allegiance to Spain, and their possession had been formally revalidated in the name of His Majesty King Charles II.³⁹

He was now ready to conquer the remaining hostile pueblos in the vicinity of Santa Fé. With a host of allies recently acquired the task was greatly lessened. If after this campaign the horses were not too tired he hoped to undertake a rapid march to Zuñi and Moqui, some 150 leagues west of Santa Fé, and from there to pass on to examine the reported quicksilver mines of Cerro Colorado. With this information at hand, Vargas wrote, the king should now begin to make plans for the permanent resettlement of this vast region which was veritably "another Mexico." "To send less than five hundred families and one hundred soldiers would be like dropping a grain of salt into the sea." On the other hand, not even one hundred families and fifty more soldiers from New Vizcaya would budge without financial assistance from the royal treasury. Therefore he suggested the sending of jailbirds from Mexico City, Querétaro, Zacatecas, Guadalajara, and Rosario, and mechanics, barbers, carpenters, and destitute and vagabond miners, for in New Mexico they might have better luck in view of many promising samples of ore reported to be there. Although this type of colonization would assure the greatest saving to

³⁷ *Ibid.*, San Juan, October 11, 1692.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Santa Fé, October 15, 1692.

³⁹ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, October 16, 1692; Maas, 242-245; *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, 3rd series, Mexico, 1856, 130.

the royal treasury, the families at El Paso should be considered first, Vargas wrote, because they would be better citizens.⁴⁰

Despatching the news of his victories to the viceroy by swift courier, General Vargas resumed his campaign activities.⁴¹ Don Luis Picurías was officially appointed governor of the Indians already conquered. New plans were made to facilitate the transportation of the artillery. Whereas Vargas first intended to move his entire force to Pecos, owing to the bad condition of the storm swept road the captain of artillery instead was sent directly to Santo Domingo with the cannon, most of the horses, mules, and supplies, accompanied by the Indian allies from El Paso, liberated captives, two mounted squads from the Parral contingent, and one squad of the El Paso presidial soldiers to guard the horse and mule trains. At the abandoned pueblo of Santo Domingo they were to await their General.⁴² From here as a base Vargas would then conquer the nearby Keres, who having abandoned their pueblos, were established on the mesas of Cochití, the mesa of Jémez, and the Cerro Colorado.

On Friday, October 17, Vargas and the main body of the army departed from Santa Fé for Pecos. Here the people had finally decided to submit, and were awaiting the Spaniards at the entrance to the pueblo, where they had built archways covered with green boughs leading to a large cross. Welcomed by the *alabado*, Vargas responded with much satisfaction, and in the square took official possession. Thereafter 248 were baptized.⁴³ On the following day the natives asked if they

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ This letter, the original of which was kept by Vargas, was sent with a copy of his campaign journal to date, as stated, comprising 138 pages in all, and written on ordinary white paper as there was no stamped paper available. *Ibid.* The reports reached Mexico City on November 21. Next day there was a great celebration and the ringing of bells, and the cathedral was especially illuminated by order of the viceroy. Antonio de Robles, "Diario de sucesos notables," *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, III, Mexico, 1853, 117; Sigüenza, 12.

The reports had been carried over 1,500 miles in thirty-six days; a speed which would appear incredible if it were not proved by documents. This was the time it took, by means of horses and couriers, for the "flying mail" service between the two points a century and a half later.

⁴² Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, October 16, 1692; Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8, 1693.

⁴³ Vargas' journal, Pecos, October 17, 1692.

would be permitted to appoint their own government officials. Readily granting their request Vargas administered the oaths of office at the installation.⁴⁴ Snow fell most of the morning and as soon as it cleared up Vargas left for Santo Domingo.⁴⁵ Old and infirm Antonio Malacate, the leader of the Keres pueblos, was submissive and ready to welcome the Spaniards at Santa Ana.⁴⁶

Some Keres Indians had been sent by Vargas to the mesas near the marshes of Cochití to announce his coming, and led by their principal leader, Juan, the Cochití war captains went to meet him at Santo Domingo. The Spanish leader made his customary harangue, urging them to reoccupy their pueblos without fear. A rosary was placed about the neck of the chief. The road to the mesa was bad because of the recent rains, so Vargas set out with only five squadrons drawn from both companies. The captain of artillery and the sergeant major were ordered to await Vargas with the rest at the abandoned farm of Cristóbal de Anaya.⁴⁷

Six leagues away lay the rugged mesa and sierra of Cochití, near Cieneguilla, where most of the natives of the pueblos of Cochití, San Marcos, and San Felipe were established.⁴⁸ At the approach to the mesa the natives had placed a cross and arches. The men and women stood about a musket shot away. Vargas was welcomed, and entered the square of four dwellings, in the largest of which quarters were provided for him. After taking official possession, pardon was granted to the apostates and 103 were baptized. The natives of these three Keres pueblos, he found, had gone to the mesas not for fear of

⁴⁴ The following officers were installed: governor, lieutenant, judge, constable, two fiscals, and two military captains. *Ibid.*, October 18, 1692.

⁴⁵ The route: Pecos to Galisteo, six leagues. Galisteo was abandoned and in ruins, although the greater part of the walls was still standing. After spending the night here the march was resumed, Sunday, after Mass. San Marcos was reached after a march of three leagues; in ruins, the plan of the habitations still in good condition. Santo Domingo was reached that night, seven or eight leagues. *Ibid.*, October 18-19.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Santo Domingo, October 19, 1692.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, October 20-21, 1692.

⁴⁸ Vargas passed through the abandoned pueblo of Cochití, three leagues from Santo Domingo, and continued along the base of the mesa of Cochití to the ascent, three leagues farther.

the Spaniards, but for safety from their enemies, the recently pacified Tewas, Tanos, and Picuríes. The Spaniards were feasted with *tortillas*, then withdrew to the abandoned pueblo of Cochití, three leagues away, to rest.

Next day the General joined the remainder of his forces at the abandoned farm of Cristóbal de Anaya.⁴⁹ Here his army was reinforced by adding the rest of the officers of the two companies and fifty Indian allies. Taking provisions and fresh horses, he then set out for the Cerro Colorado and the mesa of Jémez, where the natives of Sia and Santa Ana, and Santo Domingo and Jémez, respectively, were living. The captain of artillery and the sergeant major were ordered to take the others, along with the tired horses, to Mejía, allowing two days for the trip, where they would join Captain Rafael Téllez Jirón, who had been there since September 10.⁵⁰

Sia, in ruins, as it had been left by Cruzate in 1689,⁵¹ was the stopping place for the night. The road had been passable in spite of the rigorous weather, for it ran through barren desert country. The Cerro Colorado was four leagues away. The ascent was narrow and difficult. Arches and crosses had been set up at the entrance to the pueblo as at the mesa of Cochití. Immediately upon seeing Vargas the people came down to the lower mesa to greet him, led by their old leader Antonio Malacate and the other elders, all holding crosses in their hands. After the people had assembled in the square, Don Diego took possession; 123 were baptized. He then told the natives to return to their pueblo of Sia, pointing out that the walls were still good, and the nave and choir of the church still standing. With timber a new church and convent could be built where the priests might resume their services in the pueblo.⁵²

As he was old and infirm, Governor Malacate asked for the appointment of a new captain and governor for the Keres, whereupon the Indians were gathered on the mesa of Cerro Colorado and elected a tall, handsome native named Cristóbal

⁴⁹ Vargas' journal, Cristóbal de Anaya, October 22, 1692.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, October 23, 1692.

⁵¹ Sia was seven to eight leagues from Santo Domingo. While rummaging about the ruins there, a soldier found buried a large bell. It was re-buried by order of Captain Roque Madrid. *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, Cerro Colorado, October 24, 1692.

as their leader. They promised to reoccupy their old pueblo, and to make friends with the Tanos, Tewas, and Picuríes, who had already assured the Spaniards of cooperation toward the same end. Vargas then departed, making camp in a sheltered spot one or two leagues from the abandoned pueblo of Jémez. The Jémez Indians were on a mesa three leagues north of their abandoned pueblo.⁵³

The reception at this mesa was hostile. Three hundred Indian warriors, greased with war paint and armed with bows and arrows, came down to meet him, and about two hundred others remained at the edge of the mesa above. Both groups had set up a great shout, as was their custom before battle. Mingling unafraid among the Spaniards, they threw dirt in their eyes, and when Captain Roque Madrid told them to refrain, they said that it was only in the spirit of rejoicing. Vargas boldly climbed the mesa as though unaware of any hostile acts, yet he did not fail to recall as he glanced at every visage that these were the ringleaders of the plot at Ácoma which had been revealed by faithful Taos Indians.

When he was about a musket shot from the arch of green boughs which marked the entrance to the new pueblo on the mesa, Captain Sebastián, with a cross in his hand, and a few other leaders who had been waiting there, fell to their knees. Dismounting, in reverence to the cross, Vargas went up to greet them, and entered the pueblo. It had two plazas of four dwellings each. There was no woman in sight, only armed warriors. Vargas kept his courage, feigning indifference, although he knew only too well how unwelcome he was. To quote his own words: "Thus, little to my liking, I found myself on foot in the midst of this distrustful concourse. Some had not put down their arms . . . others were engaged in a great war dance."⁵⁴

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Jémez, October 24, 1692. On the Cerro Colorado, the Zuñi half-breed Ventura, and two Moqui Indians, named Pedro and Sebastián, welcomed Vargas in a most friendly manner. They joined Vargas' camp, and were later of great service as intermediaries in the western pueblos. See *Ibid.*, November 19, 1692.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Jémez, October 25, 1692. This hostility of the Jémez may have been real, or it might have been a stratagem to try out the intentions of the Spaniards. They tried hard to provoke a battle, and were ready to overpower the visitors if they had put up a fight. Although the Spaniards failed to recognize it, this was a foreboding of the bloody campaigns of '93 to '96 soon to follow.

The women and children were ordered out of the houses. Some came out, but still the warriors were the most numerous. At this point their captain at last signaled them to lay down their arms. Vargas took official possession, the apostates received absolution, and 117 were baptized. He and the priests were invited to eat in one of the upper rooms, and having bravely accepted, they were feasted in a great hall. After this the General stepped out to the gallery where, to his surprise, he came upon a number of Apaches who up to this time had been in hiding in an adjoining room. They rendered obedience, and Vargas, showing no outward signs of surprise, spoke to the assemblage. They promised loyalty.⁵⁵ He then addressed himself to the Jémez Indians, who were urged to return to their deserted pueblo. The fears of the perplexed natives had been lessened considerably. When the Spaniards departed they were given provisions. Vargas again spent the night on the edge of the arroyo in front of the deserted pueblo of Jémez.

Although the submission of the Jémez Indians was not as spontaneous as elsewhere in the Keres country, the reconquest of New Mexico was at last, from all appearances, virtually completed. Every pueblo from Taos and Pecos on the east to Jémez in the west had submitted. In all, seventeen Indian pueblos had been peacefully reconquered, in which 1,560 persons, mostly children, were baptized.⁵⁶ The bold reconquerors now set out for the headquarters at Mejía, tired, but radiant with victory. The first night was spent at the deserted pueblo of Santa Ana,⁵⁷ and on the next day, October 27, they crossed the Río Grande to Mejía,⁵⁸ where they were greeted with much rejoicing, especially by those who had not seen them since early September.

Here the Reconqueror spent two days taking stock of his men and supplies. The Indian allies and the ten civilian resi-

⁵⁵ Concerning the presence of the Apaches Vargas wrote: "I assumed, since they had the said Apaches separated in the said house and many others in those of the second plaza, that the report given by the Taos concerning the afore-mentioned council was true." *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Vargas' journal, Mejía, October 28, 1692.

⁵⁷ Seven leagues from Jémez. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1692.

⁵⁸ Eight leagues from Santa Ana. *Ibid.*, October 27, 1692.

dents from the El Paso district were exhausted after such a strenuous campaign. The horses, mules, and wagons were in no condition for further service without rest and repairs. Furthermore, the most severe part of the winter season had set in. Everyone favored postponing the proposed expedition to Ácoma, Zuñi, and the Moqui pueblos until the following year, for the reasons just specified. Besides, some pointed out, the country in question was arid, distant, and inhabited by the most obstinate of the rebels. They had all taken part in the council at Ácoma, and the reception at Jémez, whose leaders had instigated the plot, was considered as a sample of what might be expected. Notwithstanding the imminent peril involved, with characteristic boldness Vargas decided to embark upon the campaign regardless of risk.⁵⁹

In order to be freed from unnecessary encumbrances on so dangerous an exploit, the Indian allies from El Paso, the ten civilian residents, the sixty-odd liberated captives⁶⁰ and camp followers, with carters and muleteers, were dispatched directly to El Paso along with the cannon and other luggage. They left for home on October 29, under Sergeant Major Cristóbal Tapia, escorted by eight soldiers of the El Paso presidio in command of the trusted soldier Diego Zervir,⁶¹ and well provisioned with jerked beef, cornmeal, biscuit, chocolate, sugar, tobacco, and soap.⁶²

⁵⁹ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693; Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 265; Sigüenza, 13a.

⁶⁰ Sixty-six according to Vargas in his letter to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693.

⁶¹ Vargas' journal, Mejía, October 28, 1692.

⁶² *Ibid.*, October 29, 1692. The muster roll of the liberated captives was taken, and a list drawn up to be delivered to Lieutenant Governor Luis Granillo at El Paso. They were to remain at El Paso until his Majesty should decide what to do with them. *Ibid.*, October 28, 1692. The complete muster roll may be found in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 184-185.

CHAPTER V

SUBMISSION OF THE WESTERN PUEBLOS

The scion of the house of Vargas was away from Mejía on October 30 bound for the outlying provinces to the west. His force of eighty-nine Spanish soldiers, including the officers of the two presidial companies, all riding fresh mounts, was accompanied by thirty Indian warriors.¹ The army travelled lightly, but well armed and victualed, and with a large reserve of riding horses to assure swiftness and mobility. After a four days' march of some twenty-three leagues, fording muddy fast-flowing arroyos and rivers laden with débris, wading through marshes, and plowing through storm swept desert, Vargas reached the rock of Ácoma. This impregnable natural fortress was inhabited by the Keres tribe which had murdered four missionaries in the rebellion of 1680. And Don Diego did not fail to recall the fierce resistance met here by Juan de Oñate, the founder of New Mexico, a battle epically recorded for all time by the famous soldier-poet Gaspar de Villagrà.²

Vargas had come by way of Isleta, crossing the Puerco River to the water hole called El Pozo, where he stopped to refresh the mules and horses, before approaching Ácoma.³ As

¹ Vargas' journal, Mejía, October 30, 1692. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37. All references to Vargas' day to day campaign journal, and correspondence, for the period covered in this chapter are from A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139, and S.F.A., unless otherwise indicated.

Friars Alpuente and Barroso served as chaplains on the expedition to the western pueblos. Fray Muñiz, whose name suddenly disappears from the documents in mid-October, must have accompanied the group that had left Mejía directly for El Paso.

² Letter of transmittal, Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Galve, El Paso, January 8, 1693, and *Idem to idem*, El Paso, January 10, 1693; Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 255, 266; Villagrà, cantos XXVII-XXXI.

³ The route: Mejía to Isleta, October 30, five leagues, on the opposite side of the river; the pueblo was deserted as it had been since 1681, and was in ruins except for the nave of the church, the walls of which were in good condition. Isleta to the Río Puerco, October 31, seven to eight leagues; here the ford was so steep that it was necessary to carry the provisions across on the men's shoulders. November 1, after Mass, one league to a lake usually dry, filled by the springs on the slopes of the surrounding ranges and the overflow of

they neared the Sky City by way of a steep and difficult stretch of road, smoke "made by those traitorous, treacherous, rebellious, and apostate enemies," could be seen rising into the cold, crisp winter air. At about eleven o'clock in the morning, a halt was called in view of another great rock on the right side of the road, seemingly even higher than the rock of Ácoma. This was the Enchanted Mesa of Indian legend.⁴ These two brown sandstone mesas, banked by sheer cliffs, jut out conspicuously from a level plain rimmed by bald mesas along the horizon; from a distance they appear inaccessible. On the plains below the Indians had their fields, which at this time of the year were usually flooded.⁵

No one knew just how the Ácomas would act, they who had been the hosts to the great council darkly plotting against the Spaniards just a month before. Trailing through the muddy grasslands to within a musket shot of Ácoma, Vargas leading the way, the Spaniards sang out: "Glory be to the Blessed Sacrament." The Indians, to their astonishment, answered: "Forever." Vargas spoke with them from below, in friendly terms of pardon to come, and absolution of their apostasy, if again they would become Christians and loyal Spanish vassals. But they refused to speak or move. Then several of Vargas' Indian soldiers, including a half-breed Zuñi named Ventura, were sent to them while the Franciscan fathers pleaded from below. After a while they told the Spaniards to go to the other side of the rock, where the main road up to the mesa was situated.

When all were in the place specified, Vargas and the missionaries ascended the steep, sandy slope, leaving the soldiers below. In silence, the Ácomas watched from the rim of the

the little stream of Los Quelites; here the mules and horses drank, as they had not been able to drink from the muddy Río Puerco. Due to heavy rains the army was prevented from advancing until next day. November 2, ten leagues to El Pozo, where a halt was again called to quench the thirst of the mules and horses. Ácoma was reached on November 3. Vargas' journal, October 30 to November 3, 1692.

⁴ See Frederick W. Hodge, "The Verification of a Tradition," *American Anthropologist*, X (September, 1897), 299-302, and "The Enchanted Mesa," *National Geographic Magazine*, VIII (October, 1897), 273-284.

⁵ Vargas' journal, Ácoma, November 3, 1692.

pueblo, their only expression one of curiosity and suspicion. The gate to the pueblo not only was closed tight, but was reinforced with a large stone. Suspecting treachery, Vargas thrice asked that his emissary, Ventura, and his companions be released. These finally returned, the Zuñi half-breed carrying a gift offering: a watermelon,⁶ a cooked pumpkin, some cakes. They bore a verbal message from the Ácoma leaders: they would hold a council that night and make a reply in the morning; meanwhile Vargas should be on his guard, for the Apaches were waiting to ambush his entire party. By now the sun had already set, and in fast falling darkness Vargas and his soldiers returned to El Pozo, there to await an answer.

At sunrise the next day Ventura climbed to the pueblo with a cross and a written message of peace in which the Ácomas were asked to open their gates to the Spaniards. At ten o'clock he returned with a verbal answer. The letter, on being read to the assembled Ácomas by one of them, an educated Indian named Mateo, had been listened to attentively. But they were still afraid. They would notify Vargas of their decision on his way back from Zuñi.⁷ These peace negotiations through written message are remarkable evidence of the educational work of the Franciscans among the Indians prior to the revolt of 1680.

The General found the water supply almost gone,⁸ but with characteristic faith and perseverance, and in order to hide any semblance of defeat, he decided to make one last harangue. With a handful of the military leaders he rode up to the gateway where he had been the day before. The Indians crowded the intrenchments on the edge of the mesa above. Vargas then spoke to them for a third time, directing his speech to Mateo, their leader. The Indians were at first bewildered; then

⁶ Watermelons served in November is not surprising, as the Indians still preserve them until midwinter by burying them in damp earth in a cool dark room.

⁷ Vargas' journal, Ácoma, November 4, 1692.

⁸ Adjutant and Captain Roque Madrid discovered a small water hole about a league away, but when Vargas and the military leaders went to examine it, it was dry. The Ácomas knowingly watched all these movements.

Mateo answered for them. He said that two friendly natives and several Apaches had informed them that the Spanish General would have them beheaded and hanged for their past offences.⁹ Vargas, in no uncertain terms, branded this as false. He again asked that the gates be opened. Dismounting, he sat on the flat rocks awaiting an answer. If they did not want to open the gates, Mateo could swing himself down one side, he said, and lead the Spaniards up the steep ascent by that direction. At this moment Vargas and his companions, seeing the Indians unarmed, and sensing that the opportune moment was at hand, boldly determined to scale the difficult ascent. When they reached the top of the mesa the Indians came over unarmed to greet them. In order to take advantage of the friendly reception Vargas beckoned to the missionaries to follow.¹⁰

There on the mesa top, Vargas set up a cross in the principal of the two pueblo squares, and took formal possession. The two missionaries absolved the Indians from their apostasy, and eighty-seven were baptized. His usual pious exhortation followed before he began to inspect the pueblo church dedicated to Saint Stephen, which was "even larger than the one at the convent of San Francisco, at that court [Mexico City]," with firm walls almost a yard and a half thick. The skylights and windows had been broken. Concluding his survey of the pueblo Vargas embraced the Indian chief Mateo, and departed. Through faith and determination another victory had been won.¹¹

⁹ This story was widely circulated among the pueblos as soon as Vargas left for El Paso after this campaign, and was heard on every side when he returned in 1693. It had great influence upon the Indians. Perhaps, as here intimated, it was the Apaches who spread the propaganda.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Ácoma, November 4, 1692.

¹¹ The pueblo of Ácoma, built on the spacious mesa atop the Rock of Ácoma, consisted of three communal dwellings, one of them forming the dividing line between the two squares, along side of which ran a long roadway. Their water supply came from two natural pools of rain-water on the mesa. *Ibid.*

With regard to the number of men who entered the pueblo, Vargas writes in his journal: "... scarcely fifteen soldiers, military leaders, and officers having gone up, my secretary of government and war being among the number, without allied warriors, since they had

Resting briefly at the water hole, they resumed their march, worrying as usual about the scarcity of water. On November 7, twenty-five leagues from Zuñi, the half-breed Ventura was sent to his pueblo with a rosary, a cross drawn on a piece of paper, and a verbal message announcing the coming of the Spaniards.¹² The next day they reached El Morro, now called Inscription Rock. At last, "God be praised," they found water in abundance, for in a naturally formed cavity at the base of the east side of this little mesa of solid rock there was plenty of fresh rain water.¹³ Some fifty feet from the pool, Vargas' name, like those of many others in their times, was carved on the side of the rock about ten feet from the ground. The Spanish inscription reads, in translation: "Here passed General Don Diego de Vargas, who conquered all New Mexico for our holy faith and the royal crown at his own expense, the year 1692."

From Inscription Rock, after Sunday Mass, the march was continued to Ojito de Zuñi, six leagues farther. While they rested here ten or twelve Zuñi Indians, some mounted and others on foot, arrived to welcome the Spaniards, bringing as a gift a slaughtered sheep, watermelons, and cakes.¹⁴ On Mon-

fled, only about fifteen Indians having remained." *Ibid.* He later stated: "I climbed the said Rock with only nine soldiers, including my secretary of government and war. This victory was an especially great triumph, for when this land was won by its first conquerors it took fourteen years and the flower of the soldiers of the kingdom to subdue it to our holy faith and to royal vassalage." Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693. See also Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 195, 266. In his letter to the king, Zacatecas, May 16, 1693, 21-29 (Vargas to the king, MS.), Vargas goes into great detail to impress his Majesty with this triumph. He again contrasted his victory with that of Oñate, its first conqueror, this time stating that it had taken Oñate and his successors twenty-one years to accomplish the submission of the mesa stronghold, thereby attempting to further magnify the greatness of his own achievement.

¹² Vargas' journal, November 7, 1692. The route: on November 5, after travelling five leagues, they reached a water hole on the south side of the Nativity River, on the way to Zuñi; on the 6th they reached a watering place at the source of the Nativity, two or three leagues; the night of the 7th was spent at a place called Las Peñuelas, fourteen or fifteen leagues from El Morro. *Ibid.*, November 5-7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, November 7, 1692. This pool, about 30 by 40 feet in size, is full of water all the year round, and may still be seen just as Vargas saw it.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Ojito de Zuñi, November 9, 1692.

day they came in sight of the impregnable rock of Kiakima,¹⁵ to which the Zuñis of Alona pueblo had retired.¹⁶ Vargas wished to camp at the old pueblo site; but on the insistence of the Zuñis he camped on the open plain, where there was plenty of water, pasture, and wood. The Zuñis then left, saying that they were going ahead to repair the road to the mesa. In the darkness of night, during a storm, some Faraon Apaches stealthily invaded the camp and carried off sixteen head of cattle. The theft was discovered at daybreak, but the horses were too tired to permit a pursuit.¹⁷

Marching to the rock of Zuñi, Vargas and his men climbed the mesa and were well received in the public square. Everyone came out to greet them. Zuñi was a large open pueblo with three dwellings. From the edge of the mesa one could see table land all around for some two leagues.¹⁸ Don Diego spoke to the assemblage, had a cross set up in the square, and took formal possession. Here 294 were baptized.¹⁹ Afterwards Don Diego was escorted into a room on the second floor of one of the living quarters, where stood an altar piled with religious articles. On the floor, before the altar, two tall candles were burning. Among the articles uncovered were a three-quarter length oil painting of San Juan Bautista, three silver chalices, two large bells, a missal, and seventeen books of both religious and profane literature. Among the books were works of Quevedo and Santa Teresa de Jesús. This discovery was a great surprise, for at the other pueblos Vargas had been told that all objects of Catholic worship had been destroyed.²⁰

¹⁵ Corn Mountain. Written by Vargas as the *peñol* of Xaquima (Vargas to the king, MS., 30), Exquima, Jaquima, and Xaquina (Vargas' journal, April 15, 1694, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39, and A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140), Juaquima (Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139), Caquima (Vargas' journal, August 3, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141); by Sigüenza, 14, as Caquima. See also F. W. Hodge, "The Six Cities of Cibola, 1581-1680," *New Mexico Historical Review*, I (October, 1926), 478-488.

¹⁶ Vargas' journal, November 10, 1692.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, four or five leagues beyond Ojito de Zuñi, November 10-11, 1692.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Zuñi, November 11, 1692.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*; Vargas to the king, MS., 30-31. The complete itemized list of articles, as contained in Vargas' journal, may be found in English translation in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 201-203.

Regaled with much formality, at sunset Vargas returned to his camp near the old pueblo site, taking with him all the recovered articles, with the exception of the two large bells. That night Apache visitors carried off eighteen head of cattle, escaping to the mesas, since no armed pursuit or engagement could be risked.²¹ Continuing snows forced a postponement of the trip to Moqui until November 15. The road was heavy with sand, the horses were tired, and there were only three small pools of rain water on the forty league stretch from Zuñi.²² For these reasons most of the impedimenta, horses, and cattle, were left at the abandoned Zuñi pueblo of Alona, well guarded by twenty-five of the soldiers, and Don Diego went ahead with a picked band of sixty-three and the two missionaries.²³

The last water hole, Aguaje de Magdalena, about three leagues from Aguatuvi, the easternmost of the Moqui pueblos,²⁴ was reached on November 18. The march over the sand dunes continued on the following day in the face of indescribable hardships. Shortly two Indians were seen riding toward them from the direction of the Moqui pueblos. Approaching Vargas they halted their horses, and reported that Governor Miguel of their pueblo of Aguatuvi awaited the arrival of the Spaniards. Vargas gave every evidence of friendship, and sent

²¹ On the 13th, some Saline Apaches visited Vargas, and through an interpreter they gave assurances of friendship. Vargas, suspecting treachery, refused to place any faith in them. To avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding, however, he gave them some biscuits and tobacco. Vargas' journal, November 13, 1692.

²² These water holes were: Aguaje del Entretenimiento, twelve leagues west of Alona, reached November 16; Aguaje de los Chupaderos (also called Aguaje de los Mosquitos), eight to nine long leagues farther west, reached November 17; Aguaje de la Magdalena, nine long leagues farther west, and three leagues from Aguatuvi, reached November 18. *Ibid.*, November 15-18, 1692.

²³ *Ibid.*, November 15, 1692. The journal says that sixty-three soldiers were taken and gives the 15th as the day of departure. These figures are the correct ones. Vargas to the king, MS., 32, gives sixty-nine as the number of soldiers taken, and the 13th as the date of departure for the Moqui pueblos. These erroneous figures are an example of the unreliability of details in this letter of Vargas to the king, which was written some six months after the actual events narrated.

Alona, also spelled Halona, was on the south side of the Zuñi River, directly opposite the present Zuñi pueblo. Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8, 1693.

²⁴ Vargas' journal, November 18, 1692.

them back with rosaries about their necks as tokens of friendship. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, two leagues from Aguatuvi, four Indians, on fine mounts, armed and with leather shields, rode out to meet him.

About a league from the pueblo a large troop of Indians on foot and on horseback, yelling loudly, approached the small band of Spaniards. Forthwith the Spaniards found themselves in the midst of seven or eight hundred Moqui Indians, on horses that were stout and fresh.²⁵ Miguel, the governor of Aguatuvi, at Vargas' side, led the way to the pueblo, over a series of mesas and canyons, which sapped the endurance of the horses and mules, already in a state of exhaustion for lack of water. As a consequence the stragglers were soon dangerously stretched out along the road with Indians riding amongst them. Of the eight hundred Indians, over three hundred were heavily armed with lances, bows and arrows, some arquebuses, pistols, and swords. Well might the sixty-three scattered Spaniards on tired horses be concerned. Although Miguel showed signs of good will, all the rest were clearly hostile. "It is obvious that of the whole campaign this was the day most fraught with peril."²⁶

Vargas and his escort of twenty-three soldiers were far in the lead. The Indians around, some on horse and others afoot, tried hard to provoke a battle by throwing dust in the eyes of the Spaniards, attempting to disarm them, and committing a thousand insolent acts. The din of their raucous shouting filled the air. On several occasions the General stopped to exhort them, and to answer "their diabolical questions with . . . effective arguments," in this way concealing his efforts to enable the other soldiers lagging behind to catch up. He even had the bugler call them; but as they lagged too far behind he decided to continue moving forward. The Indians crowded the horses, rendering difficult the advance, and at one point a number of them were about to unsheathe their swords. They recalled stories spread by the Faraon Apaches: that the Spaniards came protesting peace but really to kill and destroy; and

²⁵ *Ibid.*, November 19, 1692; Vargas to the viceroy, January 8 and 10, 1693; Vargas to the king, MS., 32.

²⁶ Sigüenza, 15; Vargas to the viceroy, January 8, 1693.

they were on their guard. Vargas, losing patience, addressed them sternly. If they did not act differently he would be obliged to take more drastic measures, although he did not wish to do so. Had he not come on a peaceful mission? He pointed to Our Lady of Remedies on the royal standard, telling them to lay aside their weapons, dismount, and pay homage to her as true Christians. But giving little heed they kept up their shouting and insults; three went so far as actually to unsheathe their swords.

An hour of this put the Spanish leader in high dudgeon. With characteristic fearlessness and valor, he decided to end their impudence once and for all. He told the Indian Miguel, recognizing in him a person of goodwill toward the Spaniards, "Alight from your horse and lay down your arms, for the natives will do likewise."²⁷ The Indian chief complied, but it was of no avail. They were a musket shot from the outermost houses of the pueblo, out in the flat. Vargas called a halt. He then rode out alone, whirled his horse toward the astounded native warriors, and addressed their leader Miguel in terms that permitted of no compromise.

I [Vargas] told him to silence all of them, for did they not remember that, when they were Christians, a saint or the Virgin was received with much devotion and on bended knee, not shouting, and that they should fall upon their knees? And through the divine will I succeeded in having them do so.²⁸

This was indeed the most dramatic incident in the western campaign. It is small wonder that as time wore on accounts of the

²⁷ Vargas' journal, November 19, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 33.

²⁸ Vargas' journal, November 19, 1692. There are four first-hand accounts of this incident worthy of mention, and one contemporary secondhand account, that of Sigüenza y Góngora in his *Mercurio Volante*. However, writers who have referred to the incident heretofore, quote only Sigüenza y Góngora. Their primary motive cannot be historical accuracy; perhaps dramatic effect? For, indeed, Sigüenza's account, although of all the contemporary ones it is the farthest removed from the scene, is the most detailed, and by far the most dramatic. The story had mellowed considerably within only a year's time. The five contemporary accounts mentioned are: Vargas' journal, November 19, 1692; record of transmittal, Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8, 1693; *Idem to idem*, El Paso, January 10, 1693; Vargas to the king, MS., 33; Sigüenza, 15a-16.

incident took on epic proportions. To Vargas a miracle had been wrought, so perilous were the circumstances.

At the edge of the pueblo, which was walled by its surrounding living quarters, was a doorway so small as to permit only one person to go in at a time, and this by entering sideways. From it a narrow alley between houses led to the square. Dismounting, Vargas entered the small passage-way followed by six or seven others, including the *alférez* with the royal banner. He found most of the inhabitants and many from the other Moqui pueblos gathered in the square. In the midst of this tumultuous crowd, Vargas again spoke with great valor and equal fervor, ordering them all to kneel before the Virgin, who he had come to believe was performing miracles for his cause. They did as he said. He then took formal possession in the name of the Spanish Crown, after which he had the natives join him in praise of the Spanish monarch. By this time Vargas was ready to leave, but Don Miguel held him back, urging him to dine at his house. This he politely refused. Those who were outside, fearing foul play, at this moment entered, led by one of the missionaries. Don Miguel now offered to feast the entire camp. Mats were placed on the ground just outside the pueblo and the Spaniards were fed with great hospitality. Vargas thanked the Indian chief, promising to return the next day in order that the missionaries might absolve them and baptize their children. Followed by a large troop of Indian warriors, some still suspicious, he went into camp near a water hole less than half a league away, where the night was spent under heavy guard.²⁹

In the morning, with fifty soldiers, the military leaders, and Fathers Corvera and Barroso, Vargas again ascended the slope and entered the pueblo of Aguatuví there to plant a cross, and the church was blessed by the missionaries, the Indians were absolved, and 122 baptisms were administered. The General served as godfather to a number of the children, including Don

²⁹ Vargas' journal, November 19, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 33-34. At first Don Miguel invited Vargas to spend the night inside the pueblo, but he refused, whereupon Miguel rode down to show him the best place to camp for the night.

Miguel's. Such ceremonies prompted a dinner celebration inside the house of the chieftain, which Vargas accepted mostly to dispel from the minds of the natives the possible notion that he was in any way afraid. Afterwards the soldiers returned to their camp near the water hole.³⁰

Early the next morning, November 21, a very troubled Miguel appeared alone at Vargas' tent. Father Corvera was the only one with the General at the time. Words failed him, and he cast furtive glances about for fear of watchful spies; so Vargas told him to come later when he could not be observed by the other Indians. Return he did in the evening. After greeting Vargas, he fell to his knees before the missionary, whose hands he grasped tightly, and fervently kissing them, he burst into tears. In tears he disclosed the cause of his distress. His people were angry with him, he said, and had threatened to kill him because of his friendship toward the Spaniards. He then explained why so many Indians had gathered at Aguatuvi from the surrounding pueblos for such warlike demonstrations. Upon receipt of Vargas' letter, he, Miguel, had notified his people and the leaders of the other Moqui pueblos. The astonishing number of four thousand warriors had gathered at Aguatuvi in a great war council, accompanied by all of the Moqui governors. They had decided to meet the intruders fully armed, provoke a battle, and annihilate them. But the women of the pueblo could not feed them all, so most of them had left; the warriors who had met Vargas on his arrival were only the remnant of the great force. These believed themselves quite sufficient to wipe out the small Spanish army. Miguel's pleading with them had been useless. He had attempted to warn Vargas, as the latter well knew and appreciated, and the angry natives had scolded him roundly for his appeasing attitude toward the invaders.

The loyal Miguel had tried to convince his tribesmen of the sincerity of the Spaniards, of their desire actually to pardon them in spite of their great offences at the time of the rebellion in 1680, when they had slain all the missionaries and settlers

³⁰ Vargas' journal, November 20, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 35.

they could lay hands on, had burned the churches, thrown down all images of Christ, the Virgin, and the saints, and had denied and blasphemed God; had made shirts, ribbons, waists, and jackets out of the sacred decorations and vestments; had profaned and destroyed the sacred vessels; had ridded themselves of their wives wedded in Christian marriage and taken others; and had destroyed all the fowl and animals domesticated by the Spaniards. He urged Vargas to depart from the province and leave him to his own fate. "Compadre, please depart," he said, "do not go any farther."³¹ With every sign of friendship and trust, Vargas told him to be unafraid, and to bring his wife and family to the safety of the Spanish camp if necessary. And as for visiting the rest of the Moqui pueblos, Vargas replied with supreme courage and spirit that he had not come all this way to leave his task unfinished. At sunrise, he would set out to visit the remaining pueblos, and Miguel was asked to go with him as his guide and interpreter.

Miguel appeared punctually the following morning, November 22, at sunrise. Fifteen soldiers, with their leader, were left at the camp guarding the supplies and pack animals; and with forty-five well armed Spanish soldiers, and the military leaders, Vargas left for Walpi intending to return by nightfall. The little army marched double file, to the accompaniment of military music, the General leading the way with Miguel and the missionaries at his side. Four long leagues of travel brought them to the high mesa on which Walpi pueblo stood.³²

³¹ Vargas to the king, MS., 35.

³² Vargas' journal, November 22, 1692. There is no basis in Vargas' journal and correspondence for the statement that Don Luis Tupatú and his warriors were with Vargas at the Moqui pueblos, as stated by Sigüenza, 17, and repeated by Twitchell and others. In his letter to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8, 1693, Vargas specifically states that he set out for the western pueblos "notwithstanding the absence of the soldiers from the said tribes, whose number, on the eighth day of the said month of October, as dated, I had specified and arranged with the governors of said tribes . . . for rainy and snowy weather having arrived, the said natives were hindered in cultivating their maize fields, which made it impossible for them to carry out that which had been determined and agreed upon, namely, to go with me, said governor and captain general, to visit the tribes whose captains had attended the council which was held for three days and three nights, where the treacherous, apostate, intractable, rebel tribes of the Pecos, Keres, Jémez, Apaches, Zúñis, and Moquis made plans to attack me by surprise."

At the base of the mesa they came upon a large troop of Indians, some on foot and others mounted, many fully armed. With loud and raucous war whoops they had already announced their presence. The invaders were unable to recognize many of them, though soon they proved to be Utes, Apaches, and Coninas, neighbors and allies of the Moquis, parties to the plot at Aguatuvi. In view of their hostile demonstrations, Vargas ordered them to return to the pueblo and disarm. No attention was given to the command; whereupon he fearlessly marched up the steep, winding road to the pueblo. The knife-edged rocks and jutting boulders, made more treacherous because of the slippery ice, were hard on the tired horses. Indians were yelling on every side. Some were playing musical instruments and hopping about under the spell of their maddening din.³³

Once on top of the mesa, Vargas asked for Captain Antonio. The leader of the pueblo soon appeared, unarmed. He extended his hand in greeting. The General grasped it tightly, and keeping hold of it, ordered him to force his people to lay down their weapons as the other pueblos had done, and receive the Spaniards with due respect. Then, letting go of his hand, he pointed to the image of the Virgin who looked down upon them from the royal banner, and with this, writes Vargas, the Indian chief "came to." The wary General then maneuvered twenty-one of his soldiers into the form of a crescent to stand guard, with orders to follow in case of battle. Accompanied by the rest of the soldiers and the missionaries, he entered the walled pueblo. Most of the Indians remained fully armed, and when the General gently reproached Antonio, the latter replied that he had control only over those who were unarmed. The others, he said, had gathered from the surrounding pueblos. Antonio's intentions were clearly evident; but wasting no words, Vargas and his companions rode on into the pueblo square, dismounted, and proclaimed possession in the name of the Spanish Crown.³⁴

³³ Vargas to the king, MS., 36-37.

³⁴ Vargas' journal, November 22, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 37.

In the square a cross was set up, and when the natives "were convinced by effective arguments regarding what their duty was,"³⁵ they again reconciled themselves with the God of the Christians, swore new allegiance to the distant king, and brought eighty-one children to be baptized. Indians of neighboring pueblos watched from the flat rooftops, expressionless, yet fully armed. Maintaining a bold demeanor Vargas, the missionaries, and several of the officers dined inside Don Antonio's house, on his invitation, where they were served baked eggs³⁶ and watermelons. Pleased with his success, Vargas went on to Mishongnovi, situated on another steep mesa three leagues farther on.³⁷

The Spaniards were met by the same concourse of Indian warriors that they had found on the previous stops; for these had gone on ahead to witness the proceedings. Some were sullen and disturbed, others were quite bewildered. Here the soldiers were accorded greater respect than had been the case at the preceding pueblo. The governor, Antonio's son, and two other chiefs, received them with crosses in their hands, for which reason Vargas reverently knelt three times on approaching them. He went through the same formalities of taking possession as had been performed at Walpi. The whole pueblo was assembled for absolution, and after formal possession had been proclaimed, their oath of allegiance had been received, and thirty-seven had been baptized, the white men passed on to Shongopovi. This pueblo was situated on a mesa, about a league's distance further, which was steeper and higher than the other two, and consequently the ascent was more difficult. The inhabitants, intermingled with warriors from the surrounding pueblos, rimmed the mesa top as Vargas

³⁵ The procedure was the same as at the other pueblos: the natives were ordered to wear crosses, say the four prayers morning and evening, surrender all religious articles taken from the church, rebuild a church and living quarters for a resident missionary, and live as Christians.

³⁶ "Huevos asados." Davis and Leonard have translated this as "roasted eggs."

³⁷ Vargas' journal, November 22, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 38; Sigüenza, 17-17a. Mishongnovi is often spelled Moxsonavi in Vargas' journal.

approached. They presented much the same spectacle as the Spaniards had witnessed at the other Moqui pueblos previously visited, with the exception that here the people were totally unarmed from the outset. The process of formal reduction and revalidation was repeated as elsewhere, and thirty-three were baptized.

Oraibi was the only Moqui pueblo which remained to be visited; but the country was extremely barren, the horses already exhausted, and it was getting late in the season, so it was felt advisable not to make the trip at this time. Instead a message was sent, to which a submissive answer was received. Vargas now returned, before midnight, without mishap to the water hole near Aguatuvi where he had established his headquarters. The fourteen leagues covered that very cold day, going and coming, offered no satisfactory water hole, and on the way back some had to ride two on a horse, their own mounts were so fatigued.³⁸

On the following day, in fulfillment of a royal cédula of September 13, 1689, and the viceregal order of May 28, 1692, Vargas made an investigation into the matter of the rumored silver and quicksilver mines in this vicinity: Sierra Azul and Cerro Colorado. First he questioned the Indian Francisco, who was a former servant of Father José de Espeleta, a missionary for thirty years among the Moquis prior to his martyrdom in 1680. This was the same crafty Indian at whose hands Espeleta had met his death. According to him the mines of Sierra Azul and Cerro Colorado were fourteen days travel beyond Las Salinas, in a high and steep mountain difficult of access just beyond "the river," which flowed down from the Sierra Prieta. Vargas also questioned a Zuñi Indian present, who said he had been to the mines on two occasions. He indicated the route thus: the first water hole ten leagues from Aguatuvi, at a place where Espeleta once had a *conversión*; then, not far off, was the

³⁸ Vargas' journal, November 22, 1692. Escalante's notes on this portion of the journal are published in *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, 3rd series, Mexico, 1856, 134-135. They are incomplete and unreliable, and the chronology is often confused.

land of the Coninas; beyond, a small water hole; about a day from there a cliff where there was water in a deep crevice; across from this point, accessible only on foot, was Sierra Azul. He said that it took a day or two to go up and get the red ochre out of a deep pit, and there was no water to be had in the vicinity. The ochre deposit was in a large round pool, in the form of a reddish liquid which sometimes moved and changed in color.³⁹ He stated that the Indians used this earth to paint themselves, and also for the preservation of their skin, for it kept it smooth and soft, and obliterated marks of the smallpox. Specimens of red earth, allegedly from the reported mine, were obtained for the viceroy.⁴⁰ This investigation with regard to Sierra Azul had been a leading motive for undertaking the hazardous trip to the Moqui country, and in his journal Vargas expressed the hope that from its assay the sample of red ochre should contain quicksilver sufficient to warrant the costs which might be involved in the conquest of the region and the working of the mines.⁴¹

To make his victory complete, on November 24 Vargas, to the surprise of everyone, ordered the camp to get ready for a swift trip to Oraibi before leaving the province. Preparations were already underway when the military leaders presented themselves before the General opposing so perilous a venture. Their arguments were sound: the horses and mules were virtually exhausted; there was not a single water hole on the route, nor at Oraibi; the road was difficult and dangerous, and the winter weather was making travel increasingly hazardous. It would indeed be a tragic climax should the horses and mules be lost, leaving the Spaniards stranded on foot in this distant

³⁹ Earlier reports placed the mines only twelve or fourteen leagues west of Oraibi.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, November 22-24, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 38. Samples of the red earth, allegedly from Sierra Azul, had been obtained at Shongopovi (frequently spelled Jongopavi in the documents).

⁴¹ Vargas' journal, November 24, 29, 1692; English translation in Twitchell, *Leading Facts*, IV, 341, and his *Old Santa Fe*, 111. When the red earth was examined in Mexico City it was discovered that it contained no quicksilver. The viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, April 18, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37.

and hostile desert land. Realizing that the main purpose of his expedition had been attained, Vargas heeded the advice of his trusted lieutenants. The activity, it would appear, was but a dramatic gesture on the part of the Reconqueror. At any rate, the camp must have given an unrestrained sigh of relief upon hearing the change in plans. Before starting the trek back to Zuñi to join the brave band awaiting them there, Vargas rode over to Aguatuvi, accompanied by a few of his men, and with warm affection took leave of his trusted friend Miguel, governor of the pueblo, and his people.⁴²

The tired but victorious band reached Aguaje de la Magdalena in the evening, and next day Aguaje de los Chupaderos after virtually plowing through the heavy snow. Here, at dusk, two Zuñi Indian messengers arrived with alarming news and a call for aid from Captain Téllez, at Alona. For many nights hostile Apaches had been stealthily spying on the encampment, and had actually driven off some horses; friendly Zuñi Indians had notified him of a great Apache war council held to plot the destruction of the small Spanish camp. Division of opinion had resulted in the break-up of the council, but the captain of the Salinero Apaches, who had feigned peace with the Spaniards, now was apparently stirring up trouble.⁴³ The news caused Vargas to hasten on the following day to El Entretenimiento. From here, with only thirty soldiers, each well armed and with extra riding horses, he rode on ahead, reaching Alona the following morning.⁴⁴ No misfortune had come to the camp during his absence. Captain Roque Madrid arrived safely on November 27 with the rest of the soldiers, horses, mules, and supplies.⁴⁵

⁴² Vargas' journal, November 24, 1692. Earlier in the day, since it was Sunday, the people had come down from the mesa to hear Mass at the Spanish camp, where Vargas urged them to remain loyal to their leader Miguel. Vargas took leave of all the chiefs of the Moqui pueblos at this time, and they promised once again to remain loyal.

⁴³ Vargas' journal, November 25, 1692; Rafael Téllez Jirón to Vargas, Alona, November 23, 1692.

⁴⁴ Vargas' journal, November 26, 1692.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, November 27, 1692.

Vargas was prepared to return to El Paso without delay, "because of the severe weather, and because I have completed, with the aid of Divine Providence, the entry, reduction, and conquest of the entire kingdom of New Mexico and its provinces of Zuñi and Moqui . . ." ⁴⁶ A Zuñi Indian *genízaro* ⁴⁷ named Agustín el Cabezón, for a small reward, ⁴⁸ offered to guide the expedition as far as the abandoned pueblo of Senecú, well down the Río Grande, by a direct southeasterly route. It would pass through little known, Apache infested country, but according to El Cabezón it would save much time and distance. The plan was accepted.

Since it was believed that it would be very useful to make the crossing by way of the new route, for it would involve a saving of more than fifty or sixty leagues, especially should there be quicksilver ore in the said earth, as is believed, and also for the relief of the pack trains, and in view of the miserable condition of the horses and mules of the said expedition, and the aforesaid Indian having affirmed that he would take us to the said place of Senecú in eight days, I gave orders that night that on the following day, Sunday [November 30], the camp, pack animals, and supplies should be made ready. ⁴⁹

The expedition set out from Alona on schedule. ⁵⁰ Two members of the expedition, José Madrid and Martín Hurtado, took back with them their sisters, who had been held captive by the Zuñi Indians since 1680: Lucía Madrid and her two children born in captivity, and Juana Hurtado, with two girls and a boy, of whom the youngest girl and the boy were also born in captivity. The first night was spent at Ojito de Zuñi five

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, November 29, 1692.

⁴⁷ Herbert E. Bolton defines *genízaro* as follows: "Of all the elements in the population none was more unhappy than the *genízaros*, or Janissaries. These were Indians of various tribes of the plains, ransomed or captured in childhood, employed as servants, and Christianized. They were employed especially as scouts and as auxiliaries in campaigns, hence their name. They were an extraneous element in society, and they tended to segregate themselves from both Spaniards and Pueblos. Frequently they ran away." *The Spanish Borderlands*, New Haven, 1921, 184.

⁴⁸ Vargas' journal, November 29, 1692.

⁴⁹ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8, 1693.

⁵⁰ Vargas' journal, November 30, 1692. Vargas' route day by day from Zuñi to El Paso may be plotted out in detail from Vargas' journal. The complete journal for this period may be found in English translation in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 233-251.

leagues away. Here a Zuñi Indian runner from the mesa of Kiakima, the abode of the Zuñis, brought news that hostile Apaches were following the camp. The Spaniards moved thenceforward with utmost precaution. On December 1, they reached El Morro. From the high hills southeast of Alona, the Sierra Prieta and Peña Larga, widely separated, could be seen in the distance. Everything was covered with snow.⁵¹

Two days later, in the darkness of the woods, the rear guard was attacked by the Apaches, who drove off fourteen horses, leaving one fatally injured by an arrow.⁵² The theft was facilitated by the stormy weather, and brambled mountain country. Violent snow storms, icy winds, and the inability to find expected water holes contributed to the multitude of hardships suffered by these rugged frontiersmen. They pressed on. Cutting their way out of the mountains through a pine clad ravine, they entered marsh land in the canyon of La Cebolleta, on the eastern edge of what is now Cebolleta Mesa.⁵³ Several leagues farther, continuing always in a southeastward direction, the spacious canyon opened into broad expanses of beautiful pasture land, bordered by slopes thick with royal pines and savines. Some two leagues from here the country became more hilly, and the road more difficult. From the various hills and mesas could be seen the Sandía and Salina mountains in the distance to the east.⁵⁴ Nine or ten more leagues of the same kind of country brought them to a small spring, as El Cabezón had predicted, where the soldiers refreshed themselves; but there was insufficient water for the animals. From here the Sierra de los Ladrones and Sierra de la Magdalena could be seen in the distance. An arroyo bordered with many cottonwoods was shortly reached, but it was found to be dry.⁵⁵

Disturbed because the horses and mules had not had water

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, December 1-2, 1692. It was reported that in the Peña Larga was located the *rancheria* of the Apaches Colorados.

⁵² Vargas' journal, December 3, 1692; Vargas to the king, MS., 40; Sigüenza, 18. Eighteen horses were stolen by the enemy according to Escalante's "Noticias."

⁵³ Vargas' journal, December 4, 1692.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, December 5, 1692. Not a single water hole had been found since the departure from El Morro on December 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, December 6, 1692.

for two days, Vargas called his lieutenants into his tent for consultation. It was decided to follow the advice of a Piro Indian accompanying the expedition who said that by taking the trail to Alamillo, over twenty-five leagues from the dry arroyo just mentioned, a watering place would be found which, although salty, would give relief to the hard pressed horses and pack animals. On December 7, at sunrise, after Mass, the new route was taken. The decision proved wise, for several springs were found along the way, and the saddle horses had their fill. Often the melting snow helped quench the thirst of the jaded animals.⁵⁶ Threading their way on the southwest side of the Ladrones Mountains, then across the valley to the Magdalena Range, and along its northeast slope, on a slope in front of the Sierra Magdalena the ancient ruins of a large pueblo were found.⁵⁷ Tall reed grass nearby revealed a spring, which Vargas named La Purísima Concepción, because it was discovered on the vigil of the feast of the Immaculate Conception.⁵⁸ A better watering place was located by reconnoiters two leagues beyond. When the vicinity of the Río Grande was reached, the Zuñi guides were warmly thanked and paid for their services. Now on familiar ground, the Spaniards confidently struck out on their own.⁵⁹

Rain and snow pelted them all the way, and all rivers and streams were frozen over. The wide plateau rimmed by the Magdalena and Socorro Mountains was slowly traversed toward the abandoned pueblo of Socorro, on the Río Grande. Soon the Sierra del Socorro was sighted, and on December 9 abandoned Socorro was reached. The day following Vargas and his weary band stopped to rest on the banks of the Río Grande,

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, December 7, 1692.

⁵⁷ "... y se reconoció ser grande dho Pueblo." Twitchell translates this erroneously as: "and this he recognized as the Pueblo Grande," *Old Santa Fe*, 115.

⁵⁸ Vargas' journal, December 8, 1692.

⁵⁹ Through fear of the Apaches, the guides wished to return by way of Ácoma, and requested a letter so that the Keres of the Rock would assure them safe passage, and Vargas complied with a pious letter written to his friend Mateo, the governor of Ácoma. *Ibid.* As for the route taken from Zuñi to Senecú, Vargas concluded that it was dangerous and impractical.

in view of the abandoned pueblo of Senecú.⁶⁰ The expedition proceeded along the right side of the river, in view of the Sierra del Muerto and the Sierra de Las Peñuelas, the ranges which lay beyond the Camino Real on the other side of the river.

In his anxiety to reach El Paso as soon as possible, Vargas decided on December 13 to ride on ahead with the military leaders, Father Corvera, and a picked guard of ten soldiers. The pace he wished to set was far too fast for the tired pack animals. Roque Madrid was left in charge of the remainder of the camp. On the 16th, the hard riding General and his companions, lightly equipped, crossed the Río Grande to San Diego, in order to follow the Camino Real, which ran along the left bank of the river. About two leagues out of abandoned San Diego those who were in the lead saw a small group approaching on the same road. Surmising them to be people from El Paso coming to meet them, Vargas and his men joyously spurred their horses. But they soon discovered that those whom they had descried were turning back. They were Apaches, and they had taken to flight upon seeing the Spaniards. Fearing possible foul play, the Apaches were pursued by Vargas and his men. The swiftest in the pursuit were the officers Juan Páez Hurtado, Martín de Alday, and Juan Lucero de Godoy. They caught up with two of the Apaches who, on foot and deprived of all avenue of escape, began to shoot their arrows with fury and accuracy. One wounded Captain Hurtado in the left leg, four disabled the horse of Alday, which later died, and one pierced the neck of Lucero's horse. One of the Indians was killed and the other captured. Hurtado was losing so much blood from his wound that it was necessary to stop and rest

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, December 8-10, 1692. The rapid pace resulted in the loss of several horses and mules. Senecú was 60 leagues up the river from El Paso. From here Captain Rafael Téllez Jirón was sent ahead with two soldiers to notify "the illustrious *cabildo* of said republic," "the very reverend prelate, the vice-custodian of that Holy Custodia," and his lieutenant-governor, that Vargas would be at El Paso within nine days, "should it be the will of God, our Lord." *Ibid.*, December 11, 1692; Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693.

at Robledo. Here, on orders, the Apache prisoner was baptized by Father Corvera, "and this having been done, I ordered the lieutenant of cavalry [Alday] to have four soldiers take the said Indian off to one side and shoot him forthwith, giving him a good death."⁶¹

Finally, on December 20, at eleven o'clock in the morning, Vargas and his companions reached El Paso without further misfortune. There was universal rejoicing by the townspeople. Led by Vargas, the members of the *cabildo*, and the missionaries, all made their way directly to the Church of Our Lady of Guadalupe "to give due thanks to her blessed Majesty for . . . the victory achieved through her most holy will and intercession."⁶² Captain Madrid arrived two days later with the rest of the army.

In the four months' campaign Vargas had "restored" twenty-three pueblos of ten Indian tribes to Spain's empire in America and to Christianity.⁶³ "An entire realm was restored to the Majesty of our lord and king, Charles II, without wasting a single ounce of powder, unsheathing a sword, or (what is most worthy of emphasis and appreciation) without costing the Royal Treasury a single maravedí."⁶⁴ Seventy-four persons held captive by the Indians were "delivered from slavery," among

⁶¹ Vargas' journal, December 16, 1692.

⁶² *Ibid.*, December 20, 1692. During his absence El Paso had enjoyed peace, with the exception of two Apache raids in which twenty horses and head of livestock were stolen. *Ibid.*

⁶³ Leonard, in his edition of Sigüenza y Góngora, *op. cit.*, 88, note 129, refers to Vargas to the king, MS., 40, with the following footnote: "Vargas reported that seventy-three pueblos belonging to the ten tribes were subjugated on his *primera entrada*." Vargas was attempting to impress the king, and the letter is full of exaggerations, but he made no such boast as this. It is an obvious misreading of the number "23," which is written in Arabic numerals and which does resemble seventy-three, but which is clearly twenty-three, the number corroborated by the campaign journal itself and all the contemporary records.

⁶⁴ Sigüenza, 18a. See also Vargas to the king, MS., 41. Vargas was especially proud of this boast, for Cruzate, in his attempt to recapture the lone pueblo of Sia in 1689, had lost 6 soldiers in battle, many Indians were killed, and the survivors were left hostile, a number of whom joined with the Apaches on the mesas and in the mountains. Besides, Cruzate's hollow victory had cost the crown over 3,000 pesos. *Ibid.*

them several Spaniards,⁶⁵ and 2,214 Indians, mostly children, were baptized by the missionaries.⁶⁶ Sacred vessels, images, books, and a bronze cannon had been recovered; four large mission bells were left buried for later use in rebuilding the New Mexico missions.⁶⁷ Vargas estimated that during the course of the campaign he had travelled, all told, over six hundred leagues.⁶⁸

The Reconqueror boasted, ". . . at one stroke there has been accomplished what I may describe with justifiable pride as something that only would have been entertained by and hoped for by any other governor who might hold this post. . ." It was, indeed, a personal triumph, and an example of bold but humane diplomacy hard to surpass. But, true Catholic Spaniard that he was, he did not fail to add, ". . . thanks must be given with reverent homage and burnt offerings to Our Perfect Lady . . . Most Blessed Mary, Our Lady of Remedies, the guide and protectress of this undertaking."⁶⁹ Not many months later, a pamphlet in eighteen folio pages, describing the victory, was printed and widely circulated throughout New Spain. This newssheet closed with the following words:

⁶⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8, 1693; Sigüenza, 18a. Sigüenza states that these were all half-breeds and mestizos. This statement, which most New Mexican historians repeat, is erroneous, as we have seen, for several Spaniards were found. In his letter to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693, Vargas states that the captives freed numbered sixty-six as of October 17, not counting seven more who joined the Spaniards at Ojito de Zuñi on November 30, but later on gives the total as seventy-four; in his letter to the king, MS., 40, seventy-six is the total given.

⁶⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 8 and 10, 1693; Vargas to the king, MS., 41; Sigüenza, 18a.

⁶⁷ All the religious articles and books recovered at Zuñi were placed in the custody of the president of the Franciscan missionaries at El Paso. Vargas' journal, December 27, 1692.

On September 14, 1692, at the time of the entry into Santa Fé, Vargas granted possession of the church property there to the Franciscan custodia of New Mexico, and at the request of Father Corvera the grant was put in writing. On December 18, at the site of the abandoned *ranchería* of the Mansos at Doña Ana, a similar grant of possession was made by Vargas, also at the request of Father Corvera, with regard to the church property at Ácoma, Zuñi, and Moqui. These instruments were filed in the archives of the custodia, Convent of Our Lady of Guadalupe, El Paso, December 27-28, 1692. B.N.M., legajo 4, docs. 1-2.

⁶⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 10, 1693.

⁶⁹ *Idem* to *idem*, El Paso, January 10 and 12, 1693.

These were the results of this campaign in which innumerable tribes were brought back to the fold of the Catholic Church, and an entire realm was restored to the Majesty of our lord the king, Charles II. . . . Worthy indeed is this news, which may be learned by everyone through this MERCURY, so that the governor and captain general, Don Diego de Vargas Zapata y Luján Ponce de León, constrained (by the praise this achievement will win for him) to hold steadfastly what he has courageously won, may undertake still greater deeds in the future. *Laus Deo.*⁷⁰

Thus ended the first phase of the reconquest of New Mexico. The submission of the natives was as yet a formality, however, as no Spaniards had remained in the north. Vargas now prepared to seal the victory for Spain by taking permanent settlers to reoccupy the region, missionaries to refound the Indian missions, and soldiers for the establishment of a permanent garrison to guard the newly won frontier.

⁷⁰ Sigüenza, 18a. Leonard, in his edition of Sigüenza, the source just cited, 41, emphasizes the following as the determining factors in Vargas' success on this expedition: "The comparative ease with which Vargas penetrated this hostile country on his first campaign is possibly explained in part by his more careful preparation, his undeniable courage, and his decisiveness in the presence of danger. Of equal importance, however, were the dissensions among the Indians themselves which broke out soon after the Spaniards had been forced from the province. The cruelty and despotism of their own leaders as well as the fear of marauding Apaches may have inclined the former subjects of Spain to offer little or no resistance to Vargas."

CHAPTER VI

THE COLONIZING EXPEDITION OF 1693

The glad tidings of the successful submission of Santa Fé, and the impending restoration of the whole region of New Mexico, reported by Vargas to the viceroy on October 16, were received in Mexico City on November 21, 1692. It was, indeed, an occasion for great rejoicing. As we have noted, the following day bells were rung in the capital, and the cathedral was illuminated by order of the viceroy. "Vargas, who had undertaken this expedition at his own expense, now became, for a moment at least, a national hero, a new Cid who had won back for Christendom territory held by infidel hands."¹

The Reconqueror had scarcely arrived in El Paso from his campaign when, within a few hours, a courier arrived with a message from the viceroy in answer to the reports sent from Santa Fé on October 16. The letter notified Vargas of the decisions made at the meeting of the General Junta on November 24. All praise was extended to him in the most glowing terms. Wrote the viceroy:

He [Vargas] is given many and repeated thanks, and he cannot realize the joy and excitement which it has caused throughout the kingdom; and with the very special esteem and appreciation of his Excellency and the honorable ministers of the said Junta, they have in mind to show him courtesy and to honor him as a person who, by his own deeds, calls to memory and repeats those of his ancestors. His Excellency answers him that on his part he will notify his Majesty (may God keep him) of his honorable actions with the report and records of such a singular feat, so that he will be given rewards deserving of so much merit . . .²

¹ Leonard, in his edition of Sigüenza, 31.

² Report of the viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, November 24, 1692, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139; English translation in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 290-296.

The viceroy's promise to notify the king of Vargas' recent triumph was not spontaneous. In his letter to the viceroy of October 16, 1692, Vargas had written: "I humble myself at the feet of your Excellency, not to seek remuneration, but to tell you that, with devoted affection, one of your lesser servants places and offers at your feet works without which, with their attendant risks, victories are neither won nor attained." Then, several lines later: "Just as my

Vargas was granted virtually a free hand in working out the next phase of the enterprise, the permanent occupation of New Mexico:

In order that he [Vargas] may know immediately that we agree with his suggestions, since they are so in keeping with all that which has occurred, and that during the necessary interval of time orders and aid with regard to those parts and places where they are necessary cannot be deliberated upon and decided, and that this can be resolved only by the one who is at the present time doing so: therefore, trusting in his aforesaid judgment, all of the arrangements are left to his consideration and decision, for with his zeal he will decide upon and arrange the manner whereby the said villa of Santa Fé and the other conquered pueblos may be preserved with the protection and defense which he deems necessary.³

Everything necessary for the preservation of that which had been won was promised. For the establishment of a presidio at Santa Fé, Vargas was authorized to enlist soldiers from among those of the presidios of El Paso and Parral who had participated in the expedition just completed, and "both the former and the latter may remain at his disposal at the places and localities where he decides to station them." He was empowered to enlist additional presidio soldiers from Sombrerete (also called Llerena), Zacatecas, Durango (also called Guadiana), Parral, and the surrounding area, and guarantee them the usual salaries of presidials. He "should proceed in conformity with his generous spirit, for his Excellency and the said Junta are disposed to assist him in every way." He was given permission to take from El Paso as many of the families there as he should deem necessary, without weakening the permanent security of that region. Those settlers who had been driven out of New Mexico in 1680, and who had promised to return upon its restoration, should be notified that aid would be assured them for the undertaking, and that they and their families would "be rewarded with the honors which belong to them as colonizers . . . declaring them noble settlers, and they

only duty is to serve, so those worthy of being princes honor their servants, and I am confident that your Excellency will ask his Majesty, the king, to favor my son [Don Juan Manuel de Vargas Pimentel], who was a noble page of our lady the queen who died, and who is serving the reigning queen in the same capacity."

³ *Ibid.*

shall be allotted lots and lands." Orders were sent to the officials at the royal treasuries of Zacatecas, Sombrerete, and Durango to place at Vargas' disposal 12,000 pesos to help defray the initial expenditures, and to do so "without any delay, embarrassment, or obstacle." All this, it was resolved, should be publicly proclaimed in the various localities where such settlers were now residing, and the governor of Parral was sent separate orders to cooperate in every way possible. Finally, Vargas was urged to thank all those who had helped him in his recent victory: the missionaries, the military leaders, the soldiers, and the others who had taken part in the enterprise. The letter mentioned the recent royal *cédula* of July 21, 1691, urging the reconquest of New Mexico, a copy of which was sent to Vargas under separate cover.

Armed with such absolute powers, Vargas enthusiastically set himself to the greater task before him. To determine first of all the exact number of El Paso residents willing to return to New Mexico, and their economic capabilities, he personally visited each household in the five El Paso settlements and took a careful census from December 22 to January 2. This revealed that at El Paso there were 382 inhabitants in fifty households; at the *real* of San Lorenzo, two short leagues from El Paso, 266 inhabitants in twenty-nine households, plus the native Mexicans formerly living at Santa Fé, who totalled 85 inhabitants, in nineteen households; at Senecú, three short leagues from El Paso, 63 inhabitants in two households; at Isleta, four leagues from El Paso, 118 inhabitants residing in sixteen households; at Socorro, five short leagues from El Paso, 130 inhabitants in fifteen households, not counting the children of the servants. There were 112 households all together, including those of the five priests of the district. Seventy-three married couples, 115 bachelors and single women, 448 children, and 250 servants were listed. The total population of the El Paso district was approximately 1,000.⁴ The personally conducted census revealed clearly to Vargas the destitute condition of most of the settlers. The householders, large and small, were living on

⁴ Census of the El Paso district, January 2, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 37, and A. G. I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139. English translation in *Mid-America*, XXIII (January, 1941), 61-84.

more or less the same miserable economic scale. Many were without the bare necessities for a decent existence, which explains the large size of the households, where relatives, orphaned children, and servants were living together under the same roof. They lacked sufficient clothing and, as for means of transportation, about one fourth of those Vargas visited had as much as a single horse. Most of the residents expressed their willingness to resettle New Mexico provided government assistance was definitely assured them.⁵

With this preliminary data at hand, Vargas now was able to make a fair estimate of the amount of recruiting, enlisting and purchasing of supplies necessary. Before entering into these matters, however, he sent to the viceroy copies of his campaign records for the period since October 16, along with a detailed plan of recolonization, including a list of the New Mexico pueblos, their exact location, and the most favorable sites for Spanish settlements, a plan of defense, and a copy of the census accompanied by a report of the miserable economic plight of the people at El Paso.⁶

Vargas wrote that he was about to leave for New Vizcaya and New Galicia in order to persuade the exiles living there to return to New Mexico. To assure them transportation and adequate provisions he considered the 12,000 pesos granted by the viceroy as insufficient, for among the needs of the colonizing expedition he specified livestock for the trip and for the first six months in the new settlements, grain and other food supplies, seeds to be distributed for planting, horses and mules, and wagons for the transportation of the women, children, and household belongings. He continued:

I repeat to your Excellency my opinion that five hundred families are necessary for the settlement of the villa and the . . . [surrounding] districts, not counting the hundred soldiers necessary for the presidio at the villa of Santa Fé.⁷

⁵ Among the residents visited, Lorenzo Madrid stated that he formerly had been an *encomendero* in New Mexico.

⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 3, 1693; *Idem* to *idem*, El Paso, January 12, 1693, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139.

⁷ H. H. Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico*, San Francisco, 1889, 200, and R. E. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, Cedar Rapids, 1911-1914, I, 383, erroneously write "fifty" colonists where all of the original records read "quinientas" or 500.

Such sincerity betokened a firm planting of a lasting colony—towns, hamlets, farms, and ranches, under the protective arms of the presidio at Santa Fé, from Taos to Isleta. He requested forty more missionaries to minister in the churches he proposed to build, and to spread the faith among the natives. With religious zeal he wrote:

It is my wish, with those with whom I enter, that they should first and foremost, personally build the Church and holy temple, setting up in it before all else the patroness of the said kingdom and villa, who is the one that was saved from the ferocity of the savages, her title being Our Lady of the Conquest . . . At the same time the said construction will be hastened, so that by our example the conquered will be moved to build gladly their churches in their pueblos.

Characteristically, Vargas closed this letter with the following dramatic words:

For a work of such magnitude . . . I, as a soldier, will willingly undergo the danger and risk of losing my life one and a thousand times in defense of my faith and my king, in keeping with my obligations . . . I wish that my fortune were such as to permit me to settle the region as I have reduced and conquered it . . . I am ready to serve in every way possible and to execute without delay the orders which your Excellency deigns to send me . . . Your answer will find me at Sombrerete.⁸

⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, January 2, 1693. Vargas' reports and letters were accompanied by messages of the *cabildo* and the custodian Fray Salvador de San Antonio. In a short letter from Vargas to the viceroy dated El Paso, January 12, 1693, distinct from the one referred to above, Vargas discusses the recent royal cédula of July 21, 1691, urging the reconquest of New Mexico. On the basis of Cruzate's expedition to Sia, the king suggested that a Spanish settlement might be established on the site of Sia, from which the natives were driven by Governor Cruzate on his expedition. Vargas points out the following reasons why such a plan would be undesirable: (1) most of the native inhabitants, along with their chieftain, Antonio Malacate, were absent from the pueblo at the time Cruzate burned the pueblo, and they might desire to reoccupy it, although at the time of Vargas' visit in 1692 they were living on the mesa of the Cerro Colorado, three leagues away; (2) the region was unsuitable for a Spanish settlement; (3) and he had already attained the submission of the pueblos and there were better sites to settle. A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139.

The letter of the *cabildo*, more or less repeating Vargas' views, further states that the residents of El Paso were scarcely in a position to survive, not to mention the resettlement of New Mexico, due to the extreme poverty of the colony, and that only one-fourth of the exiles from New Mexico were still living in the El Paso district (the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, El Paso, January 11, 1693, *ibid*). The custodian of the New Mexico missions, Fray Salvador, who had served for twelve years as a young missionary in New Mexico

Examined and acted upon by the General Junta in Mexico City the following month,⁹ the plans were given general approval. The author was assured full support. The king, he was gratified to learn, would be specially informed so that the crown might honor him for such distinguished and singular services "so deserving of reward." The high esteem which Viceroy Conde de Galve held for Vargas was manifest in the decisions of the Junta, over which the former presided, and was to become increasingly evident during the critical years to follow. Few favors asked by Vargas were not granted, if they were within the power of the viceroy. This complete cooperation on the part of the viceregal government was undoubtedly an important factor in assuring the ultimate success of the New Mexico enterprise, for Galve was to remain as viceroy practically until the end of Vargas' first term as governor.

Vargas' detailed plan of recolonization, and his proposal to establish a permanent presidio of one hundred government paid soldiers at Santa Fé were fully approved and authorized. Never before had New Mexico been assured such military

before the revolt of 1680, most of them spent in the province of Zuñi, requested at this time that the Indian girl who led Vargas to the religious articles recovered at Zuñi be rewarded with some special favor for this act of loyalty to the Catholic Faith. He also points out the need for additional missionaries in New Mexico. Fray Salvador de San Antonio to the viceroy, El Paso, January 5, 1693, *ibid.*

⁹ Report of the General Junta, Mexico City, February 25, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38, and A.G.I. *Guadalajara*, legajo 139. At this time Vargas was again thanked for his services, and news was sent to the king asking that he be duly rewarded. It was stated in the General Junta in Mexico City that the king should certainly reward him, for when notified of Cruzate's entry to Sia in 1689, King Charles II had ordered that he be thanked in the royal name, had honored him with membership in one of the three military orders, and had repaid all of the expenses incurred, "yet he did not do a tenth as much as Vargas had done for the spread of the Holy Faith and the extension of the Royal Dominion." *Ibid.* By this time it was agreed that the mines of Sierra Azul did not contain quicksilver. Report of the viceroy, Mexico City, April 18, 1693, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139. English translations of both of the documents above cited may be found in Espinosa, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 297-307.

On January 8, the viceroy had notified the king of Vargas' recent victory in behalf of the Royal Crown and the Holy Faith. On May 20, he reported to the king that help had been granted to Vargas in order to assure the permanent reconquest of New Mexico. At this time the viceroy also sent to the king Vargas' journals and other records to date pertaining to New Mexico. The viceroy to the king, Mexico City, May 20, 1693, *ibid.*

protection. Prior to 1680 the defense of the province had been entrusted to the moral influence of the missionaries and the weak arm of a handful of *encomendero*-soldiers. Of the soldiers for the establishment of the new presidio, it was decided to draw twenty-five from the El Paso presidio, and seventy-five from wherever Vargas should consider it most desirable. But if all of the fifty presidial soldiers stationed at El Paso seemed necessary for the protection of that place itself, none should be removed, and the one hundred should be enlisted elsewhere. In view of these revised plans with regard to the selection of the soldiery, Vargas was ordered to restore the fifty recruits from New Vizcaya to their garrisons, as they were no longer necessary. Furthermore, the royal treasury at Sombrerete was now ordered to add 28,000 pesos more to his account, which, combined with the 12,000 pesos already granted, constituted a grand sum of 40,000 pesos. This was deemed sufficient to finance the enlistment of soldiers and the gathering of settlers, the granting of necessary aid to these and to the impoverished inhabitants of El Paso, the cost for conveyance, and the purchase of supplies for the expedition and for the support of the new colony during the first six months of its existence. Vargas was requested to keep a complete inventory of all purchases of live-stock, flour, seeds, wagons, etc., so that payments might be made promptly, and contracts fulfilled, by the royal treasuries of Zacatecas, Sombrerete, or Guadiana. The governor was empowered to draw additional sums if he should consider it necessary.¹⁰

Twelve Franciscan friars had already been sent to El Paso, and ten more were promised.¹¹ Besides, the viceroy wrote, he would send, under his own patronage, a number of families from Mexico City who had volunteered to join in the refounding of the northern province. Although they were as yet few in number, he was confident of an augmentation in due time. By viceregal decree the governor at Parral and all government

¹⁰ Report of the General Junta, Mexico City, February 25, 1693, *op. cit.*

¹¹ *Ibid.* Praise was extended by the Junta to both Vargas and the father custodian for their fine cooperation and mutual trust as expressed in their letters. Vargas was urged to reward the Zuñi girl who led the Spaniards to the religious articles that were recovered at Zuñi, in compliance with Fray Salvador's request.

officials in New Vizcaya were asked to comply fully with the requests of Governor Vargas. A similar order was directed to the officials at the royal treasuries of Sombrerete, Zacatecas, and Guadiana.¹² By July 13 these commands had been officially filed at the royal treasuries of Zacatecas and Sombrerete, and had been made known to the civil and military authorities at Parral.¹³ Meanwhile, Vargas saw to the public proclamation of the decrees in the jurisdiction of Casas Grandes, the *real* of Parral, the *real* of Santa Rosa de Cusiguriachi, and the cities of Llerena, Fresnillo, Zacatecas, and Durango.¹⁴

During the spring and summer of 1693 Vargas spent most of his time in the saddle, travelling great distances throughout New Vizcaya and New Galicia to enlist soldiers and gather former residents of New Mexico who were known to be living on certain haciendas and in the settlements throughout those provinces. By public proclamation material aid and royal favors were promised to those who would join the impending colonizing expedition. Vargas had difficulty in obtaining the authorized credits promptly from the depleted treasuries of the northern provinces. Some delays ensued; but no obstacles were too great to overcome and he proceeded tirelessly with his preparations.¹⁵ He wrote impatiently to the viceroy requesting additional orders which would facilitate his guaranteeing prompt salary payment by the treasuries of Zacatecas and

¹² *Ibid*; order and command of his Excellency the viceroy to the effect that the royal justices, in the places where it shall be made known, duly fulfill their obligations with regard to the command therein, and to those of the governor and captain general, Mexico City, November 24, 1692, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

¹³ At Zacatecas, March 29; Sombrerete, June 6; Parral, July 13. *Ibid*.

¹⁴ At Casas Grandes on January 27, 1693; Cusiguriachi, February 4; Parral, February 15; Llerena, March 5; Fresnillo, March 14; Zacatecas, March 20; Durango, June 19. Official records attesting to the proclamation of the order by voice of the designated officials in each of the above localities, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38. See also B.N.M., legajo 4, *passim*.

¹⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, Zacatecas, April 18, 1693, B.N.M., legajo 4. In this letter Vargas asked the viceroy if the samples of vermilion he had obtained at the Moqui pueblos had been found to contain quicksilver. By coincidence, that same day the viceroy had drawn up a report notifying him that the assay had been made and that the vermilion had been found to contain no quicksilver. Report of the viceroy, Mexico City, April 18, 1693, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139.

Guadalajara to the presidio soldiers he was enlisting. He notified the viceroy that the desired viceregal orders had been received and that now he would be able to visit a number of places where tentative arrangements had already been made for the recruiting of a number of soldiers and settlers. He made report of the enlistment of forty persons, five of them married, and of arrangements being made for the purchase of necessities. Looking into the future Vargas requested new guns and ammunition for the greater protection of El Paso and Santa Fé, and the additional sum of 2,000 pesos for the construction of the presidio to be established at Santa Fé. He also asked for four artillerymen.¹⁶

Several weeks later Vargas was able to report to the viceroy forty-two soldier enlistments, seven of them married, the purchase of 200 riding horses and the plan to add supplies at Fresnillo. He had changed his mind about six cannon asked for previously, now expressing the view that 300 arquebuses with a supply of ammunition would be more useful, for they could be used more effectively in case of Indian attack while the expedition was en route.¹⁷ The viceroy complied with these requests by authorizing the royal factor to send Vargas four cannon, twelve quintals of powder, molds for musket and cannon balls, 170 guns, and artillerymen.¹⁸

¹⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, Zacatecas, May 1, 1693, B.N.M., legajo 4, (A, B).

¹⁷ *Idem to idem*, Zacatecas, May 16, 1693, *ibid.*

¹⁸ The fiscal suggested that the presidio at Santa Fé could be built from the funds already granted to Vargas. Report of the fiscal, Mexico City, May 16, 1693, *ibid.*

With regard to the new arms and ammunition requested, it was suggested by the factor that ex-governor Jironza Petriz de Cruzate be consulted for the purpose of ascertaining the exact amount of military equipment he had left to his successor Vargas at the El Paso presidio. This was done, and Cruzate answered that he had drawn up such an inventory for the Royal Tribunal of Accounts, where it could be consulted. In a report of June 1, 1693, the Royal Tribunal of Accounts stated that during Cruzate's governorship, from February 21, 1689 to February 21, 1691, he had the following 131 firearms (thirty-one turned over to him by his predecessor, and 100 sent from Mexico City): seventy *trabucos*, eighteen arquebuses, twenty-three *bandolas*, three *escopetas*, twelve cannons, one *esmeril*, two bronze stone mortars, and one artillery piece, minus one smaller piece destroyed. Of these the eighty-eight *trabucos* and arquebuses were distributed among the settlers, and the other forty-two pieces were turned over to Vargas. *Ibid.*

Tarrying at the old mining town of Zacatecas, where he had been delayed while making preparations for his second expedition into New Mexico, on May 16 Vargas wrote a long letter to the king which contained an extensive account of his successful expedition of the previous year. His principal object was to supplement anything the viceroy might propose in the matter of obtaining remuneration for his successful work in the royal service. After recounting his recent victory in a manner well suited to the purpose he had in mind, Vargas asked for the following royal favors:

I beg and request of your Majesty that I may receive from your liberal and royal hand, if it be your wish, a reward in remuneration for so great a service . . . honoring me also for my well known and ancient nobility and illustrious blood with the title of Marqués of the two places which are near your Majesty's court which are called Los Caramancheles, with the lordship over them, for the rents there are from one of the entailed estates of the ancient house of Vargas of the city of Madrid to which I belong. In order that I may continue to serve your Majesty, I request the position of governor, captain general, and president of the kingdom of Guatemala; and if your Majesty has already provided for this post, then that of governor, captain general, and president of the royal audiencia of the Philippines, in succession to the one who now holds that post, whose name is Don Fausto Cruzate; and if your Majesty has already made provision for it, the post of governor, captain general and president of the kingdom of Chile; and if your Majesty has already provided for it, the post of governor and captain general of Buenos Aires and the Río de la Plata. I hope to receive the gift of one of the said positions, as well as the said title of Castile, the Marquisate of los Caramancheles.¹⁹

Although later granted the Marquisate of La Nava de Barcinas, and other royal favors subsequently applied for, Vargas did not receive any of the honors specifically requested in this very interesting letter.

At about this time, evidently to arouse interest in the impending colonizing expedition into New Mexico, the viceroy ordered the publication and distribution of an official circular telling of Vargas' remarkable campaign of 1692. Thus in the summer of 1693 appeared the *Mercurio Volante*, written by the Mexican savant Don Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora. The little pamphlet told an exciting story in words which were bound

¹⁹ Vargas to the king, MS., 43.

to interest and attract adventurous souls, and it apparently had a wide circulation in both New and Old Spain.²⁰

By the middle of June, Vargas had spent the 40,000 pesos granted by the viceroy. He had already enlisted the one hundred soldiers and an unspecified number of families, and had purchased a considerable quantity of supplies. There were more families to gather and outfit, however, and an additional 15,000 pesos was requested. Vargas, it will be recalled, originally had been authorized to draw to the amount of 12,000 pesos. When it became clear that he did not have the private fortune to finance the colonizing expedition as he had done in the case of his preliminary expedition of 1692, this amount had been augmented to 40,000 without question. The Junta had stated that additional sums might be drawn upon if necessary, but the statement was merely a polite gesture toward a respected royal servant. Vargas, however, gave it more formal significance. He considered it a supplementary promise of financial aid, and now referring to it as "the second viceregal order," he casually requested authorization to draw the additional sum referred to.²¹

While awaiting the outcome of negotiations for the supplementary 15,000 pesos with the royal officials at the treasury

²⁰ The pamphlet contains eighteen folio pages (36 regular pages), and has the following complete title: "Mercurio Volante con la Noticia de la recuperacion de las provincias del Nuevo Mexico conseguida por D. Diego de Vargas, Zapata, y Luxan Ponce de Leon, Governador y Capitan General de aquel Reyno. Escriviola por especial orden de el Excelentissimo Señor Conde de Galve, Virrey, Governador, y Capitan General de la Nueva España, etc., DON CARLOS DE SIGUENZA Y GONGORA, Cosmographo mayor de su Magestad en estos Reynos, y Cathedratico Iubilado de Mathematicas en la Academia Mexicana. Con licencia en Mexico: En la Imprenta de Antuerpia de los herederos de la Viuda de Bernardo Calderon, año de 1693."

Leonard, the authority on Sigüenza and his works, states, in his edition of the *Mercurio Volante*, *op. cit.*, 14: "The *Mercurio Volante*, or 'Flying Mercury,' should be regarded . . . as a link in the chain of more or less ephemeral publications, journalistic in nature, which begins far back in the colonial period in the scattered *relaciones*, *crónicas*, *hojas volantes*, *gacetas*, etc. These rudimentary newspapers appeared spasmodically soon after the introduction of the printing press into New Spain early in the sixteenth century and slowly evolved into true periodicals issued at stated intervals." And again, *ibid.*, 44: ". . . the name which Don Carlos gave to his account of the first campaign of Vargas in New Mexico indicates the essentially journalistic purpose of the *Mercurio Volante* and its legitimate claim as one of the forerunners of newspapers in New Spain."

²¹ Report of the royal treasury of Durango, June 20, 1693, B.N.M., legajo 4.

of Durango, Vargas penned a letter to the viceroy in which he described his activities of the past month. The expedition was practically ready, he reported, the additional sum being all that was needed to complete the preparations. Vargas had been working tirelessly, despite an unfortunate accident. On May 18, while mounting his horse, with one foot in the stirrup, he pulled the reins in such a way that the bit was dislodged, causing the horse to jump in pain. Unable to gain the saddle, Vargas was thrown to the ground, where he lay prostrate with a wrenched knee and two hard kicks in the abdomen. It was a miracle that he was not killed. Nevertheless, he had the knee bandaged, was helped to his horse, and rode on six leagues to Fresnillo, where a doctor twisted his knee back into its proper position and where he spent three days convalescing. On the 25th he rode on to Sombrerete, refusing to permit anything to delay his plans. Here he arrived very ill, for continued riding had aggravated the suffering. In constant pain, and fearing infection, Vargas had himself bled and purged. By June 14 the one hundred soldiers had been enlisted, fifty settlers, many married and with children, had been gathered, and the 40,000 pesos had been spent. Vargas now decided to set out toward El Paso immediately by way of Pasaje presidio, for he wished to cross the Nasas River before the heavy rains would make it impassable. He deplored the lack of funds which prevented the enlistment of many former residents of New Mexico residing in Parral, Carretas, Cotache de Santa Rosa, Casas Grandes, and the Valle de las Bocas de San Bartolomé, where public proclamations had been made, and where there were many volunteer families.²²

The treasury officials at Durango refused to pay the additional money without specific viceregal orders. These were issued on July 9.²³ The problem now was to obtain the money, for the treasuries at Durango and Parral protested their insufficiency. As late as October 1 viceregal orders were still being issued to the effect that Vargas be paid the additional 15,000 pesos.²⁴

²² Vargas to the viceroy, Durango, June 22, 1693, B.N.M., legajo 4.

²³ Viceregal decree, Mexico City, July 9, 1693, *ibid.*

²⁴ Viceregal decree, Mexico City, October 1, 1693, *ibid.*

Meanwhile, what about the volunteer families whom the viceroy had promised to send north from Mexico City? The organizing of this group of colonists was proceeding slowly but with success. On March 14, 1693, by viceregal order, it was publicly proclaimed throughout Mexico City that all those wishing to go to New Mexico with their families would be provided with transportation, given the honors of colonizers, and granted lands by the governor of the province.²⁵ By the first week of April, twenty families had volunteered. The Junta General now met to draw up more specific plans. It was decided that Cristóbal de Velasco and the father procurator, Francisco Farfán, should be placed in complete command of the expedition, with full power to settle disputes on the way. José Mejía, whose wagons had been hired, was to be subject to their commands, and paid 437 pesos and four reales per wagon. Orders were formulated to assure the prompt furnishing of supplies at fair prices along the road by local justices during the four months allotted for the journey. Each family was granted a minimum of 300 pesos in aid, with exceptions in the case of large families, a sum deemed sufficient for each to outfit itself with necessary clothing, firearms, and other essentials. Since the expedition was being made at the expense of the royal treasury, deserters, it was decreed, would be punished by exile to the Philippines and labor without pay. City and church records were to be carefully checked to assure that all those participating were legitimately married and of good character.²⁶

The original public proclamation was not sufficiently attractive to induce many families to volunteer, for the exact amount of financial aid forthcoming had not been designated. Now it was announced specifically that 300 pesos would be paid to each family.²⁷ A number of minor matters had yet to be ironed out: the owner of the wagons demanded 600 pesos per wagon; Cristóbal Velasco, designated leader of the expedition, was quibbling over salary; some potential volunteer families

²⁵ Viceregal decree, Mexico City, March 13, 1693; certification of public proclamation of the decree, Mexico City, March 14, 1693, B.N.M., legajo 4.

²⁶ Report of the General Junta, Mexico City, April 8, 1693, *ibid.*

²⁷ Viceregal decree and certification of public proclamation of the decree, Mexico City, April 11, 1693, *ibid.*



insisted that 300 pesos was insufficient help. Father Farfán offered to supply the necessary wagons for all as far as El Paso at the figure originally submitted by the Junta. The twenty families numbered seventy-two persons, all of whom were designated as Spaniards. According to Farfán, five wagons were necessary for their conveyance, sixteen persons to a wagon. These matters were settled at a meeting of the Junta on June 15, where Farfán's offer was accepted, and each of the larger families assigned an additional twenty pesos. This latter sum was apportioned secretly so as not to arouse ill feeling among the others.²⁸ Velasco's salary was finally settled to his satisfaction at three ducats per day.²⁹

By July 4 the volunteer families numbered sixty-two, totaling 208 individuals, which addition called for a modification of plans with regard to food supplies. It was decided that three reales a day per person should be set aside for this purpose, the total expense for the four months' journey depending on the exact number of families.³⁰ As the months rolled on, the number of families increased to a total variously estimated at sixty-five and sixty-six and a half families, or to a grand total of 227 to 234 persons, among them several single gentlemen going at their own expense.³¹

These families gathered in Mexico City were mostly of good quality, and their encampment at Guadalupe, outside the

²⁸ Report of the Junta de Hacienda, June 15, 1693, B.N.M., legajo 4.

²⁹ Report of the fiscal, Mexico City, July 10, 1693, *ibid.* An examination of the *Contaduría* papers revealed that in 1677 Lorenzo Garro had been paid four Castilian ducats per day to lead fifty volunteers and *forzados* to New Mexico. Report of the fiscal, Mexico City, July 4, 1693, *ibid.*

³⁰ Father Farfán requested the necessary authority to buy corn and meat on the road, and also papers empowering him to prevent single men from mingling with families with young girls, under threat of punishment. Both requests were granted. Viceregal decree, Mexico City, September 2, 1693, *ibid.*

³¹ The latter figures given above are from an official memorandum, Mexico City, September 3, 1693, and a viceregal decree, Mexico City, September 4, 1693, *ibid.* A muster roll of the colonists taken in Mexico City some time after September 3, date unspecified, lists sixty-five families, actually sixty-four, totalling 227 persons. Among those listed were Don Francisco de Leyba, for thirty years a quicksilver expert and miner in Peru, interested in the expedition "since it is reported that there are many silver, gold, and quicksilver mines there . . ." and Don José Serin (sic), two Spanish gentlemen who were travelling at their own expense. *Ibid.*

walls of the capital, represented a well disciplined, if somewhat impatient, group. Some were parting from relatives and friends with doubts, fears and misgivings. An interesting human aspect of life and affairs there was the case of María de Miraval. Her husband wanted to take her to New Mexico but her mother objected, and a litigation ensued typical of the detailed attention which the paternalistic viceregal government gave to its citizens. Doña Antonia Torrecilla, the mother, a widow, appealed to the viceroy, insisting that her son-in-law, Miguel de Figueroa, had married her daughter against her will, had often mistreated her, and now had lured her to the barracks of the colonists about to leave for New Mexico, where he held her by force. She accused the son-in-law of illicit relations with a mulatto woman, among numerous other indignities, and begged that the daughter be placed in a convent and thus freed from this deceiver who, if he mistreated her at home, would surely treat her even worse "in a distant land." Doña Antonia was authorized to plead her case.

The trial turned into a sort of tragicomedy. The first three witnesses, friends and relatives of Doña Antonia, justified her case. Then María was called to the stand. She repeated all of her mother's charges of mistreatment and infidelity. Having enlisted with her husband to go to New Mexico in the hope that in a new environment she might be able to reform him, she was now afraid. She concluded by summoning for witness a certain tailor, Manuel Rodríguez, who knew how badly her husband treated her. Rodríguez was then questioned. He surprised María by testifying that Figueroa loved his wife very much, and that she quarreled with him without cause and was entirely to blame for all their family troubles. The next two witnesses corroborated this testimony. Finally Cristóbal de Velasco and Father Farfán were called. All they knew was what they had seen on a few occasions, they said, but from their observations Figueroa treated his wife with love and esteem, and although they had noticed that the pair quarreled a great deal, María always started the arguments, which soon terminated, leaving both very happy, as though nothing had happened. This testimony brought a verdict little to the

liking of Doña Antonia, fond mother that she was. She appealed to the viceroy for a renewal of the case, but failed in the attempt. Strangely enough, when the families were about to leave for New Mexico the muster roll contained the following entry: "Miguel de Figueroa, cutler, his wife María de Carabajal [sic] with her mother and a brother eight years old. The mother's name is Antonia Torrecillas [sic]." ³²

During the second week of September the colonists left the temporary encampment at Guadalupe. On November 16 they reached La Laguna, in the jurisdiction of Zacatecas. ³³ Travelling slowly they were not to reach El Paso in time to participate in the Vargas re-entry of 1693; but when they did reach Santa Fé in the spring of the following year they were a most welcome group, for they arrived in time to help turn the tide of conquest more certainly in favor of the Spaniards. ³⁴

Meanwhile, after several months of active preparations, much of which time was spent travelling over the road between El Paso, Parral, Sombrerete, and Zacatecas, Governor Vargas on September 17 returned to El Paso with soldiers and settlers from the interior. ³⁵ He had ridden over 300 leagues, and he arrived in high spirits, apparently suffering none the worse from his recent knee injury. Several days later a proclamation of the governor was publicly made before the Casa Real at El Paso, and in the public squares at Senecú, Isleta, and the *real* de San Lorenzo, calling upon all to be in readiness for the day of departure, October 4, the feast of Saint Francis of Assisi. The colonists would be provided with meat, maize, wheat, seeds to plant, wagons to transport the women and children unable to go on horseback, and clothing if necessary. And the former residents of New Mexico were promised their for-

³² The case of Doña Antonia Torrecilla, Mexico City, September 4-7, 1693; muster roll, Mexico City, n.d. B.N.M., legajo 4.

³³ Here the members of the expedition again were carefully counted. They now numbered 219, not counting three French prisoners who had joined the group. Fifteen others were listed as having escaped in the vicinity of Zacatecas. Muster roll of the colonists en route to New Mexico, Zacatecas, November 16, 30, 1693, *ibid.*

³⁴ For further details regarding this group of colonists see Chapter X.

³⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

mer lands and haciendas, and all privileges and honors due to conquerors.³⁶

The expedition, alert on the day designated, consisted of 100 soldiers, some seventy families gathered at El Paso and New Vizcaya, some widows, single persons, and servants, in all over 800 persons, seventeen Franciscan friars led by their custodian, Father Salvador de San Antonio, and an unspecified number of Indian allies.³⁷ The eighteen religious were: Salvador de San Antonio, Juan Muñoz de Castro, Antonio de Sierra, Juan Daza, Juan de Zabaleta, José Diez, Francisco de Jesús María, Antonio Carbonel, Juan Alpuente, Francisco Corvera, Juan Antonio del Corral, Jerónimo Prieto, Antonio Bahamonte, Antonio Obregón, Domingo de Jesús María, Buenaventura de Contreras, José Narváez Valverde, Diego Zeinos (secretary).³⁸

Of the seventy families, twenty-seven were Negroes and mestizos, rounded up at little cost in Zacatecas, Sombrerete, and Fresnillo. It was the others, especially the former residents of New Mexico, full-blood Spaniards most of them, who were in reality the leading spirits in the refounding of the northern settlements. The entire expense of outfitting these people amounted to about 7,000 pesos. Vargas enlisted the soldiers without expense to the royal treasury by advancing 150 pesos to each, to be deducted from later pay. The flour was from the hacienda of Don Juan Cortés del Rey, of Conchos. The expedition was accompanied by 900 head of livestock, over 2,000 horses and 1,000 mules. It was a lusty colony. Aided by his friends, and drawing from his own credits, the governor assumed the burden of these expenses; for, although he had requested 15,000 pesos to finance the provisioning and

³⁶ Vargas' journal, El Paso, September 20-21, 1693, *ibid.*, and A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

³⁷ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, December 18, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38. Twelve of the friars were from the Province of Santo Evangelio, Mexico (viceregal decree, Mexico City, February 25, 1693, *ibid.*); the others were from the College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro (Juan Domingo de Arricivita, *Crónica seráfica y apostólica del Colegio de propaganda fide de la Santa Cruz de Querétaro en la Nueva España*, segunda parte, Mexico, 1792, 92, 282-284). Two were lay brothers (Vargas' journal, December 16, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38).

conveyance of the colony, this support had not been forthcoming.³⁹

The expedition set out in three divisions. Lieutenant General Luis Granillo was named second in command, Captain Roque Madrid was placed in special charge of the soldiers, and Fray Salvador, the custodian, was in charge of the missionaries. The plan was to reach Santa Fé in fifty days.⁴⁰ On October 4, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the main body of the expedition pulled out of El Paso amid great pomp and ceremony. Marching to the strains of martial music, two military squadrons of ten soldiers each led the way.⁴¹ All those who were able to ride, were on horseback; the others were crowded into twelve wagons which had been outfitted at Parral.⁴² Six wagons and eighty mules were used for the transportation of the food supplies, and the three cannon were carried in three small carts.⁴³ By the time the slow moving train had pulled up to the edge of the Río Grande it was already nightfall; so there they stopped. Vargas returned to El Paso to command from there, leaving Granillo in charge.⁴⁴

Even with the aid of Indian allies, all of the following day was consumed in getting only half the wagons across the river.⁴⁵ But once the river was crossed the march was rapid, although not much smoother; and the difficult crossing apparently had put the people in a bad humor, for they continually complained of the rough, winding road.⁴⁶ It took them eight days to reach Ancón de Fray García, a bend in the river five leagues north of El Paso, during which time many a broken

³⁹ *Acusación del cabildo*, Santa Fé, 1697, S.F.A., and A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14; Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

No exact census for this original colony of reconquerors, with individual listings, has yet been found.

⁴⁰ Vargas' journal, El Paso, October 11, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, El Paso, October 4, 1693; Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁴² Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693; Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, January 20, 1694. *Ibid.*

⁴³ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693; Vargas' journal, October 19, 1693, *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Vargas' journal, El Paso, October 4, 1693.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, October 5, 1693.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, October 6, 1693.

wheel had to be mended. With full knowledge of the obstacles ahead, the missionaries stayed behind until October 11, on which day they followed the trail already cleared by the vanguard and joined camp that same day at Ancón de Fray García.⁴⁷ From there the advance continued in two divisions; the van, conducting the cattle, was always a day ahead of the rest, clearing the road.⁴⁸

Once the expedition was well on its way, Vargas and the *cabildo* made ready to take final leave of El Paso and thus bring up the rear.⁴⁹ October 13 was set as the date of departure.⁵⁰ New civil and military officials were appointed to administer justice in the El Paso district, chief of whom was Captain Juan Páez Hurtado, who remained as *justicia mayor*.⁵¹ Dams had been repaired and ditches cleared, and on October 13, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, the *cabildo* appeared in the military square, where residents and natives had already gathered. Vargas spoke to the assemblage, urging them to keep peace, and to cooperate against the hostile Apaches who in his absence might attempt to take advantage of their slender resources. The people answered that they would be obedient to the orders of their *justicia mayor*. Then Vargas and the *cabildo*, escorted by two squads of Spanish "leather-jackets," one to guard the royal standard—Don Juan de Oñate's original banner, long guarded as a treasure, and saved at the time of the revolt of 1680—and the other to guard the horses, took final leave.⁵²

The first night was spent across the river at La Salineta, four short leagues from El Paso, and on the following day they joined forces with the main body of the expedition at Estero Largo, eight or nine leagues farther.⁵³ Thence the train advanced in two divisions: the van composed of the cattle, horses

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, October 11, 1693.

⁴⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, El Paso, October 13, 1693, *op. cit.* A day ahead meant 5 leagues.

⁴⁹ This was the *cabildo* or town council of Santa Fé, which had been carrying on at El Paso since the withdrawal from New Mexico in 1680.

⁵⁰ Vargas' journal, El Paso, October 11, 1693.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, October 13 and December 8, 1693. This disproves Bancroft's guess, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 203, repeated by Twitchell, *Leading Facts*, I, 385, that Hurtado was in special charge of the colonists of the expedition of 1693.

⁵² Vargas' journal, October 13, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, October 14, 1693.

and mules, being escorted by half the Spanish soldiery and most of the settlers who rode on horse- and muleback; and the wagons with the main body of the colonists and the impedimenta strung out behind. The governor was usually somewhere between the two rear divisions of the expedition, and within striking distance of each, in order that he might hasten to the aid of either one in case of necessity.⁵⁴ The advance was slow and difficult.

On October 18 the first wagons of the main body stopped at Yerba del Manso to await those in the rear, while Vargas and those on horseback made camp at Robledo (also called Robledito), one and a half leagues farther up the valley. Here they met Adjutant Francisco Anaya Almazán with the eighty mules, escorted by ten soldiers, from Socorro (the point reached by the advance guard), which Vargas had sent for on the 11th in order to distribute better the burden of the wagon train.⁵⁵ Anaya brought a message from Captain Madrid reporting a shortage of food.⁵⁶

From here Anaya was despatched to Socorro, which he expected to reach in eight days, carrying orders to Roque Madrid to continue his march from Socorro on November 2, and to make his journeys short so that the camps would not be too widely separated; the entire expedition would join at Alameda, and there prepare for the entry into Santa Fé.⁵⁷ Furthermore, a Sia Indian named Lorenzo, who had gone to El Paso with Cruzate in 1689, was sent to his pueblo with a letter and a rosary for Captain Malacate, the leader of the Keres, partly to announce the arrival of the Spaniards and ask for help, but principally in order to learn the general state of affairs in the north.⁵⁸

On October 22, Vargas reached San Diego with the horse-

⁵⁴ Vargas journal, October 19-20, 1693.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, October 11 and 18, 1693.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, October 18, 1693.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, October 20, 1693.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* The message stated that the Spaniards were approaching with their wives and children, and with many soldiers for their own defense and to defend the Keres from their enemies (*Ibid.*, November 10, 1693). According to the report of the second entrada sent by the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Conde de Galve, Santa Fé, January, 1694 (copy filed in Vargas' journal), Lorenzo was despatched from Socorro, and not Robledo.

men, and camped there, on the banks of the Río Grande. The wagons, carts, and baggage were left on the main road, called that of El Perrillo, because of the difficulty experienced in crossing the running streams.⁵⁹ At San Diego, Vargas crossed the river. Next day was one of general resting, and preparation on the part of the colonists for the jump to Fray Cristóbal, thirty leagues ahead. Each family was given its ration of meat and flour for the eight days' march impending, and the women spent the day making *tortillas* and *tacate*.⁶⁰

After a two days' rest the march was resumed, in two divisions, Vargas along the river, and Granillo conducting the wagons by way of the main road which passed by the water holes of El Perrillo, Peñuelas, and Paraje del Muerto, usually filled during the rainy season.⁶¹ Vargas crossed the river to Fray Cristóbal on October 31, on schedule, where he found the wagons and carts. The road along the river had been exceedingly tortuous, the only reason why it was followed being its abundant meadows and woodland. Due to the many bends in the river the distance must have been from thirty-six to forty leagues. The governor was ill most of the time with chills and fever.⁶² One sad misfortune had occurred—the accidental death of Domingo Luján, a soldier. While chasing cattle, his mount accidentally collided with one of the animals and fell; the rider, pinned beneath his mount, was immediately rendered unconscious. He died the same night. In the mountains near the watering place of Agua Escondida, Apaches were sighted for the first time.

Vargas pushed ahead with the entire camp to the ruined and abandoned hacienda of Luis López.⁶³ Here, as at San Diego, the expedition stopped to reorganize. The food supply ran desperately low by this time, because of the inadequate provisioning at El Paso, so low that the people began to sell arms, jewelry, and horses to the Indians in exchange for grain

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, October 11 and 22, 1693. San Diego was on the Río Grande, 32 leagues north of El Paso, in the vicinity of Las Cruces.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, October 23, 1693.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1693. The night of the 24th was spent at Doña María, 2 leagues farther north.

⁶² *Ibid.*, October 24 and 31, 1693.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, November 4, 1693. Situated 12 leagues from Fray Cristóbal, and 3 leagues below Socorro.

and vegetables.⁶⁴ This procedure became more or less a habit for many months to come. Here the governor left the camp in charge of Granillo, and with a small escort hastened to join Madrid in order to make plans for the acquisition of food, and the entry into the pueblo country.⁶⁵ The cold winter caused much illness and suffering.⁶⁶

Vargas left definite instructions. When all were sufficiently rested, the wagons were to follow at leisure by way of Santo Domingo and San Marcos, at which latter place, upon notification, they would be given an escort and succored with fresh food. If some of the colonists preferred to make their residence in Alameda, Sandía, or Santo Domingo, instead of going on to Santa Fé, they might be distributed accordingly with the proper equipment. The friendly Keres who had come up from El Paso were ordered to pass with their Captain, Bartolomé de Ojeda, from the hacienda of Anaya to their pueblo of Sia, where they were to be provided with a beef each Sunday and Wednesday.⁶⁷ Little did Vargas suspect that the submission of the Indians the year previous was not genuine.

The governor joined Madrid and the advance guard at the abandoned hacienda of Felipe Romero, near the former village of Alamillo.⁶⁸ They went on toward Santa Fé. Much suffering was caused by the severe weather—continued snows, and icy winds—and it took four days to travel the sixteen leagues to the deserted hacienda of the deceased Ignacio Baca, on the Río Grande.⁶⁹ Here Lorenzo, the Keres of Sia, sent ahead from Robledo, appeared on the opposite bank, accompanied by three natives of his pueblo as evidence that he had carried out his mission. They crossed over to where Vargas was. Lorenzo had delivered the letter and the rosary to Captain Malacate at La Ciénega de Cochití, and had waited four days for an answer without success. He reported that the Pueblos had

⁶⁴ *Acusación del cabildo*, 1697, *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ Vargas' journal, November 5, 1693, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, November 6, 1693.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, November 5, 1693.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, November 5-6, 1693. 13 and 14 leagues north of Luis López, or 10 to 11 leagues north of Socorro. Vargas reached this place, November 6. *Ibid.*, November 6, 1693.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, November 10, 1693. In the vicinity of Los Lunas.

again turned against the Spaniards, and were ready to resist; only Santa Ana and San Felipe, surrounded by enemies, were loyal; his own pueblo, Sia, was undecided.⁷⁰

On November 12, between Sandía and Puaray, a Keres Indian of San Felipe, named Andrés, appeared.⁷¹ He extended a friendly welcome, and assured the loyalty of his pueblo and that of Santa Ana, both of which had been in constant fear of attack by their enemy the Jémez, Tewas, and Tanos. Further good news was the report that Sia also welcomed the Spaniards. Vargas sent him back to his pueblo with orders that his people should set aside maize and flour for him, for which he promised a just price. Meanwhile, in order better to learn the attitude of the Tanos, Tewas, and Picuríes, two of the Tanos Indians brought up from El Paso were dispatched with five letters and an equal number of rosaries to the various governors of Santa Fé, Tesuque, San Juan, Picuríes, and San Lázaro. They were allowed six days in which to return an answer. The letters read as follows:

Jesus and Mary. My son and beloved brother. This is to notify you that I am near, and about to enter your city. I am very desirous to greet you and all those sons to whom you will make known my message. Tell everyone that the friars, and all the Spaniards, and many others whom they do not know are coming with their wives and children, and that consequently they should be very happy, for they will live happily with the Blessed Virgin, our Lady and our Mother, and with God. My son, may He spare you many seasons. As a sign of my love I send you a rosary.

DON DIEGO DE VARGAS ZAPATA LUJÁN PONCE DE LEÓN.⁷²

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*; official résumé of the second entrada, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 20, 1694, copy filed in Vargas' journal; report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁷¹ Vargas' journal, November 12, 1693; Vargas to Luis Granillo, November 14, 1693.

⁷² Vargas' journal, November 12 and 14, 1693. The reader is again reminded here, as has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, that many of the Indian leaders of the New Mexico pueblos could not only read, but could write as well—fruits of the educational work of the Franciscan missionaries in the period prior to the revolt of 1680. In the Vargas documents there are filed a number of letters written by the Indian governors of Santa Ana and Tesuque to Vargas, and in very good Castilian! On a number of occasions Vargas carried on peace negotiations with hostile Pueblo chieftains through the medium of the written word.

CHAPTER VII

DEFECTION OF THE PUEBLOS

When Vargas, with fifty soldiers, arrived in front of the pueblo on the mesa of San Felipe, friendly inhabitants were awaiting him.¹ The women on one side were dressed in their best, wearing crosses at their throats, while the men arrayed on the other side were without weapons.² Crosses were much in evidence, for a large one had been placed at the entrance to the pueblo and there were many others in the houses. The square had been well swept; food had been spread on new *petates*, or mats, surrounded by benches for the guests.³ Now pack mules had been driven up to carry grain back to camp; but in this respect fortune played the Spaniards false. Plagues of worms and grasshoppers, according to the natives, had ruined practically their entire harvest.⁴

Visiting Indians soon caught the eye of Vargas. Several Keres from Ciénega de Cochití were pressed into service; they were sent home to tell their captain, Malacate, to pay a visit to Vargas.⁵ Shortly, the governor of Pecos, accompanied by five of his warriors, appeared, having learned of the coming of the Spaniards through a Pecos youth. Voicing his friendship, he divulged significant information: the Tewas, Tanos, Picuríes, Taos, and Jémez were ready to resist the invaders, and Ácoma and Moqui were hostile.⁶ They had spent the previous summer

¹ Vargas' journal, November 13, 1693. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38, and A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140. On the 12th he passed by the abandoned haciendas of Doña Damiana and Cristóbal de Anaya. *Ibid.*, November 12 and 14, 1693.

All references to Vargas' journal and correspondence for the period covered in this chapter are from the above sources, unless otherwise specified.

² Official résumé of the second entrada, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 20, 1694.

³ Vargas to Luis Granillo, November 14, 1693.

⁴ *Ibid.* The Sia were living on the Cerro Colorado.

⁵ Old and infirm Malacate had been at Sia for the summer, where he had married, but he had been living at Ciénega de Cochití since winter had set in. He was alleged to be the leader who had induced the natives to be hostile toward the Spaniards. Vargas' journal, November 12 and 14, 1693. The Jémez had learned of the coming of the Spaniards through the Apaches. Vargas to Granillo, November 14, 1693.

⁶ *Ibid.* Corroborated by Lorenzo, of Sia.

making arrows and darts for use against them on their return. A highly inflammatory rumor, sweeping through the pueblos shortly after the Spaniards had departed in 1692, had aroused keen activity: the Spaniards upon their return would put all Indian chiefs to the knife. The story had been told at a gathering at San Juan by the half-breed Tapia, deceased, whom Vargas had brought as interpreter the year before.⁷ For these reasons Vargas hurried a message to Granillo ordering him to join forces on the site of the former hacienda of Doña Damiana, hard by the mesa on which San Felipe pueblo was now located, whence the joint expedition would go on to Santo Domingo.⁸

At Doña Damiana, the leader of the Keres formerly of San Marcos,⁹ named Cristóbal, arrived from the mesa of La Cieneguilla, which his people had made their home. He agreed secretly to send fifty loads of maize, beans, and flour to the relief of the Spaniards, in exchange for three slaughtered beeves. To assure the safe transit of the provisions Roque Madrid accompanied him.¹⁰ Shortly after nightfall Madrid, accompanied by a Keres youth, was on his way back with pack mules heavily laden. Between the ruined pueblos of San Felipe and Santo Domingo, an old Indian woman came running toward them from the direction of Cochití. She reported that some Tewas, Tanos, Taos, Picuríes, Navahos, and Río Colorado Apaches, on horseback and heavily armed, had ridden to La Cieneguilla and told the leaders there to come down from the mesa and join them in an attack upon the Spaniards, and that they were now on their way toward Santo Domingo. She added that there was division among the Tewas on the mesa. An Indian runner brought similar news.

Near midnight Madrid and the Indian appeared at Vargas' tent, woke him up, and announced the news. Immediately there was great bustling about camp. The provisions were taken up to the mesa of San Felipe for safe keeping; the alarm

⁷ *Ibid.* Tapia had died at San Buenaventura.

⁸ Granillo received the message the following day at the fork in the river near the abandoned pueblo of Isleta. Vargas' journal, November 15, 1693.

⁹ *Ibid.* The ruins of San Marcos pueblo are eighteen miles southwest of Santa Fé. Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, II, 448.

¹⁰ Vargas' journal, November 15-16, 1693.

was spread to every sentinel; horses, mules, and cattle were rounded up nearer to camp; forty cavalry soldiers were stationed at the entrances; and the governor ordered his horse saddled at the door of his tent; his arms-bearer was on vigil to awaken him if necessary. At two o'clock in the morning of November 16 a courier was sent with a message to Granillo, leader of the rearguard, who was commanded to send thirty of his most experienced soldiers immediately, well armed and with fresh mounts. Juan López Olguín was appointed to lead them. The people were ordered to subsist as best they could on a meat diet pending the arrival of grain and vegetables. The letter was delivered at the fork in the Río Grande called Josefillo, and twenty-five "leather-jackets," all that could be spared, reached Vargas' camp that same night at about eleven thirty.¹¹ The following day, at about noon, a Tewa rider galloped pompously into camp to announce the approach of the governors of San Juan, Picurías, San Lázaro, and Tesuque.¹² They arrived heavily armed. Don Luis Picurías apologized for not having come before, and feigned courteousness. He had been trading buckskins with the Apaches, he said, and his brother Lorenzo had been on the plains obtaining buffalo meat. Vargas crushed their conceit by stating with graveness that he brought many missionaries to Christianize them, and soldiers for their protection. He had not entered Santa Fé as yet, he said, not because he was afraid, for he had many more people with him than on the entry of the past year, but solely because some of the women on the expedition were pregnant, and the rigorous weather demanded a temporary halt. The chiefs were well treated; but at the same time Vargas cautiously placed the entire camp on the *qui vive*, fearing an ambush.¹³

Early the next morning,¹⁴ three Keres of Cochití put in an

¹¹ *Ibid.*; Vargas to Granillo, November 16, 1693; Granillo to Vargas, November 16, 1693. Granillo and the rear-guard were virtually dragging themselves along, and had not even stopped to eat the day previous. They had stopped at Josefillo to await a wagon which had broken down. The camp was advancing as rapidly as possible.

¹² *Ibid.*, November 17, 1693. These were all the same ones that had been left in those positions in 1692; Luis Picurías of San Juan; Don Lorenzo, his brother, of Picurías; Don Cristóbal Yope of San Lázaro; Domingo of Tesuque.

¹³ *Ibid.* On the 18th Granillo and his charge were at Sandía.

¹⁴ November 18th, at 8 A. M. *Ibid.*, November 18, 1693.

appearance before Vargas with apologies for what had happened; the alarm they assured him was false. Although showing every possible sign of friendship and good will, Vargas bluntly answered that he had to see to believe, and, moreover, he suspected that no attack had materialized only because the enemy could not cooperate. He could not be frightened, he remarked confidently, since he was under the protection of the Blessed Virgin, whose image was stamped on his banner and whose rosary he had on his person for protection. He conceded them one more chance to prove their loyalty. They were sent back to their pueblo with ten mules laden with meat and other goods to be exchanged for flour, maize, and beans, with a time limit of three days.

On November 19, at about eleven o'clock in the morning, Granillo arrived with his charge: the rest of the missionaries, led by Father San Antonio, the band of colonists, and all animals and impedimenta, escorted by "leather-jackets."¹⁵ The united camp was moved to a more favorable locality a league farther, on the site of the ruined hacienda of the deceased Cristóbal de Anaya.¹⁶ Vargas now prepared to go with a flying squadron to the mesas on which the Keres of Cochití, Sia, and Santo Domingo, and the Jémez had their pueblos.¹⁷ He took with him forty picked soldiers, three missionaries, and two mule teams with their muleteers for the transportation of the provisions to be acquired. Among the soldiers went the members of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé. They left on November 21. A march of eight long leagues brought them to the abandoned pueblo of Cochití at eventide.¹⁸ At eight o'clock on the following morning they went to the mesa, the soldiers in double file, the standard bearer riding in between, followed by the officers in the order of their rank, Vargas and the *cabildo* bringing up the rear. In this fashion they rode two leagues across the plain, in full view of those on the mesa.¹⁹

¹⁵ Vargas' journal, November 19, 1693.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, November 19-20, 1693. This place was on the edge of the river, in the vicinity of Bernalillo.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, November 20-22, 1693; official résumé of the second entrada.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, November 21, 1693. Cochití was just as it had been found in 1692.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, November 22, 1693.

Captain Malacate and Captain Cristóbal came down unarmed to welcome them and render allegiance. Vargas followed them up the steep ascent. A cross had been planted at the entrance to the pueblo, on the sight of which the Spanish leader dismounted, fell to his knees, and kissed the ground. The natives flocked out to greet him, joining their voices with his as he intoned the *alabado* three times. He entered the square with half of the "leather-jackets," where another cross had been erected. Holding aloft the royal standard he told the inhabitants why he had come. He urged them to rebuild their old pueblo on the plain below, where facilities for cultivation were more favorable, and he illustrated his point by pointing to some tall stalks of maize in a field below. They agreed to fulfill all his wishes; their only enemies were the Apaches of the mountains facing Socorro.²⁰ Three infants were baptized. The half starved Spaniards ate heartily of what was offered them, and left with sixty-one sacks half full of ears of maize, four and a half sacks of hulled maize, and three and a half sacks of maize flour.²¹ These supplies were sent to the camp at Anaya without delay, and on the next day Vargas followed in order to supervise their distribution among the people.²²

Before setting out for Santa Fé itself, Vargas made ready to visit the Indians of Santa Ana and Sia, who were living on the mesa of Cerro Colorado, three leagues from the abandoned pueblo of Sia, and the Jémez on the mesa of La Cañada de Jémez. Granillo was ordered to remove the camp to the abandoned hacienda of Ambrosio Sáenz, where a house was still partially standing, about a half a league distant, on the road to San Felipe.²³ Hither came four Pecos Indians on horseback to inquire for their governor Juan, who had been with the Spaniards all this time of his own volition. Relieved of their anxiety over their leader, they too joined Vargas' camp, whereupon they confirmed the dire reports that the Tewas, most of the Keres of Cochití, the Río Colorado Apaches, and the Navahos, were at La Cieneguilla de Cochití ready to resist the advance of the Spaniards.

²⁰ Probably the Sierra Ladrón.

²¹ Vargas' journal, November 22, 1693.

²² *Ibid.*, November 23, 1693.

²³ *Ibid.*, November 24, 1693.

Later in the day Don Diego betook himself to Santa Ana with fifty "leather-jackets," including the *cabildo*, three missionaries, and a guard of twenty volunteers conducting eighty pack mules. Perhaps it was the feasts with which the pueblos were regaling those who visited them that attracted the volunteers. The pueblo of Santa Ana, three leagues away, was inhabited by a few Keres, who had set up crude archways built of branches at the approach, and a cross at the entrance to their pueblo. The cacique Cristóbal extended a warm welcome, and true to the fondest hopes, regaled the Spaniards with a dinner consisting of *tortillas* and watermelons in pleasing quantities.²⁴

From here they went on to the pueblo of La Alameda del Cerro Colorado de Sia, five long leagues from Santa Ana. The ascent was steep. A cross stood on the first mesa level, where twenty-four Indians received their guests with a dance accompanied by war songs. Vargas saluted them with the cry, "Praised be the Blessed Sacrament!" and they answered, "Forever!" On the mesa top stood numerous crosses: at the entrance to the pueblo, in the square, and in most of the houses. On entering the square the Spaniards thrice intoned the *Te Deum*, on bended knee, and at the door of the low roofed room which had been prepared for him, Vargas, through an interpreter, told the natives the object of his visit. He urged them to reoccupy their pueblo three leagues away, on the road to Santa Ana, where water and wood were in greater abundance, and to rebuild their church, to all of which they agreed. They should pray each morning and evening before the cross in the square; later a priest would be assigned to administer to them the sacraments daily. The year's tenure of office of Governor Cristóbal and his lieutenants had passed, consequently he advised a new election; this over, he gave the new leaders their rods of office.²⁵ Twenty-two infants were baptized. Then, in the low-roofed room, Don Diego and the missionaries were served beans, cooked in water in Mexican fashion, *tortillas*, and watermelons, after which they thanked the natives for their

²⁴ *Ibid.*, November 24-25, 1693.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, November 25, 1693. New appointments were made to the following offices: governor, lieutenant governor, alcalde, fiscal, constable, and captain of war.

hospitality, and went on to the abandoned pueblo of Jémez, six leagues farther north, where they pitched camp.²⁶

That night Vargas was aroused from slumber by Captains Francisco Lucero de Godoy and Roque Madrid, with news that the governor of Pecos and his four companions had come with important tidings. The Indians were called to his tent, and told to sit down on the ground by his bed and tell the purpose of their visit. Through Godoy as interpreter, Governor Juan revealed a plot to ambush the Spanish camp. The storm centers of the conspiracy were the Tewas, Tanos, Picuríes, and Taos, while the chief instigators were Antonio Bolsas of Santa Fé, Governor Domingo of Tesuque, the mulatto Naranjo of Santa Clara, Don Luis Picuríes of San Juan, Governor Lorenzo of Picuríes, Governor Cristóbal Yope of San Lázaro, and the governor of San Ildefonso. These were scattering messengers to all the pueblos summoning a council to be held at the abandoned pueblo of La Cieneguilla, near Las Bocas de los dos Cerritos, three leagues from Santo Domingo. Las Bocas was at the foot of La Bajada, on the northern side, seven leagues from Santa Fé.²⁷ The only reason why the plan had not materialized as yet was that Juan's pueblo, Pecos, and that of Jémez had thus far refused to cooperate.

Juan outlined the ambushade: one detachment of Indians would be hidden at Las Bocas, another at La Cieneguilla, and when the Spaniards were between these two points, the two divisions would attack at once from front and rear, and catch them as in the jaws of a trap. Meanwhile, the horses, mules, and cattle would be stampeded, and the Spaniards annihilated. Hence Vargas was warned not to trust any of the leaders mentioned, even though they might pretend friendship. Those at Santa Fé were prepared to resist; they had even dug a well inside the city so as not to face the predicament of '92. The plan there, should the invaders get that far, was to stampede the horses by night and then attack, for they believed that the Spaniards were ineffective as fighters when on foot.²⁸

²⁶ *Ibid.* Here, early in the evening, Vargas received a letter from Granillo reporting that Governor Juan of Pecos had left for his pueblo; that a mule load of maize had arrived from San Juan; that the Indians of Santa Clara were hunting in the Sierra de la Urraca.

²⁷ Official résumé of the second entrada.

²⁸ Vargas' journal, November 25, 1693.

On the following day Captain Malacate came to Vargas' tent, with eight Sia Indians, bringing provisions: six sacks of maize, one of beans, one of flour, some onions, three strings of chili, and some white beans. The Indian chief refused to accept anything in return, so Vargas presented him with one of his riding horses. When questioned with regard to the Tewas and Tanos, Malacate at first scouted the idea of any disquiet; then, on cross-examination, he corroborated the news of the gathering at La Cieneguilla; but, he said, it had broken up. He had been called to attend by ten Indians whom he did not recognize, because their faces were smeared with grease and war paint; but he had not joined them.²⁹

Later in the day Vargas went to the mesa of La Cañada de Jémez, as planned. The Jémez nation was courteous, and customary formalities took place. In exchange for two sheep the Spaniards were given four half-sacks of hulled maize, and one of flour, and for two bulls, eight fanegas of maize, to be delivered later by the natives. Two infants were baptized here. The Spaniards were served food in their own dishes, after which they retired to spend the night at the abandoned pueblo of Jémez, two leagues away.

The leader of the expedition had no sooner gone to bed than four Jémez leaders were led to his tent. They came with a gift of nine blankets to reassure Vargas of the loyalty of their pueblo, and more, even of the prayers of their squaws for success in his visits to the remaining pueblos. The main object of the emissaries, however, was to get his permission to remain on the mesa, rather than move back to their old pueblo, for they were fully satisfied with their present home. They were well protected and had good crops in the canyon below. They added shrewdly that there was plenty of room on the mesa for a church and convent, which they promised to build. Vargas would think this over.

Next morning another embassy of two Santo Domingo Indians came in with promises of allegiance; they were Andrés, son of the former Captain Alonso Catiti, or Catiqui, and José, the governor. They had transferred their people to the mesas,

²⁹ *Ibid.*, November 26, 1693.

they said, for safety against the continual raids of the Tewas, Tanos, and Apaches of different camps, all of whom were their enemies. But if the Spaniards had come to stay, under their protection they would reoccupy their deserted pueblos the following fall. Thus far, every report and rumor confirmed the hostility of the Tewas and Tanos.

It was snowing. Nevertheless, Vargas and his party hastened to headquarters at Anaya, for it was feared that the enemy might strike at any moment. After a three league march and a night's stop in the shelter of the broken down houses at the abandoned pueblo of Sia, the party pulled into Anaya on November 28 without mishap. Granillo rode out to welcome the governor with open arms.³⁰ Only the arrival of a load of maize sent to the camp by the relatives of Sergeant Juan Ruiz de Casares in San Juan, and a visit by two natives of Taos and Picurías had broken the monotony of camp life during the governor's absence.³¹ But, although the leaders were unaware of them, there were murmurings of discontent among a few of the colonists.

Vargas set out next day with his entire expedition for Santa Fé. There he would clear up definitely the confused reports regarding the attitude of the Tanos and Tewas. Their silence and aloofness in view of the destitute condition of the Spaniards and continual requests for food, betokened enmity. The first halt was made at the former place of Ambrosio Sáenz.³² Here came Jémez Indians with the provisions as promised. Then came Juan, of Pecos, repeating the earlier reports with regard to the Tanos of Santa Fé.³³ Although Vargas did not stop at abandoned San Felipe, the former inhabitants, now living on the mesa on the opposite side of the river, came down to greet him. Among them were some Indians from La Ciénega de Cochití who consented to exchange grain and vegetables for six slaughtered beeves. Miguel Luján was sent with twenty-four "leather-jackets" and the necessary mules and muleteers to bring these provisions.³⁴ At Santo Domingo, the last stop

³⁰ Vargas' journal, November 27, 1693.

³¹ *Ibid.*, November 28, 1693.

³² *Ibid.*, November 29, 1693.

³³ *Ibid.*, November 30, 1693.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, December 1-2, 1693.

before going on to the mesa of La Cieneguilla de Cochití, the Spaniards made their headquarters.

Don Luis, the supreme governor of all the Tewas and Tanos, and the governors of Tesuque, San Lázaro, and San Ildefonso, came to Santo Domingo to greet the Spaniards. Don Luis showed no signs of joy, and Vargas, having become suspicious, asked him why. To this he answered that his people were angry because of their belief in the story Tapia had told them. He then repeated the story which Governor Juan of Pecos had told on an earlier occasion, how on a designated feast day the Indians would be taken by surprise while leaving church, and all the elders who had taken part in the rebellion of 1680 would be beheaded. In no uncertain terms Vargas branded the story as false, and attributed Tapia's untimely death shortly after the first entrada to this unpardonable lie. And were he now alive, cried Vargas, he would have him shot and quartered. But even if the Tanos and Tewas were angry, he added, he was unafraid. Had not the Virgin Mary aided him a year before by performing the miracle of causing over a thousand Moquis, who had gathered to destroy his handful of men, to lay down their weapons and thrice kneel humbly before her image?³⁵

Camped there on the south side of La Bajada mesa, the Spaniards were for the first time on the verge of entering country where resistance seemed certain. They had no assurances that they would not all be trapped in the valley on the other side, and annihilated. The faint of heart became panicky. As they sat around the camp fires that night before retiring, most of the conversation dwelt upon speculation regarding their fate. Had they not been sufficiently warned? Fervent prayers were undoubtedly said, and many must have slept with one eye open. The camp slumbered under heavy guard. Somewhere in the shadows of the encampment, a few soldiers and settlers were making ready, after careful planning, to essay their escape. Francisco de Ayala, the captain of those who were guarding the horses and mules, Diego Grimaldos, and Manuel Vargas, two of the guard, were the ringleaders. When

³⁵ Official résumé of the second entrada.

all was silence, Ayala and Grimaldos approached the guard, which consisted of four others, and said, "Friends, let us go off with these riding horses here." "Where to?" they answered; and he said, "Out of the province." Fired by the psychology of the moment, all joined in the plan. Eleven soldiers and five others were implicated. The women in the group, the wives of two of the soldiers, immediately packed their dishes and other belongings. Two of the soldiers broke into food boxes, from which they stole garlic and chocolate, the latter almost indispensable to the seventeenth century Spaniard. The garlic just happened to be in a box thought to contain other food. They took several head of livestock on the hoof, a great number of the stoutest horses, all the loose clothing handy, an extra arquebus, and a chair for good measure. Under the cover of darkness, the deserters made good their escape.³⁶

At one o'clock in the morning, the time to relieve the guards being long past, the soldier Matías Lobato went to the watch-fire to notify them. The post was deserted. Vargas was aroused; a hasty inspection disclosed that the horses were scattered and people were missing. When daylight came the camp was assembled, to the beat of the war drum, and from a written master list one of the civil and military secretaries took muster roll, whereupon the eighteen deserters were identified.³⁷ An inventory was then made of the stolen property; one hundred and eighteen horses had been carried off. At nine o'clock six soldiers were dispatched on swift horses to follow the trail. In view of the close proximity to Santa Fé, and the need of every ounce of strength under the circumstances, Vargas branded the desertion as dastardly, and ordered the pursuers to shoot down the fugitive traitors if they offered resistance.³⁸

³⁶ Vargas' journal, December 3, 1693; testimony of the deserter Pedro López, December 10, 1693.

³⁷ *Ibid.* The deserters were: the soldiers Francisco de Ayala, Diego Grimaldos, Félix Aragón, Gregorio Ramírez, Francisco de la Mora, Manuel de Vargas, Nicolás de Espinosa, Pedro López, Pedro de Leyba, Miguel Durán and his wife María de la Cruz, Andrés de Arteaga, his wife Juana, Rodríguez and son Bernardo; two settlers named José Manuel or Miguel, and Pascual Rodríguez.

³⁸ Vargas' journal, December 3-4, 1693. The expedition was ten leagues from Santa Fé.

To cap this unpleasant episode, Madrid and his party returned from La Cieneguilla de Cochití with only two and a half fanegas of maize. Although Indians were continually arriving with small amounts of grain and vegetables to trade, the camp was in such dire need of foodstuffs that Don Luis of San Juan, and Cristóbal of San Lázaro, were sent to Santa Fé with a mule train led by Miguel Luján, packed with goods to exchange for the needed supplies, and to learn more of the state of affairs there. As yet the natives of Santa Fé had not extended a welcome to the Spaniards.³⁹ Vargas resolved to go to Pecos in person, in an attempt to avert starvation; the governor of this pueblo, always at his side, was the only native leader of proved loyalty. On the advice of his lieutenants, Vargas finally changed his mind, remaining with his people and sending Madrid in his stead. Madrid took with him twelve "leather-jackets," each with four riding horses, a pack train of eighty mules, and six slaughtered beeves and other goods for trade.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, four loyal San Felipe Indians drove in eleven horses and a mule which they had found in the mountains near Cristóbal de Anaya and Ambrosio Sáenz, toward Santa Ana.⁴¹ On December 8, at sundown, Miguel Luján returned from Santa Fé with valuable news. The natives there were reported as being divided in their attitude toward the invaders. According to Luján, he and his companions were feasted royally during their two days' stay. The inhabitants of Santa Fé blamed the snow for preventing them from going out to welcome the Spaniards; they had not prepared rooms for Vargas because the Faraon Apaches had told them that they had taken him prisoner to Mexico. Now knowing otherwise, they said, they would make ready for him a watch tower just outside the city. Some of the leaders at Santa Fé were reported as being pleased about the prospect. Now that the Spaniards had returned they could hunt deer and plant their crops without

³⁹ *Ibid.*; official résumé of the second entrada.

⁴⁰ Vargas' journal, December 4-7, 1693. Madrid left Pecos on December 5th.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, December 7, 1693. They arrived at about noon December 7th. These were undoubtedly some of the horses which had gone astray the night of the desertion.

fear of the cruel Navahos, who just a week before had murdered a boy and stolen some horses.⁴² So ran their amicable comment. Luján had obtained twenty-three sacks of maize, and small quantities of foodstuffs for the return trip. Still Vargas awaited the return of the Pecos expedition before marching to Santa Fé. It came in with a disappointing haul: eight fanegas of maize, and about two of maize flour.⁴³ Consequently, Vargas pleaded with Domingo, Indian governor of Tesuque, in friendly and effective terms, to aid him with grain, and requested the delivery at the site of the abandoned farm of El Alamo, on the road to Santa Fé, as the Spaniards would be on the march thereabouts by that time. Miguel Luján was sent to Tesuque with three slaughtered beeves for barter, and was ordered to inform Vargas of the success achieved immediately upon his first dealings there.

After having partially calmed the rancor of the Tanos and Tewas through a series of friendly missions, and conferences at the ruins of Santo Domingo, and having put to rest the false rumor spread by the faithless Tapia, the entire camp set out for the old capital, Santa Fé. The wagon train was sent ahead, in order that the hard-driven mules and horses might get first call at the running arroyos. They were to await the rear at San Marcos, where the bountiful water hole and crystal clear stream were certainly a blessing.⁴⁴ The camp was united here on the following day at one o'clock in the afternoon.⁴⁵ From there the slow trek was resumed, and on the 15th the weary band reached Madrid's broken down hacienda two leagues from Santa Fé. Since some of the stragglers were still on the road, the entry into the walled city was postponed until the follow-

⁴² *Ibid.*, December 8, 1693. On this same day, December 8th, three of the deserters were captured in a forest near Ancón de Fray García with the cooperation of Manso scouts and presidial soldiers from El Paso: namely, Félix Aragón, Pedro López, and Francisco de la Mora. They were taken into custody at El Paso, and from there returned to Santa Fé. The others escaped to their destination, Sonora and Casas Grandes. *Ibid.*; testimony of Pedro López, El Paso, December 10, 1693.

⁴³ Vargas' journal, December 9, 1693.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, December 10, 1693.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, December 11, 1693.

ing day.⁴⁶ Several hours later the governor of Santa Fé and his aide, the crafty Antonio Bolsas, welcomed Vargas with a gift of *tortillas*, and renewed old acquaintances. Bolsas, who knew Spanish well, was still the spokesman of the natives of Santa Fé, whom he easily swayed with his wily tongue. He was consistently hostile toward the Spaniards.

The parade of the reconquerors through the snow to the gateway of the walled city commenced an hour before noon of December 16. Out on the plaza, in front, the natives awaited expectantly, without weapons, quiet and composed, the men separated from the women. *Alabados* rang out, and the tribesmen of the pueblo responded. Then the soldiers formed in open ranks to permit the passage of the friars, who were chanting psalms, offering prayers, and leading all in singing hymns. Vargas now led the friars into the first square, within the walls of the city, where everyone fell upon his knees before a cross planted by the Indians. All joined in the final *Te Deum* and litany of the Blessed Virgin. Vargas then spoke long to the assemblage concerning the benefits of his return. He came only to Christianize the Indians in the name of the King of Spain, to whom they should render allegiance, and to protect them from the Apaches. All of this was confirmed by the friars.⁴⁷ The natives were polite but not enthusiastic, and to avoid any rupture between the Indians and the soldiers, the Spaniards pitched camp at a place called Camino de Cuma, on the edge of the mountain, just outside the city.⁴⁸

Far from home, and greatly outnumbered by unfriendly Indians fully capable of ejecting them by force of arms, the Spaniards were in a position that was indeed precarious. Furthermore, the danger of starvation was ever present. Thus far, by keeping the uncertain natives divided, Vargas had been successful both in averting starvation and in virtually isolating the enemy stronghold at Santa Fé. As we have seen, this was facilitated by the loyalty of several influential Indian chieftains

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, December 15, 1693.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, December 16, 1693.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, December 16, 17, and 27, 1693. Vargas did not stop at the watch tower which had been prepared for his lodging; Roque Madrid, who claimed it, was given permission to occupy it.

to their promises of the year previous, by disunity among the natives—curse of the years of inter-tribal warfare that plagued the region following the expulsion of the Spaniards in 1680—, and by the shrewd psychology, bold leadership, zeal and valor of the Spanish general. These combined factors, aided by the contrasting experience and mental equipment of the two adversaries, enabled Vargas to take the initiative and convert into a game of nerves what otherwise might easily have developed into a bloody war, starvation and disaster. In this battle of nerves, Vargas already had gained the decisive advantage.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BATTLE OF SANTA FÉ

While Vargas calmly made plans for the refounding of the missions and for the distribution of the missionaries at Santa Fé and eleven other pueblos,¹ whispers were abroad in the Spanish camp. Rumor had it that the Tewas and Tanos had merely feigned obedience in order to cloak their treachery. Had not the governor of Pecos, Juan de Ye, come to Vargas' tent with reports of secret meetings on the mesa of San Juan between Tewas, Tanos, Picuríes and many Apaches? Juan de Ye had learned of battle plans of these allies from a relative, who in turn had heard it from a Zuñi Indian. The warriors were equipped for war in Spanish fashion, even to leather jackets, leather horse armor and shields. And this Antonio Bolsas, he had heard, was the guiding genius, goading on the people. In Apache style, they were to steal horses, until the Spaniards were forced to foot; then the moment for swooping down upon them would be propitious.

Juan de Ye was very serious about his story. He volunteered to get reinforcements from his pueblo. There was ample evidence to warrant trust in his assertions. None of the natives of Santa Fé bothered to hear Mass or pray at the camp of the Spaniards, the few vegetables they traded were very dear, and they showed other signs of bad faith. When several soldiers were sent into the walled villa for food, everyone stayed out of sight. All that could be obtained was eight sacks of maize brought from Tesuque and Nambé—sufficient to feed only a few of the soldiers.

Due to these circumstances, the custodian presented Vargas with a petition in which he pleaded against the distribution of the missionaries at this time. He regarded such an act as dangerous and injudicious, and urged that the warnings of the ever faithful Juan de Ye of Pecos be heeded. Was it not he,

¹ Vargas' journal, December 17, 1693. Unless otherwise specified, all footnote references in this chapter are from A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38, and A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

he argued, who in 1680 warned the Spaniards of the impending revolt twenty days before the outbreak by notifying Sergeant Major Francisco Gómez, repeating his warning twelve days later? And after he had seen that no one believed his story, had he not pleaded with his minister, Fray Fernando de Velasco Pacheco, repeating his knowledge of the plot and offering reinforcements? Vargas acknowledged the truth of the custodian's arguments, but failed to take immediate action. Meanwhile, the Spanish women and children were undergoing severe hardships due to the rigors of winter, inadequate shelter, and lack of food. The custodian's complaint was followed by another by the *cabildo*, requesting possession of the *casas reales*, or former government buildings, theirs, they argued, by natural right and legitimate and ancient possession. The Spaniards had come to repopulate Santa Fé, they said, and to place the royal banner upon its walls.²

Meanwhile, Vargas went with some of the military leaders to examine the ruined church or hermitage of San Miguel, which had formerly served as the parish church of the Mexican Indians of Santa Fé.³ It was decided to have the natives throw down the walls, repair the light shaft, and reconstruct the chapel under the direction of Governor José and Antonio Bolsas, in order to provide a decent home for "Our Lady of the Conquest . . . who was enclosed in a wagon; and that if our Lady came they were obliged to provide a house for her."⁴ In the cathedral at Santa Fé, on a side altar, there is today a beautiful Virgen del Rosario, a statue about three feet tall, that is the special object of veneration. It is called *La Conquistadora*, Our Lady of the Conquest, and according to legend still current it is the same one that was brought to Santa Fé by the reconqueror Vargas; apparently the one referred to in the above

² *Ibid.*, December 18, 1693. This entry is partially translated in Twitchell, *Leading Facts*, 1, 336-337.

³ *Ibid.* The site of San Miguel, on the same spot on which it stands today, was outside the walls of the villa proper, on the south side of the Santa Fé River.

⁴ *Ibid.* The Indians promised to carry out Vargas' wishes. Among other materials which they asked for to carry out the work (axes, etc.), was hide with which to make a ladder, presumably for binding rungs. There are examples of this type of ladder from the pueblos in the State Museum at Santa Fé. The natives did not use pole ladders only.

passage. Earlier events already had given this particular statue special importance. It had been the object of veneration in New Mexico in earlier days, and had been saved from the fury of the natives and carried to El Paso in 1680.⁵

Next day, December 19, Miguel Luján returned from San Juan, San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, Nambé, and San Ildefonso, with five loads of flour. He had been given a happy welcome everywhere. Also, Governor Francisco of San Ildefonso arrived at camp to render obedience, and he promised additional grain supplies in return for some hoes, which he was granted. The day following Governor Francisco Pacheco of Taos and Don Luis also came to assure fealty. Luis asked that Father Muñoz de Castro be designated as the pastor at San Juan. Pacheco said that the only reason why his people had not begun to construct a church and convent for the two missionaries destined for their pueblo was that all the roads to Taos were snowbound, which condition rendered difficult the bringing in of the necessary timber; but in return for a roll of cloth he offered to send maize. Luis and Francisco both left very happy.⁶

Meanwhile, Governor José and Antonio Bolsas obstinately informed Vargas that they considered it better to open an *estufa*, or kiva, in the first square of the villa for a chapel, instead of the specified chapel of San Miguel. It was difficult to obtain timber from the mountains on account of the heavy

⁵ Every year, the day after Corpus Christi, the statue is carried in procession to the Chapel of Nuestra Señora del Rosario, just outside the city, on the site of Vargas' camp. *La Conquistadora* is left there for eight, formerly nine, days, while a novena in her honor is held. At the end of the novena she is returned to the side altar at the cathedral, again in procession. It is stated and believed by some of the faithful that the statue is heavier while being returned to the cathedral, and that it always rains or is at least cloudy on that day. According to the current legend in Santa Fé, this is due to the fact that the Chapel of Nuestra Señora del Rosario is the place where *La Conquistadora* wishes to make her home. The present chapel was built in 1806; formerly a rude hermitage was built of twigs and branches each year for the occasion. It is said that the procession and the novena are held in fulfillment of a vow made by Vargas to the effect that this be done each year should he be victorious in the battle at Santa Fé, December 29-30, 1693. J. Manuel Espinosa, "The Virgin of the Reconquest of New Mexico," *Mid-America*, XVIII (April, 1936), 79-87, and *Idem*, *First Expedition of Vargas*, 284.

⁶ Vargas' journal, December 19-20, 1693.

snow, they said, and it was preferable to hear Mass within the walls of the city anyhow. Vargas went to inspect the *estufa*. It was round, low roofed, and entered by an opening in the roof by means of a wooden ladder, just like any pueblo kiva of the present day. He ordered the natives to tear open a door, whitewash the whole interior, make an altar out of adobes, and set aside two rooms of an adjoining house as the living quarters for the missionary. One door should face the altar, and another the adjoining living quarters.⁷ But after the structure was completed, the custodian objected to it as a suitable place of worship because it had once been used by the Indians for idolatrous and prohibited religious rites, and this despite Vargas' argument that there were a number of churches and cathedrals in Spain which were formerly Moorish mosques.⁸

During this time all the attempts to obtain grain were disappointing. Five more loads of flour, and three of maize, were brought in from San Ildefonso, San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, and other Tano and Tewa pueblos, and ten loads of flour and maize from Pecos. The rigorous weather continued, with tempestuous snow storms and cold winds. Sickness was rife. Children and infants were dying. Many had already succumbed to the elements. There were repeated complaints. Vargas employed all his talents in his efforts to obtain food.⁹ A fortunate incident gave Don Diego an opportunity to use his wits. On December 23, Captain Diego Arias arrived with three of the cowardly deserters captured at Ancón de Fray García two weeks before. The sight of the prisoners, for the moment at least, proved a boon and blessing, for their arrival was witnessed by Governor José and Bolsas. The Spanish leader immediately took Machiavellian advantage of the situation by saying that these were the vanguard of an army of two hundred reinforcements coming to his aid. This stratagem was invaluable, for by it the natives of Santa Fé were frightened into supplying twenty sacks of maize on very short notice. As a trick to ob-

⁷ *Ibid.* Father José Díez had been designated as pastor at Santa Fé. *Ibid.*, December 22, 1693.

⁸ Official résumé of the second entrada, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 20, 1694.

⁹ Vargas' journal, December 20-23, 1693.

tain still more, Vargas said that the reinforcements were bringing a large supply of powder and bullets to use against the Apaches, but that they lacked provisions, and had sent for two hundred sacks of maize. This series of unforeseen circumstances gave the colonists renewed confidence, and fired them into complaining more loudly of their suffering due to exposure, which they believed could and should be remedied. Twenty-two had already died of exposure, and were buried beneath the snow.¹⁰ Their designs, obviously, were upon the dwellings of the natives of Santa Fé.

It was high time for Vargas to call a general council of war. Composed of all of the leading citizens, the missionaries, and the military officers, the gathering was held in his tent, and there petitions and complaints were registered and opinions expressed.¹¹ On motion of the *cabildo* this gathering took officially the form of a *cabildo abierto*, or open town meeting.¹² Of fourteen of the most conspicuous leaders consulted, there was unanimity in agreement with the petition of the *cabildo*: namely, that the Tanos be obliged to return to their former pueblo of Galisteo, and the buildings of the city be reoccupied by the Spaniards.¹³ Six of these favored the expulsion of the natives by fire and sword if necessary. The missionaries, whose only interest was safety, deemed the time not yet auspicious to distribute the missionaries as the governor had planned. For these reasons it was decided to ask the Indians of Santa Fé to return to Galisteo.

These meetings could be clearly observed by the Indians, who watched at the ramparts with growing anger and suspicion. They knew full well what the settlers were demanding, and were ready for resistance. They were already harboring some

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, December 24, 1693.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, December 27, 1693.

¹³ *Ibid.*, December 26-27, 1693. These leading men were: Maestro de Campo Luis Granillo, Sergeant Major Juan Dios Lucero de Godoy, Captain José Téllez Jirón, Sergeant Major Francisco de Anaya Almazán, Captain Francisco Romero de Pedraza, Antonio Montoya, Captain Luis Martín, Antonio Lucero de Godoy, Diego de Montoya, Diego de Luna, Juan del Río, Captain, Cabo, and Caudillo Roque Madrid, Sergeant Major Antonio Jorge, and Captain Arias de Quirós.

of the Spaniards beneath their roofs, against the will of the majority; an attempt was being made to fleece them of their grain; now the Spaniards wanted to drive them from their homes. The atmosphere of the whole city was charged as if with electricity. For the Spaniards it was a matter of life or death, without compromise, among a people who had committed treason against their God and their king, and the spirit of the reconquest of Spain from the Moslem infidel still ran in their veins. For the Pueblo Indians, who were not warlike by nature, it was a noble and just defense of life, property, and religion at any cost. Under such circumstances war was inevitable.

The rebels countermured their houses, and kept their guns, darts, and arrows in readiness, under the pretext of preparing for a deer hunt. Crafty sentinels on the ramparts continuously watched every move of the Spaniards. Among those members of the expedition of mixed blood who were living in the villa, was Jerónima Márquez, living with a native aunt named Ángela. According to her reports, for the past two days Tanos and Tewas had been entering and leaving the city all night long, taking their food and belongings to the mountains, she believed. The natives had seen through the hoax regarding the alleged reinforcements. They were very angry, and on the night of the 26th the leaders harangued in the *estufa* until dawn. Their disgruntlement simmered down to this query: if the Spaniards wished to destroy them, let them commence; but why attempt to fleece them of food and house and home? The creoles and mestizos of Vargas' colony who were living in the villa were warned by native friends to join their own camp, for the majority of the natives were defiant, and as a consequence several families abandoned the shelter of the villa for safety.¹⁴

The tightening of nerves continued on through the hours of the following day and night, and in the false dawn of the 28th there came a break. All night long the restless natives had been gathered in the patio around their fires, listening to the harangues of their leaders. At four in the morning Vargas was suddenly aroused from sleep by a youth, a messenger from Miguel Luján, a Spanish soldier quartered in the *estufa* of the

¹⁴ Vargas' journal, December 27, 1693.

pueblo which had been partially remodeled for a chapel. The lad had escaped the vigilance of the natives by the aid of a blind mestizo named Agustín Salazar. This blind man had been eavesdropping during the speeches of the Indian governor of Santa Fé, who had assured his people of their ability to overcome the enemy. Salazar then told Luján, and Luján dispatched the boy to Vargas. Don Diego promptly sent him back to gather more information. An hour later he returned to the general's tent with word of the arrival in the village of a Picuríes and Taos. These, hearing the clamor of Santa Fé warriors for the blood of the intruders, protested loyalty to the Spanish cause. His narrative was interrupted at this point by the dramatic arrival of blind Salazar, just escaped by ladder from the walled town, who delivered himself of significant details of the native plot. Salazar, who dwelt in a room in one of the former *casas reales*, had heard many Indians entering the square, some on horse. To spy upon them, he had wrapped himself in his cloak and in the darkness of night had mingled with the throng in the patio listening to the governor's speech. The gist of this was: "Arise, massacre the Spaniards!" When some remained hesitant, preferring for fear of hurt to their children to flee to the mountains, the chief cried out that it was no time to worry about children, but to fight till the enemy was routed. At the conclusion of his remarks some of the Spanish soldiers who were living in the villa left the patio posthaste for Vargas' tent to report the imminence of an attack, since the natives had taken up their ladders.¹⁵

Vargas immediately sounded the alarm by means of the trumpet and the war drum. The governor of Pecos was sent with two swift steeds for reinforcements from his pueblo, and there was no delay in sending for the families and soldiers living inside the villa.¹⁶ Some left all their belongings behind. Then the first spark flew: as Miguel Luján, who had been living in the whitewashed *estufa*, escaped with his wife and children, he was met by a storm of darts, clods, even stone hatchets, thrown from the walls, and accompanied by hideous and venge-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, December 28, 1693. Among these soldiers was Captain José Olguín.

¹⁶ Official *résumé* of the second *entrada*.

ful shouts.¹⁷ A flying squadron sent to examine the stronghold found its walltops already lined with warriors. When these caught sight of the approaching soldiers they put forth blood curdling shouts, interspersed with repellent blasphemy, and accompanied by a flight of missiles. For better protection the camp was quickly transferred to a flat, open meadow, directly in front of and an arquebus shot distant from the stronghold. Guards were stationed at strategic points. Then, with the *cabildo* and most of the soldiers, Vargas rode to the gateway of the walled city singing praise to the Blessed Sacrament.

On the walls above the doorway stood the rebel war captains and most valiant warriors, among them Antonio Bolsas. Vargas rode out ahead with Roque Madrid and his secretary, and from below harangued the rebels. But sweet words were of no avail. His order to quit the city brought out the mettle of the defenders. They were determined to defend their lands, and wished to hear nothing of the Blessed Sacrament and the Virgin Mary; they would fight, and all New Mexico was with them; the Spaniards would be either killed or enslaved. Remembering his tactics of the previous year, Vargas continued patiently with suave words, and Bolsas finally said that he would deliberate with the people and give an answer in the evening.¹⁸

Vargas returned to his tent, but received no answer. Instead, as night fell, a chanting of war songs could be heard, which was drowned out from time to time in a din of hideous shouting. The delay worried the Spanish general, for it would give the confederates of the enemy time to come to their assistance. And so a ring of sentinels was placed around the city, and the whole camp kept watch.

At about seven o'clock next morning, December 29, 140 Pecos Indian allies came to the aid of Vargas. He sallied forth again to parley with the embattled rebels. Father Diego Zeinos gave a pious exhortation, followed by prayers and a blessing, after which the army formed and marched to the city. But Vargas had scarcely started to move forward, singing praise

¹⁷ Vargas' journal, December 28, 1693.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*; official résumé of the second entrada; report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 20, 1694.

to the Blessed Sacrament, when the Indians began their hellish shouting. They cried out to the Spaniards that the whole countryside was against them, every Apache camp, as far west as Moqui.¹⁹ They would kill everyone except the missionaries, whom they would enslave. These fiendish boasts were followed by a storm of darts, arrows, stones, and other heavy missiles. "Santiago! Santiago! Death to these rebels!" cried out Vargas to his men, and the battle was on.²⁰

Most of the soldiers dismounted and charged rapidly in an effort to gain the walls, while others, with repeated volleys of gunfire, attempted to clear the way by shooting down those who were defending the walls from the trenches above. One group of Spaniards rushed the main tower above the gateway, scaled the walls by means of ladders, amid a hail of stones and darts glancing off their leather shields, and won the position. An attempt now was made to divert the enemy by attacking from many points, but they merely hid behind walls and houses. Vargas then ordered his men to batter down the principal and only gateway. When the axes did little damage to the sturdy wood, it was set on fire and burned, although in the process four Spaniards were wounded, one fatally. Through the open doorway rushed a squad of the front line soldiers, who forced their way through barricades and gained possession of the whitewashed *estufa* of the first square. By noon the Spaniards were in possession of the main gateway, the front square, the first communal dwelling, and the two towers above the doorway overlooking the first square. Half of the stronghold was already won. But in order to achieve complete victory the trenches on the surrounding walls had to be gained at great risk. Four ladders were made for this purpose. It would have been easier to burn the stronghold and thus exterminate the entire population; but looking to the safety of the women and children, Vargas decided otherwise. Don Diego was everywhere at once, urging his men on to great deeds of valor.

Suddenly, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, the sentinels saw a large troop of Indians, on horse and on foot, coming

¹⁹ Vargas' journal, December 29, 1693; report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy.

²⁰ Vargas' journal, December 29, 1693.

to the aid of the besieged. On seeing them the rebel defenders increased their shouting and fought with renewed vigor. They rained boiling water upon the soldiers undermining the walls. The new arrivals were attacked with such fury that five of them were killed in the first skirmish, and the others fled in bewilderment to a distant vantage point from which they were content to watch the spectacle. At sundown, however, they made a second sally. Four were killed and the others fled, never again showing their faces.

The watchword through the night was vigilance. Soldiers were stationed at all the strategic points already won, in the towers and in the first *estufa*, and others were placed about the pueblo where they could prevent escape or entry. The horses, mules, and livestock were formed in a circle around the camp. From minute to minute the Spaniards were ready for an assault which did not come. In the direction of the city all was quiet and darkness, save for the occasional flash and sound of gunfire from the first *estufa*, followed by an echoing crash, or telling thud. Vargas was on horseback all night.²¹

Before dawn the soldiers hidden in the first *estufa* made a desperate attempt to scale the walls. In the light of a flint lock they took a ladder and gained control of the front walls. The surprised Indians offered little resistance; by dawn all the walls facing the first square were won. Once dominating the walltops running along the facade of the stronghold with its two towers, these crack soldiers soon captured positions covering the second square. From the barricaded houses and walls which separated the two squares, they looked down into the second square, where the fortified *estufa* was defended from within by a detachment of rebels. Shortly, from the first square was heard the cry "Praise be to the Blessed Sacrament!" as the second *estufa* was stormed and won.²²

Meanwhile, Governor José lay in his house writhing in pain from a broken right wrist, caused by a flying bullet. His fair city was being rent from the tribesmen foot by foot before his

²¹ *Ibid.*; official résumé of the second entrada; *auto de remisión*, Santa Fé, January 16, 1694; report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy.

²² Vargas' journal, December 30, 1693; report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy.

eyes, till scarce enough remained for him to stand on. Realizing that all was lost, José, in futile desperation, tightened a noose about his neck by means of a short iron bar, and took his own life.²³

By morning the city was won. The military leaders notified Vargas, who immediately had the royal banner placed upon the walls as a sign of victory, and a cross set over the main entrance. The Indians were asked to come out to obtain pardon. Most of the women and children complied, accompanied by the rebel Bolsas. The others stubbornly remained in hiding. Governor Vargas then entered the main square, accompanied by the *cabildo* and all the soldiers. Every house was searched from trapdoor to trapdoor, and from roof to cellar. Fifty-four men, women and children thus driven out of hiding were delivered to the guards.²⁴ There were so many living quarters, including those that had been built over the *palacio*, or royal government buildings, that it took twenty soldiers and thirty friendly Indians the whole day to take a complete inventory.²⁵ There were ample quarters to house the colonists.

The houses were well provisioned with maize, grain, and beans, which, under the supervision of the *cabildo*, were taken to a large *estufa*, newly swept. The *cabildo* set about distributing the grain to the families for food, and seed in order that the men might start planting. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, while the inspection tour was being made, and the rebels were being rounded up, the sentinels on the walls reported a large troop of Indians approaching. The colonists were taken into the city for protection. Eighty soldiers sallied forth to meet the enemy, who retreated without attacking. Vargas then ordered the people to take their lodging in the houses of the vanquished.

The fifty-four rebels first taken out of hiding that day, fifteen more found later, and Antonio Bolsas, the leading spirit of the uprising, were executed at the rear of the stronghold on the following charges: having stoned and destroyed a cross

²³ *Ibid.*; Vargas' journal, December 29, 1693; official *résumé* of the second entrada. One other native also committed suicide.

²⁴ Vargas' journal, December 30, 1693.

²⁵ *Ibid.*; report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy; official *résumé* of the second entrada.

placed in the center of the square, broken a statue of the Virgin Mary, and committed treason against God and the Royal Crown. Those who had surrendered of their own free will, about four hundred of both sexes, were distributed among the soldiers and settlers in servitude for a period of ten years under the following provisions: they could choose their masters; they must be well treated; they should be instructed in prayer and religion by the missionaries; they could not be exchanged, as their masters owned only their services; they could not be removed from one locality to another. In Vargas' opinion this was within his powers as specified by royal *cédula*. After the ten year period, if sufficiently instructed in Christian doctrine and citizenship, they might return to a pueblo of their choosing.²⁶ This action of Vargas was later confirmed by the viceroy and the Junta de Hacienda in Mexico City, even though the royal fiscal had previously reported that it was contrary to the Laws of the Indies.²⁷

As a result of the battle at Santa Fé, eighty-one rebels perished: seventy executions, nine battle deaths, and two suicides. Of the Spaniards, twenty-two had died of exposure during the two weeks' stay on the edge of the mountain, and one had died in battle.²⁸ The Spaniards now had a solid foothold in New Mexico. But the effects of the conquest were widespread in the land. The executions at Santa Fé, considered by Vargas as a necessary war measure, angered the war captains and medicine-men of the surrounding pueblos. Recalling Tapia's story, they fortified their positions on the mesa-tops and remained hostile.

²⁶ Vargas' journal, December 30, 1693.

²⁷ Proceedings of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, March 23, 1694; report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, March 18, 1694.

²⁸ Vargas' journal, December 30, 1693; *auto de remisión*, Santa Fé, January 16, 1694.

CHAPTER IX

CONTINUED HOSTILITIES

As the year 1694 opened, Vargas and his colonists were safely intrenched within the walls of the old capital. The victory at Santa Fé was of decisive importance, for the walled villa served as a strong base from which all New Mexico was eventually to be pacified. But for the time being almost the entire countryside was hostile. Of twenty-odd pueblos, only four were the allies of the Spaniards: namely, Pecos, and the Keres of Santa Ana, Sia, and San Felipe. These had remained faithful to their promises of '92. The natives of the other pueblos had moved to the mountains and barricaded themselves. Those of Santo Domingo and Jémez were on the mesas near their respective pueblos, the other Keres on the mesa of La Cieneguilla de Cochití, most of the Tanos and Tewas on the mesa of San Ildefonso, the rest on nearby canyon rims, and the Picuríes and Taos in their original pueblos.

Several days after the capture of Santa Fé, Bartolomé de Ojeda, the faithful Keres war captain and governor of Sia, warned that the Jémez and their neighbors the Navahos were about to join forces with the hostile Keres on the mesa of Cochití, in answer to the call of Captain Malacate. Their cherished strategy, a stampede of the Spanish horses followed by an attack, was designed to kill all Spanish efficiency. Ojeda displayed a maguey rope with four knots, which signified the number of days to be spent at the gathering, to which he and the leaders of San Felipe and Santa Ana had been invited.¹ Since those on the mesa of Cochití were rent by division of opinion, Vargas plotted to have Ojeda capture the three ring-leaders of the Keres, Jémez, and Apaches. These were Malacate, another Keres of Cochití named El Zepe, and Cristóbal of the abandoned pueblo of San Marcos,² who were ready to

¹ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, December 31, 1693. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38; A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

² *Ibid.*, January 1, 5, 1694. At this time a reported attack of the Tewas, Tanos, Picuríes, Taos, and Apaches on the pueblo of Pecos, which resulted in the sending of thirty Spanish soldiers from Santa Fé, proved to be a false alarm.

carry out their plans.³ At the same time Ojeda offered to furnish reinforcements from Santa Ana and Sia. Unrest was evident on every side. Two Indian allies brought up from El Paso had been murdered at San Lázaro and San Cristóbal. Nambé, Tesuque, Jacona, and Pojoaque were abandoned. An Indian named Juan de la Vega was sent with a cross to the Tewa pueblos to treat for peace; but he was ill received everywhere.⁴

As a result of the general state of rebellion, Vargas set off on a tour of inspection of the Tewa and Tano pueblos with sixty "leather-jackets" and thirty militia.⁵ Tesuque, the first pueblo visited, was abandoned, as expected. At Nambé five natives were found and taken captive; the others had fled five days before to the mesa of San Ildefonso, where the Tewas of Tesuque, Cuyamungué, Jacona, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, and Santa Clara were gathered, because two Tanos who had escaped from Santa Fé at the time of the siege had spread the alarm that all the pueblos would be treated just as ruthlessly as theirs had been. The captives said that Governor Domingo of Tesuque had not gone to see Vargas solely through fear.

After passing through the abandoned pueblos of Cuyamungué and Jacona, Vargas went to the mesa of San Ildefonso, the famous Black Mesa, the impregnable rock on which the Tewas had safely intrenched themselves. There on the top Indian braves were emitting raucous whoops in a noisy war dance. As the Spaniards approached with their "Praise be to God!", some of the natives answered "Forever!". The din, dancing and shouting subsided. Through an interpreter, the leaders finally asked Vargas and Fray Alpuente to climb the mesa and talk with them above. On questioning they proved convinced of the story of impending massacre for themselves. Vargas attempted to assure them, with many suave words, of his only object; the Tanos had been punished at Santa Fé because they had refused to submit peacefully to Crown and Faith. Finally he returned to Santa Fé with the promise that the leaders of the various pueblos on the mesa, as well as those of Taos and Picuríes, would go to confer with him there.⁶

³ Bartolomé de Ojeda to Vargas, Sia, January 7, 1694, *ibid.*

⁴ Vargas' journal, January 1, 8, 1694, *ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, January 9, 1694.

⁶ *Ibid.*, January 10, 1694.

Bad news awaited the governor at the villa. An Indian woman named Lucía, of Nambé, who had escaped from the mesa of San Ildefonso, reported that the leaders of all ten of the Tewa and Tano pueblos had held a great gathering at which they had decided to capture the horses and cattle of the Spanish, and take the lives of Vargas and the custodian; then, they believed, the Spaniards would be obliged to flee. As for the Indian Juan de la Vega, who had been sent on a mission of peace to visit the Tewas, Lucía said that he had been turned over to the Navahos and slain. Don Luis Picurías, she said, was living at Picurías with his family.⁷

During the month of January, Vargas found time amid these troublous conditions to send his detailed periodic reports to the viceroy in Mexico City, in which he narrates his exploits to date, of which the capture of Santa Fé was the most noteworthy. He would be able to revisit the pueblos and gain their complete submission, he wrote, on the arrival of the additional families that had been gathered by order of the viceroy, and which were on their way from Mexico City. Then the settlers and missionaries could be safely distributed.⁸ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé, in a letter dated January 20, gave evidence of being in full accord with the policies of their governor, and asked of the viceroy that Vargas be retained in office as governor and captain general after the expiration of his five year royal appointment.⁹ On the following day Vargas himself wrote two long letters to the viceroy, one asking that his achievements be reported to the king and the Council of the Indies, in order that he be justly rewarded; the other listing the material needs for the support of his colony. He argued that his salary should be equivalent to that of the governor of New Vizcaya. As on earlier occasions when attempting to arouse interest in his plans, he brought forth the old Sierra Azul story, saying that

⁷ *Ibid.*, January 11, 1694. According to Lucía the following pueblos were gathered on the mesa of San Ildefonso: San Ildefonso, Cuyamungué, Jacona, Pojoaque, and Santa Clara. The people of Tesuque, San Juan, San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, and Nambé were on the rim of the nearby river canyon.

⁸ Official résumé of the second entrada, Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Galve; *auto de remisión*, Santa Fé, January 16, 1694. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38; A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

⁹ Report of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, January 20, 1694, *ibid.*

the region of the reported quicksilver mines had yet to be settled for the purpose of obtaining more samples. Really, he wrote, the disappointing samples sent back in 1692 were insufficient proof.¹⁰

Flushed by his recent victory at Santa Fé, he was very extravagant in his demands for the support of his colony. He urged the necessity of 320 families to complete the 500 he had originally asked for, to assure the permanent safety of the missions and settlements to be established, and to make possible an expedition to Moqui and Sierra Azul. Within three years, he said, provided he be sent the families asked for, and sufficient soldiers to maintain at all times a presidio of 100 soldiers at Santa Fé alone, a census could be taken of the native population, and royal tribute gathered in the form of blankets and other articles. Gradually the colony would become self-sufficient.¹¹ But at the moment, the government at Mexico City should provide the following: clothing for the settlers, which Vargas said the central government would have to be called upon to supply for the first five years; 6,000 head of cattle, twelve for each of the proposed five hundred families; 4,000 mules; 5,000 mares and 500 stallions; 500 plowshares; 500 large axes; 500 locks; 500 regular hoes, and 500 large wooden hoes; and 500 iron spades. All these things Vargas deemed essential. His demands were indeed pretentious. And the missionaries, he added, were destitute.¹²

Meanwhile, on January 23, Vargas received word from Fray Francisco Farfán, the procurator general in charge of the families who were on their way up from Mexico City. At Parral Farfán had been supplied with 500 head of livestock from Tabalaopa. Sixty-six and a half families, consisting of 234 persons, had been gathered in Mexico City at the expense of the royal treasury, and were being led north in wagons also financed by the government. Of these, two had died en route, and four families had deserted. Farfán now asked to be provided with two wagon loads of maize at El Paso, and a military escort for the trip from there to Santa Fé. The trip thus

¹⁰ Two letters, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 21, 1694, *ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

far had been fraught with hardship, not to mention misconduct among some members of the expedition.¹³ Vargas immediately sent fourteen "leather-jackets" to El Paso, and Farfán was ordered to hasten on to Santa Fé. From Fray Cristóbal the guides were to notify Vargas of the needs of the expedition. An additional escort would be sent out to meet the new colonists at the abandoned hacienda of Felipe Romero.¹⁴

Meanwhile, Vargas patiently awaited the rebel leaders of San Ildefonso, who had promised to discuss peace. After eighteen days he decided to return to the mesa, despite heavy snows, and demand an explanation for the delay.¹⁵ On the morning of January 28, he set out with 60 men, including the members of the *cabildo*.¹⁶ Each member of the party was under strict orders not to fire upon the enemy without permission of the governor. Tesuque was abandoned as before, but the houses were still well supplied with maize. At Nambé six or eight Indians were discovered. Abandoning their horses, they fled immediately to crags and brambles, but four were captured. On being questioned, the captives said that they had come for maize from Embudo, near the confines of the river between San Juan and Picuríes, where the Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal were gathered with some of the Tewas of Nambé and Tesuque. The leaders on the mesa of San Ildefonso had held a meeting four days after Vargas' previous visit, but had not divulged their decisions to anyone. All the people desired to return to their pueblos, they added, and were only waiting for Domingo of Tesuque to negotiate with Vargas. Among the most hostile of the rebel leaders on the mesa, they mentioned El Sugua and his brother El Sugagueroi of Santa Clara, and at Embudo a brave leader of San Cristóbal called El Tegua.

On the following day Vargas went on to San Ildefonso,

¹³ Father Farfán to Vargas, Cerro Gordo, January 1, 1694, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39; Vargas' journal, January 16, 1694, *ibid.*, tomo 38; *ibid.*, January 23, 1694, *ibid.*, tomo 39; the viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, September 4, 1693, *ibid.*, tomo 38. The families had been turned over to Father Farfán by the viceroy on September 10, 1693. Vargas' journal, March 30, 1694, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

¹⁴ Vargas' journal, January 16, 23, 1694, *ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, January 28, 1694. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, January 29, 1694.

where he lodged his men in the vacant dwellings surrounding the square. From there the captives were set free and told to climb the mesa and tell the natives of Vargas' peaceful intentions, and urge them to come down and reoccupy their pueblos.¹⁷ That afternoon a native of Pojoaque named Nicolás, who spoke Castilian well, came down with an answer. The Tewas, he asserted, had sent him to say that all were desirous of reoccupying their pueblos. They had fled solely because they feared a repetition of the executions at Santa Fé. He asked Vargas and Father Alpuente to go up to the pueblo on the mesa to speak with the leaders. Vargas took off his sword belt, placed it about the Indian's neck, and sent him back with a message filled with sweet words and an invitation to the rebel leaders to come and speak with him there at the abandoned pueblo. He assured Nicolás that he would demand no tribute, but merely wished the natives to return to their pueblos as Christians and subjects of the Spanish Crown.

At nine in the evening Nicolás returned with a verbal message: the chieftains insisted that Vargas and Father Alpuente climb the mesa. Treachery was suspected. Suspicions were strengthened when the rebels were seen taking water up the slopes of the mesa, rounding up horses and cattle and driving them up the same paths, and sending out Indian riders into the surrounding country. Vargas set up a large cross in the square of the pueblo, and returned to Santa Fé. It was patent that the Tewas and Tanos of the mesa would not submit without a struggle.¹⁸

Back in Santa Fé, Vargas made a general inspection of the military equipment and a careful examination of all weapons. The gunsmith, Captain Francisco Lucero, set up his forge. Only three *arrobas*¹⁹ of gunpowder remained, and a scant seven hundred lead bullets.²⁰ Alarms were regular. On February 11, sentinels saw some Indians spying on the horses from behind

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, January 30, 1694.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, January 31, 1694.

¹⁹ An *arroba* was equivalent to about 25 pounds.

²⁰ Roque Madrid, therefore, was sent with twelve soldiers of mining experience to the Cerro de San Marcos, where reports placed a lead mine, but there the shaft, of Indian construction, was filled with earth; casual samples brought back did show signs of lead. *Ibid.*, February 3, 1694.

rocks and brambles in a nearby arroyo. Fresh tracks led in the direction of the mesa of San Ildefonso. Several days later, at about midnight, a number of Indians, some on foot and others on horseback, attempted to stampede the horses by making ingenious noises aimed at frightening them.²¹ They succeeded in driving off seventy horses and 144 mules. Again, all tracks led to the mesa of San Ildefonso. The guard over the animals was strengthened. A searching party recovered fourteen mules and five horses. For several nights the barking of dogs indicated prowling Indians.²² Drastic action was necessary, but the soldiers lacked ammunition.

Sergeant Juan Ruiz and Adjutant Francisco de Anaya were sent with fifteen soldiers to Tesuque, where they hid in the houses to watch for any rebels who might pass on their way to or from the mesa of San Ildefonso.²³ During the very first night of their vigil several Tewas and an Apache were discovered riding from the direction of Santa Fé. A sudden volley killed one Tewa. The others were taken to Santa Fé for questioning. The Apache was from a group of those from the Río Colorado who had five tents on the Chama River, from whence they had been making raids on the Spanish horses. The Tewas, from Las Peñas Coloradas facing Pojoaque, where they said most of the natives of Tesuque and Pojoaque were living, stated that they had gone to Tesuque merely for maize. The raiders, said one, were from Santa Clara and San Ildefonso, and the stolen animals had been taken to the cliffs by the river on the road to Cochití and to Embudo; thence they would be taken to the mesa of San Ildefonso. According to the story of the other Tewa captive, half the people of Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Cuyamungué, Jacona, and Pojoaque were on the mesa facing San Ildefonso, and the other half were on the mesa to the other side of the pueblo, on which there was a spring. The people of San Juan were on the cliffs on the rim of the canyon near Embudo, where they were living with the Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal. According to him the rustlers were from Santa Clara and San Cristóbal, which was probably the

²¹ *Ibid.*, February 15, 1694.

²² *Ibid.*, February 16-17, 1694.

²³ *Ibid.*, February 19, 1694.

case, in view of the testimony of his companion. He did not hesitate to say that those on the mesa of San Ildefonso were hostile. The military trial ended quickly. The three captives were given absolution; then the two Tewas were shot, and the Apache was hanged.²⁴ Moreover, Roque Madrid was now sent to remove the tempting store of maize from Tesuque to Santa Fé.²⁵

Vargas now opened an offensive campaign against the enemy,²⁶ starting February 25. He set out with sixty fully armed soldiers, thirty militia, and some Pecos allies, to storm the mesa of San Ildefonso; but at midnight a torrential rain forced him to camp six leagues from Santa Fé, two leagues short of the mesa. By morning the rain turned to snow; yet Vargas, undaunted, hastened on through San Ildefonso pueblo to the mesa. When the natives caught sight of the Spaniards they crowded to the edge shouting insults and threats. Fight they would until the last armed Spaniard was slain, and, they boasted, the Jémez, Keres of Cochití mesa, Apaches, Zuñis, Moquis, and many others would come to their assistance.²⁷ No assault was possible in the heavy snow, so Vargas made camp at the abandoned pueblo. Nor did the bad weather abate for a week. The General was forced to confine his activity to minor raids. Parties combed the surrounding countryside, recovering some animals, inspecting the abandoned Santa Clara pueblo, and on one occasion sending a volley of gunfire at a fleeing band of the enemy.²⁸

²⁴ *Ibid.*, February 20, 1694.

²⁵ Madrid was sent to Tesuque with fifty pack mules, muleteers, and a guard of fifteen soldiers, to carry off the maize stored there, and prevent the enemy from utilizing it, since the Tewas and Tanos continued their hostilities, taking refuge on the rocks and mesas, and making raids on the cattle and horses. Two loads were carried back to Santa Fé. The rebels had already carried away most of it, and for some unknown reason had burned Governor Domingo's house there. *Ibid.*, February 20-24, 1694.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, February 25, 1694.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, February 27, 1694; *auto de remisión*, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, June 2, 1694. A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140; A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

²⁸ Madrid, who had gone up the river to Santa Clara with a reconnoitering party, recovered seventy horses and four mules from the enemy. Other parties recovered fourteen mules, two horses, three cows, and two calves. Santa Clara was inspected and found to be deserted. Vargas' journal, February 27 to March 2, 1694, *ibid.*

A clear day dawned on March 4, when a crisp wind blew out of the north. Vargas marched his army out to the foot of the mesa. He found a thousand warriors on guard over all clearings and crags. The Spaniards hesitated only long enough to receive absolution from Father Alpuente and to chant thrice the *alabado*. The answer from the rim of the mesa was the prolonged war cry of the Indians. One of the cannon was aimed at the most guarded point of the enemy stronghold. It exploded with a roar, flinging pieces of metal in every direction, fortunately causing no harm to the Spaniards. Then two contingents on foot climbed the precipitous mesa from various points at great risk, for the advance was contested by a continuous barrage of stones and arrows. For five hours the Spaniards kept up a continuous volley of gunfire, killing about fifteen rebels and wounding many; but the great number of wounded among the Spaniards, over twenty, made necessary a retreat to the deserted pueblo. Captain Lázaro de Mizquía received a broken shoulder blade from a flying missile.²⁹

After a night spent under strict guard, the seriously wounded, eight in all, were sent to Santa Fé with an escort of ten soldiers. These were ordered to warn the residents of the villa to take special defensive precautions, and to return with more ammunition, food, and first aid. At the same time Sergeant Ruiz and Adjutant Anaya went with thirty soldiers and ten mules to Santa Clara, San Lázaro, and San Cristóbal, with orders to obtain provisions from those abandoned pueblos, whose store rooms were well supplied, and thus remove them as a source of supply for the mesa. This search for grain was fruitless.³⁰ And the enemy took advantage of the temporary diminution of Spanish soldiery to ambush the camp, but they were discovered in time and put to flight.³¹

A renewal of the attempt to bring the rebels to terms began on March 8, with Vargas' invitation to them to come down and make friends. Their usual threats, and a thousand blasphemies, were topped off with the sardonic cry that their god and their giver of food was the Devil; for this reason, they

²⁹ *Ibid.*, March 3-5, 1694.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, March 6, 1694.

³¹ *Ibid.* The soldiers returned from Santa Fé on the 7th.

said, they had maize in abundance. Vargas, leaving his camp in a safe position on the opposite bank of the Río Grande, proceeded to lay siege to the rocky and well guarded mesa. The distance around the mesa was so great as to make siege ineffective, although Vargas still persisted with his scheme, while scouting parties scoured the countryside in an attempt to recover horses, mules, and livestock stolen from Santa Fé during the previous month.³² At one time an exceedingly bold maneuver was ordered, an attempt to scale the precipitous slope of the mesa facing the camp by means of ladders from the nearby abandoned pueblos. Sergeant Antonio Jorge led a squad of twenty "leather-jackets" in a charge up the principal path, which was steep, rough, and apparently impregnable. The charge was made behind a heavy barrage of gunfire, by which much damage was done to the enemy. Simultaneously Captain Roque Madrid led a similar assault at another point. The ladders could not be used for lack of firm places on which to set them. The rebels responded viciously by means of Spanish firearms of their own, and with their slings, by which they hurled stones very effectively. The remarkable attack and defense raged for five hours, when it was halted by Vargas due to the utter inability of his men to gain the mesa-top. Several Spaniards were wounded in the foray, and about seven Indians killed.³³

The following morning the wounded were sent to Santa Fé by way of Santa Clara, where it was hoped that some maize might be found. As soon as these left, the chanting of war songs was heard from the mesa, which the Spaniards knew full well meant the prelude of battle. A short while later the advance sentinels were taken by surprise; shots brought assistance, and the Indians were repulsed.³⁴ Vargas sent to Santa Fé for more ammunition. The horses and mules were kept rounded up in the middle of the camp, and the siege of the mesa continued.

Hard luck dogged the footsteps of the conquerors. On one occasion the second cannon was fired at a guarded position, but like its companion it blew to pieces. Meanwhile, the Indians,

³² Vargas' journal, March 9-10, 1694.

³³ *Ibid.*, March 11, 1694.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, March 12, 1694.

having failed in several attempts to obtain water from the river, were getting worried.³⁵ But the heavy rains and dark nights destroyed all the success of the siege, for rain water was caught on the mesa, and new arroyos were formed from which, under cover of darkness, the rebels kept their water vessels well supplied.³⁶ Under such disheartening circumstances Vargas and his lieutenants decided to lift the siege and return to Santa Fé.³⁷

While preparations were being made for the departure, the couriers who had been sent to El Paso for ammunition arrived with good news to lift for a moment the spirit of depression weighing on all the men. Father Farfán and his colonists were approaching El Paso, and would soon be on their way to Santa Fé. Vargas immediately sent a note to the villa ordering a military squad to be prepared to meet the new arrivals at Doña Damiana, whence they were to continue north by way of Jémez. The courier and his companions reported that four leagues beyond Santa Fé, on the open plain, they had come upon a troop of some sixty Jémez and Keres of Cochití armed with bows and arrows, for which reason they had returned to the city, thus delaying their mission. For this reason Vargas ordered five "leather-jackets" to escort them part of the way back to Santa Fé. In view of such news, the General changed his itinerary, proceeding directly to Tesuque, where a load of maize was gathered to succor the new colonists.³⁸ The expedition was back in Santa Fé on March 20. In the campaign just concluded, about thirty Indians were slain, and the morale of the rebels on the mesa of San Ildefonso was considerably weakened. The casualties on the Spanish side were about a dozen seriously wounded men, and three horses killed in action.³⁹

In the interim Vargas' despatches and reports of January

³⁵ *Ibid.*, March 13-15, 1694.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, March 16-18, 1694.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, March 19, 1694. The return was by way of San Juan and the Chama River, in order to inspect the reported refuge there of the Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, and the Tewas of San Juan.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, March 20, 1694. The 100 horses and mules recovered were now restored to their owners, and of those left over, one was given to each of the presidial soldiers, and the remaining thirteen were presented by the governor to the members of the *cabildo* as a reward for their services. About 100 fanegas of maize acquired at Tesuque were sent south.

past were received by the viceroy in Mexico City. The royal fiscal examined the documents, and on March 18 he submitted his official report to the viceroy, objecting to most of the important policies and demands therein outlined.⁴⁰ As far as he was concerned, Vargas had exceeded his powers in shooting seventy rebels after the battle of Santa Fé; eight or ten of the guilty leaders should have been punished at most. According to the Laws of the Indies (*Recopilación de leyes de las Indias*), Laws 9, 10, and 11 of Title 4, Book III, provincial governors could make open war against rebellious Indians as a last resort, but only after having first notified and received permission from the Council of the Indies, he pointed out; the governor of New Mexico should be advised on this matter. As for the distribution of the women, youths, and children among the colonists as virtual slaves, this was prohibited repeatedly in the *Recopilación*. In no manner could natives be distributed as property without royal orders; the fine for such a violation was 1,000 pesos; and he advised that the governor "should be notified" in order to assure that the Indians distributed not be treated as slaves, but peacefully instructed and prepared for their return eventually to their pueblo life. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what Vargas had specified when the captives had been distributed. He had not placed them in permanent bondage.

The sending of 320 more families to New Mexico was deemed preposterous, as well as the governor's petition to solicit families in the vicinity of Parral. The expenses of the colony were already burdening the government, argued the fiscal, and would continue to do so, if Vargas had his way. As for establishing a permanent presidio of one hundred soldiers at Santa Fé, this was not only premature, but far too costly, and moreover it was highly doubtful that New Mexico would be able to begin repayments to the royal treasury within three years. As for Vargas' deserts in the matter of a salary equivalent to that of the governor of New Vizcaya, and the *cabildo's* petition that he be retained in office, the fiscal recommended that these matters be referred to the king.

Viceroy Conde de Galve dominated the Junta General de

⁴⁰ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, March 18, 1694. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39; A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

Hacienda which re-examined the reports five days later. Most of the criticisms and suggestions of the royal fiscal were overridden.⁴¹ Immediately following the meeting, the viceroy sent hasty notes to Vargas and the *cabildo* of Santa Fé. Vargas was thanked for his services, and granted the right to send agents to purchase horses, mules, and livestock in New Galicia and New Vizcaya at the expense of the royal treasuries in the respective jurisdictions.⁴² The *cabildo* was informed that all of the honors asked for the reconquerors would be granted, and that the petition to have Vargas retained in office had been referred to the king.⁴³ Three days later a complete report of the decisions of the Junta General de Hacienda was sent to Vargas by the viceroy.⁴⁴

In view of the peaceful policy of Vargas on his first entry into New Mexico, the storming of Santa Fé and the execution of the seventy were recognized as having been necessary war measures, and consequently approved. However, he was advised not to attempt further conquests until assured of the obedience of those pueblos already conquered. As for the distribution of the Indian captives into servitude, this was not considered incompatible with the Laws of the Indies, as the royal fiscal had stated, but rather consonant with them. Teaching Christian doctrine and education of the natives were exactly what was desired, said the Junta General de Hacienda, subject, of course, to the restrictions Governor Vargas had placed upon their masters. And whenever any became well versed in the Catholic religion before the termination of the ten year period of servitude imposed upon them, they should be allowed to return to their normal pueblo life.

The Junta General de Hacienda reported that the central government in Mexico City had insufficient resources at the moment to provide the 320 families asked for. Costs for the maintenance of those already sent to New Mexico, the original

⁴¹ Report of the Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, March 23, 1694, *ibid.* Galve always showed evident partiality toward Vargas.

⁴² The viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, March 23, 1694. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁴³ The viceroy to the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Mexico City, March 23, 1694. MS. in the files of the General Land Office, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

⁴⁴ The viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, March 26, 1694. A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

seventy families, and the sixty-six and a half on their way there, were already beyond the means of the royal treasury.⁴⁵ Nor could additional soldiers be sent to Santa Fé, especially since at this time it could only be done by diminishing the size of the presidio at El Paso, and repeated royal cédulas had set forth clearly that under no circumstances should this be done.

But the proposal to solicit colonists in New Galicia and New Vizcaya was encouraged, and Vargas was granted the right to send agents there for that purpose. The proximity of these provinces to New Mexico would entail a minimum of transportation expenditures. Ordered to aid Vargas' agents were the governor of New Vizcaya, the *corregidor* of Zacatecas, and the *alcalde mayor* of Sombrerete. This third group of settlers, to be gathered by these agents, would be sufficient to assure the permanency of the reconquest, it was believed. Paramount among the needs were livestock and farm implements, for procuring which Vargas' agents obtained full power.⁴⁶ Not so fortunate, however, did the plea for clothing fare. The long list of articles for settlers and missionaries was not approved. The claim that the missionaries were destitute was not recognized, since they had been given one and a half years' salary in advance, including a similar apportionment of livestock and horses. They had been aided sufficiently, unless, it was added, Vargas himself wished to make them more happy by keeping them well supplied with grain. On the other hand, the 100 soldiers were six months in arrears in salary payment. They were granted at this time one year's salary in advance, although this was really only six months' pay in advance considering the amount already in arrears.

Vargas' salary petition, which the Junta General de Hacienda believed justly merited, and the petition of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé regarding his tenure in office and reward for services, were brought to the attention of the king. The petition of the *cabildo* that all the reconquerors be rewarded with the title of *hijosdalgo* and the other privileges customarily granted to sons of conquerors was granted.

⁴⁵ Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 206, erroneously states that the second group of colonists also consisted of seventy families.

⁴⁶ Grain was promised upon request; meanwhile the obtaining of maize from the abandoned pueblos was sanctioned.

CHAPTER X

MEETING THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

The future success or failure of the Spanish colony at Santa Fé, which was enduring terrific hardships, hinged on the fate of San Ildefonso mesa—the forbidding, defiant, and veritably impregnable Black Mesa. Continued hostilities prevented the colonists from planting their fields, and consequently they were still forced to depend upon what they were able to seize from the granaries of the surrounding pueblos, and what was sent up from Mexico. Hence, several days after the return to Santa Fé from the futile siege of the mesa of San Ildefonso, Roque Madrid was sent to Nambé with twenty soldiers, muleteers, and a train of forty mules in quest of maize. The errand was successful both with respect to the haul of grain and the obtaining of news. According to an Indian who was captured there, the Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, formerly gathered near the Truchas River southeast of San Juan, had joined the rebels on the mesa of San Ildefonso for fear that their camp had been discovered by the Utes. Only ten or twelve families of Nambé Indians had remained there. He said that the Apaches were not allied with those on the mesa, and in fact had stolen ten or twelve of their horses in a ravine near Santa Clara.¹ Madrid was therefore sent out again to inspect the two Tano pueblos, and bring back as much grain as possible.²

Meanwhile, on March 27, Governor Juan of Pecos arrived with three Apaches from the buffalo plains. These had been friendly to the Spaniards before the abandonment of New Mexico, and had now come to greet them. They said that they would be ready to trade at Pecos, as in former days, in October. Several Spaniards went to Pecos on their invitation to see their companions, and after their arrival there they were given liberally of buffalo meat and skins.³

¹ Vargas' journal, March 21-24, 1694. Unless otherwise specified, all footnote citations in this chapter are from A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39, and A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

² *Ibid.*, March 26, 1694.

³ *Ibid.*, March 27, 1694.

Several days later Diego Zervir arrived with a letter from Father Farfán written at Tabalaopa, dated March 6, repeating the demands he had made from Cerro Gordo for a supply of grain and a hundred mules on his arrival at El Paso. Farfán was anticipating Vargas' letter of March 19, in which the fulfillment of those demands had been promised. Vargas wrote back telling Farfán to hasten northward, for the arrival of reinforcements, he believed, would have a strategic effect upon the hostile natives. Father Buenaventura would leave Santa Fé for El Paso immediately with his thirteen wagons, carrying one hundred fanegas of maize for the newcomers, and meet them at San Diego, well north of El Paso. Vargas was able to spare only fourteen mules, since all others were already being utilized in the campaigns for provisions. Zervir left with Vargas' message on April 2. Two days later the wagons were off for El Paso.⁴

Madrid returned from the pueblos with five captured horses, a colt, and word of some maize left by the Indians at San Lázaro and San Cristóbal. Sergeant Juan Ruiz de Casares and twenty soldiers were now sent to San Cristóbal with thirty mules and some muleteers for the maize there, and returned with their train heavily laden. But these acquisitions of grain were offset by irreparable losses of cattle, horses, and mules. In fact, when on April 10 soldiers were sent to bring in some cattle to be slaughtered for food, they discovered all had been carried off or scattered. The tracks led as much to the mesa of Cieneguilla de Cochití as to the mesa of San Ildefonso.⁵

Thereupon Vargas prepared to carry out a previously contemplated campaign against the Keres of the mesa of Cochití. The real cause for this campaign was the recent reports from the friendly Keres pueblos of Santa Ana, Sia, and San Felipe that they were about to abandon their pueblos due to the threats of their tribesmen of the mesa, who were allied with the hostile Jémez, Apaches, and Tewas. The reliable and active Roque Madrid was ordered to select ninety soldiers, who, with twenty militia, the standard bearer, and two others, all under the

⁴ Vargas' journal, March 30-April 4, 1694.

⁵ *Ibid.*, April 2-10, 1694.

command of Vargas himself, were to go to the aid of the friendly Keres.⁶ On April 13 the expedition left Santa Fé. The first night was spent at the abandoned pueblo of La Cienguilla, four leagues to the west, on the Santa Fé River. The next stop was at Las Boquillas, three leagues farther, and on the 15th the troop approached San Felipe, where the allies were gathered. The river was crossed, and the camp was made on the bank hard by the mesa.⁷

Passing through to Jémez were many Zuñis, whose captain, the half-breed Ventura, came with greetings and with information. He and some of his tribesmen were visiting the Jémez solely to trade furs, skins, and blankets. The Apaches del Mechón, the enemies of his people, were at war, as were also the Moquis, Utes, and Conina Apaches. These last three had attacked the Zuñis recently, he said, but had failed to harm them as they were too well fortified on the mesa and rock of Kiakima. Vargas expressed his regret over his inability to go to the aid of the Zuñis at this time, since the rock of Kiakima was eighty leagues from Santa Fé. When Ventura revealed how fearful his people were to work in their fields due to the raids of enemy Indians, Vargas suggested a move to the abandoned pueblos on the Río Grande below Isleta, where he could more easily assure them protection. Vargas asked him to stay, and return to Santa Fé as his guest; in all of this he concurred. That evening the leaders of the friendly pueblos of Santa Ana, Sia and San Felipe were ordered to have their men ready at noon next day for the attack on the enemy.

On April 16 Vargas and the combined forces moved toward the mesa of Cochití. The following day the assault was made. Three columns wound up to the mesa-top: the Indian Ojeda and Roque Madrid led the advance up the main road with forty Spaniards and one hundred Indians; Olguín and Eusebio de Vargas led forty Spaniards up the second road; Varela followed the road facing the river. In this fashion the allies closed in on the enemy, and the pueblo on the mesa was won. Many of the rebels took to flight, while Indian allies set fire to their

⁶ *Ibid.*, April 10-13, 1694.

⁷ *Ibid.*, April 13-15, 1694.

houses. Seven of the enemy were killed in the assault, and one died from burns. Afterwards 342 natives were taken captive; thirteen of the leaders were executed; seventy horses and mules, over 900 sheep, clothing, food supplies in the form of maize, fresh and dried beef, and other pillage were distributed among the victors. Of the sheep 400 had been stolen from the Spaniards.⁸

On the following day the courier who had been sent to El Paso for ammunition arrived with powder, bullets, and news. During the governor's absence the Tewas seized the opportunity to launch an attack on Santa Fé. A large band, some on foot and others on horseback, attempted to take the place by surprise, but they had failed. Eternal vigilance, nerve racking as it was, had saved the day. Twenty soldiers were immediately sent to the aid of the capital with several loads of confiscated maize.⁹

Vargas had his tent pitched at one of the entrances to the pueblo square. Shortly a San Marcos Indian with cross in hand appeared to offer submission in the name of his people. Vargas gave him the terms: they would be pardoned if they reoccupied their abandoned pueblo and brought captive El Zepe and the other leaders who were responsible for their continued hostility. The next day, April 19, a Keres came on a like mission and with the information that El Zepe was already in confinement, as well as several others of the rebellious leaders; when all of them were rounded up they would be brought before the Spanish general. All seemed well to the Spaniards, who accepted these reports in all faith. Lulled into a false security, the captains put the soldiers to hulling the maize recently acquired. Of a sudden, while the soldiers were thus engaged, unarmed and without their leather jackets, the enemy made a furious attack. Over half of the prisoners escaped, and Miguel Luján, a Spanish soldier, was killed. To prevent another such calamity the horses and mules were rounded up in the square, and the entire camp placed on strict watch. Holes

⁸ Vargas' journal, April 17-18, 1694. In a letter dated April 3, Farfán wrote from Los Patos that he had already lost 150 mules due to death or theft.

⁹ *Ibid.*, April 18, 1694; Luis Granillo to Vargas, April 17, 1694.

were opened in the walls of the houses to fire through, while the people fortified themselves in the rooms. But the rebels, having already achieved their purpose, offered no more trouble.

On the 24th Olguín returned from his trip to Santa Fé. The capital was in grave danger, he reported. He had, moreover, sad news. Adjutant Francisco de Anaya Almazán had been drowned. While crossing the river his horse had lost its footing and was washed down stream. Anaya had hurled himself at the buttocks of a companion's horse, but his long spurs got caught in the horse's tail, throwing him off his balance, and as a result he slipped, fell face down into the swift current, and went down.¹⁰

At sundown Vargas, having won a dubious victory, began his march back to Santa Fé. Several days he spent at the abandoned pueblo of Cochití waiting for the roaring stream to subside. From there a guard of four soldiers was sent to San Felipe to protect the natives while they planted their cotton, maize, and vegetables. Finally the river was crossed without mishap, and on April 25 Vargas was back in Santa Fé. There was great jubilation over the success of the enterprise. The rear-guard, consisting of most of the soldiers and the pack train loaded with grain, the seventy captives, and the sheep, arrived two days later. The captives were distributed as slaves among the Spanish residents.¹¹ Ventura, the Zuñi chief who had been with the Spaniards all this time, was sent home with a letter to his people and others for the Ácoma and the Moqui pueblos. The Spaniards were now ordered to plant their fields under the protection of the soldiers; three *suertes* of land were set aside for the soldiers, to be planted with ten fanegas of maize.¹²

His hopes aroused by the recent victory at the mesa of Cochití, the energetic governor, sometimes overly hasty in his enthusiasm, went to the living quarters of Fray Juan Muñoz de Castro, vice-custodian of the New Mexico missions and commis-

¹⁰ Vargas' journal, April 18-24, 1694.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, April 24-28, 1694. Justifiable because they were "alzados rebeldes" against the Holy Faith and the Royal Crown, taken in a just and justifiable war, and therefore their owners could sell them as slaves—so Vargas proclaimed.

¹² *Ibid.*, April 29-30, 1694.

sary of the Holy Office for the province, to inform him of his desire that plans be made for the setting up of missions. In his opinion the first should be established at the faithful pueblos of Pecos, San Felipe, Sia and Santa Ana. Father Muñoz was in full accord. Vargas turned over to him 200 of the recently captured sheep for the projected missions, and sent orders to the designated pueblos, asking for native warriors to conduct the sheep safely to their destinations. The remaining 100 sheep allotted to the missionaries were turned over to the thirteen religious and their vice-custodian at Santa Fé.¹³ Vargas now sent letters of greeting to the leaders of the Zuñi and Moqui pueblos, aimed at winning their peaceful acceptance of Spanish rule, which, incidentally, was never to be fully attained as regards the western pueblos.¹⁴

¹³ Vargas' journal, April 28, 1694.

¹⁴ These letters, which represent an interesting phase of Vargas' Indian policy, read as follows:

My son and friend Governor Miguel, of that pueblo of Aguatuvi, and the other natives and war captains:

I notify you that I am now at this villa of Santa Fé with the Fathers, Spaniards with their wives and children, and many soldiers. Many more people are on their way, and when they are all together I will go to visit you, which I desire very much, so that I may embrace you and tell you that the king, our lord, may God save him, has sent me only that you may live as Christians, which you are. I do not come to make demands of you, or to do you any harm. You already know me, for I have been with you, and when I needed anything I paid you for it, and I also gave you of what I had, as I shall do in the future, for you are all my children and I love you very much. May God watch over you, my friend, many years.

The villa of Santa Fé, April 28, 1694. Your governor and captain general, who loves you very much and wishes to see you.

Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Luján
Ponce de León.

My son and friend the governor, and other captains of war of that pueblo of Zuñi:

I wish very much to embrace you, as I have told my friend Ventura, the bearer. Already you all know my good heart, and that I love you as my sons, which you are. I notify you that his Excellency the viceroy is very pleased with you, wherefore he has sent me to this kingdom with the Fathers, the Spaniards and their wives and children, and my soldiers to defend you, so that you may live as Christians, which you are, and be certain that there is only one God and one king, for this alone will I order of you. My friend Ventura has told me that the Apaches are your enemies, and also that you were ambushed by the Moquis, Utes, and Conina Apaches. Although I will go to visit you in due time, when I am able to leave this villa, and see your said enemies, and they will leave, they will again attack your fields when the occasion presents itself, when you are scattered in them, and they will easily carry off your livestock and horses,

The governor of Pecos came to the capital on May 2 with the leader of the *rancherías* of the Apaches of the buffalo plains fourteen days travel from Santa Fé.¹⁵ This friendly and loquacious Apache chieftain guaranteed that his people would be back when the maize was ripe, bringing buffalo, elk, and buckskins for trade with the Spaniards. As a token of his friendship he presented Vargas with three buffalo skins and an elk hide camp tent. While at meal Vargas showed him a silver plate, and asked him if there was any such metal in the land of the Apaches. He answered that a day's journey from Santa Fé, on the edge of a small mountain, were some cliffs composed of an ore of the same quality as the plate, which the Indians called "white iron," and which was altogether too hard and heavy to remove. Vargas gave him an iron ax, and told him to bring a sample on his next visit. Plied with other questions he made glib responses: the kingdom of the Tejas was seven days' distance from his camp; along the way there were many rivers, and buffalo, and in the summer-time much fruit; formerly there were Spaniards in Texas. Since this last statement was true, it lent authority to his other statements. Quivira, he said, was some twenty-five days from his camp, and well known to his people, as they often went there to fight and to capture youths to sell as servants among other tribes in exchange for horses.¹⁶

and kill your wives and children and also many of you. This they will do because the ascent to your *peñol* is distant. And so I believe that you should plant those lands this summer, and pass over to live in these abandoned pueblos of the *Río Abajo*, in the particular localities of your choice. There you will be safe, and happy to live near this villa and the Spaniards. They will buy your produce, and with the pesos they pay you you will be able to buy from friendly Apaches the clothing of buffalo pelts and elk skins which you may need.

You may notify me of your decision through the said Ventura. I am not obliging you to leave, but am only expressing my opinion on the matter, for I love you very much. May God watch over all of you many years.

Written in this villa of Santa Fé, today, Thursday, April 29, 1694. Your governor and captain general, who loves you very much, and wishes to see you.

Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Luján
Ponce de León.

¹⁵ Vargas' journal, May 2, 1694. The Apache leader repeated that his people had always been the friends of the Spaniards, and that he was anxious to reestablish friendly trade relations.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, May 4, 1694.

These were busy days for Vargas. After the departure of Don Juan and the Apache chief, the latter taking with him many gifts including a horse, he attended to the distribution of land around the villa and supervised the planting. The next few days were also spent reconnoitering the surrounding country for enemy tracks.¹⁷ Several soldiers were sent to the friendly Keres pueblos to protect them from possible attack while planting was going on there. During this time several Keres of Cochití came to offer allegiance. El Zepe, they said, had not yet come because he had a broken knee. Vargas reiterated his desire that they reoccupy their old pueblo of Cochití, plant their fields, and build a church and a convent so that a missionary might be sent to live among them.¹⁸

Continuous petty rustling on the part of the enemy caused no little alarm; but far more concern developed when before daybreak of May 21 a thousand rebel warriors swooped down on the horses near La Cieneguilla. Many were scattered; the others on being rounded up had to be kept under constant guard. One captive laid blame for the foray on the Tewas of Tesuque, Nambé, Santa Clara and San Ildefonso, Picuríes, Jémez, some Keres, and Taos. According to him the Taos had been forced into the confederacy by Dominguillo of Tesuque under threat of punishment.¹⁹

Vargas waited until darkness fell. Then he led sixty soldiers and ten militia again to reconnoiter the enemy stronghold on the mesa of San Ildefonso, and to recover the stolen horses if possible. Toward midnight a halt was called at a place two leagues from the mesa. At dawn Vargas and a party of picked soldiers rode on ahead in a surprise attempt to capture horses. An Indian sentinel was taken, some horses were located, and forty-eight were recovered. A skirmish ensued in which four Spaniards were wounded, and one of the enemy killed. Satisfied, Vargas returned to Santa Fé. A captive, José of Cuyamungué, a Tewa, when questioned, placed responsibility for the

¹⁷ Vargas' journal, May 7, 1694. On this day Vargas rode with the military leaders and members of the *cabildo* as far as Tesuque, three leagues from Santa Fé.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, May 14-15, 1694.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, May 21, 1694.

rustling on the nine pueblos concentrated on the mesa: Tesuque, Cuyamungué, Nambé, Pojoaque, Jacona, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, San Lázaro, San Cristóbal; these were aided in their raids by allies from Taos, Picuríes, Jémez, and Cochití; the older men and the chieftains were the most hostile, and he mentioned Dominguito specifically.²⁰ Two nights later another attempt against San Ildefonso was made without success,²¹ except for an item of confirmation from another captive Indian: Dominguito was the leader and his lieutenants were Lorenzo of Picuríes, Pacheco of Taos, and Naranjo and Juan Griego of Santa Clara.²²

At Santa Fé, Vargas was awaited by the friendly Indian chief Ojeda and the war captains of Sia and Santa Ana. They had with them five Indian prisoners from the mesa of Jémez captured in a foray. According to one Jémez, ten of his people had taken part in the recent ambush of the Spanish horses, as well as all of the Keres warriors of Santo Domingo; the latter, he said, were now living on the mesa near their abandoned pueblo. They had been incited by the Tewas. Of the Zuñis who had recently come to Jémez, eight had joined in the ambush. He reported that eight Santo Domingo and Jémez Indians were with the rebels on the mesa of San Ildefonso. Of the livestock stolen, most of the cows and oxen had already been slaughtered and eaten, he said. The captive was then asked if he had any knowledge of the burial place of Father Juan de Jesús, who had been martyred at Jémez in 1680, and the whereabouts of the religious articles of the destroyed mission there. He replied that he knew an Indian youth who could tell Vargas their whereabouts; a former governor of Jémez pueblo, now dead, had a box full of religious articles, but the church bells, statues, and religious ornaments had been burned

²⁰ *Ibid.*, May 22-23, 1694.

²¹ *Ibid.*, May 24, 1694. On the way it was observed that the natives had planted their fields in the river valleys.

²² *Ibid.*, May 27, 1694. He further stated that the natives of nine pueblos were living on the mesa of San Ildefonso: namely, Tesuque, Cuyamungué, Nambé, Pojoaque, Jacona, San Ildefonso, San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, and Santa Clara, thereby substantiating previous reports.

by order of certain Tewa leaders who had passed through the pueblo at the time of the 1680 uprising. The life of this captive was spared in order that he might aid in the discovery of the body of the martyred missionary.²³

Amid these various parleys and peace efforts Vargas showed notable humaneness in his efforts to impress upon the natives his peaceful intentions. Most of the natives captured on the various reconnoitering expeditions who showed evidence of good faith were returned to their people with messages promising complete forgiveness without reprisals, except in the case of the ringleaders of rebellion. Obviously, Vargas' great task was to break down a deep feeling of suspicion and distrust on the part of the natives, for the bloody memory of 1680 left scars which were hard to eradicate. The Spaniards brought no spirit of vengeance, but how were the Indians to know? Had they not been ruthless in ousting the Spanish invaders just fourteen years before? The key to the recalcitrancy on the part of the natives was, of course, religion. The Spaniards were not only conquerors, but zealous crusaders of the Catholic Faith, while the older Indian leaders were determined to retain their own ancient religious practices, which the Spaniards aimed to stamp out.

Early in June Vargas sent to the viceroy a report of his recent activities, and a copy of his campaign journal for the period from January 23 to date.²⁴ In an accompanying letter he pointed out the destitution of the Spanish colonists at Santa Fé, over 1,100 persons. They did not have a single head of

²³ Vargas' journal, May 27-28, 1694. He also reported that the Zuñis had said they were returning to plant their fields, but would come back later with the Moquis to fight the Spaniards. Two of the recent captives, a Tewa and a Tano, were shot; the Jémez were spared.

A Taos Indian captive was set free at this time and sent to his pueblo with a rosary and a written message containing a plea to Governor Pacheco to be friendly. Also, seven Keres of Cochiti pueblo, which had recently made peace, now came to Santa Fé to ask for the return of those of their people who had been taken captive and made slaves. Vargas said that he would do as they asked as soon as they should reoccupy their old pueblo, rebuild their church and convent, and live peacefully as Christians and friendly neighbors.

²⁴ *Auto de remisión*, Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Galve, Santa Fé, June 2, 1694.

livestock, and had only 500 horses. Constantly on guard, they had as yet no real opportunity to plant, or in any way provide for their self-support. He begged for further aid, claiming that his activities to date had cost the royal treasury a minimum of expenditures.²⁵ Furthermore, he reported, he had empowered his agent Captain Juan Páez Hurtado to solicit more families to settle in New Mexico from New Vizcaya and New Galicia, in accord with viceregal orders of March 23 past. The royal treasury at Zacatecas, he urged, should be duly ordered to provide Hurtado with the necessary funds to finance this work, as well as the provisioning of the wagons, mules, and supplies necessary to assure the success of the enterprise.²⁶ Another letter went to the royal fiscal, who was besought to have the livestock ready when Hurtado arrived.²⁷

Accompanying these letters was one from the *cabildo* of Santa Fé bemoaning the torrents of blood being spilt by the colonists in the services of Spain, and pleading for assistance. The *cabildo* reported that when the New Mexico colonists left El Paso they were equipped with only one change of clothing, and food sufficient only for the journey. "Believe in us," they pleaded, "and if you do not, send someone to see for himself." Practically all of the livestock, they repeated, had been carried off by "these infidel apostate rebels against God and His Holy Law." All but 500 horses were in enemy hands. Soldiers and settlers, who were living in the pueblo structure the Indians had

²⁵ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, June 3, 1694. The royal fiscal, slightly irritated at Vargas' general attitude, wrote in his report to the viceroy: ". . . it is astounding that said governor continues to report so many times that this reduction has been achieved without cost to the royal treasury, in view of the considerable sums that have been set aside and granted to him at the royal treasuries of Galicia and New Vizcaya . . ." Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, July 14, 1694. The letters and reports from Vargas were received in Mexico City on July 10.

²⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, June 3, 1694.

²⁷ Vargas to the royal fiscal, Santa Fé, June 3, 1694, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140. On July 14, on receipt of this letter and other reports in Mexico City, the Junta de Hacienda reported that the treasuries of Durango, Sombrerete, and Zacatecas were already authorized to finance the sending north of families that were being gathered in the vicinity of these towns by Vargas' agent Juan Páez Hurtado. Cf. the viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, July 16, 1694, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

built over the old Governor's Palace, were barely existing on what little maize they could obtain by force of arms from the enemy, and this was being rationed out to them from a common storeroom.²⁸

In New Mexico, the Jémez continued to harass the friendly Keres of Santa Ana, Sia, and San Felipe to such an extent that the leaders of the three Keres pueblos went to Santa Fé and begged for some Spanish "leather-jackets" to protect them.²⁹ Finally, although at great sacrifice, their demands were partially fulfilled. Ten soldiers, fully armed and on horseback, were sent to protect them from enemy ambush while they tilled their fields.³⁰ Meanwhile, the grain shortage was becoming more and more critical for the Spaniards. Because of general economic distress, the morale of the *cabildo* and many of the colonists was, indeed, very low. But Vargas was undaunted, and his courageous leadership prevailed. As we have seen, in anticipation of final victory, he was already making plans for the refounding of the Indian missions and the spread of settlement. The stage was being set for a final showdown, and the arrival of additional colonists and supplies from Mexico at this time at last turned the scale definitely in favor of the Spaniards.

On June 22, the news reached Santa Fé that the long awaited wagons bringing colonists from Mexico City were approaching the walled city. Governor Vargas rode out to meet them at the abandoned hacienda of Captain Roque Madrid. On the following day, at nine o'clock in the morning, Father Farfán and the new colonists entered Santa Fé. The group consisted of from 220 to 230 persons. Three of them were Frenchmen

²⁸ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Mexico City, June 3, 1694.

At the meeting of the Junta General of July 16, 1694, Vargas was thanked for his successes, and provisions were made to assure the financing of the colonists who were being gathered by Vargas' agent Hurtado. With regard to the reconquest of the rebellious pueblos, Vargas was urged to attempt no further conquest for the present, and to spend all his efforts in rebuilding and Christianizing the regions already under control. Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, July 16, 1694.

²⁹ Vargas' journal, June 14, 1694.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1694; *auto de remisión*, September 1, 1694.

—survivors of La Salle's lost colony. All were assigned lodgings in the villa.³¹

This meant more reinforcements, but it also meant additional mouths to feed; so with both of these facts in mind Vargas now decided to embark upon a project which previously could only have been attempted at a great risk, a decisive campaign to crush the rebellious nations of Jémez and Santo Domingo, who continued their murderous forays upon the three allied Keres pueblos. If victorious here, he then would have his hands free to deal with the only other immediate objective, the subduing of the natives of the nine rebellious pueblos atop Black Mesa. A proclamation was made in the fashion customary on such occasions, by the official crier to the sound of mili-

³¹ Vargas' journal, June 22-23, 1694; Certification, Mexico City, July 17, 1694. On the organizing of this expedition, see Chapter VI, above. There are four known lists of this group of settlers: two in B.N.M., legajo 4, one in A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140, and a damaged and incomplete list in the Santa Fé Archives, Santa Fé. The first list in B.N.M., legajo 4, made in Mexico City, n.d., contains sixty-five families. According to later documents dated September 3 and 4, 1693, and as yet before the families had left Mexico City, the list had been augmented to sixty-six and one-half families, totalling 234 persons. The second list in B.N.M. is the muster roll of the families made upon their arrival at La Laguna, near Zacatecas, on November 16, 1693. This list contains 222 persons, including the three Frenchmen, who are here named for the first time as Pedro Munier, Santiago Grola, and Juan Arechibeca, "*forzados . . . rayados en la cara.*" *Forzados* were criminals or enemy prisoners. Listed, but not counted in the total, are fifteen persons who had previously deserted the expedition, and one of two who died en route. Both lists mention the many useful trades of the heads of families and older boys. (There is considerable data on the earlier and later activities of the three Frenchmen, survivors of the ill-fated La Salle expedition. See especially Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 12-14, II, 184-185; Hackett, *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico*, II, 472-473; W. E. Dunn, *Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States, 1678-1702*, University of Texas Bulletin, Studies in History, No. 1, Austin, 1917, 99, 108, 122, 124-125, 149; M. de Villiers, *L'Expédition de Cavelier de la Salle dans le Golfe du Mexique, 1684-1687*, Paris, 1931, 180-191, 215-216; Herbert E. Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest*, New York, 1930, 364, 375, 401, 413, 423; Alfred B. Thomas, *After Coronado*, Norman, 1935, 264-265.)

The list in A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140, contains the names of sixty-five families, one Spaniard listed separately, making the total sixty-six, and the three Frenchmen, unnamed, listed together as the equivalent of one-half a family; hence the total is given as sixty-six and one-half. The number of persons in the list totals 232, two of whom are referred to as having died en route. The list includes the four families reported elsewhere to have escaped from the expedition in the vicinity of Zacatecas. The trades of most of the heads of

tary music.³² The plan was to make the expedition immediately. But the friendly Pecos chieftain, Governor Juan de Ye, some of whose warriors had arrived to participate in the enterprise, reported that the Río Grande was running dangerously high, and was difficult to cross even on rafts; so the expedition was temporarily postponed. In view of this delay, the readiness of his army, and the pressing need of feeding his colony, Vargas decided upon a quick trip to the Tano and Tewa pueblos, thence to Picuríes, for the purpose of stocking up with more maize from the granaries of the abandoned pueblos. If necessary, he was prepared to go even as far as Taos.³³ As it turned out, he went even farther northward, into what is now southern Colorado, before the expedition was completed.

On the morning of June 30 the expedition started, proceeding in two divisions: Vargas and Don Juan in the vanguard, with the *cabildo*, the military leaders, and the chaplains, Fathers Alpuente and Farfán, amidst whom the royal banner could be seen fluttering in the breeze, immediately followed by fifty "leather-jackets" and an army of Pecos allies, fifty militia with muleteers, and the pack train bringing up the rear. At Cuya-

families are mentioned. Two were experts on quicksilver—shades of Sierra Azul!

The list in the Santa Fé Archive is dated Mexico City, September 9, 1693, but it is only a fragment, containing 186 names, although on the last page of the incomplete document sixty-seven families are referred to as contained in the list. The three Frenchmen are not listed. As may be seen from the date, it was a list of the families made before they had left Mexico City, and virtually the same as the first list in B.N.M., legajo 4, mentioned above. Hence it gives no clue as to the number that actually reached Santa Fé. The special value of this list lies in the fact that it contains a brief description of the physical appearance of each of the individuals listed. It is printed in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 92-106. Twitchell is wrong when, in the above cited work, he refers to this list as "a list of the settlers accompanying De Vargas on his second *entrada*."

The expedition numbered 222 in the muster roll made near Zacatecas on November 16, 1693, which is the latest one of which we have record, and the one perhaps most nearly correct. It is quite possible, however, that some of the deserters were later caught, and that a few others joined the expedition en route between Zacatecas and El Paso. We will probably never know exactly how many of the persons in these lists actually reached Santa Fé. An almost exact approximation can be reached, however, by checking the names with those found in later lists and with names frequently mentioned in later New Mexican records.

³² Vargas' journal, June 25-26, 1694.

³³ *Ibid.*, June 28-29, 1694.

mungué, four leagues from Santa Fé, a group of Indians viciously attacked the vanguard, and refusing to listen to peaceful overtures, they did not take to flight until eleven of them had been killed. An inspection of the mesa of San Ildefonso brought forth manifestations of enmity in the form of yelling and war whoops. Vargas made no attempt to provoke a battle, and camped on the edge of the Río Grande a league from the mesa. Turning eastward from the Río Grande at a point where the river forks a short distance below San Juan, the expedition passed through San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, whose residents had planted their fields, and then proceeded to the former hacienda of Moraga, seven leagues from where they had pitched camp the night before. Toward evening of the following day Picuríes, on the edge of the canyon, was reached. It was abandoned, but Vargas set up a cross in the square and refused to allow pillage of any kind.³⁴

A rough and trying mountain pass led to Taos. From the smoke and fires which could be seen at various points on the horizon and in the mountain fastness, the expedition, it was clear, was being closely followed by the enemy. Some of the military leaders and members of the *cabildo* reminded Vargas of the grave danger at hand. His reaction was typical: he had gone forth to obtain food, and obtain it he would, by purchase, if possible, or, if necessary, by force of arms. And so, the expedition continued.

At about four o'clock in the afternoon Taos came in view. They made camp just beyond the fields of the pueblo, which was a short league off, and on the edge of the little river which runs through the pueblo. Leaving the horses and pack animals here, Vargas went on with a troop of forty men to inspect the pueblo. As they passed through the fields, crosses were in evidence at various points. Everything was deathly silent, for the pueblo was abandoned. But crosses had been recently painted on the walls of the houses. Vargas believed this to be an act of piety born of fear, which was exactly the idea that the crafty Indians meant to convey, hoping thus to prevent the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, June 28-July 3, 1694. Picuríes was 10 leagues from Taos.

Spaniards from molesting their property and looting their grain. A cross was set up by Vargas in each of the open squares before the two great communal dwellings. Sergeant Major Antonio Jorge was sent to plant another at the entrance of the heavily wooded mountain canyon, about a half a league north of the pueblo, which, as fresh tracks clearly revealed, was the natives' place of refuge. This funnel-like canyon made a very excellent natural stronghold, and according to tradition it had been the home of the Taos Indians in earlier times. On the way a group of plains Apaches appeared. They shook hands in friendly manner, and said that they had been trading with the Taos when Governor Pacheco heard from Picuríes of Vargas' coming, whereupon he and his people had immediately fled into the canyon, to the entrance of which the Apaches had accompanied them.

Vargas went with about fifteen men to plead with Pacheco at the mountain retreat, using Don Juan, the Pecos leader, as interpreter. Pacheco soon appeared with a formidable army of warriors compared to the handful of Spaniards. He sullenly addressed himself to Don Juan, asking him to enter the canyon to talk things over with him; and Don Juan, blind to Vargas' warnings, decided to spend the night in the mountains with Pacheco in order to entreat with him. In the presence of everyone he divested himself of his spurs and powder pouch, put down his cloak, shield, and arquebus, embraced Vargas, and, leaving even his mule behind, went unarmed to join the enemy. Night was falling fast as Vargas returned to where his men were, there to await an answer. Riding back to the encampment by way of the abandoned pueblo, Vargas was met there by a detachment of the men he had left behind, who, fearing foul play, had decided to hasten to his side. The governor was pleased, and after thanking them, he notified them of what had happened. That night was spent under heavy guard.³⁵

Until nine o'clock the following morning Vargas awaited an answer; but neither did his trusted friend Don Juan appear nor was an answer from Pacheco forthcoming. Impatient, Vargas called out one hundred of his men, the soldiers of the presidio and the militia, as well as the chaplains and *cabildo*

³⁵ Vargas' journal, July 3-4, 1694.

members, leaving the rest of the camp to guard the horses, mules, and equipment. In chorus the force cried out: "Blessed be the Holy Sacrament of the Altar!" They then rode to the pueblo. A glance at his watch told Vargas it was eleven o'clock; he spurred his horse, and his men, following double file, kept pace. The entrance to the canyon was reached; the Taos natives had moved farther into the mountain fastness. They had guards posted behind the rocks and thickets dominating the entrance to their natural stronghold. The Spaniards asked for Don Juan, but the rebels answered only with vague and ambiguous phrases. Now, through an interpreter, Vargas told those within hearing distance that he would wait until one hour past noon, and if by then Don Juan and Governor Pacheco did not come out he would order the sacking of the pueblo. After a long wait Vargas again looked at the watch; it was after one o'clock, and the lookouts he had stationed on the high rooftops of the pueblo dwellings reported no one in sight. Making good his threat, the Spanish leader ordered his soldiers to enter the houses. The lower rooms were broken into with an iron crow bar, and until evening the muleteers, who had been called into the pueblo to carry off the spoils, were engaged in loading the mules with a large quantity of maize.³⁶

That night all was still in the direction of the mountain retreat of Taos; but across the canyon leading south to Picuríes a great smoke could be seen in the moonlight. The Spaniards thought the Picuríes were sending up smoke signals assuring the Taos of aid in case of need. Until late into the night the muleteers and others worked incessantly hulling maize to lessen its bulk, while the soldiers kept constant vigil patrolling the camp all night in relays of ten. Throughout the following day smoke signals in increasing numbers could be seen on the mountain tops all around the valley of Taos. Since it was well nigh impossible to transport the heavy loads of grain over the difficult mountain passes by way of Picuríes without great risk of being trapped by the rebels and annihilated, Vargas and the leaders cast about for a safer return route to Santa Fé. Some of the older members of the expedition, old residents of New Mexico who apparently knew whereof they spoke, suggested a

³⁶ *Ibid.*, July 4, 1694.


roundabout route which would delay the succoring of Santa Fé, to be sure, but which would definitely assure the safety of the expedition. The plan was to go directly northward into the Ute country, on the fringes of what is now southern Colorado, then circle to the west and return to the capital by way of the Chama River, thereby evading the enemy completely. The Utes, they were confident, had always been the friends of the Spaniards, and this would be an excellent occasion to renew friendly trade relations. Furthermore, buffalo would be found, which would help provide food for the people, adding a little variety to the everlasting diet of maize preparations.³⁷

Vargas was won over to the plan. Convinced that Santa Fé was secure, since all the dangerous enemies seemed to be occupied in following him, he made preparations for the long, circuitous journey ahead. Late into the night the expedition made ready, the loading of the maize onto the pack animals being a slow and tedious task. Finally, at about one o'clock in the morning, July 7, the expedition set out, supposedly unobserved, taking the road which led due north to the land of the Utes. But the Spaniards scarcely had gone a half a league northward along the edge of the mountains in which the Taos were hidden, when the sight of a low fire signal gave indication of enemy awareness. As a precautionary measure Vargas now ordered that the expedition march in three compact divisions, each one close at the heels of the other: forty soldiers in the vanguard led by the field captain Juan Olguín, followed by the train, camp and food supplies; Vargas and the fighting squadron in the middle, accompanied by the guard of the royal banner, the military leaders, the missionaries, and a flying squadron; and Eusebio de Vargas and thirty soldiers in the rear, guarding the horses and mules.

After travelling about two leagues the little army crossed the Arroyo Hondo. From there it followed a road along the edge of the mountains which was fairly safe because the hills of the region were clear of large trees; torrent beds were frequent, giving relief to the camp. At ten o'clock in the morning of July 7, some five leagues north of the Arroyo Hondo, they came upon fresh tracks of a large troop of Indians from

³⁷ Vargas' journal, July 5-6, 1694.

ROUTE
of the
VARGAS EXPEDITION
INTO COLORADO



the mountains. Immediately Vargas ordered those whose horses were jaded to change mounts. While passing through a deep mountain gorge, they were surprised by an ambush of eighty Taos Indians, five of whom were killed and two captured before they took to flight. From one it was learned that Pacheco, having thirty Indians spying on the Spaniards constantly, had ordered eighty young braves with their war captains to waylay Vargas and kill him. They said that Governor Juan of Pecos was alive but held prisoner. Both of the Indians were absolved by Father Alpuente, one of the chaplains, and executed before a firing squad. The march was resumed to the Colorado River, where the tired army made camp for the night.³⁸

No long rest was granted here, for the confines of the Colorado River were inhabited by the Apaches del Acho, who were the bitter enemies of the Utes. It was, therefore, advisable to depart from this place immediately. After passing through a beautiful country of many fertile river valleys, Vargas pitched camp on the bank of Culebra Creek, nine long leagues north of the Colorado,³⁹ within the borders of the present state of Colorado. The Culebra was followed westward four long leagues to where it emptied into the Río Grande.⁴⁰ At a distance of slightly less than two leagues to the south of this point the river was crossed. From there the expedition passed on four leagues due west to the San Antonio River, just below the mountain from which it derived its name. Here Vargas rested his weary band. No more attractive spot could have been chosen, and the Spaniards, no longer being followed by the enemy, relaxed for the first time in many days. Vargas described the place in glowing terms as a magnificent meadow along a beautiful mountain stream; two leagues beyond lay a spacious valley covered with buffalo. This was a portion of the beautiful San Luis Valley, in southern Colorado.

Camp made, eighty of the men went to hunt elk and buffalo for food. A herd of over 500 buffalo was seen, but they stampeded when they spied the Spaniards; still, fourteen were killed, along with some deer "as large as elk." The next day

³⁸ Vargas' journal, July 7, 1694.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, July 8, 1694.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, July 9, 1694.

was spent in the same fashion. This day Vargas took out one hundred men on the buffalo hunt, but the stampede of the day before had scattered the herd, and the bag of the day was only half as large. Having enjoyed a veritable holiday, nevertheless, Vargas planned to hurry on to Santa Fé early the next morning. All the while, smoke signals had been raised from time to time in the hopes of attracting the attention of the friendly Utes.⁴¹

In the early morning hours of July 12, while the Spaniards were breaking camp, they were attacked by a large band of Utes, armed with bows and arrows and war clubs.⁴² Taken completely off guard, six were wounded before they could gather their wits. The situation was soon under control, however, and when eight Utes had been killed, the others fled across the river.⁴³ From there they waved a buckskin as a flag of peace, recrossed the river, and mingled peacefully as though nothing had occurred. There were almost three hundred of them counting the women. Their apologetic explanation for the attack was quite plausible. They pointed out that before the revolt of 1680 they had been the friends of the Spaniards, but had long been the enemies of the Tewas, Tanos, Picuríes, Jémez, and Keres. During the period of Pueblo Independence these Pueblo enemies had often come to this region, which the Utes considered their own private hunting ground, disguised as Spaniards. Hence the recent misfortune, the result of mistaken identity.⁴⁴ The Spaniards accepted the story in good faith, and the expedition departed with manifestations of friendship on both sides. The Utes were invited to Santa Fé to trade with the Spaniards as had been their custom prior to 1680.

Vargas placed his trust in his faithful Indian guide, who promised a direct short cut to Santa Fé. The San Antonio River was followed in a southwesterly direction some eight leagues to another San Antonio Mountain, just to the east of the river at this point. On July 15, by way of the Ojo Caliente River, the mouth of the Chama River, where it flows into the Río Grande,

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, July 10-11, 1694; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, September 1, 1694.

⁴² Vargas' journal, July 12, 1694.

⁴³ *Ibid.*; Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 210, is incorrect in his statement that the attack was made on the night of the 12th. He is again in error when he states that eight Spaniards were killed.

⁴⁴ Vargas' journal, July 12, 1694.

was reached. San Juan pueblo was only three leagues farther on, and Santa Fé itself only twelve leagues away. The expedition crossed the Río Grande in view of San Juan pueblo, spending the night near the edge of the river a short distance from the enemy-occupied mesa of San Ildefonso.⁴⁵

The next morning the pack train and most of the camp were sent directly to Santa Fé, while Vargas, with forty soldiers, went to reconnoiter the mesa of San Ildefonso. The rebels were still strongly entrenched there, and as the Spanish leader had no desire to provoke a battle, he went on his way, joining the vanguard at Jacona. From there they proceeded directly to Santa Fé, where to his joy Vargas found that the city had experienced peace and quiet during his absence.⁴⁶ But this joy was mingled with great sadness, for he also learned this same day, from Pecos Indians who arrived with glazed earthenware to sell, that Don Juan of Pecos had not yet been heard from by his fellow tribesmen. Had he been treacherously slain at Taos? No one knows, for Don Juan, great and admired friend of the Spaniards, was never heard from again.⁴⁷

From the economic viewpoint the expedition was a real success. The 300 fanegas of grain taken at Taos were turned over to the *cabildo* for distribution among the families. The loss of the Indians in provender was the gain of the Spaniards. Santa Fé could survive, and the position of the Spaniards could be consolidated around the city, only by thus gradually solving the food problem. No more formidable weapon of war could have been used against the hostile Indians than the seizure of their vital grain stores. Every effort was being made to win the hostile Pueblos by peaceful means, and by long months of diplomacy; where this failed, centers of resistance gradually had to be eliminated by force of arms.

⁴⁵ Vargas' journal, July 13-15, 1694.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, July 16, 1694. During the seventeen day excursion Vargas and his courageous band travelled a distance of over 120 leagues. For a detailed account of Vargas' expedition into Colorado, see J. Manuel Espinosa, "Governor Vargas in Colorado," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XI (April, 1936), 179-187; *Idem*, "Journal of the Vargas expedition into Colorado, 1694," *Colorado Magazine*, XVI (May, 1939), 81-90.

⁴⁷ Vargas' journal, July 17, 1694; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, September 1, 1694.

CHAPTER XI

PACIFICATION OF THE PUEBLOS

The sound of military music and the voice of the official crier called all to the public squares of Santa Fé on July 20, 1694. When the sundry inhabitants had gathered, the crier read a proclamation announcing the campaign, long delayed, against the Jémez and their confederates the Keres of Santo Domingo. All were to be in readiness to start on the morrow, with the exception of the guard of the gateway to the villa. The next day, under a hot morning sun, Vargas, with 120 men and all camp attendants and accessories, with chaplains Farfán and Alpuente, sallied forth.¹

The first night was spent at abandoned La Cieneguilla, just beyond the Hacienda del Alamo. At eleven o'clock the next morning, six leagues had been covered over a very rough road, under a burning sun, to Santo Domingo, on the left bank of the Río Grande. In the ruined pueblo the band enjoyed a siesta and food before crossing the river. While at Santo Domingo, a courier arrived from Sia with a written message from Governor Ojeda of Santa Ana, who reported an attack of the previous day on his pueblo by the combined forces of the Keres of Cochití, and the Navahos, in which four allied warriors were slain. The raiders withdrew only after one of their war captains had been killed.² The river was crossed in view of San Felipe pueblo, whither the panicky Ojeda had come to meet the Spaniards. Vargas reassured him, and ordered him to return to his pueblo to organize the warriors of the three allied pueblos, whose services would be necessary in the impending attack upon the well fortified *peñol* of Jémez. After examining the various approaches to the enemy mountain retreat, Var-

¹ Vargas' journal, July 20, 1694. All footnote citations in this chapter are from A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39, and A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140.

² *Ibid.*, July 22, 1694. Santo Domingo was 10 leagues from Santa Fé.

gas passed on to Bernalillo, twelve leagues farther south, there to spend the night.³

Santa Ana was reached on July 23, late in the morning. Here Vargas was feasted and took rest in a room that had been newly built for him,⁴ while an afternoon storm struck the mesa of Jémez. Toward evening the Spaniards advanced to Sia, where the allies of the three friendly Keres pueblos were gathered. Later in the evening all were dispatched to vantage points for an attack; twenty-five soldiers under Eusebio de Vargas, with Indian allies, were stationed at the rear approach to the mesa and *peñol* of Jémez, and the rest, commanded by the Spanish general, took their post at the main approach, which was at the foot of the slope facing the old pueblo of Jémez, a league off in the flat. In this manner the allies remained unobserved until dawn, when the two divisions attacked simultaneously. The mesa was swiftly carried by assault in a short, bloody battle. Only a handful of the rebel warriors escaped, many of them badly wounded;⁵ eighty-four lost their lives: seventy in battle, five burned inside their houses, seven who hurled themselves over the cliff, and two captured warriors, a Jémez and an Apache, who were executed before a firing squad.⁶ About 346 women and children were taken captive.⁷ At sundown Eusebio de Vargas' troop went to spend the night on the mesa to guard the grain in the houses and the newly won position against counter attack. Vargas and the remainder of the soldiers were on vigil at the foot of Jémez mesa. The Spanish leader had returned special thanks to Saint James (Santiago), patron saint of Spain, whose intercession he believed responsible for this "miraculous victory," won on the eve of the saint's feast day.⁸

The next morning Mass was said in the plaza of Jémez pueblo. Afterwards Sergeant Major Antonio Jorge, who had

³ *Ibid.* The *peñol* to which the Jémez people had withdrawn was 3 leagues from their original pueblo (*Ibid.*, August 11, 1694).

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1694.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 24, 1694.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *auto de remisión*, September 1, 1694.

⁷ *Ibid.*; Vargas' journal, July 24, 1694. Some horses and 172 sheep were taken, 106 of which were turned over to the governor of Sia, in order that he keep them for the missionary later to be designated for that pueblo.

⁸ *Ibid.*

fought brilliantly in the recent assault, was sent to the mesa-top with fifty or more young Indian prisoners, and pack animals, ordained to the tedious task of bringing down the large quantities of grain found there. Two loads of grain were dispatched without delay for the relief of Santa Fé. By nightfall 110 sacks of unshelled maize were brought down the steep slope of the mesa to the abandoned pueblo below, where it was hulled in one of the houses which had been swept out for the purpose. And this went on for over a week.⁹ The extremely large supply of grain which the natives had carried in vain to the top of the recently conquered mesa, over 500 fanegas, presented a difficult transportation problem. It would take at least two months to carry down all the grain from the mesa, not to mention its transportation to Santa Fé, twenty-five leagues away. To avoid unnecessary delay Vargas requested Farfán, procurator general of the custodia in charge of the wagon train at Santa Fé, to permit him to bring the wagons as far as the ford in the river facing San Felipe pueblo, at which point the grain could be loaded on the wagons from pack animals and from there carried on to Santa Fé. When Farfán agreed to place fourteen wagons at the disposal of the governor, Captain Eusebio de Vargas and the venerable procurator general, escorted by twenty soldiers and accompanying pack animals laden with maize, now made ready to hasten to Santa Fé to obtain the wagons.¹⁰

They were fully armed and mounted, and about to leave, when several shots were suddenly heard from the *peñol* atop the mesa. This halted the departure. Immediately, Vargas ordered the horsemen to the aid of the mesa guard. About an hour later the soldiers returned from the *peñol* bringing prisoner a war captain of the rebellious Keres pueblo of Santo Domingo. It turned out that the Santo Domingo Indian leader just captured had been wounded in the recent foray, his right shoulder and elbow bruised and one leg badly damaged, and dragging himself to safety, he had hidden among the rocks near the top of the mesa after his escape. But crazed with thirst he

⁹ *Ibid.*, July 25-26, 1694. Two trips were made daily, one in the morning, and one in the afternoon.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, July 26, 1694.

had dragged himself to the top under the delusion that it was unoccupied, and since it was occupied by a guard of thirty soldiers, he had been easily captured. The Indian was brought before the governor and questioned. He told where the Indians had gone: to Taos, to Cochití, and a few to join Navahos. He promised to show the Spaniards where the natives of Santo Domingo had hidden their maize and the location of nine *coscomates*, or maize caches, and hence his life was spared. But more careful precautionary measures had to be taken. Sentinels were posted everywhere and the guards were strengthened. Although that night was passed without disaster, a muleteer standing guard at one of the entrances to the pueblo was seriously wounded by the arrow of an enemy spy.

The following day, July 27, Eusebio de Vargas and his squadron finally departed for Santa Fé.¹¹ The recently defeated natives and the allies busily employed in carrying the heavy loads of maize down the steep *peñol* completed their chore on August 2.¹² Nearly half of it was given to the Indian allies who had participated in the enterprise. Then the houses on the *peñol* were burned and razed as an example to the other rebels. When, next day, Eusebio de Vargas returned, he left the wagons at the river crossing, where they were loaded with 240 fanegas of maize, and sent to Santa Fé under the direction of the majordomo of the wagons, along with the captives, 346 in all, and an escort of twenty soldiers.¹³ Governor Vargas now went with forty soldiers and sixty allies to Santo Domingo in search of the hidden maize reported by the wounded captive; but the report proved to be a hoax, and the captive was shot.¹⁴

Vargas remained to search for the bones of Fray Juan de Jesús, one of the martyrs of 1680. A certain Indian woman and a boy said that the body was buried near the *estufa*, or kiva, in the main square of the old Jémez pueblo. The directions

¹¹ Vargas' journal, July 27, 1694.

¹² *Ibid.*, July 24 to August 2, 1694. It took nine days to carry down all of the maize.

¹³ *Ibid.*, August 5-8, 1694. It seems that the wagons were at this time brought to a place out on the flat one league from the mesa, to which point the maize was carried on pack animals from the foot of the *peñol*, a task which was described as most difficult and tiring.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, August 4, 1694. The round trip from Jémez was 8 leagues.

were true, and the martyr's remains were unearthed. The skeleton was short of stature, and certain other known features still visible, such as a bald head and small nose, convinced all of those present that these were the remains of the missionary. An arrowhead was embedded in the spine, behind the shoulders, a part of the colored arrow still attached, and rotted fragments of a brown garment were found.¹⁵ On August 10 Vargas was back in Santa Fé. The venerated bones of Father Jesús were wrapped in silk and placed in a box in Vargas' own room. The key to the box was turned over to Father Juan Muñoz de Castro, the vice-custodian.¹⁶ On the following day the remains were buried in the chapel which served as parish church for the presidio, next to the main altar on the gospel side. Vargas and all the soldiers and settlers were present at the solemn religious ceremony. The record of the discovery of the bones was then turned over to the missionaries to be placed in the archive of the custodia.¹⁷

Five days later, on August 16, Captain Antonio Jorge arrived at the capital with the main part of the army. He brought with him two Jémez rebels who had come out to meet him carrying a cross near San Felipe, and offering submission in the name of the recently defeated Jémez. Their governor, they said, had not come to sue for peace because he had sustained a broken leg in the recent battle. Seventy-two men and women had escaped at the time of the assault. More important, they further stated that a certain Diego, one of the native leaders most responsible for the rebellious attitude of the Jémez people, would be brought by them before the Spanish governor. Vargas dealt with them diplomatically, and told them that if they rebuilt their church and reoccupied their pueblo at old Jémez, and renewed their vassalage to Spain and the Catholic Church, he would restore to them their women and children, and pardon them of all past offenses.¹⁸ Ten days later sixteen Jémez leaders, fulfilling their promise, arrived at the capital with the In-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, August 8, 1694; *auto de remisión*, September 1, 1694; *auto*, Santa Fé, August 11, 1694.

¹⁶ Vargas' journal, August 10, 1694.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, August 11, 1694. Father Juan de Jesús was a native of Granada, in Andalusia.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, August 16, 1694; *auto de remisión*, September 1, 1694.

dian leader named Diego. His life was spared on the intercession of the missionaries, the Pecos allies, and the Jémez leaders who had brought him, and his sentence was commuted to ten years' labor in the mines of New Vizcaya. These Jémez leaders promised to do as they had been ordered, and were given four carpenters' hatchets and four hoes to facilitate their work. They were also allowed to visit their women and children who were in captivity. Vargas now consented to restore these captives on condition that the Jémez first prove their loyalty by aiding him in a campaign to bring the natives on the mesa of San Ildefonso to terms. Upon the return to the capital from this proposed expedition, a missionary would be selected to be stationed at Jémez, and he would take the native Jémez people (the *chusma*) with him.¹⁹

The Jémez leaders agreed, so Vargas immediately made definite plans for the expedition. One half of the Jémez warriors should join him in the campaign, the other half should stay behind to protect their pueblo. Vargas then gave them a cord with five knots, signifying that in five days he expected these warriors to be on hand. All was done in secrecy. The campaign was postponed several days, however, on the request of Pecos, for some Apaches had just arrived from the plains to trade. A number of Spaniards went to Pecos to join in the trading, although prohibited absolutely the use of horses as a medium of exchange.²⁰ Meanwhile, to the viceroy Vargas sent his usual lengthy reports on recent events and developments, along with copies of his campaign journals. Among other things he repeated that his agent Juan Páez Hurtado was having great difficulty in attempting to gather colonists for New Mexico, a project which the viceroy had authorized, but which was apparently receiving no cooperation from the royal authorities at Zacatecas and other places on the northern frontier.²¹

Vargas was now ready to strike the decisive blow against the Tewas and Tanos and their confederates, all of whom were

¹⁹ Vargas' journal, August 26, 1694; *auto de remisión*, September 1, 1694.

²⁰ Vargas' journal, August 28, 1694.

²¹ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, September 1, 1694, and Vargas' journal, September 2, 1694.

concentrated on the mesa of San Ildefonso. The public proclamation was made on September 1. With all his available force, including one hundred and fifty warriors from Jémez, Pecos, and the three friendly Keres pueblos, he marched on September 4 to assault the mesa, by way of Tesuque, Cuyamungué, Jacona, and San Ildefonso. At two o'clock in the afternoon the mesa came in view. Scarcely did the enemy see the allied forces approaching when they commenced their usual hostile shouting. Vargas ordered the assault. For more than three or four hours the enemy kept the allies at bay with a storm of stones, darts, arrows, and other missiles. Eleven Spaniards were wounded, including the valiant soldier Antonio Jorge: an arrow passed through the fleshy part of his right arm. Vargas and his men now withdrew to the edge of the Río Grande at the west end of the mesa. After a short lull, at seven o'clock in the evening, a second assault was made. In this engagement two of the allies were slain, two others wounded. As it was already late, the battle was brought to a close, and the Spaniards retired to their camp for the night. The wounded were sent to Santa Fé the following morning, with a message ordering immediate reinforcements.²²

The rebels had planted their fields in the river valley. Therefore, besieging them on the mesa would cut them off from their foodstuffs, which Vargas decided to use for his troops. When, however, Sergeant Juan Ruiz was espied moving toward the fields with some twenty mules, the provoked enemy charged down the slope, and engaged their foe for two full hours in a skirmish, losing two braves. For several days the Spaniards followed these tactics, hoping to starve the mesa people into submission.

In the midst of battle Vargas found time to write to the viceroy, outlining the needs of his troops and of his colonists. Of the twelve quintals of powder that Farfán had brought up, ten were already used up. Vargas asked for twelve more from Parral. Furthermore, Farfán had not brought any lead, as the viceroy's orders had called for. To satisfy the needs of

²² *Ibid.*, September 4-5, 1694. The two killed were a Spaniard, named Francisco de Santiago, and a mulatto of La Puebla, named Sebastián Luis.

the colonists Vargas put in the following order: 2,000 varas of flannel cloth; 2,000 varas of fine cloth; 1,000 varas of blue woolen cloth; 2,000 blankets from Villalta; 500 campeches; 2,000 varas of flowered linen; 2,000 varas of wide sack cloth; 1,000 varas of wide chapaneco; 100 dozen men's leather shoes; 150 dozen women's shoes; 50 rolls of Brittany linen; 12 spools of sewing silk; 80 spools of buttonhole silk; 20 skeins of maguey fibre; 30 dozen hats; 100 dozen pairs of men's stockings; 100 dozen pairs of women's stockings; 150 gross of silk buttons; 20 dozen women's shawls from Guachinango and Misteca; 12 spools of assorted ribbons; 50 rolls of goat hair cloth; 50 rolls of mitanes; 30 rolls of camel hair cloth; 20 packs of soap from La Puebla; 200 bars of crude soap; the necessary blankets in which to distribute these articles; and 300 pesos worth of medicine for the wounded and the sick. Also, the viceroy was asked to pay the representative of General Antonio de la Campa of Sombrerete 4,715 pesos in return for 1,070 head of livestock purchased by Hurtado and already driven up to El Paso.²³

Meanwhile, on seeing their ripening maize being consumed by the Spaniards, the wrath of the confederates knew no bounds. On September 7, at nine o'clock in the morning, they made a surprise rush upon the sentinels; but soldiers dashed against them, and they were repulsed after an hour's skirmish in which they suffered six killed and many wounded. One of Vargas' Indian allies scalped an enemy warrior, and he and his native companions joined in a war dance, accompanied by war songs, around the victim's dead body, to celebrate the feat. A careful vigil was kept that night, with the camp heavily guarded.²⁴

Vargas' strategy proved successful, for the enemy confederates soon became discouraged. At seven o'clock in the morning of the following day, when all was deathly silent in the direction of the mesa, one of the rebel leaders suddenly came down from the natural stronghold to sue for peace. An advance guard immediately relayed the news to Vargas, who laid down the terms of surrender. The confederates, many of whom

²³ Vargas to the viceroy, San Ildefonso, September 6, 1694; *Idem to idem*, San Ildefonso, September 7, 1694. The words *campeches*, *chapaneco*, and *mitanes* refer to different kinds of cloth.

²⁴ Vargas' journal, September 7, 1694.

hove into view at various points on the rim of the mesa, were timid and afraid; so Vargas went to the foot of the mesa with his leaders, the *alférez* carrying the royal banner, and unarmed he hailed them in a friendly manner. They answered "Glory to the Blessed Sacrament!" in the Spanish fashion. Seeing how pleased the Spaniards were with their salutation, they began to come down unarmed to where Vargas was, there to be met with outstretched arms and embraces. In this manner an important Spanish victory was won. The natives promised to become faithful Spanish subjects and good Christians, and gave Vargas trifling gifts of buffalo robes, buckskins, and elk skins to appease his displeasure. The leaders promised to come down and discuss matters more fully the following morning. Vargas wrote in his campaign journal:

I called them my children, and told them how much it had grieved me, the other time that I had come, to learn that they had not then made the resolve which they now made on this day. [I told them] that they should be very devout, for this day was the feast of the Nativity of Our Lady, and that she had been in sorrow over them, for she was Our Mother and judge; and I ordered the royal *alférez* to show them Our Lady of Remedies, whose image was on the royal banner. I assured them before the image of said Divine Lady, and by the Holy Cross of the rosary, that, in the name of His Majesty the King, I fully pardoned them and all those who were living on the mesa. All of the people were viewing this momentous scene. Lastly, I told them I had buried beneath the soil all that they had done, and that from this day forward they should always remember what they had done this day, which was to promise me that they would again live as Christians and be very obedient subjects of His Royal Majesty.²⁵

True to their word, the Indian leaders appeared at Vargas' tent at the time specified. The people on the mesa had their fields in scattered localities, and they asked permission to remain on the mesa until after winter, as it would be difficult to rebuild their homes at this time. But Vargas answered that he could neither offer full pardon nor lift the siege till all the pueblos were reoccupied. The leaders begged for fifteen days, and Vargas finally consented to an extension of eight days, by which time all of the pueblos must be reoccupied without exception. The rebels agreed fully with this stipulation, the siege

²⁵ *Ibid.*, September 8, 1694.

was raised, and during the day many natives came down from the mesa to mingle as friends with the Spaniards. Four arquebuses which they had previously captured were voluntarily surrendered. The camp spent the night at Tesuque, while Vargas and the leaders returned to the capital. By September 10 the Spaniards were all back in Santa Fé.²⁶

Since the Jémez warriors had assisted punctually against the rebels of San Ildefonso mesa, their leaders now asked the return of their people, who had been held in temporary servitude since the battle at the *peñol* of Jémez. In fulfillment of his promise, Vargas turned over to the faithful Jémez their women and children. This act won him great gratitude and brought forth protestations of a strengthened loyalty.²⁷ Word of this apparently got around. Several days later the chiefs of Tesuque, Santa Clara, San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, and San Juan came in with seven of fifteen mules missing from Farfán's train; they had been captured by some Keres of Cochití from the Apaches. Vargas "thanked them, and gave them hats, ribbons, and other articles which they value highly."²⁸ The Indian chieftains reported that their people were busy rebuilding the pueblos. Vargas now formally presented them with rods of office, in official recognition of their posts as governors and captains of war of their respective pueblos. After they had taken the oath of office, Vargas invited them to attend Mass at Santa Fé with him the next day, an invitation which they graciously accepted without hesitation.

Thus, after nearly a year of constant warfare, during which time the very survival of the Spanish colony was frequently threatened, New Mexico, except for Picuríes and Taos in the north, and the western pueblos, was at last pacified and permanently reconquered for Spain. The manner in which this was achieved was tangible proof not only of the soundness, but also of the comparative humaneness, of Vargas' Indian policy.

²⁶ Vargas' journal, September 9-10, 1694.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, September 11, 1694.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, September 13, 1694.

CHAPTER XII

REBUILDING MISSIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

A new problem had presented itself at Santa Fé. The colonists had subsisted most of the year just past on maize captured from the surrounding pueblos, Vargas wrote to the viceroy, and this represented an important saving to the royal treasury. But now the Indians of these pueblos were friends, and this method of subsistence was no longer possible; and the colonists had not yet had an opportunity to plant. Maize must be sent from Mexico to carry the settlers through the winter. Vargas was already arranging with Farfán for the transportation of 1,000 fanegas from the valley of Parral, purchased from Diego de Maturana, the cost of which was estimated at 3,000 pesos. For this he asked that funds be provided.¹ Meanwhile, Granillo was being sent to New Vizcaya with orders to purchase 3,000 fanegas of maize. There was no sense in depriving the natives further of their badly needed maize, and arousing feelings of bad faith.²

In spite of the dire needs experienced by the soldiers, settlers, and missionaries during these early days, steady progress was being made in laying the foundations for the firm and permanent habitation of New Mexico. With the pacification of the Indian natives of the vicinity of Santa Fé, the abandoned pueblos were reoccupied, missions were reestablished, and plans were made for the reoccupation and redevelopment of farms and ranches. On a two day tour of inspection of the newly submitted pueblos, beginning September 17, Vargas witnessed crosses set up at Tesuque and Nambé, houses rapidly being remodelled, and reoccupations going on. Near the small river running by Nambé, an Indian was found peacefully pasturing

¹ Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Galve, Santa Fé, September 15, 1694. In this chapter, unless otherwise specified, all footnote references to Vargas' journal, and to reports and correspondence to and from the viceroy and other officials in Mexico City, are from A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 140, and S.F.A.

² Vargas' journal, September 20, 1694. From later evidence, it would appear that some of the settlers were not as one with Vargas in this praiseworthy attitude, but instead were concerned only with their own economic plight.

his goats. He greeted Vargas with the words: "Glory be to the Blessed Sacrament!" Seventeen people were already living at the pueblo. The situation was much the same at San Lázaro and San Cristóbal. In each place Vargas took formal possession in the usual manner, raising the royal standard and crying out three times: "Long live the King, Don Carlos the Second, may God spare him, King of Spain and of all this kingdom and its lands and pueblos, and these natives who are his vassals!"³ The soldiers then flung their hats high into the air, and the Indians joined in the celebration, tossing their blankets into the air in like fashion. The following day saw the formal submission, pardon, and repossession of San Juan, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Jacona, and Cuyamungué, where the natives were busily reoccupying their homes or working in the fields.⁴

The province was now considered sufficiently pacified for the distribution of the missionaries, the rebuilding of the missions, and the reestablishment of political jurisdictions (*alcaldías*). When, on September 11, the vice-custodian, Father Muñoz de Castro, was presented with a petition signed by the eight missionaries (the others had withdrawn to El Paso) requesting, in view of the coming of peace, that they be assigned to Indian missions, plans were soon put into operation.⁵ Two days later, Vargas and the vice-custodian, accompanied by an escort of presidial soldiers, left Santa Fé with the four missionaries selected for Pecos, San Felipe, Sia, and Jémez. At Pecos Father Diego Zeinos was left as missionary and Sergeant Major Francisco de Anaya Almazán as *alcalde mayor*, and the local Indian officials of the pueblo, after having been freely elected by their own people, were formally and ceremoniously given rods of office: the governor, the lieutenant-governor, two *alcaldes*, the *alcaide*, the *alguacil*, four church fiscals, and nine captains of war. These formalities were to be performed in essentially the same manner in all the other pueblos. Vargas

³ Vargas' journal, September 17, 1694.

⁴ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1694.

⁵ *Parecer* of the religious of New Mexico, Santa Fé, September 22, 1694, signed by Antonio Carbonel, Jerónimo Prieto, José Díez, Francisco de Jesús María, Francisco Corvera, Juan Alpuente, Antonio de Obregón, and Diego Zeinos. B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 7; Vargas' journal, September 20, 1694.

urged the Pecos to hasten the rebuilding of their church, and they promised to comply with his request.⁶

Father Antonio Carbonel was left at San Felipe on September 26,⁷ and next day Father Juan de Alpuente took up residence at Sia, having Santa Ana as a *visita*.⁸ In each place temporary chapels and humble but spacious headquarters for the missionaries were constructed. At San Diego de Jémez, to which Father Francisco de Jesús was assigned, the natives had set up a beautiful cross and a stone altar in the center of the square.⁹ Universal manifestations of loyalty and obedience were given in each place to Vargas and the missionaries, especially in the three long-loyal pueblos of San Felipe, Santa Ana and Sia.¹⁰ At Santo Domingo, two days later, on the way back to Santa Fé, the Keres leader El Zepe of Cochití, accompanied by his war veterans, came out to render obedience.¹¹

Back in Santa Fé, natives from the surrounding pueblos were trading their produce with the settlers and mingling as the best of friends. Runners were now sent to San Ildefonso, San Juan, and San Cristóbal to tell the governors of these pueblos to be ready to receive their missionaries.¹² Those of Tesuque, Cuyamungué, and Pojoaque were to be designated when the rest of the missionaries should arrive from El Paso,¹³ where four had withdrawn earlier in the year, with the custodian, to await the termination of the wars, or to recover from illness.¹⁴

Father Francisco Corvera assumed his duties at San Ildefonso on October 5; Jacona was his *visita*. The installation of the local Indian officials was carried out that evening at San

⁶ *Ibid.*, September 24, 1694.

⁷ *Ibid.*, September 26, 1694. Later stationed at Cochití and Taos.

⁸ *Ibid.*, September 27, 1694. A *visita* was an Indian pueblo or settlement, with its church or chapel, where services were performed, but without a resident missionary, and administered from a regular mission establishment. During the absence of the missionary, daily prayers, etc., were under the direction of designated Indian *fiscales*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1694.

¹⁰ At each place, as elsewhere, the local Indian leaders were officially invested in office, and the people were reminded to be respectful to their missionary, to obediently assist at prayers morning and evening, and attend Mass regularly.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, September 30, 1694.

¹² *Ibid.*, October 2, 1694.

¹³ *Ibid.*, October 7, 1694.

¹⁴ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, October 8, 1694.

Ildefonso, where Vargas spent the night. On the 6th Father Jerónimo Prieto was left at San Juan, also temporarily in charge at Santa Clara, and Father Antonio Obregón at San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, with residence at the former.¹⁵ At each pueblo, with the exception of San Cristóbal, where the natives happened to be working in the fields, the native civil officers were officially inducted. Vargas could now notify the viceroy of the final pacification of New Mexico, after a continuous war of nine months. Missionaries were carrying on their regular functions in seven missions, not counting Santa Fé, and others were waiting to be established upon the return of several of the missionaries from El Paso.¹⁶ The loyalty of the Pecos Indians even led Father Zeinos to petition Vargas for special privileges for his pueblo, and the governor sent the request on to the viceroy.¹⁷

Late in October the Junta de Hacienda in Mexico City decided upon Vargas' letters and reports of the month prior, in which the governor of New Mexico had asked for considerable aid in the form of maize, articles of clothing, medicine, and ammunition. There had been a slip somewhere in carrying out the orders with regard to the sending of bullets, and they were ordered sent immediately. One hundred pesos were granted for the purchase of lead at Santa Rosa or Casas Grandes; the powder, and medicine, too, were granted. Don Antonio de la Campa, or his agent, was to be paid 4,715 pesos at Sombrerete or Zacatecas for the purchase of 1,070 head of livestock already in the hands of Vargas' agent Hurtado; Hurtado was to be aided to assemble families of Parral, Sombrerete, Zacatecas, and Durango, and given the necessary sums at the royal treasuries in these localities, especially at Zacatecas and Sombrerete, the only places where he was having success in enlisting families. The articles of clothing asked for were considered an unnecessary expenditure and could not be supplied. Vargas was warned thenceforth to send full testimony to the viceroy before

¹⁵ Vargas' journal, October 6-7, 1694.

¹⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, October 8, 1694.

¹⁷ Father Diego Zeinos to Vargas, Pecos, October 14, 1694. Vargas answered that he would notify the viceroy, and did so (Vargas to Father Zeinos, Santa Fé, October 14, 1694, and Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, October 14, 1694).

assuming the authority to mete out capital punishment to rebels.¹⁸ These decisions were sent by courier to Vargas.¹⁹

In the meantime, Father Francisco de Vargas, the newly appointed vice-custodian of New Mexico, arrived at Santa Fé with the four friars from El Paso, and new missions were re-established.²⁰ Father José Díez, pastor at Santa Fé since his recent arrival, was assigned to Tesuque, and Father Muñoz de Castro replaced him at the villa, with Father Antonio Moreno as his companion.²¹ Toward the middle of November Governor Vargas and the new vice-custodian made a tour of inspection of the various missions, during which two new missionaries were placed, Father José García Marín at Santa Clara, and Father Díez at Tesuque.²² Two weeks later Father Antonio Carbonel was established at Cochití, having been transferred from San Felipe, and Father Miguel Trizio was assigned to Santo Domingo.²³ On November 28 Vargas returned to

¹⁸ Report of the Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, October 27, 1694; see also report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, October 25, 1694.

¹⁹ The viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, October 27, 1694.

²⁰ Vargas' journal, November 1, 1694. Father Salvador de San Antonio, in charge at Santa Fé prior to his departure, had returned to El Paso on Palm Sunday past. Father Vargas now became vice-custodian, replacing Father Juan Muñoz de Castro, commissary of the Holy Office, whom Father Salvador had left in that capacity at the time of his departure. For biographical data on Muñoz de Castro, who had served in the El Paso district from 1680 to 1693, see Certifications of the services of Fray Juan Muñoz de Castro, El Paso, June 28, 1692, and April 22, 1694, B.N.M., legajo 4.

²¹ Vargas' journal, November 5, 1694. Father Díez had been active in Mexico prior to his service in New Mexico. He spent three years in New Mexico, after which time he was recalled to the Franciscan college at Querétaro, later serving in important posts in his order. There is a biographical sketch of Díez in Fr. Juan Domingo Arricivita, *Crónica Seráfica y Apostólica del Colegio de Propaganda Fide de la Santa Cruz de Querétaro en la Nueva España*, segunda parte, Mexico, 1792, 189-206.

²² Vargas' journal, November 13-14, 1694. García Marín, although American born, was preaching in the province of Burgos, Spain, when he learned that missionaries were needed in Texas. He returned to America as a volunteer to work in that mission field, but he soon learned that Texas had been abandoned. Shortly after his arrival there was a call for volunteers for New Mexico, and he offered his services and was accepted. Fray José García Marín to the custodian, Santa Clara, December 31, 1694, B.N.M., legajo 3.

²³ Vargas' journal, November 27-28, 1694. Trizio is also spelled Tirso in the documents. Father Antonio del Corral was designated by the father vice-custodian to take the place of Father Carbonel at San Felipe.

Santa Fé to attend to other matters, while the father vice-custodian, accompanied by a squad of ten soldiers, continued his visitation of the missions.

Before describing the new missions reestablished in the closing months of the year 1694, let us review for a moment their place in the general picture. In the seventeenth century New Mexico was first and last a frontier in the eyes of missionaries and civil authorities. The Franciscan Custodia of the Conversion of Saint Paul, in New Mexico, had attained great success prior to 1680. Indeed, the work of the custodia came to dominate the scene in the middle seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the custodia was never raised to the status of a province.²⁴ Until the end of the Spanish period it was to remain, as in the beginning, a custodia, under the jurisdiction of the Franciscan Province of Santo Evangelio in Mexico. The province of Santo Evangelio was the oldest on the mainland of the New World. The Franciscans had begun their work of conversion on a grand scale with the arrival of the so-called "Twelve Apostles" in 1524 in Mexico City. In that year the Custodia of Santo Evangelio was organized. In 1535 it was elevated to the rank of a province. Later other custodias were founded by the province of Santo Evangelio, many of these eventually to grow into strong mission fields, and become independent provinces themselves, and the creators of new custodias.

The attitude of the government toward the missions and the policies of the Friars Minor were in a period of transition during the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico. The trend toward secularization was already manifesting itself in the definite supremacy of the civil authority in all of the affairs of the province. In the relations between Church and State prior to 1680, the custodian was, next to the governor, the most powerful personage in New Mexico, and in some cases he was in reality more influential than the governor. This situation came to an end in 1680. At the same time the influence of the custodia was now greatly diminished, as changes were taking place in the organization of Franciscan missionary activity. Prior to this time the work of the missions was directed exclu-

²⁴ For a good description of the administrative organization of the Franciscans, see Scholes, "Problems in the Early Ecclesiastical History of New Mexico," *passim*.

sively by the eighteen provinces of the order throughout Spanish America, and their custodias and convents. But now the era of the apostolic colleges, or Franciscan seminaries, was beginning. In 1683 the missionary college *de Propaganda Fide* of Santa Cruz de Querétaro was founded.²⁵ This was the first of the great missionary colleges, whence zealous missionaries set out to convert the natives on the various Indian frontiers. These missionary colleges were to dominate the missionary field in the eighteenth century. During the period of the reconquest of New Mexico these transitional developments were all manifest. In the mission field, it appears that at this time the custodian usually dealt directly with the Father Commissary of the order in New Spain, rather than with the provincial, in important matters. The Franciscan missionaries now laboring in New Mexico were recruited both from the convents of the province, and from the newly established College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro.

The work of conversion among the New Mexico pueblos still presented most of the problems and difficulties characteristic of a new frontier. This the Friars Minor well knew from the bitter lessons of nearly a century of previous effort. The Pueblos were a sedentary people, and in this sense they were easier to deal with than the usual nomadic tribes of the frontier; but they had an equally narrow view of their place in society. Theirs was a primitive, isolated existence in the social and economic spheres, in which they were satisfied to remain. In great part because of their many years of sedentary localism, they were steeped in ancient pagan superstitions and nature-worship that many of them refused to give up at any price. They had no predilection for a more ordered and broader social world, built on the principles of Christianity, which constituted the basis of Western European civilization. This had been amply proved by the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. And yet the Spanish missionaries, with the cooperation of the civil authorities—not in the nineteenth century, with its new humanitarianism, but in the seventeenth century, as in the Spanish colonies of the century previous—were sincerely attempting to apply

²⁵ Francis Borgia Steck, O.F.M., "Los Colegios Misioneros Franciscanos en la América Española," *Ensayos Históricos Hispano-americanos*, Mexico, 1940, 59-64.

the principles of the Bull of Pope Paul III, of 1537, concerning the natives of America, which declared them rational beings, with human rights equal before God with any hidalgo of Spain—the first official declaration of the equality of the colored races with the white. It was no easy task. Over on the Atlantic seaboard Puritan ministers were urging the use of dogs “to hunt Indians as they do Bears,” for the Indians “act like wolves and are to be dealt with as wolves.”²⁶

At the close of the year 1694, Father Vargas sent out a letter to the missionaries now established at the various missions, requesting information on the progress thus far attained among the newly reduced tribes.²⁷ The missionaries were at this time distributed as follows: Francisco Corvera at San Ildefonso, José García Marín at Santa Clara, Juan Alpuente at Sia and Santa Ana, Juan Antonio del Corral at San Felipe, Miguel de Trizio at Santo Domingo, José Díez at Tesuque, Antonio Carbonel at Cochití, Jerónimo Prieto at San Juan de los Caballeros (or, de los Teguas), Diego Zeinos at Pecos. The native population of the various mission establishments and *visitas* was as follows: San Ildefonso, 188, and the *visita* of Jacona, forty; Santa Clara, 249; Sia, 279, and Santa Ana, 168; San Felipe, 240; at Santo Domingo about twenty persons usually attended Mass, most of the natives still residing on the mesa of San Juan de Jémez; Tesuque, 183, with many of the natives still residing elsewhere; Cochití, 500; San Juan de los Caballeros, 172; Pecos, 736.²⁸

²⁶ Frederick J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, New York, 1920, 45. See also Lewis Hanke, “Pope Paul III and the American Indians,” *Harvard Theological Review*, XXX (April, 1937), 65-102. Here, as in his *The First Social Experiment in America*, Cambridge, 1935, Hanke is aware that Paul III was but reaffirming “the official Christian doctrine of the spiritual equality of all men,” but much of his discussion is built on a false conception of the spiritual and material aspects of the equality in question.

²⁷ *Carta Patente*, Fray Francisco de Vargas to the religious, Santa Fé, December 20, 1694, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 8.

²⁸ These autograph reports are filed in B.N.M., legajo 3, doc. 6. The authors, and date and place of writing, are as follows: Corvera, San Ildefonso, December 27; García Marín, Santa Clara, December 31; Alpuente, Sia and Santa Ana, December 28; del Corral, San Felipe, December 30; Trizio, Santo Domingo, December 27; Díez, Tesuque, December 22; Carbonel, Cochití, December 26; Prieto, San Juan de los Caballeros, December 26; Zeinos, Pecos, December 28; Muñoz de Castro, Santa Fé, January 4, 1695. See also Father Vargas’ résumé of the above letters, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 6.

The reports of the missionaries gave evidence of real progress, although the attitude of the Indians varied in the different pueblos. Corvera, at San Ildefonso, spoke proudly of his flock, who knew their prayers, frequented the sacraments, and attended *doctrina* twice daily without fail. Each noon the children gathered in front of the church to pray. A number of Christian marriages had been solemnized, and illicit ones ended. He proudly described the mission church, which was well built and decorated, and could accommodate three hundred people. He had four sacristans, one of whom served Mass, and a choir of six singers. Daily, at noon and evening, the natives brought him *tortillas*, and whenever they went hunting, they did not fail to present him with quail, rabbits, and buffalo meat. On the last day of the church year the natives celebrated in the plaza and church, presenting him with a gift of twelve *costales* of maize, four of piñon, fish, and vegetables, sufficient food for all of Advent. Diez, at Tesuque, told how in the evenings the Indian governor of that pueblo was teaching Christian doctrine to his children. The natives of Santa Clara and San Lázaro were also well versed in doctrine.

In general, the Indians were responding to the efforts of the missionaries, a few receiving baptism and Christian marriage, all having adequate chapels with living quarters for the friars. More beautiful new mission churches were under construction. At Santa Ana the destroyed church was being rebuilt. It was the desire of the missionaries to make the church, rather than the *estufa*, the general meeting place of the pueblo community. The ringing of the mission bell called the neophytes to the church morning and evening for prayers and instruction in Christian doctrine. There the natives were instructed by the missionaries and by the natives most proficient in doctrine. The exercises were generally conducted in Spanish. A few of the friars already knew the native language of their wards; the others worked diligently to master the difficult native tongues. The principal prayers taught were the Our Father, the Hail Mary, the Creed, and the *Salve*; and the Commandments and the Sacraments of the Church were explained. No one was excused from these religious instructions, and those who were absent without a good reason were subject to

public penance or, in more serious cases, a lashing by their own native fiscal. It is perhaps not out of place to repeat here that contrary to the general belief, the natives were not hastily baptized, but were first instructed. Some adults who were willing, but had many doubts, underwent long instruction before the Sacrament was administered to them.

The Pueblo Indians were not averse to regular habits of industry, for they were by now accustomed to tilling the land, and tending their sheep, swine, chickens, and livestock. They also cultivated the fields and tended the sheep and livestock of the mission. But the poverty of the struggling new mission establishments was a serious hindrance to the effective work of the missionaries. A shortage of crops would force missionaries to use their own small allowance provided by the king to help their impoverished wards. They kept, under lock and key, a small supply of chocolate, tobacco, and other imported goods, which they distributed in small quantities as gifts to the most deserving Indians, as incentives to self-control, diligence, obedience, and Christian living.

In some of the pueblos the missionaries were having serious difficulty in stamping out the open practice of pagan rites. Corvera reported from San Ildefonso: "As you know, in all the plazas of the pueblos there are some stones where they offer ground maize and feathers, mixing this with many superstitions in order to ask for water and other things." Such piles of rocks were removed at San Ildefonso, Cuyamungué, and Tesuque. At San Juan de los Caballeros the natives were less tractable. There also they gathered rocks of different colors which they piled up, with a larger pile in the middle, and where they placed offerings of ground maize, *almagre*, feathers, straw, and the like; when admonished, they boldly answered that they had done this since ancient times, and that the attempt to prevent it had been one of the reasons for the uprising of 1680. The chief obstacles to the success of the missions were the open and underground activities of intractable medicine men and their sympathizers, and the depredations of the Apaches, both facilitated by the absence of military protection at the missions; the economic distress, which all were striving to overcome; and the occasional epidemics of small-

pox. The newly established missions were soon to suffer a cruel and disheartening setback; but they weathered the storm, and have survived to this day.

Women and children who during the period of Indian rebellion had been taken captive and distributed as servants among the colonists and soldiers were now gradually given their freedom, as Vargas had promised, although not without some opposition from their masters. The hostages of Cochití were set free on December 4.²⁹ The Tano and Tewa women held in servitude had their own way of escaping; somehow they got away unnoticed with departing friends and relatives come to visit them. When the governors of the Tewa and Tano pueblos were confronted with the facts, without hesitation they returned forty-five fugitives, thus gratifying Vargas so much that he responded chivalrously by granting them release and a promise of freedom for all shortly. He proposed that in the planting season they be settled on the site of the abandoned pueblo of La Cieneguilla, four to five leagues west of Santa Fé.³⁰ These plans pleased the natives, but created for the governor many bitter foes among the more economically minded colonists. The native governors who had come remained in the capital for the Christmas holidays. As rewards for their loyalty, Vargas ordered cloth cloaks made up for them, and they were given hats and other gifts.³¹

On November 20 the Junta de Hacienda in Mexico City authorized the grant of funds to pay for the 3,000 fanegas of maize for which Vargas had sent Granillo south two months earlier, at the rate of three pesos per fanega, plus freightage. But, resolved the Junta, since the Indians are again in their pueblos, and since the missions are being rapidly reestablished, each of the settlers should be planting and cultivating his plot of land, for the soil was known to be fertile; definitely the only reason why the purchase of maize was being sanctioned at this time was that the Spaniards had been engaged in almost constant war and had had no time to plant their fields. And to make the officials in Mexico City fully aware of the actual

²⁹ Vargas' journal, December 4, 1694.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, December 6, 10, 21, 1694.

³¹ *Ibid.*, December 21, 1694.

situation in New Mexico, its needs and state of pacification, Vargas was ordered to send to the viceroy a clear and full report on the exact number of pueblos and extent of territory reconquered, a complete census listing the number of Indians pacified, the size of the families, and their occupations. Then, after praising Vargas, and also all the soldiers and settlers, and the Pecos and other Indian allies for their part in the recent victories, the viceroy assured the governor of New Mexico that his glorious achievements in the service of both Majesties, the King and the Church, would be brought to the attention of the Spanish monarch for appropriate reward.³²

Meanwhile, Hurtado was still hard pressed to enlist additional colonists for New Mexico and to obtain the essential financial aid promised by the royal authorities at Mexico City and authorized by viceregal orders of July 16 and October 27 past. To the royal authorities at Zacatecas, Hurtado made his statement. When he left El Paso on June 25, 1694, in pursuance of Governor Vargas' orders, and with the approval of the royal authorities in Mexico City, he had in his employ twenty-one soldiers, four settlers, and twenty-one Indians for the purpose of conducting the cattle from the hacienda of Atotonilco to Santa Fé. The expenses for food and other needs incidental to the carrying out of this task had amounted to 820 pesos, he said, and he was appealing to the Zacatecas authorities for satisfaction, as the royal authorities in Mexico City had authorized; and further he was entitled to payment to cover his expenses while recruiting families, during which task he was supporting as best he could seven soldiers, who up to November 27 had helped him recruit families.³³ The royal treasury at Zacatecas stated that it had no orders from the viceroy to meet these demands in full, but gave him 350 pesos for the time being, in order to facilitate his activities while in that city.³⁴ Hurtado placed the whole question before the

³² Report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, November 20, 1694.

³³ Juan Páez Hurtado to the royal authorities, Zacatecas, December 2, 1694.

³⁴ Report of the royal treasury of Zacatecas, Zacatecas, December 2, 1694; Hurtado to the viceroy, Zacatecas, December 6-7, 1694.

viceroys. He needed money to pay rent for the temporary housing of himself and his aides, and to support the families being assembled.³⁵

The government in Mexico City investigated the whole matter with its customary thoroughness, and all the important records pertaining to the question were brought together and reexamined. All statements checked with the records,³⁶ and consequently, on December 22, the Junta de Hacienda ordered the royal treasury in Zacatecas to pay the 820 pesos, minus the 350 pesos already granted; Hurtado was told to complete the recruiting as soon as possible, and for a period of one month the treasury of Zacatecas should provide quarters for the families already gathered and provide food for the period of their transit to Santa Fé. Hurtado was ordered to enlist no bachelors under any circumstances, as they usually caused trouble.³⁷

As the year 1695 opened, New Mexico was at last laying the foundations of self-sufficiency and permanency. Vargas wrote to the viceroy, "With sails full we forge ahead." Twelve missions had been reestablished, including the one at Santa Fé. The only important pueblos in the upper Río Grande valley still without a missionary were Picuríes and Taos. But thus far all of the colonists were living in Santa Fé and its immediate environs. On the arrival of Hurtado's colonists, Vargas planned, with defensive precaution, to found new settlements. It was hoped that they would arrive in April in time for plant-

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ It was seen that Hurtado, whom Vargas had left as *Justicia Mayor* at El Paso in 1693, was duly authorized by the governor of New Mexico to enlist colonists for Santa Fé in the northern provinces of New Spain, with full official approval in accordance with a viceregal decree of March 26, 1694. Also at the meeting of the Junta of July 11, 1694, Hurtado's appointment had been officially authorized, and repeated viceregal orders had been sent to the authorities at Durango, Parral, Sombrerete, and Zacatecas, requesting the prompt payment of the expenditures of Hurtado and the families under his charge, and also the expenses for the conducting of the families from Parral, or any other properly designated point of departure, to Santa Fé. Record of title to Juan Páez Hurtado empowering him as agent of Vargas to enlist families in the northern provinces of New Spain, Santa Fé, June 5, 1694; viceregal decrees, Mexico City, July 11, July 16, and October 27, 1694.

³⁷ Report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, December 22, 1694; report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, December 16, 1694.

ing.³⁸ On February 14, Hurtado, leading his assembled colonists, moved out of Zacatecas northward bound for Parral and Santa Fé.³⁹

The Spanish stronghold at Santa Fé consisted of a presidio of 100 soldiers with their families, approximately 130 families of settlers, and two missionaries, one of whom was in charge of the local organization of the Third Order of Saint Francis.⁴⁰ Some of the colonists already had ranches assigned to them for occupancy in the summer.⁴¹ All, however, were awaiting the much needed farm implements, many times promised, but still forthcoming. The following Indian pueblos had been placed under the jurisdiction of *alcaldes mayores*: Pecos, Tesuque, Nambé, Cuyamungué, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, Jacona, Santa Clara, San Juan, San Cristóbal, San Lázaro, Picuríes, Taos, Santo Domingo, Cochití, Sia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, Jémez (on the mesa of San Diego), and the pueblo on the mesa of San Juan, nearby that of Jémez, composed of Jémez and Santo Domingo Indians in equal numbers.⁴² In one case, that of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, more than one pueblo was placed under the jurisdiction of a single *alcaldía*. Also an *alcalde* already had been appointed for the proposed mining

³⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 10, 1694.

³⁹ Juan Páez Hurtado to the viceroy, Zacatecas, February 11, 1695. He also had with him 1,000 head of livestock, purchased at the hacienda of Captain Diego de Maturana, near Parral; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 10, 1695. On April 15, 1695, the viceroy ordered that Maturana be paid 5,000 pesos at Durango in compliance with the decisions of the Junta de Hacienda of March 23, 1694; vice-regal decree, April 15, 1695.

Early in March the following long delayed farm implements were finally sent up to New Mexico: 250 plowshares, 250 large axes, 250 hoes, 200 iron spades, 250 large wooden hoes, and 100 locks. It was arranged that these be sent to Parral without delay, and there loaded on Hurtado's wagons. Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, March 1, 1695; factor's report, Mexico City, March 5, 1695; report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, March 11, 1695; report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, April 19, 1695; the viceroy to Vargas, April 19, 1695, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁴⁰ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 10, 1694. Father Antonio Moreno was the chaplain of the Brothers of the Third Order of Saint Francis.

⁴¹ Many of these original Spanish land grants are preserved in the General Land Office at Santa Fé. They are listed in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, *passim*.

⁴² Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 10, 1695.

*Sites of
MISSIONS and TOWNS
Reestablished
1694-1695*



camp to be established at the alleged silver mine of Cerro de San Marcos, six leagues west of Santa Fé, which, the officials hoped, would make up for the disappointing Sierra Azul.⁴³ The eleven pueblos with resident missionaries were Pecos, Tesuque, San Ildefonso (with Jacona as a *visita*), San Juan, Santa Clara, San Lázaro, Santo Domingo, Cochití, San Felipe, Sia (with Santa Ana as a *visita*), and Jémez. Nambé, Pojoaque, Cuyamungué, San Cristóbal, Picuríes, and Taos were not yet with resident clergy. Santa Ana soon was established as a separate mission, under the care of the father vice-custodian himself. With the arrival of additional missionaries expected from El Paso, more missions would be established, making a total of seventeen.⁴⁴ The future looked bright.⁴⁵

Plans went on apace for the reoccupation of the ruined and abandoned Spanish haciendas in the surrounding valleys and arroyos. Luis Granillo, Juan Ruiz de Casares, and Matías Luján, travelling forth for a detailed inspection of the old farms, were to make a map showing all boundaries, confer with the people and distribute the lands.⁴⁶ From March 20 to 23, the official survey of the regions formerly occupied by Spanish settlers north of Santa Fé was made under the direction of Captain Granillo and Sergeant Ruiz de Casares. Riding two leagues north on the road to Tesuque, they inspected the ruined hacienda of Maestre de Campo Francisco Gómez. From there they went on to San Cristóbal and San Lázaro. The following day they travelled from San Lázaro eastward along the Santa Cruz River canyon, formerly the site of numerous Spanish farms and ranches. After having inspected both sides of the *cañada*, or Santa Cruz River valley, as far as Chimayó, the officials turned south, inspecting the region between San Lázaro

⁴³ *Ibid.* Vargas claimed that good silver ore had been found here. He said he would name the mining camp after Viceroy Galve.

⁴⁴ The demand for more missionaries had been considered by the Junta as unwarranted, however, the viceroy stating that those pueblos which were close together could be administered jointly by a single missionary.

⁴⁵ The Jémez were established on San Diego mesa. Most of the Santo Domingo Indians remained on the mesa of San Juan, as a result of which the mission at Santo Domingo was soon to be transferred to the mesa.

⁴⁶ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, March 18, 1695.

and San Ildefonso, where the sites of numerous former haciendas were located and recorded.⁴⁷

San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, it was decided, must be abandoned by their Tano residents, for these pueblos had been built on the foundations of former Spanish settlements. After the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 these Tanos had moved to San Juan from their original pueblos southwest of Santa Fé in order to be closer to their Tewa and Tano allies. Then, just a few years before the return of the Spaniards, they had occupied the sites of which they were now to be deprived. On March 18, Vargas ordered the residents of San Lázaro to reoccupy their communal dwelling at San Juan, which was still standing, and gave them permission to plant at Yunque; and those of San Cristóbal were ordered to betake themselves to Chimayó, known in earlier Spanish days for its vineyards. The Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal petitioned (March 20) to be allowed to cultivate their present fields until the following year, for they had already dug their irrigation ditches. It seems that Vargas did permit the natives of San Cristóbal to remain and harvest crops already planted; but he insisted that they leave the fields as well as their houses immediately afterwards, a very injudicious act, as the friars later pointed out. Most of them finally settled farther up the Chimayó Valley.⁴⁸

By public proclamation of the governor in the two squares of Santa Fé, on April 19 the sixty-six and one-half families brought north by Father Farfán were notified to be ready on the 21st, with all their belongings, to found, on the site just vacated by the Tanos, the Villa Nueva de Santa Cruz de Españoles Mexicanos del Rey Nuestro Señor Carlos Segundo, now commonly known as the town of Santa Cruz, or La Cañada. Being a frontier town, it was given a military government composed of an *alcalde mayor*, a captain of militia, an *alférez*, a sergeant, an *alguacil* and four military squad leaders. Each family was provided with half a fanega of seeds to plant, and

⁴⁷ The former farm sites visited are fully described in Vargas' journal, March 20-21, 23, 1695. These documents may be found in English translation in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 247-251.

⁴⁸ Vargas' journal, March 18-23, and April 23, 1695; proclamation of Governor Vargas, Santa Fé, April 19, 1695. English translations of these documents may be found in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 252-257.

farm implements, and the *alcalde mayor* was provided with firearms, gunpowder, and lead, to be kept in the town armory.⁴⁹

The settlers departed for Santa Cruz on April 21, and next day the new settlement was formally founded on the site of the recently vacated Indian pueblo of San Lázaro.⁵⁰ It was a momentous occasion. In the center of the new villa, near the chapel constructed by the natives of the former pueblo, Vargas ordered the people to form in a semicircle, and accompanied by the *alférez*, who was carrying the royal banner, his lieutenant governor, and his secretary, he called forward the newly selected town officials to take oath of office. These were the Alcalde Mayor and Captain of War, Sergeant Major Antonio Jorge; his lieutenant and militia captain, Sergeant Nicolás Ortiz; *Alférez* José Valdés; Sergeant Manuel Vallejo; *Alguacil* Antonio Godínez; and the four squad leaders José del Valle, Sebastián de Salas, Miguel Fajardo, and Juan de Paz Bustillos. Vargas then granted official possession of the land to the people, the general boundaries of the town being those of the former Tano pueblo. The settlers of the new villa were granted possession of all the ores that might be discovered in the mountains of Chimayó. Father Antonio Moreno was appointed by Father Francisco de Vargas as pastor for the villa, and the parish was officially turned over to him. Then, to seal the ceremony, the *alférez*, accompanied by the civil and military secretary, was sent to the center of the square to repeat the grant of possession to the new residents. He announced to them their duty: to defend the place for the Spanish Crown; and with sword unsheathed he asked if anyone believed otherwise. In one voice all shouted three times:

Long live the King, our Master, may God spare him, Señor Don Carlos the Second, King of the Spains and of all this New World, and of this new villa which is founded in his royal name with the title of Villa Nueva de los Españoles Mexicanos!

Hats were tossed into the air, the people shouted in spirit of jubilee, and three salutes were fired.⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Vargas' journal, April 22, 1695; Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 132, 257-261. Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 213, erroneously gives April 12 as the date.

⁵¹ Vargas' journal, April 22, 1695.

On the following day Vargas left Father Antonio de Acevedo as missionary at Nambé.⁵² By the end of May, Taos and Picurías were peacefully reduced and placed under the charge of the missionaries.⁵³ Of great interest during this time were reports emanating from the Apaches de los Chipaynes, who had come from the east to trade at Picurías, to the effect that some light haired white men had defeated a large nation of Apaches Conejeros who lived farther inland than they, and had then retired. These light haired men were immediately suspected of being Frenchmen.⁵⁴

On May 9 Hurtado and his settlers, forty-four families in all, gathered under the patronage of the viceroy, arrived in Santa Fé. They were lodged in the houses recently vacated by the founders of the new town of Santa Cruz.⁵⁵ Vargas, of course, reported this to the viceroy together with other affairs of his province. When the cattle herd brought by the newcomers was found insufficient,⁵⁶ he got permission of the Junta de Hacienda to obtain 500 more from Durango. He expressed his intention to found a new town with Hurtado's colony, but was frowned down by officials who told him to make his settlements compact for better defense.⁵⁷ The governor was heedless of orders and official fears; without notifying Mexico City he pushed his plans, and by the opening of the year 1696 a mining camp had been established on the site of the former settlement of Los Cerrillos, and a flourishing Spanish town was in existence at Bernalillo, on the Río Grande some eighteen leagues southwest of Santa Fé. Also land had been granted to many enterprising individuals throughout central New Mexico, thereby establishing the titles for later and even present land claims and holdings.

⁵² *Ibid.*, April 23, 1695.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, May 31, 1695.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, May 9, 1695.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Bancroft was completely unaware of this group of colonists; Twitchell gives it no mention in his *Leading Facts*, but makes vague reference to it in his later article, "The Pueblo Revolt of 1696," *Old Santa Fe*, III (October, 1916), 337-338.

⁵⁶ As stated previously, the herd totalled 1,000 when it left Mexico; it appears to have reached its destination without serious mishap. Report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, July 29, 1695; the viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, July 29, 1695.

⁵⁷ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, May 9 and May 27, 1695; the viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, July 29, 1695.

CHAPTER XIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE

The winter of 1695-1696 was one of typical pioneer suffering and hardship, one of New Mexico's "starving times." A great plague of worms and a drought caused crop failures; livestock and sufficient tools to cultivate the soil were both seriously lacking.¹ Petitions of settlers told a sad story. The grain supply was virtually exhausted, and Vargas had sufficient maize only to support the twenty-one poorest families, seventy-nine persons. Many of the others bartered most of their clothing with the Indians for food. The farm implements, which arrived in October, could be put to good use the following spring; but for the moment they were of little help. Conditions came to such a pass that on November 3 representatives of all the colonists appeared before the town council of Santa Fé and demanded aid from Mexico. In their petition they wrote: "We can hardly be called settlers, for we are suffering souls or fantastic beings."² The petition was immediately sent to the viceroy.³ In a report written several years later, and in great part highly colored, since it was written for the express purpose of denouncing Vargas, it is stated that the people were forced to live on dogs, cats, horses, mules, bull hides, foul herbs, and old bones. The report depicted many roaming over the fields almost naked, some hiring themselves to the Indians to carry wood and water and to grind maize, and over two hundred dying of privations.⁴

Seeing the settlers on the verge of starvation, the missionaries distributed, and the soldiers somewhat scattered and without adequate military equipment, some of the native chiefs began to harbor thoughts of another massacre like that of 1680,

¹ Petition of the residents of Santa Cruz to the governor, Santa Fé, September 25, 1695, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

² Petition of the colonists of New Mexico to the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Santa Fé, November 3, 1695, *ibid.*

³ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 4, 1695, *ibid.*

⁴ *Acusación del cabildo*, Santa Fé, 1697, S.F.A.; A.G.N., *Vinculos*, tomo 14.

by which once more they might rid their country of the conquering Spaniards. Their hatred for the invaders smouldered continuously, and the hardships of the Spanish colonists put confidence in their hearts. The causes were fundamentally religious and economic. In December, 1695, the Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, bitter over the loss of their lands, had run away to the mountains; but they were persuaded to return and receive pardon. No revolt took definite shape that year, but there were ominous signs of insurrection. An extremely unfortunate and untimely incident fanned smouldering embers. Father Zeinos accidentally shot and killed an Indian at Pecos. To forestall any further tension, he was replaced by Father Juan Alpuente. Because of the existing conditions Vargas ordered effective enforcement of the law forbidding the sale of arms to Indians.

To complicate matters further, during this time fears of French intrusion from the east were renewed by continual Apache reports. Two Apaches were questioned at Picuríes. Other Apaches who lived farther east than they had told them that some white men had come to "the bank of the water" and made war on the people of Quivira.⁵ Fear of the French danger led Vargas to send records of the investigation to the viceroy with a petition for the following additional military equipment: one hundred lances, four field cannon, twelve quintals of powder, an artilleryman, and a gunsmith.⁶ On receipt of these letters, reports, and petitions at Mexico City, the French danger was the first concern. The Junta de Hacienda decided to aid the colony with all the assistance it demanded. But no military help was actually sent for over a year! As for the colonists, Vargas was authorized to purchase only two hundred head of livestock in the district of Parral. And this statement was added to the records: "This is the last that can be done for them, and let it be thus understood by said gover-

⁵ Luis Granillo to Vargas, Santa Fé, September 29, 1695, Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, October 2, 1695, testimony of the Apaches, Picuríes, October 4, 1695; A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39. The last mentioned *diligencia* was translated into English by F. W. Hodge, "French Intrusion toward New Mexico in 1695," *New Mexico Historical Review*, IV (January, 1929), 72-76.

⁶ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 8, 1695, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 39.

nor."⁷ In a letter of February 6, 1696, the viceroy notified Vargas of these decisions.⁸

Meanwhile, in the closing months of the year 1695, the missionaries, now under the charge of Father Francisco de Vargas, the new custodian, were becoming increasingly aware of the growing discontent showing itself among the Indians. Those stationed at the pueblos, thereby having the best opportunity for knowing the real sentiments of the Indians, reported grave fears to their superior. The suggestion went to the governor to maintain a constant military patrol to safeguard the missions and Spanish settlements.⁹ At this time missionaries were stationed at fifteen Indian missions.¹⁰

During the month of December there were continuous reports of unrest and disorder among the natives. Many signs seemed to bear out the rumor that the Indians planned to murder the missionaries of the pueblos west of the Río Grande on Christmas eve, and so the custodian ordered the missionaries of this region to gather at Sia Christmas eve, and spend the night in prayer. Governor Vargas promised to send there Captain Olguín with fifteen armed men for their protection.¹¹ Nothing happened. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Indians seemed to indicate that the rebellion had miscarried due to its discovery and the precautionary measures. The following months were

⁷ Report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, February 1, 1696, *ibid.*

⁸ The viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, February 6, 1696, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

⁹ *Parecer*, Santa Fé, December 13, 1695, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

¹⁰ Francisco de Vargas at Santa Ana; José Ramírez at San Felipe; Pedro Matta at Sia; Francisco de Jesús María y Casañas at San Diego del Monte de Jémez; Miguel Trizio at San Juan de Jémez; Alonso Jiménez de Cisneros at Cochití; Francisco Corvera at San Ildefonso; José García Marín at Santa Clara; José de Arbizu at San Cristóbal; Jerónimo Prieto at San Juan; José Díez at Tesuque; Antonio Moreno, and later Antonio Carbonel, at Nambé, the latter also at Taos for a time; Juan Alpuente and Domingo de Jesús at Pecos; Blas Navarro at Picuríes; Juan de Zavaleta and Diego de Chavarría (or Echevarría) at Taos. This list does not include Father Antonio Obregón at Santa Cruz, and Father Antonio Acevedo at Santa Fé. These were the missionaries in New Mexico at the close of 1695 and in the opening months of 1696. A number of transfers had been made the year previous, and some of the missionaries were later withdrawn to El Paso prior to the outbreak.

¹¹ *Carta Patente*, Father Vargas to the religious of Santo Domingo, Cochití, San Felipe, Sia, San Diego de Jémez, and San Juan de Jémez, Santa Fé, December 18, 1695, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

tortuous ones for the missionaries. Rumors persisted; the Indians were arrogant except in Governor Vargas' presence, when they craftily pretended to be as meek as lambs, and the missions were gradually becoming completely ineffectual as far as religious teaching was concerned. Corvera, writing from his mission at San Ildefonso, told how on many nights, wrapped in a buffalo robe, he crept to the door of the pueblo *estufa*, where hidden from view he listened, and knowing their language, heard definite plans for a rebellion; but he cautioned the custodian not to be too much alarmed as yet, promising to write only to him and not to the governor, for the latter might punish the ringleaders and make matters worse.¹²

Indications became so alarming in some quarters that on March 7 the custodian warned Governor Vargas of the imminent danger of a revolt, and begged an adequate guard of soldiers for each mission. Over 1,600 head of cattle and sheep, and 150 horses distributed among the missions of the custodia were in danger, and the Spaniards were lacking in food and horses as it was. Many of the missionaries journeyed to Santa Fé to ask for help. Navarro, of Picuríes, reported an overheard plot to kill him while he slept; Diez reported hostile scheming at Tesuque. The new mission churches were being profaned at various pueblos. Missionaries warned that if a revolt should take place, they, scattered and unprotected, would from all indications be the first victims. Friendly Indians corroborated the rumors.¹³

Despite the fact that the presidio at Santa Fé could not spare any of its one hundred men, without endangering the capital, and the fact that thirty soldiers had been stationed at Taos for

¹² Father Corvera to the custodian, San Ildefonso, December 20, 1695, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 10.

¹³ Petition to Governor Vargas, signed by Fray Francisco de Vargas, custodian, and four other friars, Santa Fé, March 7, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141. The first serious reports of rebellion had been brought to the attention of Vargas early in December, 1695 (Vargas' journal, March 14, 1696, and Diego de Vargas to the Conde de Galve, March 28, 1696, *ibid*). According to Father José Diez, of Tesuque pueblo, in a letter to the Father Commissary General, dated Santa Fé, March 23, 1696, he had been notified by the governor of his pueblo as early as August, 1695, that the natives were contemplating an uprising. The said Indian governor had gone to Santa Fé to report the plot to Governor Vargas on February 26, 1696 (B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 15).

the past month, and a reconnoitering expedition had been sent from San Juan as far north as the San Antonio River to guard against Ute incursions, Vargas promised to send soldiers to the missions which deemed military protection absolutely necessary.¹⁴ The custodian now sent out a letter to all the missionaries notifying them of the governor's decision, and requesting that they each report the exact number of soldiers necessary to assure their safety and that of the religious articles at the mission establishments.

The custodian's order was promptly answered.¹⁵ Alpuente wrote from Pecos of the need of six soldiers to assure the safety of his mission; but he would accept them only on the following terms: they must be adequately armed, God-fearing Christians, lest they set a bad example among the Indians by living in concubinage, and they must support themselves from their own salary. Cisneros, writing from Cochití, said he did not need military protection. Ramírez, of San Felipe, was at the time residing at the Spanish settlement of Bernalillo due to bad health. Matta, writing from Sia, called for six or eight well-armed men as necessary to assure the safety of his mission. Trizio and Jesús María, at the two Jémez missions, specified the need of at least eight or ten soldiers at San Juan de los Jémez, and four at San Diego del Monte.

Diez, writing from Tesuque (March 9), wanted twelve soldiers, since Domingo, the governor general of the Tewas and Tanos, had notified him that the Pecos had concocted a revolt set for the next moon, eight days thence. The natives of San Cristóbal had already carried most of their belongings to the mountains, at the approaches to which they had built horse traps. Two Indians of Tesuque had told some Pecos: "You alone have not answered the call; the Spaniards are dying of hunger; only twenty are with valor." Several months previously some natives of Tesuque had gathered at the house of a witch-doctor where, accompanied by the chant of war songs, was heard the cry: "Death to the Spaniards, because they are Span-

¹⁴ Vargas' journal, March 8, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

¹⁵ The *Carta Patente*, Father Vargas to the religious, Santa Fé, March 9, 1696, and the original letters sent in by the missionaries in response, dated March 9-11, are found in B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

iards; we were better off before!" Corvera now wrote of natives from his pueblo attending a war council near Santa Clara, falsely telling him that they were going to hunt. He bluntly counseled: "If one arm is cancerous, cut it off and save the body." He would probably be killed soon, he calmly stated, but after so much warning, he wondered whether it would be true martyrdom or mere foolhardiness. With a note of sarcasm he stated to his superior that as for the number of soldiers necessary for his safety at his mission, Governor Vargas might spend eight days at the most quiet mission with the amount of military escort he should deem necessary, and with the same amount he would be satisfied.

Prieto wrote from San Juan de los Caballeros added information: the Indians had been planning a revolt since August of the previous year; on Shrove Tuesday, in the customary meeting held by the Indians in his mission church after services, Domingo, the governor of the Tewa and Tano pueblos, spoke of a gathering held in the hills near the mesa between San Ildefonso and Santa Clara, attended by representatives from San Cristóbal, San Lázaro, Santa Clara, Nambé, Jacona, Cuyamungué, and Tesuque, for the purpose of perfecting their plans for the uprising; loyal Indians reported that natives from Zuñi, Ácoma, and Moqui were planning to join in the general revolt at the opportune moment. He referred to the frontier position of his mission, and left to the decision of the governor the number of soldiers necessary for its protection.¹⁶ Father Arbizu, writing from San Cristóbal, described the unrest among his charges as primarily economic. They had complained to him that Governor Vargas first had made them leave one of their pueblos to build there the Spanish settlement of Santa Cruz, promising them lands in Chimayó. More recently he had changed his mind and ordered them to remove to uninviting Galisteo. Rebelling, the natives had withdrawn to the mountains of Chimayó, taking with them nearly all their belongings. This had been confirmed when Alcalde Mayor

¹⁶ According to Father Prieto's testimony it would appear that a well-planned general uprising, like that of 1680, had been set for March, 1696, but had miscarried, having been discovered by the missionaries. When the revolt finally occurred on June 4, 1696, it was poorly organized and executed, the opportunity for decisive coordinated action having been broken up.

Roque Madrid, going to buy two hundred *costales* of maize from them for the Spanish residents of Santa Cruz, the quota requested by Vargas for this purpose, found, after searching the abandoned houses of the natives, only thirteen *costales*. The rest had already been toted off to the mountains, where nearly all of the Tano, Tiwa, and Piro natives of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, numbering about 500 persons, were now residing. Arbizu also left to the governor the decision as to how many soldiers would be necessary for the safety of his life. Carbonel wrote in a similar vein from Nambé. All vigorously denied that their fears were mere presumption. As for Fathers Zavaleta and Chavarría of Taos, Navarro of Picuríes, and García Marín of Santa Clara, they had already withdrawn to the protection of Santa Fé. Navarro said that he could not return safely to his mission without a guard of at least twelve resident soldiers. García Marín asked for ten, and the missionaries of Taos, referring to the frontier location of their mission, left the matter to the decision of the governor.

A second petition was now sent to Vargas by the Father Custodian on the 13th, based on the reports from the missionaries. In it were listed the requests for military protection from the missionaries of Taos, Picuríes, Santa Clara, San Juan, San Cristóbal, Pecos, Sia, San Juan de Jémez, and San Diego de Jémez, to a total of over sixty soldiers.¹⁷ This, Vargas made clear, was absolutely impossible, for he had only one hundred soldiers at his command. As he pointed out to the custodian of the missions, two squads of thirty soldiers each were necessary to guard the garrison and the horses, and ten were necessary to guard the protective towers and gateway of the villa of Santa Fé. This left thirty. Two squads of twelve soldiers each, with their leaders, had been sent to El Paso with the pack trains to bring back supplies and cattle. This left four—and the missionaries requested over sixty! Because of the dangerous situation, however, temporary protective measures were taken. Four soldiers were ordered stationed at each of the following pueblo missions: San Juan, because of its frontier location, San Ildefonso, Taos, Picuríes, San Juan de Jémez, and

¹⁷ Petition from the custodian, Fray Francisco de Vargas, to Governor Vargas, Santa Fé, March 13, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

San Diego de Jémez. And the missionaries at Santa Clara and Tesuque were advised to withdraw to San Juan and Santa Fé respectively.¹⁸ On March 16 the Father Custodian notified the missionaries of the governor's decision. He concluded his letter by asking the fathers to weigh the matter carefully, and then, letting their consciences dictate, give their final opinions on the matter, so that he might send a final report on the whole matter to the governor.¹⁹

Meanwhile, since the missionaries could see from close range that war clouds were descending rapidly, all of them had withdrawn to the protection of the Spanish settlements of Santa Fé, Santa Cruz, and Bernalillo. The well-weighed messages of the missionaries in response to their paternal and deeply concerned custodian, were the desperate voices of men torn between their religious zeal and the knowledge that they would be walking foolishly into the jaws of death should they return to their missions under existing conditions. At Santa Fé were gathered Friars Zavaleta, Chavarría, Navarro, Diez, Alpuente, and Carbonel; at Santa Cruz were Friars Corvera, García, Arbizu, and Prieto; and at Bernalillo, Friars Jesús María, Trizio, Matta, and Jiménez de Cisneros. The three gatherings of Franciscans reaffirmed their absolute refusal to return to their missions without adequate protection against an impending rebellion of the reality of which they were firmly convinced. In Navarro's mission the image of the patron saint, on the altar, had been stoned. At Tesuque some of the natives had declared themselves openly in favor of the coming uprising. Corvera would not return to San Ildefonso unless the natives would unanimously declare themselves at peace or unless his superior should command. García, protesting ill health, argued that he could not licitly administer to declared apostates at Santa Clara. Arbizu had fled from his mission of San Cristóbal in the night, on foot, having been warned by a loyal Indian of a plot to take his life and desecrate the holy vessels; the natives had fled to the mountains and refused to return despite three summons of Governor Vargas himself. In the opin-

¹⁸ Vargas' journal, March 14, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

¹⁹ *Carta Patente*, Father Vargas to the religious, Santa Fé, March 16, 1696, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

ion of Jesús María at San Diego de Jémez the whole presidio of Santa Fé would be required to assure the safety of his mission under existing conditions, which in his mind were hourly growing worse. Jiménez, denying any cowardice, for he had already resigned himself to a treacherous death, said that since the province was now at peace in name only, at least twenty-four soldiers would be necessary to give any sort of security to a resident missionary at Cochití. One Indian of his mission had boasted that he would drink from the Holy Chalice. In desperation he added: "Shall I, their minister, go to die so that this dog may carry out his boast?" Only drastic measures would prevent a repetition of the tragic events of 1680.²⁰

Father Domingo de Jesús, who had ventured to remain at Pecos, told of Indian jibes and ridicule as he preached with a crucifix in his hands; when he had put away the sacred vessels in his room, at midnight, March 21, Indians broke into his room, removed them along with the keys to the convent and church, and commanded him not to report the incident to anyone. He had warning by an Indian of a plot to decapitate him if he did not leave. Furthermore, there was a *ranchería* of Faraon Apaches in the pueblo, and another at the edge of the Pecos River.²¹

Upon examining these letters, the Franciscan Superior addressed a third petition to the governor,²² this time not requesting resident military guards for the missions, since there were insufficient soldiers for adequate protection ("there was not sufficient bread for so many wedding ceremonies," to quote the words of Father Jesús María), but requesting a military escort to remove to safety the sacred vessels and sacred ornaments of the mission churches, and the livestock and other mission property. According to the friars the land was no longer

²⁰ These letters are filed in B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

²¹ Petition to Governor Vargas, signed by Fray Francisco de Vargas, custodian, and four other friars, Santa Fé, March 22, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

²² Decree of the reverend *definidores*, Santa Fé, March 22, 1696, *ibid.* This decree also outlined the manner in which the missionaries should conduct themselves during their temporary residence in the Spanish settlements. They were ordered to live in community, and forbidden to eat or reside in secular establishments. The decree was signed by Father Vargas, the custodian, and the *definidores* Fathers Acevedo, Alpuente, Zavaleta, and Carbonel.

at peace. The Father Custodian assured the governor that the missionaries would promptly return to their missions with the restoration of peace, but for the present he could not permit them to return to their posts, as idolatry was rife at the missions, the natives were making a mockery of Christian living, and the province was seething with rebellion.²³

In answer, Vargas admitted the gravity of the situation, but he believed the majority of the Indians in the surrounding pueblos to be loyal, and laconically continued to refer to the complaints and fears of the missionaries as based on "reports, rumors, presumptions." He urged them to remain at their posts wherever it was possible. Suddenly to send soldiers to the missions, he countered, would arouse suspicions, and might appear to the natives as an aggressive provocation smacking of bad faith and mutual distrust. Nevertheless, he promised to send some military aid due to the urgent pleadings of the missionaries, even though his better judgment prompted him not to divide forces dangerously.²⁴ Cattle, sheep, and other property were evacuated from the missions of Santa Clara, San Juan, San Cristóbal, San Ildefonso, and Picurías, and taken to the

²³ Petition to Governor Vargas, signed by Fray Francisco de Vargas, custodian, and four other friars, Santa Fé, March 22, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

²⁴ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, March 22, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

Vargas said that to Fathers Alpuente and Domingo de Jesús, at Pecos, he would send six soldiers for three weeks, after which time two would remain to accompany the missionaries when called to administer the sacraments at night, etc. The missionaries at Santa Clara, San Juan de los Caballeros, and San Cristóbal were told to join the missionary of San Ildefonso at the villa of Santa Cruz, and administer their missions from there. At Santa Cruz they would have the protection of the eight soldiers under the command of the *alcalde mayor* there, who was also the *alcalde mayor* for the Tewa and Tano pueblos nearby. Five soldiers would be sent to the *alcalde mayor* of Taos if and when absolutely necessary. Vargas refused to send soldiers to protect Father Jiménez de Cisneros at Cochiti, stating that it would be provocation, since these Indians had been reduced by fire and sword. Nambé and Tesuque, he felt, were near enough to the two villas, and to send soldiers would only arouse suspicions on all sides. Hence Father Cisneros was urged to establish himself at Santo Domingo, and administer his mission from there. As for the missionaries at the pueblos of San Juan de los Jémez, and the one on the mesa, San Diego del Monte, one long league's distance, Father Miguel Trizio at the former and Father Francisco de Jesús at the latter were offered four soldiers each. These men would also serve as sufficient protection for Father Matta at Sia, near San Juan de los Jémez, and also near friendly Santa Ana. *Ibid.*

villa of Santa Cruz. But in order not to provoke suspicion he was careful to instruct Father García Marín of Santa Clara to inform the Indian chiefs there that this move was being made solely because of the impending danger of raids by their enemies the Utes, who might take advantage of the facility of transit offered by the rise in the river waters. Vargas himself had so explained things to the Picuríes leaders, because in the minds of the natives he did not want the least suspicion of either weakness or bad faith on his part.

Toward the end of March Vargas unfolded to the viceroy the critical situation in New Mexico and the discouraging events of recent months. The first serious rumors of revolt had begun in December past, then had ceased, only to be renewed in the latter part of February. As a result Vargas had visited the Tewa and Tano pueblos, the danger centers, and followed this with a tour of inspection to the Keres and Jémez pueblos. At the latter pueblo he was told of a great council at Ácoma, attended by many infidels, including warriors from Zuñi and Moqui. Many Tanos had already fled to the mountains. Thereupon, he made Santa Cruz his temporary military headquarters, and soon induced some of the natives of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal to return to their pueblos. He was opposed, he pointed out, to the complete abandonment of the missions, for fear of losing the confidence of the natives, and wanted all missionaries to return to their flocks. Nevertheless, the colony was in grave danger, and would continue to be so until at least 500 families, as he had repeatedly requested, should be maintained in New Mexico, along with its presidio of 100 soldiers. Then, and then only, would New Mexico offer security, prosperity and self-sufficiency to the settlers, and success to the missionaries. At this time 276 families in the upper Río Grande country remained of a total of 328. The epidemic of 1695 had taken a terrible toll. Fifty-two men had died in the epidemic, or in battle, including valorous soldiers, or had abandoned the province.²⁵ Vargas listed the

²⁵ The list of those who had lost their lives, in one way or another, during the recently concluded military campaigns, follows: (1) Sergeant Major and Presidio Captain Antonio Jorge, (2) Adjutant General Francisco de Anaya Almazán, (3) Miguel Luján, (4) Francisco de Santiago, (5) Francisco Pacheco, (6) José de Vidal, (7) Juan Antonio Bermúdez, (8) Sergeant Major Alonso García,

following as absolutely necessary for the moment: 1,500 head of cattle per year; clothing for the destitute wives, widows, children, and orphans of the group brought up from Sombrete and Zacatecas; 500 yoke of oxen for plowing; additional colonists. Now all was quiet, and the missionaries continued to say Mass at the pueblos, some still residing at their missions;²⁶ but he emphasized the urgent need for action on the part of the authorities in Mexico City. The plea that clung to every word of the letter was: "Please send more colonists!"²⁷

Meanwhile, fully aware of the governor's attitude, a number of the missionaries had quietly returned to their missions. On the 26th the custodian formally notified them of Vargas'

(9) Miguel Díaz, (10) José López (11) Francisco de Apodaca, (12) Captain Eusebio de Vargas, (13) Domingo Luján, (14) Felipe Carrión, (15) Félix de Aragón. Those who had left New Mexico for the south due to sickness: (1) Don José de Rojas, (2) Don José de Mier, (3) Don Francisco de Levia. Settlers listed as dead or missing at this time: (1) Don Francisco de Espindola, (2) Manuel de Atienza, (3) Francisco García, (4) Francisco de la Rosa, (5) Juan Fernández, (6) El Portugués, (7) El Saboyano, (8) Pedro de la Torre, (9) Sebastián Rodríguez, (10) El Poblano, (11) Francisco de la Cruz, (12) Andrés Hurtado, (13) Mateo Negrette, (14) Adjutant Bartolomé Romero, (15) Antonio Montano, (16) Regidor José Gallegos, (17) José Cavello, (18) Juan Pacheco, (19) Miguel de Reina, (20) Juan de los Santos, (21) Captain José Téllez Xirón, (22) Francisco Hernández, (23) Simón de Horteiga, (24) Bernavé Rodarte, (25) Pedro Iñiguez, (26) Bernavé Jorge, (27) Manuel Gómez, (28) Don Diego Fernández de Aguilar, (29) Diego Zervir, who went to the Philippines, (30) Miguel García, (31) Antonio González, (32) Bernardino Varela, (33) Alonso Romero, who returned to New Spain, (34) Juan de los Santos. *Ibid.*

²⁶ According to Father Diez, of Tesuque, in a letter to the Father Commissary General dated Santa Fé, March 23, 1696, only one missionary was still residing at his mission at that time, and all the others were administering their missions from the Spanish settlements. He admitted that Governor Vargas did not have sufficient soldiers to protect the missions in their existing danger. (*Ibid.*) By the time Vargas wrote this letter to the viceroy, on March 28, however, some were back at the missions, against their better judgment, due to the governor's attitude.

²⁷ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, March 28, 1696, *ibid.* Vargas points out in this letter that he had sent to the agent of Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente, at Janos, a letter of credit of 3,000 pesos for the purchase of 500 head of cattle at six pesos each. Also, the oxen were urgently needed: he had given each family one half a fanega of maize to plant the year previous, but they could not cultivate effectively without oxen. He further points out that he had been working three mines, hoping to obtain results sufficient to attract settlers; that one showed silver ore content, and that prayers were being offered to Our Lady of Remedies, along with other pious acts, in the hope of better success.

decisions, and requested an answer from each.²⁸ All resented the governor's assertion that their fears were based on presumptions and rumor; all wrote in a spirit of desperate futility; all wrote prophetically of the impending revolt.

Diez wrote from Tesuque that it was not death which the missionaries feared, but rather the profaning of the sacred articles, in the defense of which, he stated, the loss of one's life was of little consequence. As for the governor's charge that the fears of an uprising were presumings, Diez recalled how Vargas himself had gone several times to beg the dispersed Tanos to return to their pueblo; how a Tano Indian had told him in the presence of Roque Madrid of an attack set for the next full moon; how Vargas tacitly admitted the gravity of the situation by augmenting the guard of the herdsman from fifteen to thirty men. Then, he added, if the herds need an augmented guard of thirty men, how could a missionary be safe with not even one soldier's protection? Despite all this, Diez had returned to his mission. He gave the custodian the following reasons for his action. Natives of his mission, he was aware, were parties to the plan of rebellion; nevertheless, the governor of the pueblo was loyal to the Spaniards and for this his life had been threatened. "In conscience I cannot leave the said Indian without the services of the Mass, or the sacraments, nor can I do so with regard to the Indians whose intentions I do not know . . . The just should not pay for the sinners, especially when they wish to fulfill their duties in the church." Another reason was this: although the governor had not granted him any military escort, he had personally promised to place the herdsman with its guard of thirty soldiers near his mission. Besides he would willingly die in defense of the sacred articles. In an earlier letter he told of refraining from the celebration of Mass before the natives of his mission because some had been excommunicated; but this obstacle had been removed because he had absolved them. He was going to wait several days for the governor to fulfill his promise, and if not fulfilled he would return to Santa Fé. He ended

²⁸ *Carta Patente*, Father Vargas to the religious, Santa Fé, March 26, 1696, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 24.

his letter by saying that the full moon had passed without mishap, but there were others in the days ahead.²⁹

Father Carbonel, writing from Nambé, gave a number of reasons why he had decided to return to his mission. In the first place, the governor did not have sufficient soldiers to protect the missions despite the state of virtual rebellion throughout the province. His fears were based on no idle rumors. Had not the San Lázaro natives fled to the mountains and defied Vargas' three summons to return to their pueblo? This Carbonel had seen with his own eyes in the presence of Father Arbizu and Roque Madrid. As for Nambé, it had not openly rebelled, but agitators were constantly urging its people to do so. "The jug is carried to the fountain so often that finally it is broken." Comparing himself to an ant amidst a thousand carnivorous wolves, he had returned to his mission to prevent the profaning of the religious articles, and with the hope of possibly baptizing a child and saving a soul. He stated that the natives had been permitted too many excesses without being punished. He recalled how he had been struck by a native at Cochití eight months before, had notified the governor, and nothing had been done about it; and this took place the same day the governor had visited the pueblo. During Governor Vargas' visits the natives acted like lambs, but the rest of the time they lived in idolatry and concubinage. Now was the time to put an end to all this, urged Carbonel, for "they know that the one with the power to punish them is tolerating all this." The natives had killed his finest cow, one of three placed at the mission. In the last three months they had stolen twenty-seven of his best sheep. All went unpunished. Twice they had broken into the convent and stolen chocolate and sugar. They mocked the missionaries and the Blessed Sacrament. He added: "They should be brought to understand; otherwise royal funds are being spent dishonorably . . . It weighs upon my conscience that the king is spending money in alms for the support of these missions and so little is being accomplished . . . This is not conquered land, we are working among *infeles*." In closing he stated that death was stalking near,

²⁹ Father José Díez to the custodian, Tesuque, March 29, 1696, *ibid.*

but that all warning was in vain, for the governor refused to listen.³⁰

Arbizu, writing from Santa Fé, found it impossible in conscience to return to his mission of San Cristóbal without sufficient military protection. Prieto and García Marín wrote in the same vein from the Spanish villa of Santa Cruz. Francisco de Jesús wrote from the Spanish settlement of Bernalillo that he was tired of sending in written reports to which the governor refused to pay any attention. He had been attending his mission, and the four soldiers assigned to it were poorly armed and virtually useless. Father Trizio, also writing from Bernalillo, saw conditions at his mission of San Juan de los Jémez growing worse. As for the four soldiers sent, they were a hindrance rather than a help; poorly armed, they emboldened the Indians, who judged by their weakness the strength of the Spanish armed forces. He expressed the opinion that to spill one's blood in defense of the Faith was very desirable if something was being accomplished thereby, but that if nothing was being won, it was foolish. The natives, he felt, were minded to destroy the missionaries, thinking the Spaniards would then no longer bother them. He advised, as did all the other missionaries directly or indirectly, abandonment of the missions for some more fruitful field. Meanwhile, he would visit his mission frequently, for it was the planting season, and he would say Mass at his mission on Sundays, but remain in residence at Bernalillo.³¹

As for the mission at Sia, the governor had written to the *alcalde mayor* saying that the soldiers of the Jémez mission were sufficient protection for Sia as well. Matta, writing from Sia, deemed these soldiers useless, half-starved and without adequate arms. "Sia needs armed protection," he wrote. With regard to the hostility of the natives, it was his belief that if careful investigation were made Father José Ramírez, who

³⁰ Father Antonio Carbonel to the custodian, Nambé, March 31, 1696, *ibid.*

³¹ Father José Arbizu to the custodian, Santa Fé, April 2, 1696; Father Jerónimo Prieto and Father José García Marín to the custodian, Santa Cruz, April 2, 1696; Father Francisco de Jesús to the custodian, "Villa de San Francisco de Bernalillo," April 17, 1696; Father Miguel de Trizio to the custodian, "Pueblo de Bernalillo," April 17, 1696. *Ibid.*

had died recently, might be found victim of witchcraft or poison. He concluded with the plea: "Please, Reverend Custodian, make known the grave peril in this kingdom!"³² Jiménez de Cisneros, writing at Cochití, to which he had obediently returned, repeated that if Governor Vargas entertained any notions that the province was at peace he was badly mistaken. The natives are preparing for the proper moment to rise, and there is no doubt about it. Why does the governor not punish the natives who have deserted San Cristóbal and San Juan? Did he not try the Spaniards who attempted to flee from the kingdom? Jiménez added that Governor Vargas could well ignore all warnings, however, because he himself was well protected.³³

The Father Custodian read with sadness the many reports. He pieced the words of his confreres into a letter to the Commissary General on May 17. The missions were precariously near the brink of destruction.³⁴

³² Father Pedro Matta to the custodian, Sia, April 17, 1696, *ibid.*

³³ Father Alfonso Jiménez de Cisneros to the custodian, Cochití, April 21, 1696, *ibid.*

³⁴ Father Vargas to the Father Commissary General, Santa Ana, May 17, 1696, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 13. At this time Fathers José Diez, Jerónimo Prieto, and Domingo de Jesús left New Mexico with permission from the father provincial of the Franciscan province of Michoacán. Jesús arrived at Querétaro on August 19; Diez and Prieto arrived two days later. Certification, Querétaro, August 21, 1696. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XIV

THE PUEBLO REVOLT OF 1696

News of widespread acts of open rebellion began to pour into Santa Fé from every side on June 4, a Monday. The direst prophecies of some of the friars had come true. The Taos, Picuríes, Jémez, Keres of Santo Domingo and Cochití, and the Tanos and Tewas, with a fury long kindled, had killed five missionaries and twenty-one Spanish settlers and soldiers, had burned and desecrated churches, abandoned their pueblos, and fled into the nearby mountains.¹ The uprising was planned in the typically haphazard fashion of the red men, with poor coördination but fearsome effect. When the war whoops, the thunder of hoofs, and the fires died away disorder reigned in the silent pueblos. Only Pecos, Tesuque, San Felipe, Santa Ana, and Sia remained faithful.

During the evening of that fateful day Vargas received four communications notifying him of the swift developments of the past forty-eight hours. They came from Fray Alfonso Jiménez de Cisneros, writing from San Felipe, Don Fernando de Chávez, the *alcalde mayor* of the Bernalillo post and the above pueblo, Roque Madrid, the *alcalde mayor* at the villa of Santa Cruz, and the loyal Indian governor Domingo of Tesuque. At six o'clock in the evening an Indian runner brought Vargas the message from Jiménez de Cisneros, of Cochití. The friar reported that after Mass the entire population of Cochití had withdrawn to the nearby mesa with all the cattle, sheep, and

¹ The importance of the Pueblo Revolt of 1696 generally has been overlooked solely because heretofore no effort was made to utilize the adequate but widely scattered documentation. The event was one of the most critical in the whole history of the reconquest, and it is no exaggeration to say that it could easily have resulted in a disaster no less momentous than that of 1680. The records for the uprising and the immediate events which followed, for the period June 4 to 17, as preserved in the Santa Fé Archives, were translated by Twitchell in *Old Santa Fe*, III (October, 1916), 333-373. The present account is based on these, supplemented by hitherto unutilized documents in A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and B.N.M., legajos 3 and 4.

In this chapter all footnote citations, unless otherwise specified, are from A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and S.F.A.

horses of the mission, whereupon he had hastened to San Felipe. There he found Captain Chávez, with other settlers. This report was soon corroborated by the note from Chávez. The tribesmen had departed shouting war cries, and with them had gone the Pecos and Tewas. A certain Antonio de la Torre had been struck over the head with a *macana* but had escaped. Chávez asked for arms for the people of Bernalillo posthaste.² Domingo, too, sent news of the rise of the pueblos and requested military aid immediately to protect the missionaries of the surrounding places.³

Vargas acted swiftly. The squad leader Juan de Ulibarri was dispatched with a message to the guards watching horses, ordering all to withdraw to Santa Fé. Eight soldiers, powder, and bullets were sent to Lieutenant General Roque Madrid, and he was commanded to call in all the missionaries in the vicinity who might still be at their posts. The *alcalde mayor* at Pecos was ordered to gather one hundred friendly Indian warriors and, with the two missionaries there, to hasten to Santa Fé. A guard of five soldiers, under the command of Juan de Archuleta, was sent to the aid of Chávez, at Bernalillo. The latter was told to consult the settlers as to

² Fray Alfonso Jiménez de Cisneros to Vargas, San Felipe, June 4, 1696; Fernando de Chávez to Vargas, Bernalillo, n. d.; and Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 4, 1696.

Torre was one of four questionable characters, bachelors, who were living with the Indians. Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, July 31, 1696.

An interesting legend telling of the miraculous escape of Father Jiménez de Cisneros from Cochiti, fanciful but with an element of fact, was related to Charles F. Lummis in Spanish by an old Indian of San Felipe. Charles F. Lummis, *A New Mexico David*, New York, 1891, 174-182.

³ As indicated previously, a number of the Pueblo Indian leaders were able to read and write, some more perfectly than others, and carried on official correspondence with Vargas. Copies of some of these letters are filed with Vargas' journals. The letter from the loyal Domingo, a copy of which is contained in Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 7, 1696, follows:

"Que dize Dom.º Levina avissar de Cuyamuge el Cantorre francisco que dize q. Va alzar toda la nacion toda la gente Pecos y Domus y Tuus Picurri y Teguas De Acoma y Sum hemegi y Queres todos qe. vina de Cuyamuge avissar que tan de tezuge que to su gente Dom.º que venga soldado a ber los Padre que estan los Pueblos antes que suseda algu que de por la Madre de Dios que ya se estan de los Pueblos esto no mas digo Le encomiendo a mi compadre Govenador Señor."

whether or not they preferred to remain there or withdraw to Santa Fé.⁴

Toward midnight an Indian courier arrived with fresh news from Roque Madrid. When at evening prayers an Indian had notified him that the natives of San Cristóbal, and the Keres, Apaches, Moquis, and Pecos had risen, he had ordered all the horses brought into the villa and was leaving for an inspection of San Cristóbal, where he feared that the missionary had been killed.⁵ The following day Juan de Ulibarri returned to Santa Fé, accompanied by the guard leader Ignacio Roybal, with verification of the horrible news. Father José Arbizu, of the San Cristóbal mission, and Father Antonio Carbonel, of Taos, had both been killed by Tanos natives outside the convent at the former pueblo. Others found killed there were Simón de Molina, Diego Betanzos, a Mexican Indian servant fourteen or fifteen years of age, and an Indian, nine or ten years old, from El Paso. Having learned of the above developments, Juan de Archuleta had hastened from the villa of Santa Cruz to San Juan de los Caballeros, which the natives had deserted, and had withdrawn Father Blas Navarro and the soldier Mateo Lovatto safely to the villa, as well as the sacred vessels and ornaments of the convent there. Lovatto had locked the friar in the convent and guarded him there, lest he be slain; his horse had been stolen, and he had been awaiting aid.

Passing on to San Ildefonso, they found the church and convent burned, and Father Francisco Corvera, of that mission, and Father Antonio Moreno, of Nambé, smothered to death in the convent, in which they had barricaded themselves. Others who had suffered death there from the fury of the rebels were identified as Doña Juana de Almazán, her seventeen year old son Alonso, her daughter Doña Leonor (the wife of Pedro Sánchez), with her son and daughter, and a soldier identified as Mateo Trujillo. These were found dead in the sacristy and convent. Passing on to Nambé, they found that the sacred vessels and ornaments had been carried off, the convent sacked. And at the door of the church they found the dead

⁴ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 4-6, 1696.

⁵ Roque Madrid to Vargas, Santa Cruz, June 4, 1696.

bodies of Juan Cortés, his daughter, his son-in-law, José Sánchez, and one Andrés, all stripped of their clothing.⁶

Alcalde Francisco de Anaya Almazán arrived near midnight at the capital with Father José García, of Pecos, and Father Miguel Trizio of San Juan de Jémez, who happened to be at Pecos at the time. All was quiet at Pecos, the *alcalde* assured Vargas, and the Indian warriors requested by the governor would be at Santa Fé the following day. The next day, at three o'clock in the afternoon, Governor Felipe of Pecos arrived with his war captains and the requested one hundred Indians, on foot and on horseback. During the course of the day Captain Alfonso Rael de Aguilar, *alcalde mayor* of the *real* of Los Cerrillos and the pueblo of Santo Domingo, entered Santa Fé with the families from the *real* and surrounding haciendas. He brought with him several Indian prisoners, including the Indian governor of Santo Domingo, who had been captured while suspiciously lurking about the hacienda of El Alamo. To forestall any possible enemy attack upon the villa of Santa Fé, drastic defensive measures were taken. All outside doors and windows were covered with adobe bricks, and a heavy guard was stationed in the entrenchments and at the entrances to the city.⁷

Vargas set out to make an official inspection of the surrounding pueblos. He was accompanied by the principal officials and military leaders, a squad of twenty picked soldiers, and Governor Felipe and his one hundred Indian warriors. At Tesuque the loyal Domingo welcomed Vargas, telling him how the rebels had tried to coax him to join in the revolt and how he had protested loyalty to the Spaniards. At Nambé Vargas came upon the unhappy sight which Captain Ulibarri had previously reported. The already rotting bodies were buried in a destroyed house near the church cemetery; the cemetery was not used because it had been profaned. Father Juan de Alpuente, who officiated at the burial, then made a search of the convent, where some books, a missal, and various religious articles, some

⁶ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 5, 1696. This Andrés is described here as another son of Doña Juana de Almazán. Later Vargas identifies him as Andrés Baca, a native settler ("originario") of New Mexico. See *ibid.*, June 7, 1696.

⁷ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 6, 1696.

intact and others damaged, were salvaged.⁸ At San Ildefonso the little army came upon similar charred ruins and other lifeless bodies.⁹ The bodies were covered with adobes from the mission church. A missal, a breviary, the church bell, and a small quantity of maize alone remained after the thefts and fires. Jacona pueblo was found abandoned with the exception of one lone native, who, insisting that even if he were threatened with death he would not talk, was given absolution and summarily shot. Having accomplished his purpose, Vargas returned to Santa Fé.¹⁰

One of Vargas' soldiers, Agustín Trujillo, who had thrown earth over the grave of his father, Mateo, at San Ildefonso several days previously, met with an unusual welcome. Apparently there had occurred a case of mistaken identity, for Mateo, with five wounds in his body, naked, barefoot, and faint, a rapier clenched firmly in one hand, had arrived safely at Santa Fé after a harrowing four days' journey, hiding by day and traveling by night. This "resurrection" was hailed as evidence of divine justice, and described by one pious Spaniard as "almost more wonderful than that of Lazarus."¹¹

This incident provided but a passing moment of joy, for all the Spaniards were in extreme danger, and Vargas himself was met with less pleasant news. Shortly after his return to Santa Fé he received a letter from Bartolomé de Ojeda, the loyal Indian governor of Santa Ana, with a plea for immediate military aid against a possible attack from Jémez. He claimed to have definite information that the Jémez had been joined by hostile Acomas, and were only awaiting Moqui, Zuñi, and Ute

⁸ Vargas' journal, June 7, 1696. The image of Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception, on the main altar, and the church bell, neither of which had been disturbed, were removed to Santa Cruz, where they were placed in the custody of Father Antonio Obregón there.

⁹ As identified by Vargas they were as follows: Fathers Corvera and Antonio Moreno, Doña Juana de Almazán, her daughter Doña Leonor, Doña Rosa, and a body identified as that of Mateo Trujillo by his son Agustín. Vargas states that they had been gagged and met their death by suffocation from the smoke of the burning buildings (Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 8, 1696). This list does not include two of the persons listed by Ulibarri, above.

¹⁰ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 8, 1696.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Santa Fé, June 8-9, 1696, and Fernando de Chávez to Vargas, Bernalillo, June 10, 1696. See also Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, July 31, 1696.

confederates before attacking. He had already made a foray against the pueblo, and had taken a prisoner. Ojeda added: "As you know we are on the frontier, and I beg of you to send me a firearm, powder, and bullets, for you know well that we are very loyal vassals of his Majesty."¹² Vargas immediately ordered Ojeda to remove his people to Santa Fé, by way of San Felipe mesa, and promised a military escort for the operation. Simultaneously, a message was sent to the custodian of the missions, Father Francisco de Vargas, ordering him to retire immediately to Santa Fé, and to command all other missionaries to do likewise, as no soldiers could be spared to protect the missions.¹³ At the same time Chávez was advised to remove the people of Bernalillo to the capital, by way of San Felipe mesa, where they could establish temporary headquarters while making rafts to cross the river. Chávez answered that the order would be carried out.¹⁴

Ojeda, on June 11, wrote to Vargas. The conspiracy previously reported had apparently broken up, for there were numerous fresh tracks leading toward Ácoma. All the property had been removed from the convent, which he feared might be set afire, and had been nailed up in a house where its safety was assured. The situation at Sia was still precarious, however, and rebel spies were constantly lurking about.¹⁵ The following day, eight soldiers, under the command of Miguel de Lara, were belatedly on their way to the aid of the loyal pueblo of Sia.¹⁶

¹² Bartolomé de Ojeda to Vargas, Sia, June 8, 1696, and Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 5, 1696.

¹³ Vargas to Father Francisco de Vargas, Santa Fé, June 9, 1696. On June 12, Father Juan Antonio del Corral arrived at Santa Fé from friendly San Felipe pueblo, escorted by Miguel de Lara (Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 12, 1696).

¹⁴ Fernando de Chávez to Vargas, Bernalillo, June 10, 1696, and Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 11, 1696.

¹⁵ Bartolomé de Ojeda to Father Francisco de Vargas, Sia, June 11, 1696.

¹⁶ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 12, 1696. Meanwhile, Chávez had not yet moved the people of Bernalillo closer to Santa Fé, as Vargas had ordered. Chávez had two reasons for this: first, Ojeda, at Sia, was opposed to the move, for it would leave his people in a very dangerous position, surrounded by powerful enemies, and secondly, the people of Bernalillo, nearby the loyal pueblos of San Felipe, Sia, and Santa Ana, were content to remain there, panic stricken over the fear that they would not be able to get their property and livestock across the fast running Río Grande without irreparable loss.

At four in the afternoon of the 12th, Felipe, the Indian governor of Pecos, arrived at Santa Fé, accompanied by a retinue of warriors, and bringing two captives: an Indian of the mesa of San Diego de Jeméz named Luis Cuniju, and Diego Xenome, cacique of Nambé, both active ringleaders in the recent revolt and massacre. They were questioned, along with other rebels who had been taken captive during the past week, and important light, evidence, and substantiation with regard to the revolt of June 4 was gathered. Cuniju had arrived at Pecos the morning before, carrying a gilded eight-sided reliquary containing various relics, as evidence that Fray Francisco de Jesús had been killed. He was received there by the rebel faction led by the cacique Don Diego, an old Pecos leader, and a number of war captains, Cachina conspicuous among them. Shortly after his arrival he had gone into conference with another Tewa named Diaguillo, of Nambé, who had spent the previous winter travelling from pueblo to pueblo, as far as Ácoma, Zuñi, and Moqui, and among the Apaches, organizing the revolt. The two rebels had been called into the principal *estufa*, and Don Diego and his rebel followers had agreed to join in the rebellion. But Felipe, native governor of the pueblo, who had also been present, rising from where he was sitting, and clutching his cane with determination, had said: "Here we are loyal to the king!" Thereupon Don Diego was overpowered and taken out and hanged, and the two rebel agitators, Cuniju and Xenome, were taken prisoner to Santa Fé. Here they were jailed for questioning, and Vargas issued orders to take into custody any Indian at Santa Fé mentioned by the defendants in their testimony.¹⁷

Cuniju described in detail the story of the events which had taken place at his pueblo on June 4. The revolt began in the early morning. Father Francisco de Jesús had been falsely summoned to confess an Indian woman. He was overpowered by the two Indians accompanying him; he had cried out in supplication to God and the Blessed Virgin, as he was clubbed to death. His body was taken and thrown at the door

¹⁷ The existence of the rebel faction at Pecos, described as large, had been reported to Vargas by Governor Felipe on June 9. He had asked Vargas for permission to hang the ringleaders, and the permission had been granted. Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 12, 1696.

of the church.¹⁸ Two Spaniards who were at the pueblo, the *alcalde mayor*, Captain Juan Olguín, and Melchor Trujillo, were also killed; and two Spanish women, and two boys, also residing there, were taken over as servants by the governor of the pueblo and the Indian interpreter Francisco.¹⁹ The governor of Jémez pueblo, said Cuniju, had sent him to Pecos with the reliquary, as a trophy of victory for the purpose of encouraging the rebel partisans there. No representatives from other pueblos had gathered at Jémez prior to his departure from there on the 10th; but Apaches had reported that Zuñi and Moqui warriors were on their way to join in an attack on Santa Fé.

Xenome was now questioned. At Cochití a Spaniard had told him and other natives that Governor Vargas had decided to massacre within the month all the men of the pueblo, sparing only the small boys. Thereupon, the leaders of the Jémez, and the Keres of Santo Domingo and Cochití, joined by partisans from San Felipe, Santa Ana, and Sia, had held a council and decided to join in the uprising. Acting swiftly, Naranjo of Cochití had sent messengers with knotted cords to the different pueblos, as far as Ácoma, Zuñi, and Moqui, and to the Apaches. At all the pueblos strong elements were in agreement with the plan.²⁰ After the killing of the Spaniards at the various pueblos, the natives of Nambé, Cuyamungué, Pojoaque, Jacona, and San Cristóbal had betaken themselves to Chimayó, where they were gathered with horses and supplies on a very steep

¹⁸ This story is recorded in Isidro Félix de Espinosa, *Crónica apostólica* . . . , Mexico, 1746, 285. Father Jesús had been active previously among the pioneer missionaries of Texas. He founded, in 1691, the second Spanish mission in east Texas, the mission of Santísimo Nombre de María, on the banks of the Neches. The mission was destroyed by a flood in 1693, the year of Spain's abandonment of Texas. A sketch of the friar's life may be found in Espinosa's *Crónica*, 260-286. See also Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas*, I, 348-350, 354, 366-368, 373, II, 2.

¹⁹ The two boys, taken by Francisco, were said to be the sons of Captain Juan de Olguín and Francisco de Apodaca. Also an Indian named Cristóbal was killed at the pueblo because he was a friend of the Spaniards, spoke "en Castilla," and reported their secrets. According to Cuniju, the interpreter, Francisco, and Diagui-llo had committed all the murders. Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 12, 1696.

²⁰ He pointed out, however, that the leaders and most of the inhabitants of Santa Ana and Sia were opposed to the conspiracy.

cerro, at the foot of the mountains, accessible only on foot. The killing, Xenome continued, of the two missionaries and others at San Ildefonso had been done by natives, Apaches, and confederates from Santa Clara and Jacona. The Picuríes alone had carried out the ambushade on the slope of Picuríes of the Spanish settlers and the missionary who were withdrawing from Taos to Santa Fé, in which two of the latter were thought to have been killed, including the *alcalde mayor* of Taos, with two still missing.²¹ With regard to a woman killed near Santa Fé a few days previously, he said that he had been told by El Zepe that the Pecos Indians had done it in order to please the Faraon Apaches.

Future plans of the rebels were dragged from the captive Xenome. Those at Chimayó were awaiting news from the Apaches, who had left for their land to attend a dance; Navaho Apaches were eager to have all the Apaches and other tribes join in the revolt; and Acomas, Zuñis, Moquis, their Apache neighbors, and the Utes had decided definitely to join the war "when the green maize is picked." Then the Apaches first were to drive off the horses of the Spaniards, as preliminary to an assault on Santa Fé. He mentioned Cristóbal Yope, the Indian governor of San Cristóbal, his son-in-law Perucho, and Naranjo of Cochití as among the principal rebel leaders at Chimayó. Quite significant was his repetition of the story that the Spaniards were contemplating the massacre of all the pueblo braves, leaving only the children. According to his version, a Piro in Cochití had given details of the rumored Spanish atrocity: when the wagons coming up from El Paso, allegedly accompanied by additional men, should reach Sandía, Vargas would sally forth with all the Spaniards to crush the various pueblos and destroy the men.²²

The Piro captive, Francisco Témpano, from Las Salinas, of the pueblo of Tajique, had been named as an accomplice in the murder of the two missionaries Fathers Carbonel and Arbizu at San Cristóbal. On the following day he was taken from the jail for examination. Témpano told the following story. The

²¹ Some Taos warriors arrived on the scene too late to participate in the action. It is significant that Xenome stated that Governor Domingo of Tesuque had refused to participate in the revolt.

²² Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 12, 1696.

day before the massacre of June 4 he had left Santa Cruz on a borrowed mule in order to get some maize at San Cristóbal, in exchange for some knives. The following morning all the people of the pueblo were called out to work in the missionary's fields, but he had remained in the *estufa* playing cards. In the evening, on his way to the house of a relative, he was called to the *estufa*, where a number of the natives of the pueblo had gathered. Sitting about with their hoes in their hands, they asked him whether he was with them or with the Spaniards, for they suspected his loyalty. They said that the day had arrived when all the Spaniards and the missionaries should die, and that this would be accomplished in all the pueblos before sundown; Naranjo and Juan Chillo, both of Santa Clara, had notified the Tanos, and the Apaches and Moquis were already gathered to attack the enemy horses and kill the Spaniards; and in the morning all were to join in an attack on the villa of Santa Cruz, while Faraon Apaches, Keres, and Acomas, already assembled in the Sandía mountains, would attack Bernalillo and from there advance to lay siege to Los Cerrillos. Spies were in the streets, and as soon as they reported that the two Spanish soldiers stationed at the pueblo were not watching, the Indians went out in pairs, all in great secrecy, and killed the missionaries, who were walking about in the convent at the time. After the crime, Témpano had escaped to Santa Cruz and immediately reported these events to Roque Madrid, and the latter, trusting his loyalty, had sent him posthaste with the news to Vargas. Near Chimayó he had come upon the soldier Juan Antonio Barrios, who rode with him to Santa Fé.²³

Having reviewed the testimony taken, Vargas formally delivered his decision, given at the governor's palace in audience before the officials of the villa, with his hat on, his sword girded, and holding in his hand the baton of his authority as governor and captain general of the province. Diego Xenome of Nambé, Luis Cuniju of San Diego de Jémez, and Alonso

²³ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 13, 1696. The captive Indian governor of Santo Domingo, Alonso Guiqui, native of Jémez, was also questioned, and he insisted that he was on his way to Santa Fé to notify Vargas of the uprising when taken prisoner at El Alamo.

Guíqui, the governor of Santo Domingo, were sentenced to be shot, and were given three hours to prepare themselves and confess to the priests. Témpano was set free on his testimony. Fathers Alpuente, Chavarría, and Navarro prepared the prisoners for a happy death; they were marched in military formation to the front of the old church of the villa, where three arquebus shots ended their earthly lives.

On June 14 Vargas received news from Roque Madrid. Some settlers, while gathering wood at the edge of the Río Grande, had been told by an Indian that the Acomas, Zuñis, and Moquis, had gone to Santa Cruz to attack the villa, but had left because the river was high, and would return in one hundred days. A native of Cochití, said the Indian, had told him of Vargas' plan to attack the pueblos on San Juan's day—the false tale which some seemingly had come to believe through sheer repetition. Madrid assured Vargas of the secure defense of Santa Cruz against possible attack.²⁴

The residents of Santa Fé rejoiced anew over another "resurrection," through the arrival there of Captain Lázaro de Mizquía, the *alcalde mayor* of Taos, who had been given up for dead. He had been with Father Chavarría and a squad of twelve soldiers led by Alférez José Domínguez, the group that had left Taos anticipating the revolt, and had been attacked by Picuríes, Taos, Tewas, and Tanos on the slope called "del Ayre" on the night of the 5th. Wounded in the engagement, and his horse shot from under him, Mizquía had escaped into the surrounding woods. Placing himself under the protection of Our Lady of Remedies, to whose "miraculous intercession" he attributed his good fortune, he had taken a route through the highest mountains behind San Cristóbal, Nambé, and Tesuque. On his eight day journey he had lived on toasted *tabali* and five green *cañutillos*. He had travelled nearly all the way carrying his leather shield, a sword, and a lasso ready in case he should come upon a horse. Near Tesuque he had cut two pieces from his shield and tied them to his feet for shoes.²⁵

Meanwhile, Vargas was concerned over the problem of

²⁴ Vargas' journal, June 14, 1696.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Chávez at Bernalillo. The people there had considerable livestock, including 1,200 sheep; it would be impossible to get them across the high running Río Grande safely. Hence they had refused to move to Santa Fé. Chávez again notified Vargas of this condition on June 13. As a result, Vargas had to accept the arguments of the people of Bernalillo.²⁶

A small expedition cantering to Santo Domingo in a fruitless search for maize, having passed beyond the point where the horses were pasturing near El Alamo, entered the pueblo, and came upon three Indians, one of whom was captured and taken to Santa Fé for questioning. The prisoner, Sebastián Pasairi, a Keres of Santo Domingo, gave some notion of events there. His people had abandoned their pueblo at the insistence of the natives of Cochití, while the Cochití Indians were at their new pueblo on the mesa nearby the old pueblo. Those of Santo Domingo were in the arroyo; their horses and cattle were up the river a bit. The Cochití Indians had their maize, chocolate, and other supplies hidden in the *barrancas* near their mesa. According to Sebastián, Cristóbal Yope was the principal leader among the rebels, and El Zepe was the chief insurrectionist of Cochití.

Of greater moment, however, was the arrival the same day of Governor Domingo, of Tesuque, with the report that warriors from Santa Clara and San Ildefonso, under the command of Naranjo, were planning to enter his pueblo the following day, kill him, because he was a friend of the Spaniards and the Catholic faith, and force his people to abandon their pueblo and join the rebels. Protesting loyalty, he begged Vargas to send armed forces for the protection of his pueblo.²⁷

Several weeks were yet to pass before Vargas would be able to obtain a clear picture of the exact character and extent of the revolt. But one thing was certain, the events of the summer of 1696 were the prelude to another winter of starvation and suffering. The long months of constant warfare which began on June 17, 1696, were to sap dangerously the productive strength and the morale of the Spanish settlers. Virtually the

²⁶ *Ibid.*, June 14-15, 1696.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, June 17, 1696.

entire male population of the colony was to become a roving army. By the end of the year the morale of the rationed and overworked colony was to be at the cracking point, and Vargas' popularity would suffer greatly in consequence. But the Reconqueror, who practically lived in the saddle, tireless beyond the physical capacities of most of those who rode behind him, was to meet the task with peerless courage, in pursuit of the objectives as he saw them, and before the year's end he would be able to report to his government total victory: the permanent pacification of the Pueblo Indians of the upper Río Grande.

During the first month or so of the active campaigning which began on June 17, the stage was set for what was to follow. The problem faced during this period was to learn the exact whereabouts of the new localities to which the enemy had withdrawn, fastnesses especially chosen for their natural defenses (mesas, rims of canyons difficult of access, and the like), and then to formulate a plan of attack. Two courses lay before Vargas: either a swift and bloody military offensive, or a firm but less ruthless effort to wear down the morale of the enemy in a war of attrition. The latter course was the one pursued.

Hard upon the news from Governor Domingo of Tesuque, Vargas was away with an army to the aid of the loyal pueblo. At about midnight he led a mounted force of thirty-seven men to the outskirts of Tesuque, where he lay in wait for the expected enemy. But the rebel forces, led by the half-breed Naranjo, lost courage as they approached the pueblo, and withdrew. The large troop fled across the river, whereupon Vargas returned to Santa Fé, satisfied with having seized a considerable quantity of maize at the abandoned pueblo of San Ildefonso.²⁸ Scouting expeditions into the surrounding mountains and canyons during the next few days gave indications of rebel Tewas of Nambé, Pojoaque, Jacona, San Ildefonso, and San Juan de los Caballeros in the mountains in the region between Santa Clara and San Juan de los Caballeros, and evidence of Tanos in the Sierra de Chimayó, in the region facing Picuríes. Large numbers of Ácoma Indians were rumored to have joined the

²⁸ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 17, 1696.

natives of Jémez. Scouts kept a careful check on the movements of the enemy.²⁹ While such events were taking place, Vargas got news from Bernalillo of the approach of the supply train from El Paso, and Ignacio Roybal was sent with a military guard of five men to escort it from Santo Domingo to the capital.³⁰

With a small armed force, accompanied by sixty Pecos Indian warriors, Vargas now set out for Santa Cruz, from which, as campaign headquarters, he planned to run down the Tewa and Tano rebels in their mountain, canyon, and mesa retreats.³¹ At Santa Cruz, Vargas was presented with a petition from sixteen of the settlers, requesting the calling of a council of war for the purpose of removing the settlers to a safer place, even back to the interior of New Spain if necessary. It was held the following day, attended by the principal officials and military leaders. Although Vargas objected vigorously to such a proce-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, June 20, 26, 1696.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, June 20, 22, 1696. These were probably the supplies Vargas refers to in a letter to the governor of New Vizcaya dated Santa Fé, February 10, 1696, in which the latter is requested to facilitate the transportation of 1,000 fanegas of corn destined for Santa Fé. Governor Gabriel del Castillo's answer dated Parral, February 26, 1696, gave little satisfaction. His rambling, gossipy letter was as much a discussion of the condition of his health as anything else. However, it contains one interesting fact concerning Vargas' health: "Fray Juan Daza notifies me that on the first day of Pascuas de Navidad you nearly died." Incidentally, Daza was with the supply train of the custodian.

While these events were taking place, the authorities in Mexico City were examining Vargas' most recent demands for aid, made in his letter to the viceroy of March 28. In the report of the Junta General de Hacienda of February 1, 1696, they had told him that the aid authorized in that report was the last that could be sent. However, the royal fiscal, in his suggestions to the members of the Junta, as of June 23, 1696, warned of the defensive importance of New Mexico, adding "especially when law sixty-six, title two, book three, of the New Recopilation of the Indies, assigns to their Excellencies the viceroys, the duty of the conversion and pacification of their kingdoms." He also cited the royal cédula of December 22, 1685, in which the viceroy was admonished for not maintaining sufficient defense on the northwest frontier of New Spain, and thereby making possible the Indian disorders which had occurred in the vicinity of New Vizcaya. The viceroy ordered that this cédula be placed with Vargas' records, to be examined at the forthcoming meeting of the Junta. Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, June 23, 1696, and viceregal decree, Mexico City, June 30, 1696.

³¹ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, June 29-30, 1696. Vargas left Santa Fé on the 13th at about 3 P. M. The projected campaign against the Picuries and Taos was set for September.

ture, and was promptly and unanimously seconded by his staff, nevertheless, he agreed to send the petition to the viceroy with the courier who was soon expected from Mexico City.³²

On July 1, Domingo of Tesuque arrived with his Tewa warriors and combined them with Vargas' forces for a joint expedition into the Chimayó mountains. Vargas set out that night at nine, and at two in the morning reached the river which flows down from Picuríes, five long leagues from Santa Cruz. There he rested until dawn, the zero hour for the attack. The *rancherías* of the rebels were discovered, and several skirmishes ensued; but the enemy escaped. One Spanish soldier was wounded slightly in the arm, and one rebel Indian was killed. Twenty-four horses were captured, and considerable clothing, left behind by the rebels, was seized by the Pecos allies. Upon his return to Santa Cruz in the evening of July 2, Vargas found several letters from Bernalillo reporting an important Spanish victory over the Jémez in which the Spanish forces at Sia had engaged.³³

³² *Ibid.*, June 30 and July 1, 1696. This council of war was composed of Governor Vargas, Lieutenant Governor Luis Granillo, Lieutenant General of Cavalry Roque Madrid, *alcalde mayor* of Santa Cruz, Maestre de Campo Lorenzo Madrid, *alcalde* of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Antonio Valverde, captain of the presidio of Santa Fé, his *alférez* Don Martín de Urioste, and Adjutant Juan Ruiz de Casares. Vargas pointed out that although the villa of Santa Cruz was surrounded by hostile country (the Tanos in the Chimayó mountains, five leagues away; the Tewas of San Juan and the Picuríes at El Embudo, and in the mountains at the "caja" of the river, about five or six leagues away; the Tewas of Santa Clara in the sierra facing the said pueblo, about the same distance away; and those of San Ildefonso scattered through the sierra on the other side of the river and facing their pueblo, etc.), nevertheless, the villa was sufficiently protected and was strategically located for the proposed expedition to Taos. He believed the war would be over by October, for the Indians would eventually starve if they remained in the mountains, and should the war last longer, winter would bring them to terms. He pointed out the fertility and the abundance of water in the Santa Cruz region, and expressed the assurance that the viceroy would certainly send sufficient aid to prevent abandonment of the province. Luis Granillo insisted vigorously that the enemy was inferior in strength; that it would blemish the repute of Spanish arms to permit such a withdrawal to New Spain; that the people of Santa Cruz were sufficiently provisioned and protected; furthermore, such a move would give new hope to the hostile tribes on the whole northern frontier of New Spain, as happened when the Spaniards abandoned New Mexico in 1680.

³³ *Ibid.*, July 1-2, 1696.

Campaign Captain Miguel de Lara, with the soldiers recently sent to Sia, had been following the trail of the enemy leading in the direction of Ácoma, along the Sierra de Jémez. They were suddenly surprised by a volley of gunfire from a nearby mesa. Taking position on a *peñol* they forced the enemy to withdraw, and fought their way to San Diego de Jémez, where, under violent attack, they went up and recovered the bones of Father Jesús. From there they continued the pursuit, and were caught in an ambush about two arquebus shots from San Juan de Jémez. Seeing further pursuit purposeless, the Spaniards retreated, under constant attack, and were again ambushed, this time on the open plains and by an augmented enemy group on horseback. Forced to make battle under these circumstances, the Spaniards cried out "Santiago!" and a bloody two hour battle ensued; finally the enemy withdrew after having sustained heavy losses. The Spanish, remarkably enough, suffered only one casualty, the bold garrison soldier Cristóbal Tafoya having been wounded. Two Indians were taken prisoner. It was learned from one of them that a large group of Acomas, Zuñis, Moquis, Jémez, Tewas, and Tanos were gathered on the mesa of San Juan, determined and vengeful.³⁴

³⁴ Miguel de Lara to Vargas, Sia, July 1, 1696; Fernando de Chávez to Vargas, Bernalillo, July 1, 1696; Bartolomé de Ojeda to Vargas, Sia, n.d.; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, July 31, 1696. According to Lara twenty-eight of the enemy were killed in the battle; according to Ojeda, and Vargas' letter to the viceroy, forty. Lara appealed for more guns, bullets, horses, and leather jackets.

Vargas ordered that the captives taken in battle at Jémez be questioned at Santa Fé, confessed, and "taken across the river" to be executed. Vargas justified the executions by stating that the province was in a state of war. One of the prisoners escaped on the way to the villa. The other, a young Ácoma, was questioned. He stated that Zuñi, Moqui, Navaho, Apache, Cochiti, Jémez and Ácoma (about forty-five) warriors were gathered on the *peñol* of Jémez, having assembled there to attack Sia, under the impression that the Spaniards had already abandoned Bernalillo. He said that rebel leaders from the *peñol* had been sent to Pecos, Zuñi, and Moqui, to incite them against the Spaniards. Indicating lack of harmony among the rebels, he pointed out that the Tewas, Picuries, Taos, and Tanos were the enemies of the group at Jémez. He said that only the Tanos living at Zuñi were their friends. He further stated that Ácoma had had a bad crop, and that the water reservoirs atop their mesa were dry, for which reasons the mesa could be won in two days if besieged. After the testimony the prisoner was instructed and confessed by Fathers Alpuente and Chavarria, and executed "four squares from the villa." Vargas to Captain Alfonso Rael de Aguilar, Santa Cruz, July 2, 1696, and report, Santa Fé, July 3, 1696.

Meanwhile, from his base at Santa Cruz, Vargas continuously reconnoitered the enemy camps near Chimayó. On July 3 he inspected the abandoned pueblo at Chimayó, whose partially built church, well constructed ditches, and fine fields caused him to express pity that all this had been abandoned simply because of the "evil advice" of four or five rebel agitators. Considering it futile to carry on further operations without first capturing an enemy from whom information might be obtained as to where the enemy had fled, Vargas spent several days resting the horses, and on July 5, having left the greater part of the horses, well guarded, pasturing at Cuyamungué, he returned to Santa Fé.³⁵

A petition was soon presented to the governor by the custodian and ordinary ecclesiastical judge of the province, Fray Francisco de Vargas, in which the latter reviewed the condition of the missions, and made a specific appeal for aid for the Pecos mission. The custodian was residing in Santa Fé along with the nine other friars who had been obliged to abandon their missions. Missionaries were now stationed only at three friendly pueblos: San Felipe, Santa Ana, and Sia. Describing the damage done to mission property, and the increasingly dangerous situation at Pecos, where there was a strong rebel faction, he now requested Vargas to provide pack animals and a military escort to remove religious articles, sixty-two *costales* of maize, eight fanegas of wheat, and livestock from the Pecos mission. Vargas responded promptly with thirty-six mules, muleteers, and an escort of eight soldiers, and the property was removed safely to Santa Fé. He was careful to give reasons for this to the Pecos, whose goodwill he did not wish to alienate, since eighty warriors from there were aiding him in the war; it was being done only as a defensive measure against a possible Apache attack while he was campaigning elsewhere. He showed his concern for the welfare of the missionaries by cancelling the debt of 600 pesos owed him by four of the missionaries recently killed, as well as a small sum owed him by Father José de Arbizu. He also assured the custodian that his table

³⁵ Vargas' journal, Santa Cruz, July 3-4, and Santa Fé, July 5, 1696.

was always open to the missionaries, and that his salary and his all were at their service.³⁶

Meanwhile, to follow up Lara's recent victory over the Jémez, José Madrid was sent from Santa Fé, accompanied by four soldiers, as reinforcements for Bernalillo. There he was to consult with Lara, Chávez, and Ojeda, and then inspect carefully the position of the enemy. At the same time Chávez was ordered to send out spies to discover the exact location of the rebellious natives of Santo Domingo and Cochití. The next day, July 10, Vargas would lead his army, including Pecos and Tesuque allies, to San Felipe, where José Madrid would report his findings, and a plan of attack would be worked out. And so it was done. Vargas, with his small force of Spanish cavalry, forty-five Pecos warriors, and eleven from Tesuque, set out from Santa Fé, reached the Río Grande by way of a wagon road leading to San Felipe, and spent the night at the river's edge. The next morning headquarters were established among the trees on the opposite bank. Shortly, Lara, Chávez, the Indian governors of Sia, Santa Ana, and San Felipe, and others charged with various military missions arrived to consult with their leader. They had been unsuccessful in ferreting out the rebels of Santo Domingo and Cochití; but tracks gave indication of their presence in the mountains facing the mesa on which their pueblo had been destroyed by Vargas in 1694. Lara was ordered to return to Sia, leave five soldiers there, and come back with the remaining eleven. The Indian governors were told to leave sufficient soldiers at their pueblos to assure them protection, as those of Tesuque and Pecos had done, and join Vargas at noon the next day with the rest of their warriors.³⁷

The reinforcements arrived shortly after schedule, and as

³⁶ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, July 6, 1696. Vargas prevented the lay brother José Narváez Valverde from leaving the province at this time. Valverde felt that his presence was unnecessary under existing conditions; just another mouth to feed. He had served as apothecary and surgeon. He left New Mexico in 1697, and returned in Vargas' company in 1703. As late as the 1730's he was still serving in upper New Mexico! (Hackett, *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico*, III, 378, 385-387). The pack train from Pecos arrived at Santa Fé on the 8th (Vargas' journal, July 8, 1696).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, July 6, 9-10, 1696.

darkness fell Vargas sallied forth to seek out the enemy and defeat him by fire and sword if necessary. At midnight the band reached the Pueblo Viejo de Cochití; headquarters were established in the plaza. The troops changed to fresh mounts, each soldier taking in addition two auxiliary riding horses. Ordering Martín Hurtado to remain behind with the rest of the horses, the mules, and a guard of twenty soldiers, Vargas then led his troops into the mountains believed to be the refuge of the enemy. Having travelled four or five leagues he called a halt to await spies sent out ahead, and in order to permit his men to change again to fresh mounts. Proceeding at daybreak, the expedition passed through a deep canyon, dangerous because the enemy could roll stones down the slopes and block the way. Finally a group of the enemy was observed at the entrance of another canyon between the two sierras. Pursued, they fled, leaving bundles of clothing behind. Six of them were killed. Some books and religious articles from the Cochití mission were found; eighty head of sheep, a cow, and a calf were seized; and thirty-one women and children were taken. No Spaniard was killed or wounded. Vargas now had the bugler call in the soldiers clattering throughout the canyon in pursuit of the enemy. The tired band returned to headquarters at Cochití.³⁸

Two more entries into the canyon in the course of the next two days led to the discovery of several maize caches hidden in the mountain sides. The grain was carried off; but only a handful of lone rebels made an appearance, one of whom was killed by Miguel de Lara in a hand-to-hand struggle. Unable to make full contact with the rebels, and having won a victory by virtue of seizing over one hundred fanegas of maize, essential food supplies of the enemy, Vargas and his lieutenants returned from Pueblo Viejo de Cochití to their respective posts. Vargas and his men reached Santa Fé on the 17th, where no trophy of war could have been more welcome to the underfed Spanish settlers than the maize brought in on the backs of the weary pack mules following this campaign.³⁹

³⁸ Vargas' journal, July 11-13, 1696.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, July 14-17, 1696.

Although the fate of New Mexico was in the balance, authorities in Mexico City were dealing with the needs of the distant outpost on the basis of information several months old. As yet they were without official knowledge of the course of events set in motion on June 4. However, continual reports from Vargas and the missionaries concerning the hardships of the settlers, and fear lest a refusal of immediate aid might result in abandoning the province finally caused the Junta General de Hacienda to act. It recognized the dire need for assuring the preservation of the re-won part of New Mexico,⁴⁰ and it was aware that the New Mexicans lacked provisions because of inability to cultivate the fields, hard times, and Indian warfare. Therefore it made grants and gave authorizations and instructions, on July 4, 1696, to Vargas. To be distributed among the settlers were: 600 cows with bulls for breeding; 200 oxen for plowing; 400 various cattle for slaughter; 3,000 sheep and 2,000 goats with males for breeding; the royal treasury at Parral was to pay for these. The royal treasury at Mexico City was to send 2,000 varas of Seseno cloth, and 2,000 blankets from Villa Alta or Nejapa. More missionaries and settlers were denied to Vargas. The Santa Fé presidio was to be maintained at full strength; the governor at Parral was ordered to provide replacements when necessary. The stabilization of the frontier and not continued campaigning nor spread of settlements was the chief interest of the government; for this missions and presidios were bulwark. The recently sent settlers had been equipped with implements for soil cultivation and provided with livestock; El Paso was an example of work and frugality to be emulated. (Apparently the officials in Mexico City did not realize that the existence of the Santa Fé outpost farther north decidedly diminished the cost of the upkeep of El Paso.) The governor was by all means to aid and protect the missions. Also the Franciscan Commissary General, Fray Manuel de Monzaval, was urged by the Junta to inspire the missionaries with zeal in their holy obligation of

⁴⁰ The royal cédula, December 22, 1685, cited above, was fully discussed here, and the king's admonition that New Mexico had been lost in 1680 for lack of prompt preventive measures was reemphasized.

converting souls in the dangerous but praiseworthy service of God and King.⁴¹

In compliance with this last order, the Commissary General wrote to Francisco de Vargas, Custodian of the New Mexico missions, words which must have echoed with a thousand sad memories as they were read. For, as he wrote, the Father Commissary was as yet without knowledge that some six weeks before, five of those to whom his letter was addressed had won the martyr's crown. Among other exhortations, the Commissary General wrote:

Through the blood of martyrs, the religion will be multiplied and extended throughout all the world and in New Mexico . . . Our Redeemer Christ shed His blood to win souls to Heaven . . . Be strong while the battle lasts; cast aside, my sons, the fear of those who can only kill the body. Perfect charity casts out all fear, and there can be no greater charity than to expose one's corporal life to combat an idolater, and to preserve in the faith those already converted, nor a greater reward for your Reverences; for should it happen that in this service corporal lives should be lost, the eternal lives of their souls would be assured salvation . . .⁴²

Needless to say, the unlimited bravery, zeal, kindness, and obedience of all the Franciscan friars in that time of crisis was clearly manifest to everyone in New Mexico.

Immediately upon his return to Santa Fé, General Vargas embarked upon another campaign, this time to quiet the troublesome rebels who had their *rancherías* in the mountains north of Santa Cruz. Awaiting him at the capital was a letter from Roque Madrid, *alcalde mayor* of Santa Cruz, written several days past and containing information obtained by scouts. Most of the Tanos were at Taos, where the church had been converted into a corral; the Tanos were boasting that they would defeat the Spaniards and were generally converting the place into a hotbed of rebellion. The letter closed with an ur-

⁴¹ Report of the Junta de Hacienda, Mexico City, July 4, 1696; the viceroy to Vargas, Mexico City, July 4, 1696, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38; see also viceregal decree, Mexico City, August 2, 1696, authorizing the payment of salaries to the presidial soldiers of El Paso at the royal treasury of Zacatecas.

⁴² The Father Commissary General, Fray Manuel de Monzaval, to Fray Francisco de Vargas, Santiago de Querétaro, July 19, 1696.

gent request for food for the destitute people. They had been living on *quelites*, and the supply was near exhaustion.⁴³

Vargas now called for eighty Pecos warriors to aid him in the projected campaign. In reply Sergeant Major Almazán, *alcalde mayor* of Pecos, reported a large troop of Taos, Picuríes, and Tanos, on foot, in the canyon near Taos, for which reason Pecos could spare no men. Ammunition was rushed to Pecos, and warnings were immediately sent to Tesuque, Santa Cruz, and Bernalillo. At Santa Fé many feared that this troop was on its way to attack Santa Fé, and drastic defense measures were taken. These were indeed days of suspense and real fear. Another letter was received from Roque Madrid, at Santa Cruz, reporting a large number of Indians, from the sierra where the Tanos had their *ranchería*, crossing the Río Grande, their horses loaded with their belongings, on their way to the sierra of Santa Clara; also, of the dispersed inhabitants of the abandoned pueblo of San Juan de los Caballeros, four *rancherías* were located at El Embudo de Cochití, and their governor had gone to visit the Navahos in an effort to obtain maize; sixteen men were on guard day and night to forestall any possible raids by the enemy.⁴⁴

The rebel group seen near Taos did not make the expected attack on Pecos. On the following day Almazán arrived at Santa Fé with forty Pecos warriors, whereupon Vargas immediately set out for Tesuque. There a council of war was held, and Governor Domingo of Tesuque formulated a plan of attack which was agreed upon.⁴⁵ Domingo, with forty of his picked Indians and twenty Spanish soldiers led by Captain Valverde, and accompanied by Fray Juan de Alpuente, as chaplain, would attack at sunrise. Meanwhile, Vargas, with the rest

⁴³ Roque Madrid to Vargas, Santa Cruz, July 15, 1696.

⁴⁴ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, July 19, 1696. Madrid, in his letter, requested that the saddles used by the widows who had been evacuated to Santa Fé be returned, for the owners who had graciously lent them needed them. The rebels reported crossing the Río Grande were going to join confederates, but apparently had no immediate military objective in mind. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1696. See also, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, July 31, 1696.

⁴⁵ Vargas' journal, July 20-21, 1696. Vargas set out for Tesuque on the 21st, at 10 A. M.

of the soldiers, including the Pecos allies and volunteer settlers from Santa Fé, and reinforcements from Santa Cruz, accompanied by Fray Blas Navarro, would pass on through Santa Cruz, enter the mountain, and lie in hiding. The sound of gunfire from Domingo's squad would be the signal for Vargas to close in on the enemy from the rear, and at the same time the sounding clarion would notify Domingo of Vargas' attack. But enemy spies observed Vargas' forces and the rebels were able to flee into the mountains beyond Nambé. However, Valverde, leading his men into this thickly wooded region, came upon the hiding place of the natives of Nambé, and some Tanos and natives of Pojoaque, Cuyamungué, and Jacona. A small rebel troop protecting the flight of the hard pressed natives joined battle with Valverde's forces. Several of the enemy were killed, and one prisoner was taken. Valverde's booty included clothing, twenty goats, a number of kids, and three horses. The Spaniards lost two horses. At Santa Cruz, the prisoner, a native of Cuyamungué, was questioned, and sentenced to death, but his life was spared at the request of Governor Domingo, for the prisoner was his son-in-law.⁴⁶ An old Indian woman who had escaped to Santa Cruz from the above enemy camp was provisioned and sent to her people to tell them to return to their pueblos and to the peace of their

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, July 21-23, 1696. According to the testimony of the captive, his pueblo had joined in the rebellion at the urging of the leaders from Santa Clara, Pojoaque, San Cristóbal and San Lázaro, their neighbors. These leaders told them that the Spaniards would behead all of them, and enslave their women and children. He said that the day after the natives of these pueblos had fled to the mountains, they had joined in a war council with those of Nambé, Jacona, and Cuyamungué, and it had been decided to go to the place where Vargas had first come upon the Tanos; from there they had withdrawn to the mountain tops, protected by the Tanos, who had engaged in battle with Captain Valverde and his men, and later joined them. Those of Jacona and Pojoaque were on their way to join the Navahos. Some of the natives of Nambé were in the mountains, and others, along with all those of Cuyamungué, had gone to Taos. He said that the Tanos of San Cristóbal and San Lázaro were primarily responsible for the uprising; they had dispersed, some going to join Navahos, while others had gone to Taos. Significantly, he pointed out that lack of maize was making their stay in the mountains untenable. He claimed to have no knowledge of the whereabouts of the natives of San Ildefonso, San Juan, and Santa Clara, or of Naranjo, the leader of the revolt and massacre at Santa Clara on June 4.

fields and houses; if they did so, they would be pardoned. She carried a written message of peace and good will.⁴⁷

Scraps of evidence gathered from time to time pointed to Naranjo and the rebellious natives of Santa Clara as among those primarily responsible for the existing state of affairs, and now Governor Domingo of Tesuque, through his spies, had discovered their whereabouts. On the 23rd, Vargas' campaign forces, with explicit orders to travel quietly and under cover to avoid detection, sallied forth from Santa Cruz. Taking the road to San Juan, the Río Grande was easily forded. From there the expedition crossed the mountains, and dropped down upon a broad plateau which led into the canyon called El Embudo. Here enemy tracks were observed. Soon El Embudo was reached, narrow and heavily forested with large trees. The terrain was craggy and difficult, and it seemed virtually impossible to enter the deep canyon on horseback. But a small force, including Captain Lázaro de Mizquía, did enter the canyon. It was a daring exploit, for Naranjo, the bitterly hostile enemy captain, and his men, well entrenched in the rocks above, controlling the ascents, were quietly awaiting the opportune moment to strike. Sudden fire came down upon the Spaniards; Antonio Cisneros, hit directly in the head, fell to the ground, and a rebel warrior darted out from the rocks and decapitated him. Meanwhile, Naranjo was observed making determined efforts to kill Father Alpuente. An arrow struck the friar squarely on the lower leg; but he came out unscathed thanks to the protection of his heavy leather boots.

These incidents aroused Vargas to unbounded fury. Many of the Spaniards were forced to withdraw to the heavily wooded entrance to the canyon, under a barrage of heavy stones being rolled down from both sides. An Indian riding at Vargas' side emerged with a broken arm. Some of the Spaniards were still fighting deep in the canyon, and reinforcements and ammunition were sent to their aid. They finally emerged, battered but victorious, having put the rebels to flight. They

⁴⁷ The Spaniards often sent elderly Indian women on missions of peace to the rebels because of their special importance in the social structure of the Pueblo Indians. The social unit among the Pueblos was the clan; "a clan comprised all the descendants of a traditional maternal ancestor. Children belonged to the clan of the mother." Hewett, *Ancient Life in the American Southwest*, 72.

had the head of Naranjo, the enemy leader. The Indian allies were loaded with plunder. Vargas, enraged because one of his men had been lost in the fray, the first such casualty since the massacre of June 4, recorded in his diary: "And I took great pleasure in seeing that rebel apostate dog in the said state." In the engagement four of Vargas' men were wounded. The expedition returned to Santa Cruz by way of Santa Clara, and after Mass was celebrated at Santa Cruz in honor of Santiago and the recent victory, Vargas returned to Santa Fé. The Indian allies went to their respective pueblos.⁴⁸

Back in Santa Fé, Vargas put his campaign records in order, and sent his periodic report to the viceroy, notifying him for the first time of the existing state of rebellion. A copy of Vargas' day by day journal of the period since the last such report was, as usual, the principal item. This was accompanied by three letters from Vargas to the viceroy, dated July 30, July 31, and August 1, the record of a petition presented by some of the settlers to the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, a letter from the *cabildo* to the viceroy, and a brief note from the *cabildo* member Lázaro de Mizquía. When the mail left Santa Fé, it also included official correspondence to be delivered at El Paso and Parral.

In his letter of July 30, Vargas outlined New Mexico's paramount problems and needs as he saw them. He began by recalling how in the year 1692 he had conquered all New Mexico, as far west as Ácoma, the Rock of Kiakima, where the people of the five Zuñi pueblos were gathered, and Moqui. He then related how in 1693 he had reentered New Mexico and encountered opposition; he recalled the long war which followed, the famous siege of the mesa of San Ildefonso and its final submission in September of 1694, after which victory the viceroy had ordered no further conquests, rather the consolidation of what was already won; this had been accomplished during the year 1695. He had repeatedly requested a total of 500 families as necessary for the complete safety of New Mexico, and

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, July 23, 25, 1696. Two old Indian women were sent to the recently discovered enemy camp, with the promise to the natives there that if they should return to their pueblos they would be pardoned. They were given a piece of paper with a cross painted on it as a sign of the offer of peace and pardon.

stated that 276 families were still lacking toward the attainment of this goal. Vargas requested immediate replacements for the fifty-eight soldiers and male settlers who had died in the wars of the reconquest and in epidemics (*peste*).

The settlers in New Mexico were as much of a problem as the rebels, he noted, a fact which the authorities in Mexico City did not seem to appreciate. This was due to the lack of food, clothing, oxen, cattle, and other bare necessities. As a result, all were dissatisfied, many wishing to leave, to the extent that husbands and wives were placing the blame on each other for having been led to such a miserable place. In begging the viceroy to act without delay, Vargas reminded him of the time required, four to five months, to receive answers to his letters, and that much could happen during such intervals. To assure success, and to relieve the New Mexican people of burdens beyond endurance, Vargas insisted on the following immediate needs: 200 additional men, provisioned, each with two riding mules; 300 arquebuses; 4,000 gunflints; and lead. Also, 2,000 head of five year old cattle, over and above the 500 Vargas had recently ordered purchased at a price of 3,000 pesos. To prevent delay they could be obtained at two different places, half from the hacienda of Captain Don Diego de Maturana, on the Nasas River in New Vizcaya, in the jurisdiction of the real of Parral, and the other half at the hacienda of General Antonio de la Campa at Atotonilco and San Sebastián. In addition, 3,000 fanegas of maize from New Vizcaya were considered necessary to feed the colony until next year's harvest. Soldiers were requested from Parral to escort the supplies to El Paso, from where Vargas could take care of the transportation. In his estimation, what grain he could capture by force of arms from the enemy would supply the colony for only three or four months. Should it be necessary to abandon New Mexico, as in 1680, it would be only for one reason: hunger and need.

Describing the recent Indian revolt, in which five missionaries and twenty-one settlers had been killed, and churches and religious articles burned or desecrated, he insisted that he was by no means defeated, but rather certain of final victory. Even though the Pueblo Indians had fled into the mountains, some joining the Navaho Apaches, and others going as far as the

fertile and beautiful lands of Casa Fuerte and Cuartelejo, the enemy was scattered and divided, and it would only be a matter of months before they would be starved and harassed into submission. Vargas felt certain that after his projected campaign against Taos and Picuríes in the fall, New Mexico would again be at peace. Because of the existing conditions, thirteen friars and a lay brother were sufficient now in the New Mexico missions: namely, the custodian, eight missionaries and a lay brother in upper New Mexico, and four missionaries in the El Paso district.⁴⁹

As stated above, Vargas' journal and correspondence were accompanied by separate letters from Lázaro de Mizquía and the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, and a copy of a petition presented to the *cabildo* by a group of settlers. Vargas bitterly resented this. He permitted these papers to be sent with the understanding that he would never allow this sort of thing to be done again unless by explicit order of the viceroy. Mizquía's brief note ended with the erroneous prophecy: "For various reasons I cannot say much, but you may soon hear that more than fifteen hundred persons will have died, the people of this kingdom."⁵⁰ The petition to the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, presented by a group of settlers, who felt themselves representing the "voice of the republic," referred to the misery and want in New Mexico, a place which had again become a cursed and bloody ground. The signers, "like starving beasts," were eating the grass of the fields, and other sources of sustenance not used among humans. A severe drought, and the hostility of the Indians, who had carried their grain into the mountains, were given as the principal reasons for the famine. Attempting to soften the heart of some emotional soul, they wrote: "It is a pity to hear the sound of children crying for want of food." Even water seemed to be lacking, for since the uprising of June 4, wells had been dug within the limits of Santa Fé itself, and the water from this source was none too pure. The *cabildo* of Santa Fé referred to the above petition as "notoriously justified." It repeated the wail: New Mexico was virtually starving; many there were living on such things as roasted skins of

⁴⁹ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, July 30, 1696.

⁵⁰ Lázaro de Mizquía to the viceroy, Bernalillo, August 2, 1696, and memorandum Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, August 1, 1696.

animals, and dogs, and nothing else. Due to the lack of rain there was no maize, wheat, or even *quelites*. Referring to the recent revolt and massacre, the *cabildo* pointed out that the rebels who had abandoned their pueblos were permitting their fields to dry up and deteriorate. Also, it emphasized, the Spaniards had insufficient horses to operate against the enemy. The letter ended with the pathetic plea: "Have pity on us and help us."⁵¹

In a letter dated July 21, Father Vargas, custodian of the New Mexico missions, reported to his Commissary General, Father Manuel de Monzaval, the recent setback of the missions under his care, and the tragic martyrdom of Fathers Arbizu, Carbonel, Corvera, Moreno, and Francisco de Jesús. Fathers Arbizu and Carbonel had been buried in the church at San Cristóbal. For days they had laid as the apostate natives had thrown them, face up, in the form of a cross. The bodies were buried in a few underclothes. Many noted that Father Arbizu's body was very light and soft. Fathers Corvera and Moreno had not yet been buried. Their rotting bodies had been covered over, however, and he would later gather up their bones and bury them in sacred ground. The body of Father Francisco de Jesús was already consumed by wild beasts when found, but some of the bones were gathered and buried in the church at the pueblo of Sia. The rebellion had been doubly disastrous for the missions, as considerable property had been lost; and the future appeared almost hopeless.⁵²

⁵¹ Petition presented to the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Santa Fé, July 20, 1696; the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Santa Fé, July 27, 1696.

When the mail left Santa Fé, it also included a letter from Vargas to Gabriel del Castillo, at Parral, governor of New Vizcaya, dated Santa Fé, July 31, 1696, in which he requested that Castillo lend him eight soldiers to escort to El Paso 200 horses he had ordered Captain Don Diego de Maturana to purchase for him. The courier from Santa Fé reached Parral August 18, and delivered the message. Castillo complied with the request (Gabriel del Castillo to the viceroy, Parral, August 18, 1696). The courier apparently had reached El Paso on August 9, because in a letter of that date Tiburcio de Ortega, *regidor* and *alguacil mayor* at El Paso, notified the viceroy that he had received a report from Governor Vargas telling of the disastrous developments in the north; and in which he added that El Paso was in such need of livestock, maize, horses and supplies, that it was not much better off! Tiburcio de Ortega to the viceroy, El Paso, August 9, 1696.

⁵² Father Vargas to the Father Commissary General, Santa Fé, July 21, 1696, B.N.M., legajo 4, docs. 13 and 15.

CHAPTER XV

INDIAN WARFARE

After two months of campaigning, Vargas' war to subdue the rebellious Pueblo Indians was half won. Of the five most powerful enemy groups (the Jémez and their confederates, Naranjo and his following, Ácoma and the west, Picuríes, and the concentration at Taos), two had been effectively broken up. The victory over the Jémez was decisive, and it impressed their confederates from the western pueblos (Ácoma, Zuñi, and Moqui) sufficiently; thereafter these were no longer a serious factor in the revolt. Naranjo, the guiding spirit of a large group in the Cochití mountains, was dead. The casualties among both the Spaniards and Indians were relatively few. During the two months just passed only one Spanish soldier had lost his life in battle. Two Spanish women were held captive by the rebels; two more had been carried off by the Apaches.¹ On the other hand ninety-three rebel Indians had been killed, including those executed, and forty-eight had been captured and were held as prisoners.² The pressure of economic warfare against the insurgents was being gradually increased, with conclusive results. In New Mexico, because of its peculiar geographic character and position, no type of warfare was more devastating and decisive in its results than economic warfare. Formally pronouncing the rebels traitors to the royal Crown and apostate enemies of the Holy Faith, Vargas promised a relentless offensive, "by fire and sword" if necessary, until all hostilities should be completely crushed.

Having rested his men, Vargas turned his attention to the west, and in the afternoon of August 1 left for the mesa of San Felipe. Climbing this the next morning at sunrise, he was graciously received by the loyal natives, whom he promised to defend against the common enemy. From there he went on

¹ Vargas to Gabriel del Castillo, governor of New Vizcaya, Santa Fé, July 31, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

Unless otherwise specified, all footnote citations in this chapter are from A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and S.F.A.

² *Ibid.*

to visit the Bernalillo settlements, spending the night at Santa Ana pueblo. On the 3d he reached Sia. During his visit there two Zuñi Indians entered the pueblo, and, suspected of being enemy spies, they were held for questioning.³ The first of these, a clever Zuñi, resident of the Rock of Kiakima, where the Zuñis lived, stated that they had been sent by their governor and cacique to inform Vargas that the Zuñis had no intentions to rise as did the Tewas and Tanos, but instead wished peace with the Spaniards. Twenty Tanos, men and women, were residing at Zuñi, and two Tewas of Santa Clara, with their wives, had gone to live at Moqui.⁴ The second Zuñi repeated the statement of Zuñi's good faith, adding that their governor had sent them to ask the Spaniards for help against the Moquis, with whom they could not live in safety. According to his story, Jémez leaders had gone to Zuñi with the report that the Keres were at war with them; hence some had gone to aid Jémez, but with no intention of fighting the Spaniards. Eleven Acomas had been killed in the battle of Jémez, an event that had aroused the pueblo to great anger. None of the Zuñis or Moquis had been killed, for they were eating when the battle started, and arrived on the scene after it was all over.

Accompanied by twenty soldiers and Indian allies, Vargas reconnoitered the surrounding country with the dual purpose of searching for much needed grain secreted by the enemy, and of assuring the security of the region before embarking on a proposed campaign against Ácoma. After a day of scouting, however, the Ácoma campaign was postponed owing to the happy arrival of 250 head of livestock from New Vizcaya. These were half of the 500 purchased by Vargas some time

³ Vargas' journal, August 1-3, 1696.

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1696. This informant stated that the two Tewas mentioned had gone to Moqui with the Moquis who had recently fought on the side of the Jémez; that no Keres of Cochití or Santo Domingo were living at Ácoma, Zuñi, or Moqui; that the older men of Zuñi wanted only peace so that they could plant their fields in security; and that although many from Ácoma and Moqui had gone to the call of the Jémez, and had taken part in the recent battle, only eight Zuñis had participated, and these against the will of the Zuñi leaders. He also said that the Tanos were liars and that the Zuñis had no use for them, and that as a result of the defeat at Jémez, the Moquis and Acomas had returned to their pueblos frightened and with no further plans to help the Tewa and Tano rebels.

previously. According to the message from Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente, of Janos presidio, the remainder would be sent up in October.⁵ In consequence of these developments, Vargas returned to Santa Fé to direct the distribution of cattle among the people there and at Santa Cruz. Meanwhile, brave and resourceful Captain Miguel de Lara was sent with twelve soldiers, Indian allies, pack mules and muleteers, to search for maize caches in the Jémez region in order to facilitate provisioning the contemplated expedition to Ácoma.⁶

Ready for the Ácoma campaign, Vargas by August 8 was on the march. The following day he obtained news of Lara's success in obtaining grain—about one hundred fanegas of maize found in some caves in the vicinity of the mesa of San Juan pueblo.⁷ A Jémez Indian captured on the mesa, after a half mile chase, gave news to Lara. All the Jémez and Cochití Indians had gone to Ácoma, except a small number from both San Juan and San Diego de Jémez who were living in the mountains; the Tewas were now residing in front of Los Pedernales, on the Chama River; and the Acomas and Zuñis had left after the battle at Jémez vowing no peace until the Spaniards were exterminated. Having achieved his mission, Lara returned to Sia.⁸

Vargas soon arrived at Sia, which he made his campaign headquarters. After a rest of several days, the expedition set out for Ácoma.⁹ The grizzled campaigner was accompanied by a picked group of Spanish soldiers, and Indian allies from Sia, Santa Ana, and San Felipe.¹⁰ Fathers Chavarría and Matta served as chaplains for the expedition. The first night was

⁵ *Ibid.*, August 4, 1696. Fernández was about to leave Janos on a campaign in Sonora, having been called by the governor at Parral, and expected to be back from the wars by October; on his return he promised to send the remainder of the cattle.

⁶ *Ibid.*, August 5-6, 1696.

⁷ The six mules were loaded to capacity, and Lara's men carried the rest. *Ibid.*, August 8, 1696.

⁸ *Ibid.* After having been questioned, the Jémez Indian was left hanging from a tree, by Vargas' orders. Pedernales was about fifteen miles up the Chama River from San Juan; five or six miles farther up the river was Valle de la Piedra Alumbre. See Miera y Pacheco's map (1779), in Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, 87.

⁹ Vargas arrived at Sia on August 10. Vargas' journal, August 10, 1696.

¹⁰ The expedition set out from Sia on August 13, between 8 and 9 A. M. *Ibid.*, August 13, 1696.

spent on the edge of the Río Puerco, which, being dry, was crossed without difficulty.¹¹ The following day Vargas reached Paraje de la Laguna de Ácoma, only five leagues from the Rock. From there he proceeded more cautiously. Indians were stationed as sentinels on the rocks and *cerros* surrounding the canyon, and twelve Indians were sent ahead to spy on the enemy.¹²

While at Paraje de la Laguna de Ácoma, Vargas succeeded in capturing two Indians from whom valuable information was obtained concerning the enemy. According to their testimony, eighty Cochití Indians were now living at Ácoma, and had planted maize, watermelons, melons, and squash in the fields below the Rock. Others from Cochití, they said, were at Embudo de Cochití.¹³ Also five Jémez families, and twenty-five Indians from the abandoned pueblo of Santo Domingo were at Ácoma, and there were about forty Tewas and Tanos at Zuñi. Two Spanish women and a boy were held captive at Ácoma, one of the women having been obtained from the Navaho Apaches. The Ácoma Indians had about eighty horses and one hundred sheep; one of the Jémez Indians had taken his flock with him; all the animals were turned loose at sunrise, at which time the natives went down from the Rock, leaving it unprotected, to work in the fields. Also, they said that at the next full moon there would be a great council attended by all the Zuñis, Moquis, Coninas, Utes, Apaches of the Gila and Chilmos, for the purpose of planning an attack on Sia, which they would enter in the guise of peace.¹⁴

¹¹ "Paraje del Río Puerco."

¹² Paraje de la Laguna de Ácoma was in a canyon near some caves found before reaching the river which runs down from the above mentioned lake. It was nine leagues from Paraje del Río Puerco.

¹³ Where the rebel half-breed Naranjo recently had been killed in battle.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, August 14, 1696. He also said that a Cochití Indian had hidden a statue of the Blessed Virgin and other religious articles from Santo Domingo in a cave; it is not stated exactly where.

According to the second prisoner the great enemy war council was to be held in October, and for the purpose of planning an attack on Bernalillo as well as Sia.

After they had been questioned, the two prisoners were prepared for a happy death by Fathers Chavarria and Matta, and executed. Because of the shortage of powder and bullets, the prisoners were hanged instead of being executed before a firing squad as was customary.

Vargas waited until evening before approaching the Rock of Ácoma, for it was his plan to do so unobserved. The broad sweep of level land all around made it impossible to travel any farther by day without being discovered by the enemy, for an occasional mesa was the only means of cover. As darkness fell, the little army, consisting of fifty Spanish soldiers and a slightly larger force of Indian allies, advanced to within three leagues of Ácoma. Here the army was divided into two groups, one under the command of Vargas, the other under the Indian leader Ojeda and the presidio captain Valverde. By one o'clock in the morning the two groups were stationed at strategic positions about a league from the Rock.¹⁵ There they waited, unobserved, until morning. Very few Acomas descended to the fields, as had been expected; so the Spaniards decided to attack the formidable stronghold. As they approached the ascent to the mesa, they saw the mesatop crowned with enemy warriors yelling furiously and preparing for battle. The Spaniards began to round up the sheep in the fields below the mesa, and some Acomas descended to prevent them from doing so; but the rebels were driven back by a withering volley of gunfire. Soon Valverde and his men appeared with eight prisoners, one of them the cacique. The enemy had been engaged at the other side of the mesa, and six or eight rebels had been killed in the encounter; but Valverde had stopped firing because the Acomas were well entrenched above, and he had decided against further fighting as merely a waste of ammunition. Vargas offered to return enemy prisoners in exchange for rebels from other pueblos who had taken refuge at Ácoma; but he received no answer. That night the Spanish forces pitched camp in the fields. Nine horses, a mule, and four hundred sheep constituted the day's booty.¹⁶

On the following day Vargas sent the cacique prisoner to his pueblo with a message repeating the demand of the previous day, and with an ultimatum: if no answer were forthcoming this time, the Spaniards would lay waste to the fields

¹⁵ Vargas' forces were apparently hiding behind Enchanted Mesa, for he describes the place as a huge rock which, silhouetted in the night, had the appearance of the ruins of a great church.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, August 14-15, 1696. The night of the 15th, four more rebels were taken prisoner.

and carry off the livestock. Ten o'clock in the morning came, and no answer. Vargas went forth in person to repeat his demands; but again no answer from atop the mesa. Realizing his small force could not capture the Rock by assault, for the Acomas, besides being strong in numbers, had guns and ammunition, and apprehensive lest the Apaches come to the aid of Ácoma, Vargas proceeded to lay waste to the fields, hoping in this way to lure the Acomas down from the mesa, where he could fight them to his advantage. None descended from the mesa, however. The three day siege of Ácoma was lifted, and Vargas returned to Sia.¹⁷

The vital problem of obtaining more food now engrossed the attention of the governor. Constant warfare had caused a stoppage of trade with the Indians in essential foodstuffs, and made it impossible to plant, and supplies from New Vizcaya were insufficient. Besides, the campaigning armies demanded reserve supplies. To add to the general misery of the settlers, what little they were able to plant withered away in a plaguing drought. Until peace should come, the constant seizure of grain from the enemy was the only recourse. Immediately upon his return to Sia, Vargas sent an expedition to San Juan de Jémez to search for hidden enemy grain. Another group of soldiers was sent to Bernalillo to obtain cattle held there on Vargas' account, and drive it to Santa Fé.¹⁸

While resting at Sia, Vargas received a message from Roque Madrid which caused him to hasten to Santa Fé to prepare the proposed expedition to Picuríes and Taos. Madrid reported that there were constant rumors of a proposed attack on Santa Cruz, and there appeared to be a plot on foot among the Taos, Picuríes, and Tanos to kill Vargas, whose demise, the rebels believed, would lead the Spaniards to abandon New

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, August 16-19, 1696. Vargas and the leaders reached Sia the evening of August 18. The remainder of the camp arrived the following day. From Sia, Vargas sent a Zuñi captive to his pueblo with a message to his people telling them that they were considered as having done no wrong, and that as a sign of good faith they should kill or surrender to him all the rebels who had taken refuge there; that those pueblos showing bad faith by not complying in this matter would suffer the same fate as Ácoma.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, August 19, 1696. On the following day part of the cattle was distributed at Santa Fé, the remainder sent to Santa Cruz. *Ibid.*, August 20, 1696.

Mexico.¹⁹ From Santa Fé, Vargas ordered Roque Madrid to send out an expedition to El Embudo, three leagues from San Juan de los Caballeros, to search for maize.²⁰ By now the starving natives had learned a few lessons, and left their grain supplies less exposed to seizure; hence these Spanish searching expeditions were much less successful than the earlier ones. In a week's time only two loads of maize were seized.²¹ The Spaniards had only to hold out a few more months, however, for the hardships which were being suffered by the rebels, many of whom were roaming like beasts in the mountains, starving and homeless, could not possibly be endured in the coming winter months. Lack of cooperation among the hostile tribes, in fact enmity between some of them, intensified by suffering, were working strongly in Vargas' favor.

Tangible evidence of the gradual collapse of the rebellion was the voluntary surrender of Miguel Saxette, the native governor of the abandoned rebel pueblo of San Juan de los Caballeros, on August 27. He was brought before Vargas by Governor Domingo of Tesuque. Saxette protested that he had taken no part in the uprising of June 4, and cast the entire blame for the events at San Juan upon the Indian war captain Juan Griego of that pueblo. According to his story, Griego had induced the people of the pueblo to flee with him to Taos, taking with them their belongings, horses, and livestock. All but six families were at Taos, the remainder in the mountains.²² The natives of both Taos and Picuríes were divided in their views, some wishing to make peace with the Spaniards, the others determined to fight. They were now living in the mountains near their pueblos, he said, the Taos having removed to the *embudo*, or entrance to the canyon beyond their pueblo. All the natives of Santa Clara had left to join the Moquis and Navahos, and a few from Pojoaque and San

¹⁹ *Ibid.* Madrid also stated that many Taos had left for Acoma, and that others had gone to the plains and had joined the Navahos. He also had heard reports that the Tanos were starving, and that the Taos, themselves hard pressed, were refusing to give their confederates any help. Vargas reached Santa Fé on August 20.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, August 22, 1696.

²¹ *Ibid.*, August 25, 1696.

²² He stated that he himself had not gone to Taos because Antonio of Picuríes had told him that he would be killed for having refused to cooperate in the rebellion.

Cristóbal, along with a larger number from Cochití and Jémez, were hiding in the mountains, from where they were attempting to gather a few ears of maize and beans in their abandoned fields. Since he proclaimed convincingly his loyalty as a Christian and vassal of the Spanish king, Vargas pardoned him, and sent him to Picuríes with a message offering pardon to Governor Lorenzo and his brother Antonio.²³

The next few days were spent reconnoitering in preparation for the long planned expedition to Picuríes and Taos. Santa Fé and Santa Cruz were in a state of constant alarm, as every fresh enemy track was trailed; but no unexpected developments materialized. Perhaps the most exciting episode at Santa Fé during this breathing spell was the arrival of a gruesome gift from Pecos. The rebel Pecos Indian Caripicado, it happened, who had escaped the noose on August 5th, when four of his rebel companions were hanged by Governor Felipe of that pueblo, with permission from Vargas, was secretly visiting some friends at the pueblo. Governor Felipe surprised him just outside the pueblo, and shot him through the temple. The head, a hand, and a foot of the victim were sent to Vargas by Governor Felipe as a token of loyalty.²⁴

Vargas was constantly in the saddle. On September 3 Miguel Saxette returned from his mission with the following information. Near El Embudo, beyond Santa Cruz, he had come upon Antonio, brother of Governor Lorenzo of Picuríes, with two companions. Lorenzo was sad at the sight of his people wandering in the mountains like wild deer, and had called a meeting to discuss the desirability of their returning to their pueblo; but they were afraid, for they had abandoned their pueblo at the time of the uprising, although not through guilt of any kind, and now feared punishment as accomplices. Those to blame for the uprising, according to the Picuríes leaders, were the Tano Ebzequebe, Juan Griego of San Juan, Naranjo and Juan Chillo of Santa Clara, and Diaguillo of Nambé. According to Miguel, both Lorenzo and Antonio proclaimed their willingness to visit Vargas if he so desired; they had, they averred, all the religious articles of the pueblo of

²³ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, August 27, 1696.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, August 30, 1696.

Picuríes in safe keeping. To test the truth of the protestations of loyalty by the Picuríes leaders, Vargas sent Miguel to tell them to return their people to their pueblo, and bring in person the religious articles of the Picuríes church, and the head of the rebel Tomás, lieutenant-governor of the Tanos of San Cristóbal.²⁵

September 6 brought news which warranted immediate investigation. First, Miguel returned without fulfilling his mission, accompanied by his wife and children, whom he had come upon fleeing for their lives; word had gone out from Taos to seize him for attempting to induce the native leaders to visit Vargas and meet certain death; Jémez Indians, he was told, were spreading the story carried by an Apache recently up from El Paso: the Spaniards were systematically attempting to kill all the Indian men, after which they would return to El Paso with the boys. And secondly, Vargas learned from some Indians captured at Santa Clara that the Picuríes were travelling eastward.²⁶ Amid this confusion of rumors and reports from the north, all of them potentially of utmost importance, Vargas decided to make Santa Cruz his headquarters, for it was more strategically located to deal with the northern danger. From Santa Cruz as a base, he spent several days scouring the mountain sides, and very successfully, for 250 loads of maize were seized in El Embudo, northeast of Santa Cruz. On one occasion Governor Lorenzo of Picuríes appeared on the mountain side, but refused to come down; instead some of his companions let fly a shower of arrows aimed at Vargas and his men, none of which hit its mark.²⁷

A letter coming on September 9 from Captain Lara, stationed at Sia with ten soldiers, reported all quiet in the west: the forces there could well be withdrawn for use in the campaigns in the northeast. Significantly, this meant that the conflict had been narrowed to the region north and northeast of Santa Fé. Indeed, Vargas' battle was now almost won.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, September 3, 1696. Tomás was alleged to have killed the Indian governor Cristóbal Yope, whose wife and children had taken refuge at Santa Cruz on August 9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, September 6, 1696.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, September 6-9, 1696.

Lara was ordered to withdraw with four soldiers to Bernalillo, and to send the rest of the soldiers to Santa Cruz.²⁸

On September 21, with his augmented Spanish forces, accompanied by friendly warriors from Pecos and Tesuque, and leaving Santa Fé well provisioned for at least three weeks, Vargas sallied forth on the carefully planned expedition to the north—the expedition destined to break the back of the rebellion.²⁹ The Trampas River was reached before nightfall, and the men continued on as far as a *torreón* which stood a fourth of a league from Picuríes, where the night was spent.³⁰ Finding Picuríes abandoned, Vargas proceeded to Taos.³¹ At Miranda, four leagues from Taos, the soldiers stopped to rest, and after a change to fresh mounts, a swift detachment, led by Vargas, went ahead to examine the pueblo. The place was abandoned, except for a few natives seen in the fields who immediately betook themselves to flight. They were pursued as far as the entrance to their mountain retreat (behind the pueblo), which was soon astir. Many of the Indians were gathered at the mouth of the canyon, where Vargas pleaded with them to return to their homes and fields and receive pardon. But the answer they gave was a discharge of arrows at the Indian allies, who responded with some shots. Unsuccessful in his pleadings, Vargas withdrew to the pueblo dwellings, where the soldiers took lodging for the night. The following day, after receiving absolution from Father Blas Navarro, chaplain of the expedition, Vargas and his men again rode out to the mountain retreat to repeat the promise of pardon should they return peacefully to their pueblo. But again their only answer was that they did not want peace but war with the Spaniards.

Vargas now conferred with his lieutenants, and decided to attack the enemy. In view of the advantageous position of the rebels, distributed on the declivities of the two ridges overlooking the dark funnel-like canyon below so as to make the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, September 9, 1696.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, September 20-21, 1696.

³⁰ The Trampas River was two leagues from Picuríes. *Ibid.*, September 21, 1696.

³¹ A translation of Vargas' diary for the period from September 22 to October 9, based on the damaged copy of the diary in S.F.A., with two of the entries missing, by R. E. Twitchell, is reproduced in Blanche C. Grant, *Taos Indians*, Taos, 1925, 37-59.

mountains themselves serve as ramparts, Vargas divided his force into three divisions: one was placed at the entrance to the canyon, under Granillo and Valverde; the second was sent to the left side of the canyon, under the command of Roque Madrid; and the third, led by Vargas, advanced up the mountain ridge to the right of the canyon. Scaling the heights dominating the canyon, the Spaniards then descended rapidly into the narrow canyon itself, only to find the enemy scattered on the inner slopes of the two mountain ridges, having abandoned their mountain camp. They succeeded in hiding behind rocks in virtually unassailable positions; so Vargas sacked their log huts, and withdrew loaded with clothing, and skins of elk and buffalo. As the heavily laden Spaniards withdrew single file by way of the narrow canyon path, the enemy harassed them with arrows and bullets from the steep slopes and precipices above; but the only casualties were two soldiers wounded; they also lost five horses as a result of a successful enemy ambush. About four of the rebels were killed in the skirmishes. That evening the pueblo, converted into a Spanish barracks, was the scene of much rejoicing over what Vargas described as "such a happy victory."³²

Since the enemy still remained strongly entrenched, Vargas continued the battle, and on the following day he again led his soldiers to the entrance of the canyon. Detachments were sent up the outer ridges on either side, and when they reached the summits, Vargas, under their protective fire, entered the canyon. The enemy camp had not been slept in. Proceeding cautiously, for fear of possible snipers hiding among the rocky cliffs, Vargas rode deeper into the canyon, where he found a number of caves from which much hidden booty in skins, furs, beans, and maize was seized. During the course of the day several Indians were taken captive. Setting fire to the log huts in the canyon, Vargas returned to his headquarters in the pueblo. Here one of the captives, named Felipe, a former sacristan, turned over a number of religious articles which he had hidden in his house, including an image of Our Lady of Aranzazú, painted on a canvas about a yard and three quarters high

³² Vargas' journal, September 22-23, 1696.

and a quarter wide. This was received on bended knees and amid repeated salutes by the arquebusiers.³³

The next day Don Bernardino, cacique of Taos, made bold to pay a visit to Vargas. He begged the governor to spare the fields of his people. Vargas refused point-blank; his army would continue to load all the food and supplies which they could carry away, and to despoil the fields sowed by the Tano and Tewa rebels, until such a time as the Taos should reoccupy their pueblo and submit as loyal vassals to the Spanish authorities. Furthermore, Don Bernardino was ordered to prove the sincerity of his desire for peace by bringing the severed head of the rebel Indian leader Juan Griego. The cacique left, promising to return with an answer, and Vargas awaited his return before taking any further measures. Don Gerónimo, lieutenant governor of Taos, brought the answer. The scattered natives had not yet descended from the mountains only through fear; it would take a little time to round them up, but the task would be fulfilled without delay. As a result of numerous manifestations of good faith, Vargas decided patiently to await further developments.³⁴ The following day, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, as Vargas was standing in the fields in view of the funnel-like entrance to the canyon retreat of the rebels, a large troop of people—men, women, and children—, heavily laden with their belongings, was seen trudging down the road from the canyon. Vargas spoke to them lovingly as they passed, and told them to reoccupy their homes in peace and contentment, and they appeared to be well satisfied with these assurances.³⁵

Meanwhile, Captain Valverde and a military escort were sent with pack animals heavily burdened with food supplies destined for Santa Fé and Santa Cruz. On October 2 they returned to Taos with news that all was quiet at the settlements, except for one episode which revealed the mental strain these trying times brought on some of the more faint hearted

³³ *Ibid.*, September 24, 1696. The complete list of articles obtained may be found in Grant, *op. cit.*, 45-46.

³⁴ Vargas' journal, September 25, 1696. At this time two captive women were released by the rebels. They were the wives of the soldier Juan de Mestas and the settler Pedro Moraga. Both women appeared dressed in Indian garb.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, September 26, 1696.

settlers: during Vargas' absence, three soldiers, led by Cabo Andrés González, had attempted to flee from the province with seventy horses and mules. But the able frontier scout Miguel de Lara had discovered their tracks, and captured the fugitives less than five leagues from Bernalillo.³⁶ On October 3, a second load of supplies was dispatched to Santa Cruz, this time under the command of Roque Madrid, the *alcalde mayor* of the villa, who welcomed the opportunity to visit his war-weary people, and give them fresh words of encouragement.³⁷

At Taos, the natives, in small groups, were gradually emerging from their retreats and reoccupying their pueblo, and with them a number of Tewa and Tano families. Heavy snowfall was undoubtedly influencing them in their decision. While this was going on, some of the principal rebel leaders, who as yet refused to yield, were objecting bitterly. Finally, Pacheco, the governor of the pueblo, decided to give himself up, come what may, rather than permit his people to perish of hunger and die of cold in the mountains. Presenting himself before Vargas, he said that the natives of Taos had been about to come down several days past, but a Navaho Apache had arrived with a message from the rebel Jémez telling them not to trust Vargas if they valued their lives, as a result of which the people had scattered throughout the mountains in fear. All blame for the damage to the church, which had been converted into a stable, the slaughter of the mission sheep, and the theft of horses, was placed on Juan Griego and his Tewa and Tano followers. Juan Griego was held in great fear and respect, as were the Tanos and Tewas, because of their great bravery. Pacheco surrendered a horse which was recognized as that of Father Carbonel, whom the Tanos of San Cristóbal had killed in the massacre of June 4.

Pacheco heard a long recital of acts of disloyalty on the part of Taos, received an admonishment and was told by Vargas to go back into the mountains and bring down his people; no harm would be done to them. With these words, Vargas bade him godspeed. Pacheco requested three or four days time, since the snow was deep and the people widely dispersed.

³⁶ Vargas' journal, September 27 and October 2, 1696.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, October 3, 1696.

Patting Pacheco affectionately, Vargas told him that there was no hurry, and the latter left as perplexed as he was happy to be alive. True to his word, Pacheco returned several days later, bringing in the greater part of his people, heavily loaded with their belongings. They presented a tragic sight. Vargas received them with kindness and affection, embraced the women and children, and told them to reenter their abandoned homes, "to all of which they responded with visible pleasure."³⁸ Vargas now summoned Pacheco and his lieutenants, and commanded them to repair and sweep out the church, and place a cross on the table where the altar had formerly stood, "and they went off immediately to order done what I had commanded and instructed them to do."³⁹

The greater part of the Indians had reestablished themselves in their pueblo households, when on October 9 Vargas decided to "withdraw and leave them the freedom of their pueblo."⁴⁰ The natives, assembled at the church, were commanded to live as loyal vassals of the two Majesties, and Father Navarro then absolved them from their apostasy, ordering them to say their prayers every morning and evening, as true Christians, and telling them never again to place their trust in talebearers. Finally, Vargas spoke to them, ordering their governor and principal leaders to execute anyone who should come to them with evil tales, and to visit him frequently at Santa Fé and keep him posted on conditions in the north. With this Vargas gave them his hand, and embracing them with affection, took leave. The night was spent at Miranda, four leagues away.⁴¹

The next day Vargas and his troops reached the ascent leading to Picuríes. From there the major part of the army was sent straightway to the Trampas River, by way of the Camino Real, while Vargas, with a swift detachment of cav-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, October 3-7, 1696. During this time Pacheco turned over to Vargas two of the horses captured in the ambush of September 23.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, October 8, 1696. Twitchell's translation of this entry, cited above, is misleading. There is no basis for the belief that the church was razed to the ground at this time, as Twitchell and Grant intimate.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, October 9, 1696.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* The loaded pack train, and most of the soldiers, had been sent on to Miranda earlier in the day.

alry, went up to inspect the pueblo. The natives had set up a large cross at the entrance to the pueblo, and a few of them were standing in front of the church, before which another cross had been erected. The walls of the church, which formerly had diabolical figures painted on them, were now white-washed, and the floor was swept clean. A war captain, holding a cross in his hands as a sign of peace, turned over a number of religious articles, two missals, and some books. Treating the natives with affection, Vargas told them that Don Lorenzo must lead his people back to their pueblo, and that Don Antonio, upon his return to Picurías, should gather up the above religious articles and take them to Santa Fé.⁴² He took leave of the natives and proceeded to the Trampas River, where he joined the vanguard. There the night was spent. The next morning they reached Santa Cruz, and on the 11th Vargas victoriously entered Santa Fé. But the 12th was a day of even greater rejoicing for the townspeople, for that day the pack trains entered the villa loaded with clothing, maize, and beans—welcome spoils of the recent victory at Taos.⁴³

Although the war in the north was in its final stages, it was not yet over. On October 15, Vargas was notified of a theft of six horses; their tracks led to the mesa of San Ildefonso. Immediately an expedition was organized to punish the perpetrators of this hostile act; but a series of alarming dispatches from Santa Cruz demanded immediate action elsewhere. In a letter from Roque Madrid, received at six o'clock in the evening of October 18, Vargas was notified that the alleged arch-rebel Juan Chillo had surrendered himself, and had reported all the Picurías fleeing eastward. Four hours later Vargas received another stimulating message from Madrid: the rebel chieftain Juan Griego also had given himself up and was being held prisoner.⁴⁴ The following day Madrid confirmed the report regarding the mass flight of the Picurías.⁴⁵

⁴² Vargas' journal, October 10, 1696.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, October 11-12, 1696. On the 13th, Don Antonio arrived at Santa Fé with the report that Don Lorenzo was ill, due to a fall from his horse. That same day twenty Apaches had accompanied Don Antonio to Santa Cruz with articles of trade, and protestations of friendship. *Ibid.*, October 13, 1696.

⁴⁴ Griego blamed the deceased Naranjo for stirring up unrest and bad faith among the pueblos. *Ibid.*, October 18, 1696.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, October 19, 1696.

On the 20th Vargas was at Santa Cruz, swiftly organizing an expedition for the purpose of frustrating their plan. The day following the army was on the trail: fifty Spaniards and over sixty Pecos and Tesuque allies. Juan Griego was taken along to aid in the enterprise. The first night was spent on the edge of the Truchas River. Scouts brought in a Picuríes Indian who had been taken by surprise in the woods across the river, where he was roasting and eating deer meat. He was questioned, and according to his story the Picuríes, some of whom had sworn obedience on October 10, had fled because the Apaches, who had recently accompanied the Picuríes leader Don Antonio to Santa Cruz, had stolen three horses there, for which reason they feared severe punishment as accomplices. Vargas set him free, and told him to tell his people to return to their pueblo, and rest assured that they would not be harmed in any way.⁴⁶

Picuríes was found abandoned, as previously reported.⁴⁷ Vargas hotly pursued the fugitives. They were accompanied by a number of Apaches, Tewas, and Tanos, and were headed for the buffalo plains. Crossing the mountains to the east of the pueblos, Vargas' scouts brought in a Taos Indian, who was forced to serve as guide for the expedition. He took the Spaniards to an abandoned camp of thirty-one Apache lodges some five leagues to the east. From there, despite heavy rain and snow, the fleeing Pueblos and Apaches were easily followed: because of their pell-mell haste their trail was marked with freshly abandoned camp fires, and strewn with tepee poles, metates, cooking utensils, and other evidences of consternation. Advancing rapidly, on the 26th the Spaniards caught up with them on the slopes of a ravine, where, scattering in many directions, they made a desperate effort to escape. Some succeeded, and others were killed, including the cacique Don Antonio, but the majority of them were forced to surrender. Having gathered together the command, Vargas

⁴⁶ Vargas' journal, October 20-21, 1696; Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 24, 1696.

⁴⁷ Vargas' journal, October 22, 1696. Vargas' diary for the period from October 22 to November 9, 1696, omitting the events of October 23, is translated in Twitchell, *Leading Facts*, III, 390-396, note 249, and complete in Thomas, *After Coronado*, 53-59.

halted on a level spot, in the lower part of the ravine, to celebrate the victory. Fifty persons (men, women, and children), forty animals, and a large quantity of provisions and clothing had been captured. During the evening and in the course of the following day, some thirty more of the fugitives wandered into camp to render submission. Vargas welcomed the unfortunates, and humanely ordered his men to share provisions with them. Don Lorenzo, the governor of Picuríes, and some others had escaped eastward with the Apaches.⁴⁸

A tall cross was set up on the spot as a memorial of the triumph. Vargas and his party began on October 27 their long trek back to the settlements. The travel through deep snow in a driving blizzard was harrowing. More than two hundred horses and five mules dropped by the wayside, benumbed and frozen. The men ate only roasted maize and the flesh of the dead horses. In fine, the march of the half frozen cavalcade assumed heroic proportions. Finally, after ten days, the wearied band reached Pecos,⁴⁹ and by November 9, Santa Fé. The eighty-four enemy captives, counting children and suckling babes, were distributed by Vargas among the soldiers and citizens who had participated in the campaign.⁵⁰ The distance covered on the expedition, Vargas later stated, was from sixty to seventy-five leagues (this apparently being the entire distance going and coming).⁵¹ Perhaps no new trails were blazed, but of greater consequence was the fact that the last serious obstacle to the restoration of peace and order in New Mexico had been definitely crushed.⁵²

⁴⁸ Ten years later the Spaniards learned that Don Lorenzo, the Picuríes chief, and those who had escaped with him, were the slaves of the Cuartelejo Apaches, in present eastern Colorado. Thomas, *After Coronado*, 16.

⁴⁹ Vargas' journal, October 22 to November 7, 1696. They reached Pecos on November 7.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, November 9, 1696. Eighty-four is the number given by Vargas in his diary; in his record of transmittal to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696, he gives the number as ninety.

⁵¹ "Y regulando la distancia desde esta dicha Va de Sta Fee abra como de sesenta a setenta y sinco leguas." *Ibid.*

⁵² Twitchell, *Old Santa Fe*, 147, states that Vargas reached the panhandle of present Oklahoma. Thomas, *After Coronado*, 16, believes that the expedition did not pass beyond northeastern New Mexico. Thomas is probably correct. Vargas describes the region visited as "los llanos de Sibolos por tierra yncognita" (Vargas to the viceroy, November 28, 1696).

CHAPTER XVI

THE ROAD TO FINAL VICTORY

While Governor Vargas was victoriously terminating the Indian war almost singlehanded, the authorities in Mexico City, several months late as usual, due to the slowness of communications, were acting on his first official reports of the Indian revolt.¹ The reality of armed rebellion, and the definite danger of again losing New Mexico, finally moved the money-pinched Junta General de Hacienda to grant and to send considerable aid to New Mexico. Although too late as far as the Indian war was concerned, this aid was an important factor in assuring the survival of this distant frontier outpost during the troublous years which were to follow.²

As was customary, Vargas' journal and correspondence were first examined by the royal fiscal, and the Junta then acted upon his report. The fiscal presented his report on September 20, 1696. After a careful examination of the documents he rendered his opinion on what he considered the fundamental points involved: the causes of the Indian revolt, the conduct of the war, the question of retaining or abandoning the northern outpost, and the amount of aid believed to be necessary for its preservation.³ He considered the widely circulated Indian story to the effect that Vargas intended to put all the Indians to the knife, for which reason they had risen in self-defense to frustrate the scheme, as a pretext to justify the uprising, since the report could be traced only to four Indian agitators. In fact, it will be recalled, Vargas had heard the same story on every side when he made his second expedition into New Mexico in 1693. It was apparently a stock argument used

¹ Vargas' report of events in New Mexico through July, 1696, described above.

² The Junta acted as promptly as could be expected, without awaiting the official approval of the king and the Council of the Indies, which involved many months, sometimes several years. Such action was in line with customary and accepted procedure, excepting, of course, special matters beyond viceregal jurisdiction.

³ There was no question of abandoning all New Mexico; the issue was that of possible withdrawal southward to El Paso.

to stir up hatred towards the Spaniards. The feigned peace of the Pueblos in 1692, quickly broken in 1693, gave strength to the view that Vargas was not responsible for the revolt on these grounds. In any case, the fiscal suggested, it would be bad policy to permit the people of New Mexico to think that their governor was believed to be in any way to blame. However, he added, Don Gabriel del Castillo, the governor at Parral, might be questioned secretly by the viceroy in a tone of mere personal curiosity, with regard to the uprising. Then, if the governor of New Mexico were to be found guilty, action should be taken.

The type of warfare being carried out by Vargas was described as fully justified under the circumstances. Citing Book III, Title 4, Laws 8, 9, and 10, of the Recopilation of the Laws of the Indies, the fiscal judged Vargas to have been acting fully within the law in his war, and indeed might be guilty of a grave crime had he acted differently. Law 8, addressed to vice-roys, audiencias, and governors, stated that rebellious Indians should be dealt with peacefully, without war or bloodshed, and pardoned for their crimes, in the effort to restore them in their allegiance to the Crown and to the Holy Faith. According to Law 9:

War may not be made against the Indians of any province in order to bring them into the Holy Catholic Faith, or to obtain their obedience, or for any other reason. And if they should become aggressors, and with arms make war against our vassals, settlements and pacified lands, first the necessary *requerimientos* should be made, once, twice, thrice, or more if deemed advisable, until they accede to the peace which we desire. But if these measures are in vain, they should be punished as they justly deserve, and no more. And if having embraced the Holy Faith, and rendered obedience, they apostatize and deny it, they should be dealt with as apostates and rebels, and punished according to the seriousness of their excesses . . .

Law 10 stated:

No governor, lieutenant, or ordinary *alcalde* may send armed men against Indians for the purpose of reducing them, or to enforce *mita* service, or for any other pretext, under penalty of removal from office and a fine of two thousand pesos to be paid to this body. But if any Indians should do harm to the person or property of Spaniards, or peaceful Indians, then certainly they may immediately, or within

three months, send armed men to punish them, or take them as prisoners.⁴

The fiscal then recalled that similar methods of warfare, as carried out by Otermín and Cruzate in their previous unsuccessful efforts to reconquer New Mexico, had been fully approved by his Majesty in several royal cédulas. Vargas, it was believed, had made every possible effort to deal peacefully with the rebels before making war upon them. The measures Vargas had taken to quell the revolt, and his methods of dealing both with the rebels and those who remained loyal, were described by the fiscal as sensible, wise, and prudent.

The urgency of preserving upper New Mexico was emphasized by the fiscal. Abandonment would not only be ignominious, but also it would endanger the safety of the whole northern border, as had been the case following the successful Pueblo Revolt of 1680, which was followed by uprisings among the Sumas and Mansos of the El Paso district, and the hostile tribes throughout Sonora. Furthermore, abandonment would entail the withdrawal from the region of some 2,000 pacified Indians as well as the 1,500 Spaniards. The fiscal urged that Vargas be thanked for his resolve to preserve New Mexico, and that the necessary aid be sent to assure victory.⁵

On September 22, after a thorough consultation, the Junta General, presided over by the viceroy, presented its report on the matter. Concurring with the views of the fiscal, it declared the uprising of the Pueblo Indians to have been solely the result of bad faith and "the vice of apostasy," to which they were known to be notoriously inclined in their desire to live with license and without restraints. Their charge regarding Vargas' planned general massacre was branded as false, since the tale had, to all appearances, been spread by a handful of rebellious agitators. The feigned peace of 1692, previously referred to by the fiscal, was repeated by the Junta

⁴ *Recopilación*, II, fols. 24-25.

⁵ Report of the royal fiscal, Don Baltasar de Tovar, Mexico City, September 20, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

The fiscal gives the Spanish and Mexican population of New Mexico as 1,200. In the report of the Junta, below, the figure is given throughout as 1,500. The latter is the figure generally given by Vargas in his reports for this period.

as ample evidence against the case of the rebels for the uprising.

Cleared of all blame for the revolt, Vargas was commended highly for his integrity and loyalty. His actions in protecting the settlers and missionaries, in showing good faith toward and extending aid to the loyal Indian pueblos, and in declaring war upon the apostate rebels, again were described as prudent and wise. With regard to the natives of Sia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, Pecos, and Tesuque, Vargas was ordered to thank them, in the name of his Majesty, for their proved loyalty, and make it known to them that they would be honored with the privileges due loyal subjects, and assured his Majesty's protection against their enemies. However, he was cautioned to proceed shrewdly, dealing with them in good faith, but always cognizant of their native inconstancy. With regard to the treatment of rebel prisoners of war, he was urged to show justice and mercy:

. . . and if the death penalty is necessary, the crime being inexcusable because of its gravity, or being that of apostasy, all the rules of Christianity must be followed, in keeping with the spirit of our Holy Faith and Holy Mother Church, and with knowledge of the error, seeking to obtain contrition and repentance, and making every effort to grant the benefits of absolution to the victim.⁶

Vargas' policies were justified by the Junta on the following grounds: the repeated transgressions of the hostile apostate rebels against the peace, the Holy Faith and his Majesty; their rebellion without cause other than the refusal to give up their detestable vices, despite the sincere effort to live with them in peace; their apparent schemes for the total destruction of the Spaniards; and the fact that the king, by royal *cédula*, had approved similar wars against the Indians of New Mexico under less critical circumstances, in the case of the unsuccessful efforts of Vargas' predecessors, Otermín and Cruzate, to reconquer New Mexico. With regard to the strategic importance of the northern province, the Junta seconded heartily the previously mentioned arguments of the fiscal, and ordered New Mexico preserved by all means.

⁶ Report of the Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, September 22, 1696, A.G.I. *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

After presenting a summary of the not inconsiderable expenditures of the viceregal government for the reconquest, support, and preservation of New Mexico, in the midst of many cares, setbacks, and the existing depletion of the royal treasury,⁷ the Junta offered Vargas a few specific suggestions, making clear to him room for improvement in his Indian policy. Much unnecessary expense was attributed to the fact that instead of consolidating and building up the Spanish settlements with the aid sent, it was consumed in the effort to conquer additional rebel tribes and pueblos beyond the immediate needs of essential defense. "Victory does not consist in conquest alone, but rather in the preservation of that which already has been acquired and conquered," the Junta cautioned the governor. Then, Law 23, Title 7, Book IV, of the Laws of the Indies, was cited. This law reads:

If the natives should desire to defend themselves against a new settlement, they should be given to understand that the purpose of settling there is to teach them to know God and His Holy Law, in order that they may be saved, to be their friends, and to teach them to live civilly, and not to do them any harm, nor take their haciendas from them. And thus, they should be persuaded, by gentle means, with the aid of the religious and the clergy, and other persons delegated by the governor, making use of interpreters, and using all of the good means possible, to assure that the settlement be made peacefully and with their consent. And if they should still object, after demands had been made in conformity with Law 9, Title 4, Book 3, the settlers should establish their settlement, without infringing on the private property of the Indians, and without molesting them in any way, unless it should be unavoidable in order to defend the settlers and to prevent harassment of the settlement.⁸

Law 9, Title 4, Book III, justifying defensive war alone, was also cited. The viceroy was insistent on obedience to these to the letter. In short, peace and order should be the sole aim for the moment. Hence, Vargas should embark on no further

⁷ The aid granted thus far was listed by the Junta as follows: 40,000 pesos; a presidio of 100 soldiers at Santa Fé, paid by the royal treasury; considerable expenses incurred in recruiting, aiding, and conducting families from Mexico City and the interior which were sent to New Mexico; the sending of missionaries for the education and religious instruction of the Indians; livestock, grain, tools, and farm implements; cloth and blankets ordered sent by the Junta at its previous meeting.

⁸ *Recopilación*, II, fol. 93.

wars of conquest, but instead strengthen the present settlements, and engage only in defensive war against invasion—the “just war” as enunciated by His Holiness Pius V.

All efforts should be devoted to strengthening and fortifying the three Spanish settlements of Santa Fé, Santa Cruz, and Bernalillo, and to protecting the pacified pueblos of the surrounding area, all of which were within a radius of twenty-two leagues, and, hence, well within reach of the protective arm of the presidio at Santa Fé. This would facilitate the effort to win the war by peaceful means. It was the belief of the Junta that the rebellious Indians who had abandoned their pueblos, accustomed as they were to a sedentary life, and with a century of Spanish experience behind them, could not long endure in continual movement in the mountains, and that the rigors of winter would soon force them to sue for peace without a struggle. Besides, they were surrounded by the hostile Apaches on every side, with whom, it was felt, they could not live in security for long, owing to the well known character of the Apaches. Since the three Spanish settlements in New Mexico had a population of approximately 1,500 Spanish settlers, about 400 of whom were capable of bearing arms, including the 100 presidial soldiers at Santa Fé, and not counting the presidio of fifty soldiers at El Paso and the settlers there, New Mexico, it was agreed, could be adequately defended without additional manpower, granted, of course, a proper distribution of the 400 throughout the Spanish settlements and friendly Indian pueblos.

The importance of New Mexico in the frontier defense of New Spain was repeatedly emphasized. Should the Spaniards ever abandon the province and again permit the rebels to become its masters, they would in all probability turn their full strength against the Spaniards, incite the pacified Manso and Suma tribes, embolden the proud and restless Conchos and Tarahumares, and thus place in grave peril not only the “opulent kingdom” of Parral, but possibly the entire northern border. A war of this magnitude would be much more costly than the present one, or others like it. All this could be avoided only by successful Spanish control in New Mexico; therefore, New Mexico must be preserved.

The Junta ordered the immediate issuing of royal orders to facilitate the purchase and prompt dispatch to New Mexico of the various supplies granted at the meeting of the Junta on July 4. The following additional supplies were now granted: 500 head of livestock, 400 pesos worth of lead, 4,000 flints, and 2,000 fanegas of maize.⁹ The royal authorities at Parral were ordered to provide a military escort for the wagons as far as El Paso.

With regard to the number of missionaries for New Mexico, thirteen were sufficient for the present, as Vargas said, and the Father Commissary General of the Franciscan Order should be notified accordingly. Lázaro de Mizquía, *procurador mayor* and member of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, the alarmist who, it will be recalled, had recently sent a note to the viceroy in which he expressed the conviction that New Mexico was about to be lost, was ordered to appear before the viceroy to present his proposals for the betterment of the New Mexican outpost.¹⁰ At the same time, Vargas and his people were thanked for their loyalty in the royal service. The New Mexicans were urged to speed up the rehabilitation of their farms and ranches. Lastly, should the friendly tribes of New Mexico continue in their commendable loyalty, they would be granted the special privileges of the Tlascalans, and favored as loyal vassals of His Majesty.¹¹ Notification of these decisions of the Junta was immediately sent to Vargas.¹²

During the next two weeks the necessary government orders were issued for the prompt execution of the above decisions. The military supplies for New Mexico authorized by the Junta on February 6, 1696, and the cloth and blankets

⁹ It was suggested here that these be purchased from the haciendas of Conchos and Valle de Tamaluapa, which were along the road, and thus more convenient for the wagon train.

¹⁰ As recorded in the report of the Junta, this order appears to put Mizquía in a dubious light. However, the suggestion of the fiscal that it might be well to obtain secret information with regard to conditions in New Mexico seems to have some connection here.

¹¹ Report of the Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, September 22, 1696.

¹² The Conde de Galve to Vargas, Mexico City, September 22, 1696, A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 38.

authorized by the Junta on July 4, 1696, had not been dispatched to Santa Fé, it was now revealed.¹³ The viceroy ordained that the 400 quintals of powder and 100 *medias lunas* (lances with a hooked knife on the end), previously authorized, be sent with the pack train immediately, along with the cloth and blankets, and that the armorer, artilleryman and four stone mortars be sent with the wagons which were to follow. Accompanying the mail notifying Governor Vargas of these decisions and orders, was a letter from Fray Clemente de Ledesma, provincial minister of the Province of Santo Evangelio, and of the custodias of Tampico and New Mexico, to Fray Francisco de Vargas, custodian of the New Mexican missions, notifying him of the patent issued by the Father Commissary General of the Franciscan Order in New Spain ordering the withdrawal from New Mexico of all missionaries in excess of the thirteen, as authorized by the Junta.¹⁴

Meanwhile, in far-off New Mexico, following the Picurías campaign, small groups of frightened natives of San Ildefonso, Jacona, and Nambé were gradually emerging from their poor shelters in mesa and mountain retreats and returning to their forsaken pueblos. It was reported from Bernalillo that the dispersed Indians of Cochití were about to submit, and Ácoma also desired peace. On November 11, Governor Francisco of Jacona voluntarily presented his submission, and was pardoned. The same day, Roque Madrid made a tour of inspection of the surrounding area and found seventeen men and thirty-six women and children already established at San Ildefonso, and twelve men and nineteen women and children at Jacona, with others reported on their way. In letters to the viceroy dated November 24 and 28, respectively, Vargas was able to report all rebels in the district surrounding Santa Fé as reduced and reinhabiting their pueblos, with the exception of the Tanos, the Jémez, and those of Santa Clara, Pojoaque, and Cuyamungué. Since eight Picurías families were in the mountains, Vargas was holding the Picurías captives as

¹³ *Consulta*, Mexico City, September 28, 1696, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141. (Unless otherwise specified the remaining citations in this chapter are from this same legajo.)

¹⁴ Viceregal decrees, Mexico City, September 28, 1696.

hostages until the return of the former to their pueblo. Anticipating orders from the viceroy, Vargas announced the cessation of further campaigns, and intensification of efforts to rehabilitate the Spanish settlements and those of the pacified Indians. However, true to his restless nature, he added a qualification: upon the arrival of the four stone mortars and the ammunition authorized by the Junta in February, he hoped to invade Ácoma, capture the enemy Jémez, Tano, and Santo Domingo Indians living there, and settle them at Sandía, and force Ácoma to break its bonds of friendship with the hostile Faraon, Salinero, Sierra de Gila, and Chilmo Apaches.¹⁵

During the long months of continuous war just concluded, a large number of the dispersed Indians took up residence among the Apaches and in the western pueblos, and when the pueblos were again reoccupied, they were much more sparsely populated than before. Many of the Tanos, Jémez, and Tewas of Santa Clara were now living at Zuñi, Ácoma, and the Moqui pueblos, and others had joined the Navahos. Otherwise, it may be said, by the end of the year 1696 the permanent submission of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to Spanish authority was complete.

With peace brooding over the land the gradual trek of the Indians to their pueblos and farms forecast a return to better times, for the economic life of New Mexico depended in great part upon Indian farm produce, pottery, and other commodities obtained in peaceful trade. In the interim, however, the road back was not easy, and inevitable hardships were accompanied by frequent complaints from the Spanish settlers. Residents of the villa of Santa Cruz at this time petitioned the governor to move them to a better locality. This kind of talk from Santa Cruz was becoming almost endemic. The reason for the request was ascribed this time to the existence of weeds in the vicinity which allegedly poisoned the sheep and cattle. Vargas consulted on the matter with Luis Granillo and Juan Ruiz de Casares, who had surveyed and suggested the site upon which the villa was established. Inasmuch as the region had

¹⁵ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, November 9-11, 1696; Roque Madrid to Vargas, Santa Cruz, November 11, 1696; letters of transmittal, Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 24 and 28, 1696.

been the site of a prosperous settlement prior to 1680, with surrounding farms and haciendas known for their fertility, the petition was branded as unjustifiable both from the economic point of view and with regard to defense. Alameda, twenty leagues south of Santa Fé, was regarded as a likely site for a new settlement, but not at the expense of abandoning any of the three existing ones.¹⁶

Next to economic reconstruction, the most important problem was the reestablishment of the Indian missions. When Father Francisco de Vargas entered New Mexico as the newly appointed vice-custodian in 1694, twelve missions had resident friars and were to all appearances functioning normally. In August, 1695, Blas Navarro had taken up residence at Picurías, and Juan de Zavaleta and Diego de Chavarría at Taos, and before the year was out, Santa Ana had its Franciscan evangelist. Early in 1696, however, there were serious signs of unrest which disrupted normal mission life, and which eventually culminated in the bloody revolt of June 4. During the first five months of that year the fathers stationed at Picurías, Taos, San Juan, San Cristóbal, Santa Clara, and Tesuque had found it necessary to withdraw to the safety of Santa Fé and Santa Cruz. The two missionaries at San Diego del Monte and San Juan de Jémez were forced to take refuge at Bernalillo. Santa Clara became a *visita* of Santa Cruz, where Father Antonio Obregón was pastor, and Tesuque became a *visita* of Santa Fé. A short while later Jerónimo Prieto, José Diez, and Domingo de Jesús withdrew to the college of Santa Cruz de Querétaro, in the Franciscan province of Michoacán, to assume new duties.¹⁷

The missionaries who had been robbed of their horses, livestock, and other property, and had withdrawn to the safety of the Spanish settlements, were provided with all possible material support by their tireless custodian, Father Vargas.¹⁸ Loyal natives from the abandoned missions helped relieve the

¹⁶ Petition of settlers of the villa of Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, n. d.; Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, November 26, 1696.

¹⁷ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, November 23, 1696.

¹⁸ Each was supplied monthly with eight pounds of chocolate, sugar, soap, paper, and other needs. Father Vargas to Governor Vargas, November 23, 1696.

burden by supplying the friars at Santa Cruz and Bernalillo with wood and food, and helping to watch over their salvaged sheep and mission property. The natives of Santa Ana, Sia, and San Felipe were loyal during the entire crisis. There was a strong loyal faction at Tesuque, including the native governor, and the sacraments were frequently administered there. Brave missionaries, and a few soldiers and families, were at hostile San Cristóbal, San Diego de Jémez, San Juan de los Caballeros, San Ildefonso, Nambé, and Cochití, and at divided Pecos, at the time of the uprising.¹⁹

The tragic events of June 3-4, and their effect on the missions, have been fully described elsewhere. In July all supplies and movable property had been withdrawn from the partially abandoned Pecos mission to the safety of Santa Fé. Although the Indian governor of Pecos was loyal, the existence of a strong party of rebel sympathizers there made necessary this move. Nevertheless, the friars continued to journey there from Santa Fé to celebrate Mass, and during the month of August, under the direction of the custodian, the church at Pecos was enlarged and beautified. Similar improvements were being made on the mission church at Santa Ana. Mission life was eventually to be restored to its traditional pattern; but in general the status of the missions was still unsatisfactory. Father Vargas was constantly in the saddle, making heroic efforts to keep the Faith alive at the few pueblos which had not been abandoned, and among the fickle natives who were now gradually being won back. The other Franciscans were similarly engaged, and so mission life could not possibly be normal even in the loyal pueblos. For example, while the custodian was travelling, Father Matta, of Sia, took care of Santa Ana, Bernalillo, and San Felipe as well. It now became necessary to make San Felipe a *visita* of Bernalillo.²⁰

The missions were all in distressful straits as regards essential equipment, vestments and all religious articles, as well as sheep and cattle, chocolate, sugar, and other mission supplies done away with during the course of the rebellion. As for wine, wax, and oil, the missionaries were carrying on with what

¹⁹ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, November 23, 1696; Father Vargas to Governor Vargas, November 23, 1696.

²⁰ Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, November 23, 1696.

little supplies were left of the alms sent up every three years. As for sheep and livestock, when Father Vargas entered New Mexico in November of 1694, 500 sheep and some cows and oxen were delivered to the mission at Santa Ana. In May of the following year, he travelled to El Paso, and returned early in October with 1,000 additional sheep for distribution among the missions. The sheep at the missions of Pecos, Tesuque, San Felipe, Santa Ana, and Sia had been saved, and of the flock lost at Cochití, 160 head were later recovered. All the rest were lost. At Taos the natives had slaughtered all the mission sheep for food.²¹

In a letter to the viceroy, the custodian, attesting to the zeal and valor of the missionaries, and recalling the martyrdoms, now implored replacements. He described the natives as being very averse to Christian law and religion, despite the efforts of their instructors. They persisted in their idolatry and ancient pagan customs, much to the spiritual anguish of the friars. Their desire for peace with the Spaniards seemed only for the purpose of trade and commerce, rather than for any desire to observe the Holy Law. Not love and kindness, as taught by the missionaries, but only the strong arm of the presidio seemed to determine their conduct. Thus spoke Father Vargas, a shrewd observer, from several years of experience among the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico. Nevertheless, with the return of the natives to their abandoned pueblos, which was already in process, the sturdy custodian, ever hopeful, viewed the future with a note of optimism. The twelve priests and a lay brother authorized by the Junta would be sufficient for the moment, but a normal quota of men for the labor would soon be necessary. The number had been set at thirteen when dark shadows clouded all hope; but now the scene was rapidly changing, and the vision of a new day of successful mission building was becoming a reality. Father Vargas was a man planning for the future. He looked toward a return of normal times, when the number of missionaries in New Mexico should be augmented to twenty, including the custodian and ecclesiastical judge, distributed in the following

²¹ *Ibid.*; Father Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696.

manner: for Santa Fé and its two *visitas*, Tesuque and Cuyamungué, three; Pecos, one; Nambé and its *visita* of Pojoaque, one; San Ildefonso and its *visita* of Jacona, one; San Juan de los Caballeros and Santa Clara, one; Picuríes, one; Taos, because of its distant and isolated position, two; Santa Cruz with its *visita* of San Cristóbal, one; Cochiti, with a *visita* at Santo Domingo, one; San Felipe and the Spanish settlement of Bernalillo, one; Sia, with Santa Ana as a *visita*, one; El Paso with the *visita* at the Spanish settlement at the *real* of San Lorenzo, two; the Piro pueblo of Senecú, one; the Tiwa pueblo of Isleta, one; the pueblo of the Piros and Sumas at Socorro, one.²²

On November 28, the governor himself writing the viceroy mentioned eight of the pueblos as already reduced, and others in the process of being reoccupied; his previously estimated number of necessary religious, thirteen, now should be raised to the total specified by the custodian. Indeed, the submission of the dispersed Pueblos was taking place with unexpected rapidity, and the mission outlook at the end of November had a more promising glow than at the end of July.²³ A far more sanguine note was sounded in Governor Vargas' periodic reports to the viceroy. Still Vargas did not hesitate to make clear to the viceroy that he could not agree entirely with certain of the Junta's criticisms of his Indian policy. Reviewing his long record of service—the war of reconquest, the story of the recent defection of the eleven pueblos, the five months' war just over, and the reestablishment of order in eight of the pueblos—he justified his stern war policies. Referring to the massacre of June 4, he asserted with strong emotion:

I was so shocked and saddened upon seeing and listing the dead bodies at the pueblos of Nambé and San Ildefonso, and contemplating the burned church [at the latter pueblo], that if I had found all the said rebels at that time I would have killed them without sparing a single one . . . But from my activities with regard to their reduction it will be seen that my heart has again become softened, and I shall treat them with commiseration.²⁴

²² Father Vargas to Governor Vargas, November 23, 1696.

²³ Governor Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696.

²⁴ *Ibid.* Later Vargas was warned by his superiors that punishment should be meted out only for recognized crimes, according to the laws, and not for sentimental reasons such as Vargas seemed to justify in this statement.

With regard to the Junta's instructions that no efforts should be made to conquer additional tribes until the Spanish settlements had attained complete economic stability and security, Vargas contended that such an argument was tenable only if such Spanish settlements could be established independent of Indian cooperation, which was not the case in New Mexico. The settlers, poor and ragged, could not exist without trading with the Indians for wood, salt, chili, maize, beans, earthenware, buffalo meat, and peltry. This could be accomplished only by first bringing the Indians into subjugation, and this, it had been amply proved, could be attained in New Mexico only by war. In conclusion, Vargas tabulated his many achievements, and, calling attention to the rewards granted to his predecessors for relatively insignificant services, bewailed the fact that his services, "being so notorious," had not had the good fortune of reaching the ear of the king.²⁵

Several months later, on March 12, the Junta in Mexico City acted on Vargas' November reports. Vargas' campaigns were given full approval, and in view of the rapine and murder committed by the apostate rebels, and their continued harassment of the Spanish settlements, his pursuit of the enemy into their various lairs was justified as the only means of checking hostilities. He was commended for having offered pardon to the eight Picurías families should they voluntarily return to their pueblo, an act, it was felt, which would serve as an example to hasten similar action on the part of the other rebels, who were already hard pressed by the rigors of winter. Again, and not in the spirit of disapproval of any of Vargas' acts, so said the Junta, he was reminded of his Majesty's laws, to be followed to the letter in dealing with the rebels. Punishment should be meted out only for recognized errors and crimes, and not for sentimental reasons.²⁶

With regard to the eighty-four Picurías taken prisoner and distributed among the soldiers and settlers of Santa Fé as servants, it was pointed out that their treatment should be in accordance with the law in every respect, "so that they will be

²⁵ Governor Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696.

²⁶ Criticism here was aimed especially at Vargas' execution of a rebel Indian at Jacona without first permitting him to make a statement.

duly instructed and taught [Christian] doctrine . . . nor should they be permitted to be treated as slaves, nor taken to any other place, traded, or sold, nor victimized by any other pretext while they are being instructed in the ways of civic life." And when proficient in the ways of the *vida política*, or civic life, and in their knowledge of Christian doctrine, they should be granted their full liberty and sent to live in the reduced pueblos with their fellow tribesmen. The Junta instructed that both the Indian prisoners and their present masters should be familiarized with all legislation pertaining to the matter.

As for the raise in Father Vargas' quota of missionaries for New Mexico to twenty friars and a lay brother, official approval was granted. Various petitions of the settlers were denied. Those of Santa Cruz had asked to move to the more fertile lands in the vicinity of Alameda, or to the haciendas of Mejía and Atrisco, to the south of Bernalillo. In view of the delicate situation in New Mexico, for strategic reasons alone the petition was refused. Also, the Spanish settlers, some of whom were fretting over the recent limited distribution of eighty-four rebels as servants, had requested use of additional Indian labor in planting their fields. It was pointed out by the Junta that numerous royal cédulas prohibited such personal service except for special punishment in unusual cases. Just recently, it was added, Indian service three days a week, as practiced in Venezuela and Campeche, had been abolished, as it caused the natives to lose the faith and run away to the mountains. The Indians should not be arbitrarily robbed of their liberties by such pernicious and evil practices, for "the uprising in New Mexico carried out by the Indians in the year '80 was largely the result of misuse of the Indians in *repartimiento*."²⁷

In New Mexico, the subjugated Pueblo Indians continued to return to their recently abandoned pueblos. Early in 1697 Vargas resettled the pueblo of Santa Cruz de Galisteo with the remnant of the Tanos of San Cristóbal and San Lázaro.²⁸ Many of the Pueblos had left their homes never to re-

²⁷ Report of the Junta General de Hacienda, Mexico City, March 12, 1697. At this session of the Junta it was also ordered that the stone mortars, previously ordered sent to New Mexico, if not already delivered, should be sent immediately.

²⁸ Escalante's "Noticias," B.N.M., legajo 3.

turn, and there was a permanent intermingling of the tribes in some cases. As a result of this dispersion some of the reoccupied pueblos were greatly reduced in size. The western pueblos, although still hostile, offered no great menace, for they were sufficiently distant and they were satisfied to remain aloof. The Apache peril was ever present, but there was little one could do about it on the New Mexico frontier. In any event, the upper Río Grande pueblos were at last permanently pacified, and that meant peace of mind for the Spanish settler and missionary, and time for peaceful pursuits.

As the spring of 1697 approached, New Mexico was well on its way toward economic recovery. By the following spring, the province would, according to general belief, no longer be a financial burden on the royal treasury of New Spain. This remarkable progress was only accomplished by dint of tireless work on the part of Governor Vargas and his people. There was much toiling and sweating, wherefore, as might be expected, some settlers grumbled, others berated their leader on the grounds that they were being overworked. As for official attitudes, it had taken a second Indian revolt, the one of 1696, to convince authorities in Mexico City that far-off New Mexico needed more than a niggardly helping hand. With the resultant dispatch of adequate aid in food, clothing, and other needed supplies, however, the permanence of New Mexico was assured.

Already, 1,400 of the 2,000 fanegas of maize for New Mexico authorized by the Junta on September 22 of the previous year had been contracted for and sent, and the remaining 600 fanegas were soon on their way.²⁹ The following supplies were also on their way to New Mexico: 1,500 varas of cloth, 1,245 varas of heavy flannel, and 2,000 Villalta blankets; 2,000 goats, with 200 males, 3,000 sheep, with rams for breeding, 600 cows, with 70 bulls for breeding, and 200 bulls to be broken in for use as oxen in the fields. In April, the main body of the long awaited livestock, and the shipment of clothing and blankets, arrived at Santa Fé—one of the year's

²⁹ Governor Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, April 30, 1697; viceregal decree, Mexico City, June 14, 1697.

most important episodes. The cloth had been carried by pack train from Mexico City, the livestock driven up from Parral.³⁰ On May 1, the newly arrived livestock and supplies were distributed among the families of New Mexico. These comprised 1,007 persons, described as follows: natives of New Mexico, 96 families totalling 404 persons; Mexicans of the group residing at Santa Fé prior to 1680, 17 families totalling 71 persons; residents from Zacatecas and Sombrerete, 124 families (including 25 orphan households) totalling 449 persons; 83 listed individually as orphans, bachelors, single women, and half-breeds.³¹ This did not include many of the officials, soldiers, and other settlers; the total of the Spanish and Mexican population was probably not less than 1,500.³²

Since a single suit of clothing required at least nine or ten varas of cloth, the new supply of goods was necessarily divided sparingly among the settlers, and in reporting the distribution to the viceroy, Vargas listed numerous "absolutely essential" articles of wearing apparel as still lacking. The men needed hats, belts, stockings, shoes, lining for their trousers, chaps, and overcoats, and some good wide *saya* (coarse woollen stuff) for their jackets. And:

... for the poor wives and daughters, their colored cloth for their petticoats, some Campeche wool for their shirt waists, and fine Rouen linen for sleeves and underskirts. They need Villalta blankets, and also, for clothing, their camel hair material in solid and mixed colors. They also need their holland, ribbons, silk, and pita thread. And for their protection, both in and out of doors, their shawls of Guachinango cotton, and their flannel cloth for *mantellinas* [a sort of mantilla]; and some Brittany linen to wrap around the neck and head. Also Tornay stockings, and women's shoes.³³

Vargas also requested mining tools and medical supplies. On June 16, 1697, the viceroy ordered 350 pesos paid to the

³⁰ A portion of this livestock had been left at El Paso; most of it was to be driven north later.

³¹ Record of distribution, in Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, May 1, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and S.F.A.

³² A year and a half later, at the close of the year 1698, the population was estimated as over 2,000. The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the king, December 28, 1698, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

³³ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, April 29, 1697.

apothecary master for the purchase of medical supplies, which were to go to New Mexico without delay.³⁴

The war of the reconquest was over. But the return of peace was not without its difficulties and vicissitudes. It was a period of economic readjustment accompanied by typical frontier hardships; and with it came a release of latent civic energy characterized by a brief spell of violent political unrest—a turbulence perhaps more individualistic than democratic in spirit.

³⁴ A list of the needed medical supplies was drawn up by the religious apothecary and sent to the viceroy at this time. Medical supplies had been sent to New Mexico on three occasions prior to this, each time in quantities valued at 300 pesos. Twice they were purchased by Governor Vargas at his own expense. The factor, Sebastián de Guzmán, to the viceroy, Mexico City, June 15, 1697; viceroyal decree, Mexico City, June 16, 1697.

CHAPTER XVII

BORDER POLITICS

The political edifice was roughhewn on the isolated northern frontier province of New Mexico. The politics of colonists and officials were in no wise marked by suavity or finesse, and often smacked of maneuverings little short of pettiness. The mark of selfishness was apparent, albeit somewhat condoned in Spain, Mexico, and Santa Fé, because of the constant struggle for self-preservation going on in the region. Prior to 1680, the New Mexican outpost of Old Mexico, far from the restraining hand of viceregal authorities, was noted for the turbulent character of its body politic. Indeed, the great Pueblo Indian revolt of 1680, by which the entire Spanish colony came to abandon the province and to retreat with the Spanish frontier some three hundred and fifty miles in a single move, was by and large a result of the political vicissitudes in the province.

After Governor Vargas successfully mastered New Mexico in the last decade of the century, these old bickerings were not renewed with any of the intensity of the pre-1680 period. During his administration there was political stability in the province. The *cabildo*, or municipal government of Santa Fé, and the custodian of the Franciscan missions, the local ecclesiastical authority, entered politics only in a secondary capacity. Vargas ruled, however, with a benevolent hand. With the friars he cooperated fully, and his services in the preservation of the missions are beyond exaggeration. His relationship with the clergy was in the spirit of the traditional Spanish ideal—the union of Church and State for the common good. The weakening of the ecclesiastical authority in the eighteenth century was to stem from new forces identified with a general trend toward secularization in Spain and throughout the Spanish empire, and is not to be directly identified with Vargas' policy. As for the *cabildo*, it was assuming the form of a stronghold of democratic and independent forces, and although very limited in power, it was always a source of potential local political influence.

By reason of the necessary *residencia*, the judicial review to which every outgoing governor was subject at the termination of his administrative period, any incumbent could suffer at the hands of disgruntled persons within his jurisdiction. Despite his hold upon his province, Vargas, at the end of his appointed term, fell afoul of political forces long latent in the Santa Fé district. The chronology of events may be briefly summarized. Vargas' five year appointment as governor of New Mexico, made June 18, 1688, to go into effect at his predecessor's termination of office (Vargas taking over February 22, 1691), expired on February 22, 1696. A year and a half after Vargas had taken office, that is, on June 24, 1692, his successor, Don Pedro Rodríguez Cubero, was assigned by a royal cédula containing similar clauses.¹ One of the clauses was this: the incumbent was to continue in office until relieved by his successor. Failing to obtain higher kingly appointment, Vargas during the closing years of his governorship asked for continuation in office for another term. When his term did expire officially in 1696, he clung to his post until July 2, 1697, when Cubero arrived in Santa Fé. A week afterwards he was subjected to a *residencia* of thirty days—and thereafter held in confinement for almost three years! Such an astounding turn of events seems worthy of explanation. Here was unanticipated ill-fortune for a notable frontiersman and builder; yet it was largely of his own making, for it came indirectly as a result of his personal ambitions.

The Cubero appointment of 1692 came as a matter of form. The king harbored no fear that Vargas, if successful in his conquest, might, according to the pattern of individualistic conquerors of old, become a frontier dictator. Nor did he have any forethought of Vargas' coming success or of the value of his fame among the Indians or of future circumstances which might make such an early appointment seem unwise at a later date. But Vargas, assuredly, kept the court in mind of his growing value to New Spain and New Mexico.

¹ *Consulta* of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, February 25, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141. See also Lansing B. Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIV (October, 1939), 377, note 28.

Shortly after his successful first expedition he had sent a long letter to the king describing his exploits and requesting a higher appointment.² At intervals he pressed his requests, and the viceroy had communicated them to the court in reports sent on the *flotas* of 1693, 1694, 1695, and 1696.³ No answer came. The term was about up, and in desperation Vargas now appealed for a continuation in office. Even while his appeal was going the long route of all negotiations between New Spain and Old Spain, Cubero had established himself firmly in Santa Fé. An important element in the situation was the fact that Vargas' old friend and dispenser of favors, the Conde de Galve, was no longer viceroy of New Spain. The Reconqueror now had to present his case to a viceroy to whom he was obliged to introduce himself with the statement, "Although you do not know me personally." Up to the very last moment, however, Vargas pressed his case. He described his long services and his success in reconquering New Mexico, adding: "I am sorry, my services being so well-known, that I have not had the good fortune to have them reach the ear of the king." He referred to the ancient name and the nobility of his house. He pointed out how his son, Don Juan Manuel de Vargas Pimentel, had been a royal page in the service of two queens, adventurer in the *tercio de los colorados*, and captain of cavalry in the army of Catalonia; and his son-in-law, Don Ignacio López de Zárate, was a member of his Majesty's council. His predecessor, Cruzate, had been rewarded by the king for accomplishing but one-tenth of what he had achieved.⁴ The viceroy did not ignore Vargas' requests, but without news from the king he refused to act on the matter.⁵

Meanwhile, in March of 1697, Cubero's agent in Mexico City was requesting that the title of governor of New Mexico

² Vargas to the king, MS. (Zacatecas, May 16, 1693), A.G.I. *Guadalajara*, legajo 139, cited above.

³ *Informe*, Mexico City, March 14, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

⁴ Vargas to the viceroy, Conde de Montezuma, Santa Fé, November 28, 1696, *Idem to idem*, Santa Fé, April 29, 1697, *ibid.* Vargas also addressed a letter to the former viceroy, his friend the Conde de Galve, asking him to use his influence in the matter. The Conde de Galve to Vargas, Vera Cruz, July 20, 1696, *ibid.*

⁵ Report of the Junta General, Mexico City, March 12, 1697, *ibid.*

be turned over to its rightful claimant.⁶ On March 7-10, 1697, Cubero was given the necessary authorization by the viceroy to assume the title of governor and captain general of New Mexico by virtue of his royal appointment. Vargas' attorney in Mexico City immediately protested. His arguments ran along the following lines: a change of administration in New Mexico at this time would be prejudicial to the safety of the province; since rewards for singular services such as those of reconqueror, pacificator, and refounder of a new province were made by the king alone, his decisions should be awaited before taking action; besides, he argued, when Cubero was appointed to succeed Vargas in the post back in 1692, New Mexico consisted only of the El Paso district; hence the appointment applied to that region alone, and not to Santa Fé and the surrounding territories subsequently conquered and settled by Vargas. He asked just how many of Vargas' reports had found their way to the king and the Council of the Indies. The petitions were examined, the royal cédula appointing Cubero to succeed Vargas was again checked, and the viceregal authorization granting to Cubero the right to assume the post was confirmed.⁷

The attorney now prepared to take up the matter directly with the king. Vargas, learning of these developments, wrote to the viceroy requesting suspension of Cubero's appointment pending definite orders from Spain. A short while later he succeeded in obtaining a statement from the *cabildo* of Santa Fé protesting loyalty and recommending him for the royal honors he was seeking, which was promptly sent to the viceroy.⁸ On June 10 the various records in the viceregal archives pertaining to Vargas' services were reexamined.⁹ The king

⁶ The documents on these negotiations are in "Gov't. Year 1698. Autos pertaining to the protest made by Don Diego de Vargas Zapata y Luján, governor and captain general of New Mexico, at the presentation of the royal cédulas in which his Majesty granted that office to the castellan Don Pedro Rodríguez Cubero," A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141. These records, with a letter of the viceroy dated April 18, 1698, reached Spain on October 13, 1698.

⁷ Viceregal decree, Mexico City, March 15, 1697, *ibid.*

⁸ Vargas to the viceroy, Santa Fé, March 25, 1697; certification of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Santa Fé, April 27, 1697, *ibid.*

⁹ Documents consulted in the government office, Mexico City, June 10, 1697, and viceregal decree, Mexico City, June 14, 1697, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

was then duly notified of Vargas' requests and recent complaints. Nevertheless, the viceroy upheld Cubero's appointment and informed the king that Cubero had been granted full authority to take over the post.¹⁰ Cubero's appointment was later confirmed by the king.

A native of Calatayud, Spain, Cubero had been in the royal service for twenty-six years. He had served in the Spanish army of Sicily, the royal armada of the ocean, and as castellan of the castle of San Salvador at the port of Havana, Cuba.¹¹ Before going on to Santa Fé, he stopped at El Paso, which was being attacked by Apaches. After a few punitive expeditions he left the region at peace and proceeded north.¹² Cubero, entering the villa of Santa Fé, capital of the frontier province, on July 2, 1697, promptly took possession of the government.

He found Vargas unwilling to surrender his post. Cubero was simply assuming a fully authorized royal appointment; but Vargas clung to the hope that he had been appointed by the king to succeed himself, and that the royal order was undergoing the customary delay of overseas communications and was undoubtedly on the way to the viceroy. Besides, Vargas' successes made the post appear more attractive than before, for from 1680 to 1692 it had been little more than that of a garrison captain, and this apparently caused him to look with some degree of contempt upon his successor; this, of course, did not change one whit the validity of Cubero's royal appointment. The *residencia*, however, was inaugurated on July 12, and conducted in a spirit of bitter animosity. The town councilmen and people of Santa Fé, with misgivings of their own, and anxious to win the favor of the new governor, since support

¹⁰ The litigation continued, and on October 2, 1697, the viceroy ordered a re-investigation of the whole matter, and Vargas' protests were again declared invalid. Viceregal decree, and *Informe*, Francisco de Morales to the viceroy, both dated Mexico City, October 2, 1697; the viceroy to the king, Mexico City, April 18, 1698, *ibid.*

¹¹ See *Memorial*, Cubero to the viceroy, Mexico City, n. d. [1697], A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141; Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, September 16, 1699, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 30; "Superior Gobierno. Año de 1702. Nueva México. Testimonio del Noveno quaderno de los autos sobre las Pretensiones del Capitan Don Antonio de Valverde . . .," A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142; Escalante's "Noticias," B.N.M., legajo 3. See also *Dictionary of American Biography*, IV (1930), 584.

¹² Escalante's "Noticias."

from any other source was so remote on this distant frontier, sided with him, and denounced Vargas. Despite the many charges placed against him, the thirty-day time limit for the *residencia* expired on August 11, and Vargas appeared to have successfully survived the ordeal. But the *cabildo* had other ideas. Shortly after the expiration of the *residencia*, Cubero received a petition from that body further pressing the charges against him and the proceedings were renewed on September 23. Vargas protested the utter illegality of the action, since the time limit of the official *residencia* had expired, and Cubero had been given no special authority to continue the trial. It was to no avail.¹³

The *cabildo*, in its petition, drew up a number of charges against Vargas. He was accused of embezzling large sums of money which had been turned over to him by the royal treasury for the support of the colonists. His condemnation and execution of the Tano captives after the battle at Santa Fé, in 1693, were put down as direct incitements to warfare, nay, provoking the causes of the Indian hostilities of 1694-1696. Blame for the famine of 1695 fell to his door, first because of an unfair distribution of the food supplies, and secondly because he prevented settlers from freedom of transit to and from New Vizcaya, where they might have engaged in traffic necessary for the economic well-being of the province. He was accused of favoritism. His policy of restoring Indian captives to their several pueblos gave great dissatisfaction to the settlers, who were thus deprived of slaves. He was charged with having driven out of the country individuals who he knew would testify against him.¹⁴

Now, it may be recalled, from the beginning Vargas had been held in high esteem by the viceroys, especially by the Conde de Galve, who always dealt directly with him in all official matters, without paying the least attention to the *cabildo*; the jealous members recalled with bitterness the pre-1680 days, when it was a real power in the affairs of the

¹³ *Memorial*, Vargas to the king, Santa Fé, n. d. [1700], A.G.I., Guadalajara, legajo 142.

¹⁴ Accusations of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Santa Fé, 1697, S.F.A., cited in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 112-114; "Marqués de Vargas. Varios cuadernos con relación a Nuevo México," A.G.N., Vínculos, tomo 14.

province. This undoubtedly played a part in arousing the local politicians and their following against Vargas, for, in short, from the beginning they aspired to dominate the government; instead, under Vargas' rule, their high ambitions had only brought upon them total ruin and political extinction. True, Vargas had his favorites, which is nothing new in any political scheme of things, and he promised much that he was unable to fulfill, despite his efforts. He often failed to mention to the viceroy many of the hardships endured in the province. Nevertheless, the records of the *cabildo* and the minute campaign journals of the period reveal no justification on the part of the settlers for the violent charges now preferred against him.¹⁵

Cubero pretended to be uninformed; he was in no wise deterred by the fact that the time limit of the *residencia* had expired and he therefore lacked any power or authority over his predecessor. He declared Vargas guilty as charged, and on October 2, 1697, forcibly confined him to his home. He then ordered the confiscation of his slaves, mules, and clothing, and fined him 4,000 pesos for costs of the trial. Again, Vargas was forbidden to communicate with anyone, and was thus prevented from presenting his case to the viceroy, which would seem to indicate a pronounced animosity on the part of Cubero.¹⁶ Fray Francisco de Vargas, it appears, at about the time of his retirement from office as custodian of the New Mexico missions, seeing the former governor suffering thus without defense, journeyed to Mexico City and spoke in his behalf; and the first petition for Vargas' release was presented to the viceroy early in the year 1698.¹⁷

¹⁵ See Escalante's "Noticias."

¹⁶ *Memorial*, Vargas to the king, Santa Fé, n. d. [1700]. According to this *memorial* some of the missionaries attempted to assist him in his plight, whereupon Cubero ordered their superior to send them out of the kingdom, and this was done. This *memorial*, presented to the Council of the Indies in his behalf, had been drawn up by Vargas during his imprisonment.

Cubero had arrested Vargas' most trusted *criados*. Valverde was exiled from the province at the request of 300 settlers on October 14, 1697. Certification, Santa Fé, March 4, 1699, *ibid.* Juan Páez Hurtado was arrested on October 20, 1697. Order of arrest and legal proceedings, Santa Fé, October 20-21, 1697, S.F.A., cited in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 113-114. See also notes 22 and 57, below.

¹⁷ Escalante's "Noticias."

Suddenly finding itself restored to a position of political influence as a result of the turn in events, the *cabildo* was arrogant beyond bounds. Its pursuit of the case against Vargas and those who had paid court to him verged on insolence. And in its efforts to ingratiate itself with Cubero, it addressed a petition to the king on December 28, 1698, requesting a lengthening of his governorship following the termination of his five year appointment.¹⁸ Vargas could look back upon a similar protestation of loyalty on the part of the *cabildo* of 1694, and, moreover, as late as April 27, 1697, that body had signed a certified statement protesting its loyalty to Vargas, and declaring him worthy of royal honors!¹⁹

Meanwhile, from his home, where he was being held a prisoner, Vargas carried on a constant campaign in self-defense which made for no little gossip, to say nothing of uneasiness on the part of the town council and the governor. As early as December, 1697, he composed letters to Cubero and to the councilmen notifying them that he had been reappointed and had been given a royal title despite the charges drawn up against him. He gave gifts of clothing and other articles to friends and partisans. Daily he awaited mail from Mexico City officially authorizing his reappointment to the governorship, and he did not hesitate to let this be known to everyone. The barber who trimmed his beard, his servants, and everyone who visited him carried away the news that Vargas had been reappointed and had been granted a royal title: perhaps it was not wise to adhere too strongly to the *cabildo* faction and its protector Cubero. These developments were soon to call down upon Vargas the full wrath of the governor.²⁰

¹⁸ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the king, Santa Fé, December 28, 1698, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

¹⁹ A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

²⁰ Vargas to the *cabildo*, and Vargas to Cubero, December 4, 1697; Vargas to Francisco de Anaya Almazán, June 17, 1698; Vargas to Fray Diego de Chavarría, August 5, 1699. A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14. These letters, and other contemporary records hitherto unutilized, prove Escalante to be misleading in his "Noticias" (unwittingly quoted by Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda," 387), where a generalization with regard to changing events that transpired from 1697 to 1700 gives the impression that Vargas was in irons and effectively denied the right to communicate with anyone from the time that he was confined in October, 1697, and that he was imprisoned "in the jail of Santa Fé."

First off, the *cabildo* got wind of the rumors. Keenly concerned, it heard that Vargas had been reappointed by the king to succeed Cubero; moreover, Vargas' close friend and "servant," Captain Antonio Valverde, whom Cubero had exiled from the province, was at the Spanish court in Madrid appealing to the king in behalf of his former "master," and seeking for himself the post of captain of the presidio at El Paso. Fearing vengeful retaliation should Vargas or Valverde be restored to positions of power in New Mexico, on February 20, 1699, the *cabildo* appeared before Governor Cubero with a list of scurrilous charges against Valverde; the members requested him to verify them and bring them to the attention of the king. The charges, the *cabildo* felt, would bring about a quick reaction on the part of his Majesty. The counts were nakedly set forth as follows: Valverde, when sent into exile, made threats against some of those testifying against him: he would cut out their tongues, take out their teeth, cut off their ears; he had lived in concubinage with a married woman, the sister of General Vargas' *dama*; in order to please the said *damas* he had seized a married woman, raised her skirts in the presence of the soldiers and put a pair of shackles on her, her husband being away at the time; he had arrogantly ordered people around, including his "master" Vargas, imprisoned his enemies on his own authority, and prevented ordinary justice against concubinage; on the eve of Corpus Christi of the year 1697 he had forced José García Jurado and Antonio de Aguilar, members of the *cabildo*, to "bailar los monos," threatening to toss them in blankets if they refused; he had told the settlers not to ask for a *residencia* against Vargas, his "master," under threat of punishment; he had alienated the soldiers to the point where on two occasions he was almost fired upon; without respect for justice he had twice stated that a captain was of more authority than an *alcalde*; he had seized the beasts of the settlers at his pleasure without paying for their services; he had sent Christian Indians out of the province and sold them as slaves in New Vizcaya.²¹ Such were the alleged high crimes and misdemean-

²¹ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to Cubero, Santa Fé, February 20, 1699, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141; B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 30.

ors of Valverde. Cubero was in no wise loath to summon witnesses to verify the accusations of the city fathers. Hearings were forthwith held. Testimony was obtained from Roque Madrid, José Antonio Romero, Tomás Palomino, José Domínguez, Antonio Gutiérrez de Figueroa, and Lorenzo Madrid, all well-known residents of New Mexico. They all swore to the truth of the charges, whereupon the testimony was officially recorded and sent to the Spanish monarch.²²

A week later, on February 28, 1699, the *cabildo* appealed to Governor Cubero to prevent Valverde from securing the post he was seeking.²³ Of Valverde, more anon. Ten days later that same body, confident now of the backing of some of Vargas' erstwhile henchmen, addressed a letter to the Spanish monarch denouncing Vargas as well as his "servant" Valverde,

²² Presentation, Santa Fé, February 20, 1699; hearings, Santa Fé, February 20-22, 1699; records of certification, Santa Fé, February 25 and 27, 1699. *Ibid.*

Roque Madrid, stating that Valverde, formerly a merchant of Sombrerete, had entered New Mexico as Vargas' "servant," and had been advanced to a captaincy without having any previous record of royal service, further testified that it was public scandal that Valverde lived in concubinage with the married sister of Vargas' *dama*, "going in and out of the rooms of the women" freely; that without respect for the law he had said that the New Recopilation of the Laws of the Indies was so much rot (*una porquería*); that he had ordered the soldiers to fire upon any justice attempting to prevent concubinage, assuring them that they would not be punished; that he cursed settlers and had them placed in irons without just cause; that on Vargas' last campaign to the plains against the Apaches he took a number of Indians captive and sold them as slaves in New Vizcaya; that immediately following the knowledge of the uprising of 1696 Vargas had ordered him, then lieutenant governor, to bring in the horseherd, and that Valverde, giving a contrary order, thereby prevented the possibility of saving four of the missionaries and a number of the Spaniards who perished only three leagues from Santa Fé. Lorenzo Madrid added that Valverde had publicly abused and kicked the wife of one Martín de Valenzuela in the plaza, causing her to have a miscarriage. With regard to the selling of Indians as slaves, Romero and Palomino testified that they knew of this on hearsay only. Palomino stated that his knowledge that Valverde had ordered soldiers to fire on any *alcalde* attempting to punish them for concubinage was also based on hearsay.

The above testimony was presented to the royal authorities in Madrid on March 26, 1700, by Luis Gerónimo Pastor, in the name of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé. Similar testimony had been sent to the viceroy at an earlier date.

²³ Petition of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, Santa Fé, February 28, 1699, A.G.I. *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

and opening up its guns on all those who until recently constituted the "inner circle" at the governor's palace. Yet there was a hesitant, defensive note in their allegations. Should Vargas resume the governorship after Cubero's five year term, he and his "servant" Valverde might wreak vengeance upon the three hundred settlers who had testified against them. Urging that Vargas' reappointment to succeed Cubero be withdrawn, the *cabildo* wrote: "If it should so happen (God forbid!) that either of the two, master or servant, should come to govern this kingdom, it would be its total ruin and destruction."²⁴

In the meantime, what was transpiring in higher official circles on this and the other side of the Atlantic? The source of final authority in all imperial matters turned the searchlight of scrutiny on the New Mexico problem, and its proceedings came as a ray of light to pierce the somber darkness which hung over Vargas in his confinement at Santa Fé. Indeed, the paradoxical developments in Madrid and Santa Fé serve as a glaring example of the vicissitudes of long-range colonial government in those days of slow communications. Of course, the official records were trotted out for review, first in the capital of New Spain, then in Madrid. Judicial fingers in Mexico City indicated certain facts, date by date. Following his first successful expedition into New Mexico, accomplished "at his own cost," and widely acclaimed in Mexico City and Spain, Vargas had expressed to the viceroy his hope of just reward for success. On February 25, 1693, the General Junta in Mexico City had recommended to the viceroy that he "make a special report to his Majesty, so that he may honor him [Vargas] and grant him the favors conformable to such distinguished and singular services." The efforts of Vargas' immediate predecessors, all of whom attempted to reconquer New Mexico but failed, had been disparagingly referred to by the Junta with the statement: "It does not amount to one tenth of what has been attained, acquired, and conquered by the said governor, Don

²⁴ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the king, Santa Fé, March 10, 1699, signed by Antonio Lucero de Godoy, Antonio de Aguilera Isasy, Diego Arias de Quirós, José García Jurado, Francisco Romero de Pedraza, and José Rodríguez. *Ibid.*

Diego de Vargas.”²⁵ On April 18 the viceroy had actually notified Vargas of his intent to report to the king the recent “glorious deeds . . . at the cost of privations and hardships, so that, having before him the knowledge of such distinguished services, he may honor him with the favors which it is his royal pleasure to grant.”²⁶ Such records as these went from Mexico City, along with various official records of Vargas’ first expedition into New Mexico and related viceregal documents. They had reached Spain on the *flota*, accompanied by a forty-four page letter, which has been referred to previously, written by Vargas directly to the king for the purpose of requesting rewards which he believed to be commensurate with the importance of his recent victories for the Spanish Crown. After alluding to many important services of his distinguished family, held in high and ancient esteem at the Spanish court for centuries, he asked for the title of Marquis of los Caramancheles, and promotion to one of the following posts, listed here in the order of his preference: governor and captain general of Guatemala, or the Philippines, or Chile, or Buenos Aires and the Río de la Plata.²⁷

Other reports and letters followed; nor did Vargas’ remarkable achievements of 1693 and 1694 fail to draw continued high praise from the royal authorities both in Mexico and Spain. But the above requests were not granted. Then, in November, 1695, Don Juan González Calderón, representing Vargas at the Spanish court, presented to the king on his behalf a *memorial* containing the following requests as rewards for his services in New Mexico: that Vargas be continued in office as governor of New Mexico for five more years immediately following the expiration of his five year appointment, now drawing to a close; that he be honored with a title of marquis for his house; and that an *encomienda* of 6,000 pesos be granted to him, which should be levied annually on the conquered Pueblo Indians. On November 2, the *memorial* was turned over to

²⁵ Report of the General Junta, Mexico City, February 25, 1693, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 139.

²⁶ Order of the viceroy, Conde de Galve, Mexico City, April 18, 1693, *ibid.*

²⁷ Vargas to the king, MS.

the Council of the Indies for an opinion.²⁸ While the matter was under discussion, additional reports concerning New Mexico reached Spain from Mexico. These reports, including a copy of Vargas' military journal, covering the period to November 25, 1695, were carefully studied, and on February 25, 1697, the Council of the Indies, when all was thoroughly mulled over, finally presented its report on the whole matter to the king.²⁹

The recommendations of the Council of the Indies were specifically as follows: everything thus far decided upon by the viceroy and General Junta in Mexico with regard to the northern province of New Mexico should be approved;³⁰ Vargas should be reappointed governor of New Mexico in succession to Cubero; he should be given the honorary distinction of "Pacificator"; he should be granted the title of marquis or count; and in order to supplement his meager salary and enable him to live in a manner suited to his dignity, since he had spent his fortune in the royal service in America and had a large family to support, he should be granted an *encomienda* of 4,000 pesos to be valid for two generations in accordance with

²⁸ This memorial, and accompanying papers and endorsements, are found in A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

On January 5, 1697, the royal fiscal, in his report, expressed the opinion that Vargas should be granted the title of marquis as requested, basing his opinion on Law 23, Book 4, Title 3, of the Recopilation of the Laws of the Indies, which he quoted as follows: "... if the *adelantado* or principal leader has been successful in his expedition, and has ably fulfilled his task, we shall feel well served by his care and diligence, by granting him the privilege of vassalage in perpetuity, and the title of marquis or others with which to honor his person and house." As for the *encomienda*, the fiscal felt that the request was excessive. Report of the fiscal, Madrid, January 5, 1697, *ibid.*

²⁹ The documents were first examined by Don Juan de Villagutierre y Sotomayor, the *relator* of the Council of the Indies, and he submitted a digest of the matter, with his opinions, to that body on February 4, 1697. After commending Vargas for his valor and success, and attesting to the fact that he belonged to one of the oldest and most distinguished families of Madrid, he made the following recommendations: that Vargas be reappointed as governor of New Mexico, to serve for five more years; that he be honored with the title of marquis or count for himself and his heirs; and that he be granted an *encomienda* of 4,000 pesos.

³⁰ It was suggested here, however, that in gathering additional families for the purpose of building up the newly refounded settlements in New Mexico, they should be drawn preferably from Mexico City, and not from New Vizcaya, which, it was stated, should not be hindered in its progress toward the attainment of a stable and permanently settled character.

the laws of succession, this last favor even though his Majesty had ordered on August 17, 1695, that *encomiendas* should not be considered.³¹

The king gave his full approval to all of the above recommendations except the granting of an *encomienda*. Copies of this decision were dispatched without delay to the viceroy in Mexico City and to Vargas. In the letter to the viceroy, the king praised his former governor highly, referring to the successful developments in New Mexico as "due (with the aid of Divine Providence) to the valor, zeal, and disinterestedness of Don Diego de Vargas."³² The request for an *encomienda* was again presented to the Council of the Indies for consideration, and on June 3 that body again recommended to the king the granting of the favor; but his Majesty persisted in his refusal to act.³³ So the matter stood until the following year. Meanwhile, additional official reports concerning New Mexico reached Spain. They told of the Pueblo revolt of 1696, the last important bid of the Pueblo Indians to overthrow Spanish rule in New Mexico, and its successful suppression by Vargas and his brave colonists.³⁴ In 1698 Vargas' close friend and "servant" Captain Valverde arrived in Madrid, seeking for himself the captaincy of the presidio at El Paso, but also pur-

³¹ Report of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, February 25, 1697, *ibid.*

³² The *consulta* records, Madrid, February 25, 1697, *ibid.* On March 11, 1697, the Council of the Indies asked the king to issue the privilege of "pacificator" to Vargas, since the document officially granting the privilege had not yet been issued. This memorandum was accompanied by the following document: "San Lorenzo, July 8, 1602. Royal cédula issued in the case of Don Juan de Oñate granting the privilege of *Hijos dalgo* to those who assist five years in the discovery, pacification, and settlement as first settlers of the province of New Mexico. Said privilege to be enjoyed by their legitimate children and descendants." A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

The following year, through correspondence from the viceroy, it was learned that Vargas was still entertaining hopes of being appointed to succeed himself in office, despite the royal cédula of June 24, 1692, granting the governorship to Cubero in succession; but the report from the viceroy notifying the king that the post had been turned over to Cubero despite Vargas' protests was approved, and the reappointment of Vargas was sustained in its original form, that is, in succession to Cubero. *Consulta*, Madrid, n. d., A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

³³ Report of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, June 3, 1697, *ibid.*

³⁴ Upon examination of these reports in Mexico, it was proposed that the New Mexican people should be specially rewarded for their bravery. The viceroy to the king, Mexico, January 19, 1698, *ibid.*

veying as a participant in the reconquest of New Mexico firsthand information. His reports and those of the viceroy referred to above, combined with the lobbying of Vargas' powerful relatives and friends at the royal court, strengthened Vargas' case and contributed to turn the scales. In July, 1698, a third petition for the *encomienda* was presented on behalf of Vargas.³⁵ Handled in the usual manner, all of the pertinent documents came in for careful reexamination, and again the recommendation of the Council of the Indies was favorable.³⁶ This time the king approved, and on August 21 a royal *cédula* granting an *encomienda* of 4,000 pesos to Vargas was dispatched to the viceroy in Mexico City.³⁷

Captain Valverde was equally successful in his personal

³⁵ This third petition for an *encomienda* was similar to the previous one, but also asked that the desired *encomienda* not be liable to payment of the *media anata*, because of Vargas' lack of funds, and further that it be assigned to Vargas' eldest son, Don Juan Manuel de Vargas Pimentel, who had served as a queen's page, and had completed four years of service as captain of cavalry in the army of Catalonia, in the Rosellon sector, where he had fought bravely during the French siege in 1697.

³⁶ The Council of the Indies, in its report, recommended the granting of the *encomienda* because of the well-known qualities of the petitioner, his lack of sufficient funds to live in a manner in keeping with his dignity and the luster of his house, and because of "the special service of Don Diego de Vargas in the conquest and recovery of the provinces of New Mexico, which it [the Council of the Indies] esteems as one of the greatest [services] which has been achieved for the Crown in those dominions." Report of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, August 21, 1698, *ibid.*

³⁷ The annual value of the *encomienda* had been reduced from 6,000 to 4,000 pesos, and it was stipulated that the *media anata* must be paid by the holder in advance. Also, the grant was to be valid only in New Mexico, to be assigned among the Indians Vargas had pacified. However, should New Mexico again be lost to Spain, the grant would at that moment become null and void. The first holder of the *encomienda* should be Vargas' eldest son. *Consulta*, Madrid, August 21, 1698, *ibid.*

The next step necessary was for the viceroy in Mexico City to put the grant into effect. But the post-residencia confinement of Vargas, and the years of litigation which followed, caused postponement, and the *encomienda* was never put into operation. Years later, in 1726, Vargas' legitimate heirs in Spain had the *encomienda* changed to a royal pension, the returns from which were later enjoyed by them, and not by Vargas' illegitimate "eldest son," who quietly disappeared from the picture. Thus ended Vargas' efforts to provide for his illicit family in America, to which he was faithful until his death. During his lifetime, he had apparently been able to pass off his illegitimate eldest son in Spain, with the connivance of his proud Castilian relatives, as a legitimate member of the family.

For a detailed study of the Vargas *encomienda* grant, see Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda."

dealings at the Spanish court. He had fortified himself with numerous recommendations several months prior to his exile from New Mexico by Vargas' successor; these were not to be gainsaid. He had arrived in Madrid with certified statements attesting to loyal services in New Mexico worthy of royal reward. They were signed by Don Diego de Vargas, the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, the father custodian of the New Mexico missions and several other missionaries, Governor Cubero, and the viceroy of New Spain.³⁸ Valverde's petition was before the Junta de Guerra in Madrid on January 16, 1699. He asked to be appointed captain of the presidio of El Paso and *alcalde mayor* of the El Paso district, independent of the jurisdiction of the governor of New Mexico in civil affairs and in handling the payment of the soldiers, and subject to him only in military matters, as in the case of the presidios of New Vizcaya (e. g. Cuencame, Gallo, Cerro Gordo, Conchos, Casas Grandes), Sinaloa, Sonora, etc.³⁹ The Junta de Guerra, upon consultation on the matter, debated the claims and requests. The post of

³⁸ Valverde's "Record of services of Captain Don Antonio Valverde Cossio, of the presidio of Our Lady of Remedies and the Exaltation of the Cross of the villa of Santa Fé, province of New Mexico, by appointment of its governor," was printed, in four folio pages, in Madrid, on November 8, 1698. This paper was drawn up from the government records in Madrid on November 5, and the printed copy made for the purpose of facilitating the deliberations of the royal authorities, as was the customary procedure. An analysis of the paper shows that: (1) by certification of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, April 24, 1697, Valverde became a soldier in the royal service at Sombrete in 1693, when he joined Governor Vargas, and was appointed adjutant of the soldiers enlisted at that time in Sombrete; that he served bravely in all of the major engagements of the reconquest, and was promoted to alférez in 1694, and captain of the presidio of Santa Fé in 1695; (2) by certification of Governor Vargas, September 16, 1697, Valverde had served bravely in all the major operations of the reconquest; (3) the same was attested to by the custodian, and by other missionaries of the New Mexico missions on September 11 and 14, 1697; (4) Vargas and the *cabildo* both recommended Valverde as worthy of royal honors because of his services and military experience; (5) on August 2, 1697, Governor Cubero, who had taken over the governorship of New Mexico the month previous, certified that Valverde had served as an officer in the presidio of Santa Fé in various ranks for forty-nine months and fifteen days at 450 pesos salary per year, from June 13, 1693 to July 27, 1697, at which latter date he obtained permission to leave for New Spain on plea of illness; (6) that all of the above certifications were approved by the viceroy of New Spain on November 18, 1697, and again certified by the viceroy on February 26, 1698. A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

³⁹ The king to the Junta de Guerra, Madrid, January 16, 1699, *ibid.*

captain of the presidio of El Paso was under viceregal jurisdiction, it reported, and that of *alcalde mayor* was held by direct appointment of the governor of New Mexico; the last request was without basis and should not be considered.⁴⁰ This report was submitted to the Council of the Indies, which recommended the appointment to the captaincy of the presidio of El Paso, with salary to be decided by the king, but rejected the second request.⁴¹ The Junta de Guerra approved of the recommendations of the Council of the Indies,⁴² and on March 17 the king appointed Valverde captain of the presidio at El Paso, and refused the other post to him.⁴³ The Valverde appointment is of special interest because the position which he obtained by direct royal appointment was one that had previously been within viceregal control.

Valverde was soon off to his new post in America. On July 8 he was awaiting the *flota* at Cádiz, and while there he received the royal patent, dated June 28, 1699, certifying his appointment.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, earlier in the year 1699, Vargas'

⁴⁰ Report of the Junta de Guerra, Madrid, January 22, 1699, *ibid.*

In 1697 the king had approved of the establishment of a presidio of one hundred soldiers *pagados* at Santa Fé, and the maintenance of a presidio of fifty soldiers *de dotación* at El Paso besides, for the protection of the northern frontiers. When the report of the Junta de Guerra was turned over to the Council of the Indies, this information was included in order to emphasize the fact that the matter under consideration was one of importance.

⁴¹ Report of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, March 5, 1699, *ibid.*

⁴² Report of the Junta de Guerra, Madrid, March 17, 1699, *ibid.*

⁴³ Official memorandum, Madrid, March 26, 1699, *ibid.*, and another of the same year, no month given, in A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142. On March 28 Valverde's financial record was checked by the royal accountants of the Council of the Indies and it was found that the royal treasury had no financial charges against him which might serve as an obstacle to the appointment. Memorandum of the royal accountants of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, March 28, 1699, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141.

⁴⁴ Official memorandum, Madrid (no day or month given), 1699, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142, and copy of the royal cédula, Madrid, June 28, 1699, in B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 30. When Valverde received these papers they were found to contain a very vague provision with regard to salary. It read in such a way that it might be implied that the salary was to be paid by the ruling governor of New Mexico, his enemy Cubero! This caused him considerable worry, and it must have contributed to make his voyage back to America an unpleasant one. However, on December 10, 1699, an agent acting for him obtained a royal order directing the viceroy to provide him the usual salary. This order was sent to the viceroy in a dispatch of January 14, 1700. *Ibid.*

son Don Juan Manuel, who had been helping to look out for his father's interests at the Spanish court, was requesting a duplicate copy of the royal order granting the *encomienda*, and on June 4 of the same year he was requesting a copy of the title authorizing his father's reappointment as governor, so that he could carry them with him in the next *flota* and notify his father and the viceroy without delay.⁴⁵ A copy of the title of reappointment to the governorship of New Mexico for a term of five years, in succession to Cubero, was made on June 15, as Juan Manuel wished.⁴⁶ Quite possibly Captain Valverde and Don Juan Manuel de Vargas embarked together for America with their rich harvests.

In Mexico City, the litigation set in motion by the *cabildo* of Santa Fé and its sympathizer, Governor Cubero, concerning the charges against Captain Valverde and governor-elect Vargas, raged on.⁴⁷ The two were still targets for bitter denunciation. A thousand documents reveal the usages of adjectives which continued to pour down from New Mexico as relentlessly as the waters of the Río Grande. The advent of Valverde and Don Juan Manuel occasioned new gnashing of teeth in Santa Fé. Litigants and sundry colonists soon learned of Valverde's assignment as presidio captain at El Paso. On August 25, 1699, José García Jurado, *regidor* and procurator general of the *cabildo*, penned a report to the viceroy enumerating the charges presented against Valverde in the hearings held at the villa the previous February; the man was certain to stir up trouble if permitted to assume his new post, and hence these charges should definitely be brought to the attention of the viceroy so that he might suspend the appointment.⁴⁸ Three

⁴⁵ Documents dated January, and February 22, 1699, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 141, and the Council of the Indies to the king, Madrid, June 4, 1699, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

⁴⁶ See Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda," 385, note 51.

⁴⁷ The important documents on the Vargas-Valverde litigations examined by the viceregal authorities in Mexico City during this period, August 25, 1699 to March 20, 1700, may be found conveniently gathered together in eighty-seven folio pages in "Nuevo México. Año de 1699. En 9 Quadernos," B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 30.

⁴⁸ José García Jurado to the viceroy, Santa Fé, August 25, 1699, *ibid.* In this letter the additional charge was made that Valverde had attempted to bribe the capitularies by offering them 500 pesos each if they would refuse to receive Cubero as governor upon his arrival in New Mexico.

days later, on August 28, the *cabildo* sent a letter to the viceroy denouncing Vargas and Valverde in high dudgeon, telling him never to permit them to take positions of power in New Mexico. It was a duplication of the petition sent to the king on March 10, and was signed by the same persons.⁴⁹ These items, with reports on the hearings of February 20-22, got to the desk of the viceroy several weeks before September 15, when another letter from the *cabildo* similar to the one sent on August 28, again signed by the same persons, fell upon the file of viceregal agenda.

The above four messages had to be examined by the fiscal in Mexico City, who wrote his opinions to the viceroy on November 6, 1699.⁵⁰ He dismissed the personal charges against Vargas as being without weight, since they were made after the legal time limit of the *residencia*. However, he added, the alleged frauds against the royal treasury could not be passed over without investigation, and Vargas' reappointment should be withheld until the above records were sent to the king for judgment. Valverde's appointment, too, should be held in abeyance pending further scrutiny of the case, since it was not desirable to place the key to New Mexico (El Paso) in the hands of an enemy of the ruling governor of the province.

Meanwhile, Governor Cubero heard directly from his agent in Mexico City of Valverde's appointment. He was all haste in getting word to the viceroy to have it withheld until the end of his administration, in order to avoid untoward consequences. He described El Paso as the key to New Mexico from the point of view of supplies and communications, and the first wall of defense on the north-central frontier. For these reasons, he added, Valverde, being Vargas' "servant," would be a disturbing element in the province, for both he and his master had been declared guilty of charges presented by the *cabildo*. Cubero added that his money and credit to the extent of 90,000 pesos were involved in the maintenance of the "presidio and kingdom" of New Mexico, through the purchase of supplies and food to support the soldiers, for although he had requested

⁴⁹ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Santa Fé, August 28, 1699, *ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* They were presented to the fiscal by Don Juan de Saldúa, Cubero's agent in Mexico City.

help from the royal treasury none had as yet been forthcoming. He closed his letter with a vote of no confidence in Valverde, whose presence at El Paso would endanger the well-being of the entire province.⁵¹

The policy of Cubero and the *cabildo* was being frustrated at every turn. Meanwhile, Vargas bided his time. His claims to the governorship and the bestowal of high royal favor were obviously not without foundation. The 300 who had testified against him were desperate. Topping their frustration was the rumor that Vargas' son had arrived in Mexico City from Spain to avenge his father, and Don Juan Manuel, word had it, was close to the viceroy and ate frequently at his table. Vargas' friends and relatives in New Mexico, including one Nicolás Ortiz, of Santa Cruz, married to Mariana de Vargas, Don Diego's niece, spoke openly in his behalf and against the *cabildo* faction. Cubero clutched this new weapon; he accused Vargas with fomenting sedition in the province. He held hearings in Santa Fé from November 28, 1699 to March 3, 1700, during which time twenty-six persons were called to testify upon the following charges: (1) Vargas had been stirring unrest since December, 1697, by spreading the news that he had been reappointed to the governorship and had received a royal title, official news of which he awaited daily: (2) he was offering favors to those who would take his side in the pending litigations: (3) he was attempting to cover up his debts and fraudulent use of royal funds by bribery: (4) he and his partisans were threatening and intimidating those who had testified against him.⁵²

These hearings resulted in more severe prison terms for Vargas. Cubero now issued a decree: in order to put an end to attempts to foment rebellion, which, he stated, had been going on for two and a half years, Vargas was to be held *incomunicado*. With his home as his prison, he could attend Mass, but could communicate only with his family; writing materials were denied him; if anyone did secure permission from Cubero to visit him the visitor was to be searched by the guard

⁵¹ Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, September 16, 1699, *ibid.*

⁵² "Autos hechos sobre causas criminales contra el General Don Diego de Vargas . . .," A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14.

lest he carry any messages. When Cubero and other officials went to Vargas' home to notify him verbally, he challenged Cubero's authority as his rightful judge, and refused to listen to the reading of the decree. As a result Cubero made his terms more severe. Vargas was not only subjected to the above punishment, but was now placed in irons.⁵³

Meanwhile, during the months of November and December, 1699, the attorney of Valverde and the agent of Cubero in Mexico City, José de Ledesma and Juan de Saldúa, engaged in an important tilt in defense of the claims and petitions of their respective patrons. They each had access to the voluminous government documents touching on the questions at issue, and each, to the best of his ability, presented his case to the viceregal authorities for a final decision. Saldúa had a definite stake in the controversy, for he was Cubero's frustrated appointee to the post which Valverde had obtained by direct royal appointment.⁵⁴

Saldúa, speaking in behalf of Cubero, presented the following reasons why Valverde's royal appointment as captain of the presidio of El Paso should be suspended until the conclusion of Cubero's term as governor of New Mexico, and until the king had been fully informed on the case at issue: (1) As Vargas' "servant" he would be a dangerous and disturbing element at strategic El Paso; (2) there would be no cooperation between El Paso and Santa Fé, for the *cabildo* and the people of the villa were his enemies; (3) Valverde was a merchant of Sombrerete when enlisted by Vargas in 1693 and served as a soldier only

⁵³ *Auto, Notificación, and Auto de Prisión*, Santa Fé, March 9, 1700, A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14. Several supporters of Vargas, including Alfonso Rael de Aguilar, had previously been jailed. Cubero notified the viceroy of the above prison terms, by courier sent at Vargas' expense, on April 1. In his letter he stated that tumult and unrest had now ceased in the province. Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, April 1, 1700, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ Immediately after Cubero assumed the governorship of New Mexico he had appointed Saldúa as captain of the presidio of El Paso. The appointment was approved by the viceregal authorities and in December of 1698 Saldúa was authorized to take over the post, which he did. All this had been done according to precedent when Valverde appeared on the scene with his direct royal appointment. Meeting of the Junta General, Mexico City, October 9, 1700; "Superior Gobierno. Año de 1702. Nueva México, Testimonio del Noveno quaderno de los autos sobre las Pretensiones del Capitan Don Antonio de Valverde . . ." A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

until 1697, whereas the person occupying the captaincy at El Paso was required by law to have served his Majesty ten years to qualify for appointment; many excesses had been committed by Valverde, Martín de Urioste, and Don Félix Martínez, all "servants" of Don Diego de Vargas; they had caused so much trouble in the villa that Cubero had found it necessary to jail them and place them in irons for twenty days, and finally, at the instance of some of the missionaries, they were ordered out of the kingdom; (4) Valverde was involved in the frauds against the royal treasury charged against Vargas; all Vargas' "servants" lived in concubinage with their *damas* during Vargas' rule; Vargas showed favoritism in the distribution of the limited supply of cattle for eating purposes, his "servants" and their *damas* being the favored ones; (5) in the hearings held against Valverde at Santa Fé, Roque Madrid testified that he was to blame for the death of four missionaries in the Indian revolt of 1696 by his countermanding of Vargas' orders; furthermore, when Captain Juan Páez Hurtado was captain at El Paso under Vargas, he opened letters to and from Santa Fé and Mexico City, and in all likelihood Valverde would do the same, a reason why someone who could be trusted to cooperate with Governor Cubero should hold the post during the governorship of the latter; (6) the charges made against Valverde in the hearings at Santa Fé indicated clearly that he lacked qualifications of character; (7) Valverde could not be trusted to distribute honestly the salary of the soldiers of the presidio; (8) the matter was of vital concern to Cubero because, according to his own statement, he had 90,000 pesos of his own funds involved in the maintenance of New Mexico; (9) untrustworthy and undeserving of reward, Valverde would be a disturbing element at El Paso, for he, like Vargas his "master," would carry with him a spirit of rancor and revenge. In conclusion, Saldúa protested that with full knowledge of the above evidence, his Excellency could not in justice confirm Valverde's royal appointment.⁵⁵

Ledesma, the attorney for Captain Valverde, countered with the following evidence. First he produced copies of indispu-

⁵⁵ "Nuevo México. Año de 1699. En 9 Quadernos."

table official documents from the government archives in Mexico City: the records and certifications of Valverde's services signed by the *cabildo* of Santa Fé on April 24 and 28, 1697, and by Governor Vargas on April 27 of the same year; the decree of November 18, 1697, in which the viceroy recommended Valverde to the king and the Council of the Indies for reward "as an example to others"; and the signed statement of the viceroy, dated Mexico, February 26, 1698, approving of and certifying separate recommendations of Valverde signed by Fathers Juan Álvarez, Antonio Obregón, Pedro Matta, Diego de Chavarría, and even Governor Cubero.

In the last mentioned document, dated Santa Fé, August 2, 1697, Cubero had signed his name to a certification of Valverde's services as contained in his *memorial*, and to a statement that Valverde was leaving the province in order to obtain medical treatment in Mexico, and he further attested that Valverde had served his Majesty with credit and with the approval of his superiors, and was therefore worthy of reward from the king.⁵⁶ Ledesma argued that the above signed statement of Cubero proved the injustice of the present efforts being made by him and by the town councilmen of Santa Fé to prevent Valverde from taking over the post at El Paso to which he had been duly appointed by the king. The document was presented as proof that Valverde had not been ousted from New Mexico as charged by the opposition, but had left due to illness. The insistence on the part of the *cabildo* that Valverde had been expelled was referred to by Ledesma as "this imaginary exile which they have the temerity to allege."⁵⁷ As for the fiscal's opinion, in agreement with that of Cubero, that it would not be desirable for Valverde to assume the post at El Paso during Cubero's rule, because of their enmity, Ledesma argued

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* The recommendations of Fathers Alvarez, Obregón, and Matta were signed at Santa Fé on September 9, 11, and 23, 1697, respectively. Father Chavarría's was signed at San Felipe, September 14, *ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* The fact remains that several months later the *cabildo* and Cubero had a change of heart, and on October 14, 1697, the latter had issued an edict exiling Valverde from the province of New Mexico. (Certified statement signed by Cubero, Santa Fé, March 4, 1699, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.) This sentence was pronounced some weeks after Valverde had already left the province.

that this principle, if generally applied, would prove ridiculous.⁵⁸

Early in the year 1700 Ledesma presented a final *memorial* before the viceroy, begging of him not to suspend Valverde's appointment, as Cubero requested. It was no irreparable crime to have been the "servant" of Vargas, he contended, and moreover all the protests were from Santa Fé, whereas Valverde's appointment and activities pertained to El Paso, where there was no controversy over the matter whatsoever. Then, too, Cubero's investigations were a matter of politics local to Santa Fé alone. The attorney then levelled a shaft at Cubero; it was not unknown for soldiers to be forced into making statements and signing them: Roque Madrid was forced to say what he did. The charges against Juan Páez Hurtado should be dismissed as without foundation in fact. Valverde had left New Mexico in good standing, and was in no way involved in any frauds against the royal treasury. On the other hand, he stated, Cubero had attempted to usurp Vargas' salary for the one year and three months period which intervened between the end of Vargas' five year term of office and Cubero's arrival. Furthermore, he argued, Cubero was now contradicting what he himself had attested to in August of 1697. In conclusion, Ledesma charged that agents of Cubero and the *cabildo* of Santa Fé in Madrid had done their best to prevent Valverde's appointment by the king, and, needless to repeat, their plans had been frustrated.

When the litigants had concluded their lengthy say, vice-regal authorities in Mexico City began to deliberate. First came the fiscal's report. With regard to the charges made against Vargas following the secret investigations held in Santa Fé, the fiscal referred to them as "fabricated by the present governor" and without foundation. Regarding Vargas' alleged frauds against the royal treasury, a royal official had been sent from Durango to investigate, and no decision had yet been rendered by the Royal Tribunal of Accounts. And so, because of recent changes in the personnel of the treasury department, the whole matter had to be gone over anew. As for Valverde,

⁵⁸ José de Ledesma to the viceroy, Mexico City, December 4, 1699, in "Nuevo México. Año de 1699. En 9 Quadernos."

despite the recent charges made by Cubero, the *cabildo*, and their agents in Mexico City, and despite the fact that the captain of the presidio at El Paso had heretofore been appointed by the governor of New Mexico and confirmed by the viceroy, the records revealed many certified statements attesting to Valverde's merit for royal reward, as his attorney in Mexico City had emphasized; and the king, who was the final authority in all such matters, had made the appointment. Hence, the fiscal believed, Valverde should be granted full viceregal authorization⁵⁹ to assume the post at El Paso.⁶⁰

The case now went before the Junta General, which met on March 20, 1700. With regard to the charges preferred by the *cabildo* against Vargas and his "servant" in the period following the expiration of the *residencia* conducted by Cubero, it was determined that the latter should send to the capital the records of Vargas' *residencia* within two months time, under penalty of a fine of 2,000 pesos for failure to comply. After an examination of these documents, a just decision could be rendered. With respect to Vargas' alleged defrauding of the royal treasury, the defendant should come to Mexico City under bond and submit his financial records to the Royal Tribunal of Accounts. Cubero should place no obstacle in the way of his release, and once in Mexico Vargas must remain there until his accounts were settled to the satisfaction of the authorities. His reappointment to the governorship of New Mexico should be withheld pending the treasury investigation. Valverde's royal appointment was sustained, and it was decided that he should be given the necessary viceregal authorization to enjoy the privileges of his title.⁶¹ The above deci-

⁵⁹ "Paso a su título."

⁶⁰ Report of the fiscal, Mexico City, February 6, 1700, *ibid.*

⁶¹ This did not end the controversy as far as Valverde was concerned. When on September 2, 1700, the viceroy fixed his salary at 450 pesos per year he requested 600 pesos. He was finally granted the request on October 9, 1701. Valverde also continued to request the civil post of *alcalde mayor* at El Paso besides the captaincy of the presidio there. The viceroy was favorable, and on September 1, 1700, he requested that Cubero appoint Valverde *alcalde mayor*, thus uniting the civil and military power at El Paso, but with the provision that as *alcalde mayor* he should be subordinate to the governor of New Mexico, as was customary in the past. This last provision Valverde was willing to overlook. The action received confirmation in Madrid. Meeting of the Junta General, Mexico City, October 9, 1700; report of the fiscal, Madrid, October 21, 1702, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

sions should be brought to the attention of the king and his Council of the Indies without delay. These measures were fully approved by the viceroy and his advisers on May 6, 1700.⁶²

Vargas suffered an immediate reaction to the decision. The viceroy had decreed his release under bond to permit him to plead his case before the viceregal authorities. He considered freedom under these conditions humiliating in view of the ancient nobility of his house and his many services to the Crown. So he awaited further action. Finally a satisfactory arrangement was reached. Vargas obtained his freedom, and departed for Mexico on July 20, 1700,⁶³ but only after having endured three years less a month of confinement, the last four months in irons.

During all this time the Spanish court across the Atlantic did not know of the Pacificator's imprisonment in Santa Fé; in fact, not until the early part of the year 1701 did the news finally reach the Spanish monarch and his councilors. By the time the issue was settled, King Charles II, "The Bewitched," weak in body and imbecile in mind, had finally died, thus ending a long reign which many had expected or hoped to be short, and he was succeeded by his "nephew" Philip V. The change, and the fact that Spain was being hurled headlong into the long and disruptive War of the Spanish Succession, had no damaging effect upon Vargas' case, which now proceeded smoothly and to his advantage, albeit with excessive slowness.

The papers prepared by the *cabildo* in the period from December, 1698, to March, 1699, were presented in Madrid on March 26, 1700.⁶⁴ Having before them the letters and reports of the *cabildo*, the Council of the Indies recommended to his Majesty that the local authorities in Santa Fé be called upon to present all the papers on the Vargas litigation to the

⁶² Meeting of the Junta General, Mexico City, March 20, 1700, in "Nuevo México. Año de 1699. En 9 Quadernos."

⁶³ Escalante's "Noticias."

⁶⁴ Memorandum, Madrid, March 26, 1700, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

viceroy and the audiencia in Mexico, so that a fair and just investigation could be made.⁶⁵ On April 22, 1700, a royal cédula was sent to the audiencia in Mexico City, commanding it to grant Vargas a fair hearing and to give him special consideration because of his family and services. At the same time Governor Cubero was ordered to comply with whatever the audiencia, the final court of appeal, should decide on the matter.⁶⁶

On the arrival of Vargas in Mexico City affairs changed considerably in appearance, and the *cabildo*, now fearful that perhaps it might have climbed precipitately on the wrong bandwagon, indited a message directly to the king, beseeching him to stop Vargas from ever reentering New Mexico, let alone take the governorship, because, they said, "this would be as placing a sword in his hand so that, at his pleasure, he might take vengeance on all those who had testified against him."⁶⁷ The letter further harped on an ancient chord, calculated ever to arouse kingly suspicion: Vargas defrauded the royal treasury to the extent of over 224,000 pesos. When this letter was examined by the royal fiscal in Madrid nine months later, he forthwith rejected the requests of the *cabildo*, and added that since there was so much rancor and mutual distrust between the parties concerned, Vargas should not be permitted to conduct the *residencia* at the termination of Cubero's governorship.⁶⁸

In April of 1701 a *memorial* was presented to the royal authorities in Spain on behalf of Vargas, which acquainted the court for the first time with the fact of his incarceration

⁶⁵ Report of the fiscal, Madrid, May 9, 1700; reports of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, May 14 and June 27, 1700. A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajos 141-142.

⁶⁶ Audiencia of Mexico to the king, Mexico City, March 30, 1703, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

⁶⁷ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the king, Santa Fé, December 6, 1700, signed by Antonio de Aguilera Ysasy, Diego Arias de Quirós, Francisco Romero de Pedraza, José García Jurado, Antonio Lucero de Godoy, and José Rodríguez, *ibid.* A portion of this letter is quoted by Escalante in his "Noticias." Escalante erroneously gives the date as December 16.

⁶⁸ Report of the fiscal, Madrid, September 22, 1701, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

at Santa Fé since October 2, 1697.⁶⁹ The whole matter was reviewed in great detail by the Council of the Indies on April 21. The *memorial* of Vargas to the king was carefully analyzed.⁷⁰ In a report containing a long paraphrasing of the *memorial*, listing the numerous royal favors granted Vargas by the king for his many services, and denouncing Cubero for

⁶⁹ Report of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, April 19 and 21, 1701; *Memorial*, Vargas to the king, Santa Fé, n. d. [1700]. *Ibid.* Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda," 385-386, confuses the chronology and thereby draws a series of erroneous conclusions in discussing these events. He ascribes to the year 1700 events which took place a year later. His errors stem from his acceptance of a scribe's erroneous dating of a document April 19, 1700, instead of the correct date, April 19, 1701. There was, of course, no way of straightening out this point without the essential documents in A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14, to which Bloom did not have access when he wrote his article. What he refers to as two distinct petitions in behalf of Vargas, one presented to the Council of the Indies in April, 1700, and another in April, 1701, were in reality but one petition, the *Memorial*, Santa Fé, n. d. [1700], cited above, which was before the Council for the first and only time in April, 1701.

⁷⁰ After a review of Vargas' achievements as governor of New Mexico, and a listing of the royal favors granted to him, the *memorial* reads as follows:

"Immediately after the said Don Pedro Cubero took possession of the said government, he took the *residencia* of the supplicant with animosity and passion, which he manifested through the opposition which he showed, in order to prevent him from assuming his appointment. [For this purpose] he solicited the *cabildo* of that kingdom, and its people, since they are easily influenced, and being persons who went out to settle such remote lands, all recourse to help being so far away, to declare everything that design and malice could contrive, imputing against the supplicant sinister and false accusations, calumnies, and voluminous charges, which were made by some who were moved by terror and threats; others by self-interest; others through malice, and by many who were unable to read or write. All of this was for no other purpose or pretext than the obvious consideration that the delay which the investigation of such charges would involve might permit the said Don Pedro Rodríguez Cubero to avail himself of continuing in the said government, and place obstacles in the way of the supplicant in order to prevent him from returning to it by virtue of the said reappointment.

"And since no charges resulted from the said *residencia* held against the supplicant, despite the termination of the thirty day limit, on the eleventh of August of sixteen hundred and ninety-seven, the said Don Pedro Cubero, on the twenty-third of September following, started new proceedings against the supplicant, without jurisdiction or authority, nor order from the viceroy Conde de Montezuma, nor from the Royal Audiencia, nor at the request of your Majesty's fiscal. And the supplicant having insisted that he was no longer empowered as his judge, his jurisdiction having expired since the said eleventh day of August, he forcibly took him into custody on the second day of October, and decided to sell his slaves, mules, and all his clothing, without the slightest basis for doing so, ignoring all legal and juridical methods, and preventing anyone from seeing him or

having taken him into custody without legal right, the Council recommended his release under bond to permit him to present his case before the viceregal authorities.⁷¹ A few days later King Philip V, having examined the Council's reports, addressed a message to the *audiencia* in Mexico City ordering it to obtain the records of the *residencia* held by Cubero and all other related papers, rendering justice with as much brevity as

communicating with him, even the religious. And because some of them [the religious] wished to assist him, he compelled their provincial to have them leave the province, and in effect they left. Also, he prevented him [the supplicant] from enjoying the consolation of writing a letter, for which reason he could not notify the viceroy and the Royal Audiencia of these injustices and outrages. Furthermore, another charge was made against the supplicant, for he was falsely accused of fomenting sedition, and put in irons in the lamentable and unbecoming prison to which he has been confined since the aforesaid second day of October of the year 'ninety-seven. This is the state in which the supplicant now finds himself, having been unable, during the long course of the time which has transpired, to obtain any other prosecution than the said charges made against him, for he has not been granted permission to have them substantiated, and his defense and plea heard . . . by the Royal Audiencia . . .

"And since it is not just, Sir, that because of great distance from the presence of your royal Majesty, the vassals of your Majesty be persecuted, especially those who, like the supplicant, have been willing to sacrifice their lives in the royal service of your Majesty and for the Faith . . . And since he finds his reputation and self-respect so prejudiced, his person so persecuted, his reason offended, and justice so disregarded . . . by such improper means as those which have been applied in the attempt to blemish his luster and quality, and the services through which the supplicant has striven to emulate all his ancestors, and his father, in the royal service, in fulfillment of his great and well-known obligations, and with the disinterestedness which is well known and qualified in the said reports, papers, *autos*, and the representations of the said viceroy Conde de Galve, and the Council of War of the Indies in New Spain, therefore:

"He begs your Majesty with the most profound reverence, to have a royal *cédula* sent ordering the viceroy of New Spain to arrange for the said Don Pedro Rodríguez Cubero to send him without delay all of the charges which he may have drawn up against the supplicant, so that they may be legally verified by the Royal Audiencia of that kingdom. And if the supplicant is charged with the slightest guilt, may it act with the severity and demonstration necessary for the proper punishment in the meting out of justice. But if it is found that all was a mere imputation, may he be granted the satisfaction corresponding to his dignity, credit, quality, and services, and be restored forthwith to the referred government, in conformity with the royal will of your Majesty, who deigned to continue him in office as a conqueror, and as has been done in the past in the case of all those who have been designated as such. And thus is awaited the royal charity, mercy, and justice of your Majesty, for which you will receive gratitude."

⁷¹ Report of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, April 21, 1701, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

possible, setting Vargas free or placing him in confinement as the case might be. Emphasis was placed on the necessity of examining carefully the papers of the "original *residencia*" held against Vargas.⁷² On October 10, 1701, the king sent to the viceregal authorities in Mexico a royal *cédula* ordering them to clear up the case against Vargas, and if he be found not guilty to allow him to take possession of the governorship of New Mexico, without power to conduct any *residencia* against Cubero.⁷³ As may be seen, all of these recommendations were merely an echo of steps which the viceregal authorities had already taken.

Meanwhile, in desperation, the *cabildo* of Santa Fé sent one of its most impassioned representatives, José García Jurado, to represent it in Mexico City. He was instructed to demand from the royal authorities a statement of the exact sums issued to Vargas by the royal treasury to pay for the needs of the settlers in New Mexico. With such a statement the extent of the alleged frauds committed by him against the people of the province could be ascertained.⁷⁴ García Jurado, it may be recalled, had accused Captain Valverde of having forced him to "bailar los monos" on threat of being tossed in a blanket in order to amuse Valverde and his *dama*. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico City, he learned that Valverde's appointment had been confirmed by the viceroy, and his first act was to present a protest.⁷⁵ It was useless, for the whole matter had been settled. He then attempted to quash the proceedings being conducted in behalf of Vargas, but his efforts were thwarted at every turn. Meanwhile, letters from Cubero and the *cabildo*

⁷² The king to the Audiencia of Mexico, El Buen Retiro, April 27, 1701, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

⁷³ Escalante's "Noticias."

⁷⁴ Power of authority granted to José García Jurado by the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, with the authorization of Governor Cubero, Santa Fé, July 15, 1700, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142; Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, April 10, 1700, and García to the viceroy, Santa Fé, n. d., A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14. In this last note García pointed out that Cubero and the *cabildo* had given permission to many to leave New Mexico with buffalo robes, buckskins, piñon nuts, and other articles to trade in Sonora and New Vizcaya in exchange for livestock, sheep, horses, and mules. This trade, he stated, was necessary to assure the prosperity of the province. This had been prevented by previous governors, including Vargas, with resultant economic stagnation.

⁷⁵ Petition of José García Jurado to the viceroy, Mexico City, n. d., A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

to the viceroy, pressing the charges against Vargas, continued to pour into the capital, but also to no avail.⁷⁶

Having failed utterly in every respect, García Jurado now accused the viceregal authorities of prejudice, and finally got off a long letter to the king as a last recourse. He bemoaned the unjust conduct of the Vargas case; despite the decisions of the General Junta held in Mexico City on March 20, 1700,

⁷⁶ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 20 and May 26, 1702; Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, April 2, 1702. A.G.N., *Vinculos*, tomo 14.

Cubero wrote that Vargas was misrepresenting the facts in presenting his case in Mexico City. He then launched into the oft repeated charges to the effect that when he took office as governor New Mexico was on the verge of abandonment and ruin, despite large sums issued to Vargas by the royal treasury, and that he, Cubero, from his own funds, had already restored New Mexico to peace and prosperity.

The *cabildo*, after bitterly assailing Vargas, stated, in praise of Cubero: that since the province was destitute when the latter took over the governorship, he purchased 300 mules with his own funds, which he used for the purpose of transporting grain into the province from El Paso and New Vizcaya, and with which he supported the presidio and supplied food to 1,000 persons for two years, by which time harvests brought self-sufficiency; that he clothed over 800 women of Santa Fé and Santa Cruz with blouses and skirts, whereas formerly they were dressed in animal skins, for which reason they were unable to attend Mass; that he hauled wood for the poor; that daily he distributed to the poor, from his house, huge quantities of *atole*; that since the 50 yoke of oxen in the province were insufficient he doubled that amount at his own expense, besides obtaining plows and other farm implements; that more than 2,000 horses, that many cows, and 8,000 sheep were brought into New Mexico by the missionaries, and Cubero paid 23,000 pesos for them; that he not only reconstructed the church and convent, but also the Casas Reales in Santa Fé at his own expense; that he reduced Ácoma, Zuñi, and Laguna without cost to the royal treasury; that the Apaches del Acho,—de Jicarilla,—de Trementina,—de los Llanos, Faraones, and Chilmos, and the Janos, Utes, and Navahos were now all at peace; that the Navahos had recently asked for missionaries; that because of the undesirable settlers brought in by Vargas and his agents from "tierra fuera," who were indolent, tainted, and unworthy persons, widespread theft and robbery had made life hazardous, but that these had been put to work in the mines, in the hopes of developing them, and that they were no longer a danger to the people; and that as a result of Cubero's efforts New Mexico was at last prosperous and at peace for the first time.

When the fiscal examined these letters he reported adversely. He referred to the earlier letter of the *cabildo* speaking in equal high praise of Vargas, and another in which that same body, in a message to former Viceroy Galve, had recommended Vargas for reappointment. The fiscal then added that in these certified statements the *cabildo* either spoke the truth or lied. If the latter were the case, then a *cabildo* which now spoke highly of Cubero was no more trustworthy than one which spoke falsely in the first instance. (Report of the fiscal, Mexico City, July 1, 1702, *ibid.*) The *cabildo* accused the fiscal of being partisan in the litigation.

to the effect that Vargas' reappointment to the governorship of New Mexico should be suspended until his accounts were put in order, and despite the royal cédula of October 10, 1701, ordering a fair investigation, no obstacles were being placed in the way of his return to New Mexico "to avenge himself" against those who justly accused him. Vargas, García alleged, influenced the authorities with bribes: "money and favors are sovereign in this empire at the expense of justice." The charges of the *cabildo* were just, and Cubero had verified them in the spirit of justice and sincerity, but the viceregal authorities continued to be undeceived; and the whole case of the *cabildo* was being judged in a false light through the misrepresentations of Vargas and his friends. He then launched into a series of more or less negative accusations. They were an exaggerated form of what had been repeated before. When Cubero succeeded Vargas in the governorship of New Mexico, he wrote, the province was in a state of abandon, and the people lacking in the bare necessities of life. There was not even grain, seeds, or livestock. The people were eating unbelievable things to keep alive. But when Cubero arrived, immediately he provided large quantities of livestock, sheep, seeds, farm implements, and other needs, and what had been misery and affliction was soon transformed into happiness and abundance. Every year thereafter Cubero distributed at least 4,000 pesos worth of clothing. He also built the church and convent of St. Francis in Santa Fé. All this at his own expense. Continuing the diatribe, García Jurado added that Vargas had the temerity to allege that the charges made by the *cabildo* were false; that the archbishop-vice-roy and others were using the power of their high offices to shield him, and that in a flagrant denial of justice he, García Jurado, sent to Mexico City as the spokesman of the people of New Mexico, had been refused permission to see the records of the royal treasury lest he might learn exactly how much money was granted to Vargas and how much of it had been used fraudulently. Now all was peaceful and quiet in New Mexico, which would undoubtedly return to its calamitous state should Vargas be permitted to return. His last desperate words were to the effect that in

every respect the viceregal authorities were displaying unjust prejudice in favor of Vargas.⁷⁷

He advanced his cause exactly nowhere. Vargas was cleared of all the charges. No weight was given to the many personal accusations made against him and his *criados*. The only accusations given meticulous attention were those alleging the misuse of royal funds. And, indeed, after a thorough investigation of the financial records Vargas' assets were found to include a balance due him from the royal treasury of 17,619 pesos, two *tomines*, six *granos*.⁷⁸ This attests to the large sums Vargas drew from his own private fortune in the financing of the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico.⁷⁹ And furthermore, when in due time he returned as governor of New Mexico, he carried new honors, among them the royal title of

⁷⁷ José García Jurado to the king, Mexico City, May 21, 1702; report of the royal fiscal, Madrid, April 13, 1703. A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142. On May 26, 1702, the *cabildo* of Santa Fé penned a similar letter to the king. A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14.

⁷⁸ Report of the accountants of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts of New Spain, Mexico City, August 31, 1702, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142. Of this sum, 7,055 pesos were later deducted to pay overdue *medias anatas* and *lanzas* to the royal treasury for the title of marquis, which Vargas had neglected to pay. In 1709, Vargas' legitimate daughter, Doña Isabel, legally recognized as his sole legitimate heir and as the Marchioness of la Nava de Barcinas, was still attempting to obtain the balance from the royal treasury of Mexico City. The king to the viceroy, the Duke of Alburquerque, Madrid, March 19, 1709; petition, Doña Isabel María de Vargas to the king, Madrid, July 10, 1709. *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ For the period 1691-1697, the cost of carrying out the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico was estimated by the officials of the royal treasury in Mexico City as totalling 217,177 pesos, 2 reales. Of this sum authorized, 198,870 pesos, 4 reales, were paid out by the royal treasuries of New Spain as follows: Mexico City—17,200 pesos; Guadiana (Durango)—100,905 pesos, 2 *tomines*, 1 *grano*; Zacatecas—56,203 pesos, 4 reales; Guadalajara—15,000 pesos; Sombrerete—9,561 pesos, 5 reales, 11 *tomines*. The remaining 18,306 pesos, 6 reales, were also authorized, but were paid by Vargas from his own fortune, hence after a careful check of expenditures, it was found that the government owed him this sum, from which deductions of several hundred pesos were later made, however, as indicated above. To avoid delay, Vargas frequently paid authorized expenditures out of his own pocket and collected from the treasury later. This money was spent on the following: soldiers' salaries and bounties to volunteer families; transportation and wagons; horses, mules, livestock (large and small); wheat, maize, beans, hardtack, flour, firearms, lances, powder, bullets; cloth and blankets; iron farm and household implements; medicine; religious articles. A detailed, thirty-two page itemized list of all of these expenditures may be found in "Reparos . . . de las cuentas Presentadas en el Real Tribunal de Quentas de

Marquis of La Nava de Barcinas. The exoneration of Governor Vargas is best told in the words of the Royal Audiencia of Mexico in the following letter addressed to the king on March 30, 1703:

. . . Sentence *de vista y revista* was pronounced, in which it was decided, notwithstanding the charges and claims brought by the villa of Santa Fé against Don Diego de Vargas, that it had been invalid to allow them to be filed, since they had been presented outside the period of the *residencia* and without the filing of bonds.

It was [therefore] ordered, in compliance with the royal cédula whereby the office of governor of New Mexico was granted to [Vargas] for another five years, that he might proceed to exercise the said office, admonishing him to show love and goodwill toward the members of the *cabildo* and the residents of the said villa, forgetting any reasons for prejudice which they might have occasioned him by reason of this complaint; that otherwise prompt and severe measures would be taken to remove him from office. The costs of the complaint were charged against the villa and *cabildo* members and against Don Pedro de Rodríguez Cubero their governor . . . who, without validity and without authority, instigated and continued so scandalous and notorious a case with the sole end and intent of protracting his continuance as governor, by virtue of the delay involved, as he has managed to do for more than five years, but which he has now been deprived of so continuing . . .⁸⁰

esta Nueva España por Don Diego de Bargas . . .," (1702), A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14. These expenditures did not include the arms and supplies already at El Paso in 1691, the money spent by Vargas on his expedition of 1692, nor additional cash outlays for the support of the missionaries (at this time each missionary was paid 330 pesos annually by the royal treasury).

⁸⁰ The Audiencia of Mexico to the king, Mexico City, March 30, 1703, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142. Translation in Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda," 390-391.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RETURN OF VARGAS

Upon coming to a review of the administrative activities of Cubero, one is forced to conclude that the man had none of the interests of New Mexico seriously at heart. Cubero had not been long in office when he foresaw a short term of governorship for himself, and likewise how small any personal profit to himself was likely to be. He carried out the form of government and fulfilled the mandates of crown and viceroy by holding the land against possible foreign intrusion and by maintaining a modicum of peace; but either because he was constitutionally ill-adapted to further the progress of the colony, or because he lacked more than a superficial interest in his job of administrative spade work on a barren frontier, or because of litigations and political bickerings, his regimen can be characterized at best only as an interlude. In a way, progress in New Mexico from 1697 to 1702 may be said to have marked time, although from many viewpoints there was a retrogression.

During this period many settlers and soldiers went north to swell the ranks of colonists. Added numbers aided in consolidating the work of Vargas; the pueblos became more submissive, yet, it must be added, increasing inroads of marauding Apaches had much to do with the continued pacification of the pueblos, for these raiders by attacking natives as well as Spaniards forced the new Spanish subjects to depend upon the imperial soldiery for defense. Cubero turned his attention to the far western Pueblos at Ácoma, Zuñi, and Moqui, where he gained some fleeting success. What might euphemistically be called his Indian policy was greatly weakened by his hostile attitude toward the Franciscan missionaries. A brief description of some details of Cubero's efforts seems necessary in order to understand the condition of the province at the return of Vargas.

Toward the close of the year 1697 most of the Keres

Indians originally from the pueblos of La Cieneguilla, Santo Domingo, and Cochití, who in the uprising of 1696 had moved to the Rock of Ácoma, descended and established themselves on a height four leagues north of the Rock, on the northern side of a creek called Cubero Creek, a cannon-shot distant from Laguna.¹ These, along with the Acomas and Zuñis, made peace with the Spaniards in 1698. On June 30 of the following year Governor Cubero went with the Father Vice-Custodian, Fray Diego de Chavarría, to take formal possession of the three pueblos. On July 4 the Keres of the new pueblo rendered obedience, on the 6th the Acomas, and on the 12th the natives of Zuñi. The pueblos were given the names of Señor San José de la Laguna, San Pedro de Ácoma, the patron saint of Ácoma having formerly been San Esteban (to which it again was changed later), and Purísima Concepción de Zuñi, formerly Asunción de Zuñi, and later changed to Guadalupe.²

In the course of the year 1699 a conflict arose between Cubero and the missionaries which had an important bearing on the general policy with regard to the western pueblos. When Cubero first arrived in New Mexico, he spoke in high praise of the zealous work of the missionaries, to whom he referred as tireless workers amid great hardships.³ But in September of 1699 he suffered an about-face. In a long report he termed the missionaries incompetent in their work, and meddlers in government. The long suffering friars were highly indignant. They referred to the accusations as "this iniquitous report of calumnies against this custodia . . . inspired by

¹ This group is not to be confused with the group that settled at Laguna prior to 1688. See Prologue, 23; Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, I, 752, is not clear on this point.

² Escalante's "Noticias."

³ Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, February 12, 1698, B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 13. In this document Cubero states that there were at this time thirty-four religious, with four lay brothers, serving in the missions of New Mexico including the El Paso district. Thirteen of these were serving in the north, and it was stated that at least thirteen more were needed. Apparently the friars had submitted tactfully to his authority, for in the letter, without further ado, he wrote that the missionaries needed oil and wine, indicating that they had approached him without causing friction over *patronato* authority.

the infernal and malicious odium of Don Pedro Rodríguez Cubero . . . bitter persecutor of the religious in the year 1699."⁴

Throwing caution to the winds Cubero preferred the following charges. Shortly after his arrival in New Mexico he had discovered that the friars ministering to the Indians did not know the native languages, even though some of them had resided several decades in the province. This situation had continued more or less the same since Oñate's time, and it was the principal reason why the natives were, in his estimation, as pagan as they had ever been before the Spaniards even set foot on the land. The missionaries had always meddled in affairs solely within the royal jurisdiction; their attitude had been the same toward Vargas, although during the last days of his administration they had befriended him solely to make it more difficult for his successor, with whom they were constantly in disagreement. Moreover, the missionaries heard confessions of natives through interpreters, as a result of which serious sins were not confessed. He had warned the Father Custodian, Fray Juan Álvarez, and the Father Visitor, Fray Diego Padilla, of this untoward condition, and had urged them to order the religious to compile word lists and learn the native languages. Not only had nothing been done, said Cubero, but the religious had united against him in all his policies.⁵

⁴ "Informazion que tiene siete testtigos de que no saben los religiosos de esta Custodia las lenguas y que fueron los motivos de Alzarse los Indios el año de 1680," B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 29. It is stated in a note written by one of the Franciscan friars, which is attached to the copy of this document preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional in Mexico, that the constant friction between Church and State prior to 1680, which Cubero was now reviving, had brought on the disaster of 1680; and that in 1674 Our Lady of La Macana, in a clear voice which came from her image, had prophesied punishment for all this through a general uprising. The missionaries identified this prophecy with the revolt of 1680. Another version of this story is found in Vetancurt, *Teatro Mexicano*, III, 326-327, and reproduced in Scholes, "Troublous Times in New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XVI (July, 1941), 322-323.

⁵ *Auto*, Santa Fé, September 4, 1699, B.N.M., legajo 4. The controversy was obviously related to the fact that many of the missionaries showed open sympathy toward Vargas, whom Cubero was holding at Santa Fé at this time with very dubious legal justification. But it was more than that, for it was in reality a manifestation of the old Church and State struggle over the interpretation of the *patronato* power.

Cubero was adept at legal chicanery. He drew up a questionnaire which was duly presented to influential old residents and was designed to give legal strength to his case. The questions were grouped as follows: (1) How many governors have you known and how many of them had disputes with the missionaries? Were not such disputes frequent until the end of Vargas' administration, at which time the friars joined his partisans only to make it more difficult for his successor in office; and have you heard that these litigations have been going on since Oñate's time? (2) Is it not true that in 1680 the Indians rebelled because of mistreatment by the religious, who in each pueblo had a workshop to which the natives were called morning and evening to card wool and weave blankets, thereby preventing them from taking care of their fields? (3) Is it true that when the Indians were on the mesas in 1694 they cried out that they wanted Black Robes, because they had heard of the Jesuits of Sonora, and that when after the uprising they wanted to go from El Paso to obtain Black Robes they were prevented from so doing? (4) Is it true that when the Spaniards entered New Mexico from El Paso after the revolt of 1680, some of the Indians upon seeing the Franciscans returning appeared uneasy and displeased? (5) Do any of the missionaries in New Mexico know the native languages, or have they compiled any dictionaries from which to teach them to others? Is it not true that the Indians are taught to pray in the Castilian language, which many do not know, as a result of which the prayers mean nothing to them?

Captain Francisco Romero de Pedraza answered the first three questions and the fifth in the affirmative. He said that the only governor with whom the missionaries had had no litigations was Don Juan Bautista Treviño, and this because his brother was Commissary General of the Franciscan Order.⁶ As for the fourth question, he said that he had heard that such was the case. Captain Fernando Durán de Chávez answered all the questions in the affirmative. He further added that Father Salvador de San Antonio was always complaining to the governor. With regard to the causes of the revolt of 1680,

⁶ For a complete list of the governors of New Mexico, see the *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 152-157.

he said the missionaries called the Indians to card and weave by ringing the mission bell, wherefore the bells had all been destroyed; when Otermín entered Isleta in 1681, Pedro Naranjo of San Felipe, one of the native leaders of the province, had given this as their reason for the revolt. The only missionaries, he averred, who had made any effort to learn the Indian languages were Fray José de Espeleta, now deceased, who knew the language of the Moquis, Fray Diego de Chavarría who knew Suma, and Fray Juan Álvarez who knew Manso. Antonio Lucero de Godoy and Lorenzo Madrid answered all the questions in the affirmative, although the latter added Father Alvarado's name as one who knew the language of the Sias. Roque Madrid answered in the same vein as the others: the excuse the natives had given him for their attack on the bells in 1680 was that the missionaries rang them morning and evening on the pretext of calling the people to prayers and catechism; instead they were made to weave cotton and woollen blankets, altar cloths, and stockings, and had no time to care for their irrigation ditches and fields. He also stated that in 1693 the cacique of San Felipe told him that the Pueblo Indians would not make peace until the Franciscans were replaced by Jesuits. According to him few of the missionaries had learned the native languages; unintentionally, he damaged Cubero's case by adding another name to the list of those who knew the native languages: Fray José de Paredes, familiar with the Tiwa.

Captains Luis Martín and Luis Luján, two ancients of the province, added a note of humor to the hearing. Martín gave his age as seventy, and Luján gave his as ninety. The former had known twenty-one preceding governors of New Mexico, the latter thirty. Old Luján, who had been something of a rake in his day, answered all of the questions in the affirmative; the religious were always having trouble with the royal authorities because they wanted to run things; they were constantly meddling, removing *alcaldes mayores*, and having settlers exiled and ordered to serve as military guards at distant frontier posts. He spoke from personal experience. He had been ordered to go from one frontier to another, because as soon as he fell in love with the servant girl at the mission at

which he was stationed, the missionary would report it to the governor and he would be sent to serve as military guard somewhere else. Martín was, on the other hand, a pious old gentleman who refused to speak against the missionaries. Always busy on his ranch, he had never gone to see what was going on at the missions. He said that he was hard of hearing and consequently did not know whether or not the Indians had asked for Black Robes in 1694. When asked if the Indians had voiced resentment when they saw Franciscans returning in 1692, he repeated that he did not know because of his difficulty in hearing. He did not know whether the missionaries knew the Indian languages or not. What he did know, he asserted, was that the Indians were still pagans of the worst sort.

Cubero through ignorance of the legal value of such testimony or through stupidity sent the report of these hearings to the viceroy. And we hear no word more of the matter.⁷ When the records were sent to the viceroy they were accompanied by a copy of the old *Provisión Real* from King Philip III to Fray Estévan de Perea, which described civil and ecclesiastical limitations of authority and jurisdiction, and a copy of which the viceroy of New Spain, on January 9, 1621, had ordered kept on file in the archives of both the civil government and the ecclesiastical authorities in New Mexico.⁸ The document was carefully preserved, and brought out whenever the civil authority wished to assert itself. In fact, the whole incident described above was very similar to a petty controversy which arose early in Vargas' administration, and which seems to have had as its primary aim the speedy quashing once and for all of efforts on the part of the missionaries to assume a

⁷ B.N.M., legajo 4, doc. 20; *Auto de remisión*, Cubero to the viceroy, Santa Fé, September 8, 1699, *ibid.* The hearings began on September 4.

The above witnesses "publicly recanted in an attested retraction in the year 1703 before the reverend father provincial, expressing respect for the custodian and the religious and publicly asking pardon." Report of Fray Pedro Serrano, provincial of the province of Santo Evangelio, Mexico, 1761, in Hackett, *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico*, III, 495.

⁸ The copy Cubero had made was from a copy made in Santa Fé from the original on September 6, 1670. The copy preserved in the Santa Fé Archive was translated by Lansing B. Bloom in "The Royal Order of 1620," *New Mexico Historical Review*, V (July, 1930), 288-298.

liberal interpretation of the *patronato* power. Apparently, Cubero saw such a situation arising in 1699, and the exaggerated charges were framed to put an end to it.⁹

Meanwhile, the portion of the province within the reach of the protective wings of the Santa Fé presidio was at peace. The Spanish settlers were making progress toward self-sufficiency, and the work in the Indian missions was going forward. Indeed, for a time it almost appeared that Vargas' conquest of the upper Río Grande would be strengthened by the long hoped-for submission of the western pueblos.¹⁰ In 1700 Fray Juan de Garaicoechea was sent to Zuñi. He soon won the good will of the Indians, and induced them to descend from their mesa retreat to the plain below, where they reoccupied their old pueblo of Alona. Upon learning of the success, the Father Custodian appointed Fray Juan as resident missionary at the pueblo, and a *doctrina* was established there. The governor provided eleven soldiers to guard the mission against the hostile Apaches on that frontier. Before the year had passed, Fray Juan was at Ácoma carrying forward the work of the missionaries with similar success, and Fray Antonio Miranda was stationed at Laguna.

The intractable, crafty Moquis, upon seeing that they alone among the western pueblos had not submitted to the Spaniards, feared subjection by force should they not take the initiative in negotiating for peace. This or other political motives, certainly not their love for the Christian religion, impelled them to send Moqui war captains to the Spanish capital requesting missionaries. In May they appeared in Santa Fé to sue for peace, protesting their desire to return to the Christian religion. Governor Cubero received them cordially, and accepting their

⁹ We know from other sources that missionaries not mentioned in the testimony knew the native languages: namely, Francisco Corvera (Tewa of San Ildefonso), Salvador de San Antonio (Zuñi), Domingo de Jesús (Pecos), etc.

From earlier and later episodes of a similar nature there came to exist in the local archives what amounted to a group of more or less identical stock accusations against the friars, which were used whenever it best suited the politics of the group concerned. Compare the above charges, for example, with those made in 1731 and 1750, and the circumstances under which they were made, as described in Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 240-241, 250-251.

¹⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs in this chapter are based primarily on Escalante's "Noticias."

peace overtures, promised pardon for their apostasy and previous rebellion, and missionaries to work among them. The emissaries left apparently pleased and satisfied.

At the same time, the cacique of Oraibi, Francisco de Espeleta, or "Panchuelo" as he was also called, had sent other emissaries to Zuñi to invite Fray Juan de Garaicoechea to visit the Moqui province in order to absolve the adults and baptize the children.¹¹ Their tribesmen, they announced, were anxious to return to the Christian fold. Fray Juan was elated, and in the last week of May he left for Moqui accompanied by Alcalde Mayor José López Naranjo. At Aguatuví he was well received by the natives, who already had repaired a part of the mission establishment, had prepared quarters for the guests, and had set up a humble but satisfactory chapel. During his stay of three days the natives were absolved of their apostasy, and seventy-three children were baptized. Still, peace with the Spaniards was not the unanimous desire of the Moquis. Malcontents soon spread the rumor that Governor Cubero had executed the emissaries sent to Santa Fé. This made cacique Espeleta uneasy. He stomped in to visit Fray Juan privately. Very flatly he recalled permission to visit the other pueblos until definite news was obtained concerning his emissaries. If all were well, said Espeleta to the Franciscan, he would go to Zuñi in person in order to call him back to absolve and baptize the natives of the remaining Moqui pueblos. The missionary immediately returned to Zuñi and reported all to Cubero.¹²

This sudden change of affairs presaged a complete change of heart on the part of the Moqui leaders. They now attempted to work out a "good-neighbor" policy based on self-determination. On October 11, 1700, Espeleta, as their spokesman, arrived in Santa Fé with twenty companions to present their plan to the Spanish governor. He did not ask for missionaries, as before. He wished to negotiate as an equal and to establish relations as between two independent nations, desir-

¹¹ The cacique Espeleta, it will be recalled, had been chosen by his tribesmen to murder the missionaries at the Moqui pueblos in 1680, and he had performed the murderous act. He had been the trusted servant of Father Espeleta, whose name he had taken, and who was one of his victims in the above mentioned mass execution.

¹² Fray Juan de Garaicoechea to Cubero, Zuñi, June 9, 1700. This letter is reproduced in Escalante's "Noticias."

ing peace with the Spaniards, but retaining for the Moquis their own ancient pagan religion. Cubero promised peace and pardon only on the basis of submission to the Christian religion, as the previous Moqui mission had requested. Thereupon Espeleta presented a compromise plan which purported to be an elaboration of his original one. In a general council the Moqui leaders had resolved to permit the missionaries to return to their pueblos to baptize the children in gradual stages over a six year period. According to the plan, a missionary would spend the first year in one pueblo, and after having baptized the children there, he would move to another pueblo, spend the second year there, and so on until after a period of six years the children of all the pueblos would be baptized, and all the Moquis would have submitted. Cubero refused to consider any such scheme, and the emissaries, realizing their fewness and distance from home, pretended that their people would undoubtedly accept Cubero's decision, and returned to their western pueblos. The attitude of the Moquis soon became perfectly clear, for no news was heard from them for months following the visit to Santa Fé.

Early in the year 1701 Cubero led a military expedition to Moqui and was received coolly. He rounded up three hundred of the natives, men, women, and children, and by holding them as hostages he attempted to bring their leaders to terms. But finally obliged to surrender them, he returned to Santa Fé with nothing more than empty promises.¹³ Cubero proposed two other military campaigns against hostile tribes, one against the Navahos and the other against the Faraon Apaches. The expedition against the Navahos, on which Cubero took with him 100 Spanish soldiers and 125 Indian allies, was cut short when one of the enemy war captains sued for peace at Taos.

¹³ The *cabildo* of Santa Fé presented a petition to Cubero protesting against his going on this campaign for fear of an insurrection in favor of Vargas, provoked by the friars during his absence (S.F.A., cited in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 115, doc. 78a). According to a letter from the *cabildo* of Santa Fé to the viceroy, Santa Fé, January 20, 1702, the expedition was made in June and July of 1701, and was directed against the hostile Moquis, who were disturbing the recently won Indians of Aguatuvi (A.G.N., *Vínculos*, tomo 14). Several years later Vargas stated that this expedition did more harm than good as far as the attempt to improve relations with the Moquis was concerned.

The other expedition against the troublesome Faraon Apaches did not materialize.

During this time there was continuous trouble at Pecos between the pro-Spanish Indian governor Don Felipe, and the relatives and friends of the rebellious ringleaders whom he had executed with the approval of the Spanish authorities in 1696. Toward the end of the year 1700 the latter group concocted a plot to take the life of Don Felipe. Many hostile acts ensued, much to the uneasiness of the missionary and the *alcalde mayor* there, and the latter reported the disturbances to Governor Cubero. As a result the leaders of the rebellious faction were taken into custody and jailed in Santa Fé. They made a successful escape from the jail, and fled to the mountains, where they joined the Jicarilla Apaches. Pecos remained divided into two hostile factions. On several occasions one or the other of the two groups attempted to settle accounts once and for all by bloody strife, but Don Felipe was able to prevent such a crisis. Some of the members of the opposition presented themselves before Governor Cubero and sought permission to move to Pojoaque; but we do not know whether or not this petition was granted.

There were in those days constant wild rumors of the approaching French. Two little French girls were reported among captives taken to New Mexico by the Navahos for Christian ransom, after the French had almost annihilated a Navaho force of 4,000 warriors. In 1700 an Apache from the plains reported that Frenchmen had destroyed a pueblo of the Jumanos. The *alcalde mayor* of Taos communicated the news to Governor Cubero, and the whole province was in fear of a possible French invasion from the east. The danger was as remote as it had been in previous decades; but the new rumors were not entirely unfounded, for in 1699 the French had established themselves at Biloxi, and French activity in the trans-Mississippi area from the directions of both Canada and the gulf region was becoming increasingly threatening. These were years of constant rumors which rested largely on the statements of Apaches, who trafficked with the French, and who seem in these times to have been willing witnesses against anyone just so long as there was economic advantage to be gained by it.

Early in the year 1702 alarming word reached Santa Fé through a Navaho Apache. The Zuñis had joined in a plot with the Moquis to kill the Spaniards at Zuñi—the missionary, the soldiers stationed there, and three settlers who were living as exiles at the distant outpost. This information was corroborated by official reports from Zuñi.¹⁴ As a result of similar widespread rumors, Cubero made a tour of inspection of the pueblos. Truly, some of the Tewas living at Moqui had sent emissaries to the various pueblos to stir up rebellion. The tour apparently put to rest any immediate plans for an uprising. And from Zuñi Fray Juan de Garaicoechea wrote that all was quiet.

In reality conditions in Zuñi had become unbearable. As Padre Escalante summed it up in his "Noticias," written many years later, "The soldiers stationed at Zuñi, with their customary liberty, ordered the recent converts about harshly, and in fact most of them lived publicly in concubinage, some with married Indian women, especially the leader, [who lived] with much liberty with an Indian woman of the cacique's household." Some of the Indians whose wives were involved protested to the missionary. The missionary did everything in his power to better conditions; he appealed to Cubero to withdraw the soldiers, as well as the three settlers, who were guilty of the same excesses. The Spanish governor did nothing about it. The Indians were becoming more and more hostile, especially the husbands of the Indian women involved, and in their bitterness the aroused faction plotted the death of the soldiers and settlers. Sunday, March 4, 1703, was the day chosen. During Mass the three Spanish residents were overpowered and killed: José Luis Valdés in the choir, Tomás Palomino and Juan Lucero while they were leaving the church. The soldiers escaped only because they were absent from the pueblo at the time. The missionary was spared. The Zuñi revolt brought fear of reprisals, and most of the natives moved to the Rock of Kiakima, the pueblo on the plain remaining sparsely populated.

¹⁴ Testimony of Indians of Laguna, Acoma, and Zuñi, March 4-8, 1702; Juan de Ulibarri to Cubero, Zuñi, March 8, 1702, S.F.A., cited in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 116, docs. 83-84. Ulibarri had been sent on a special mission to investigate conditions at Zuñi.

Father Garaicoechea reported the incident to Cubero on March 7, telling him that it had been impossible to write earlier because the natives were hiding in terror in their homes, and there were spies on the roads. Garaicoechea placed the blame on the soldiers, and insisted that he was being treated as friendly as ever by the natives and that they were assuring him every protection. However, the friar was merely attempting to prevent Cubero from dealing too harshly with the natives of Zuñi for so violently taking things into their own hands, for conditions were much worse than the missionary pictured them. The group which composed the hostile faction was in reality large. They had carried off the mission sheep, and many of them had moved to Moqui with their families and settled on the Rock of Walpi on a site between that pueblo and the one established by the Tanos there. This information was reported in a letter written by Fray Antonio Miranda to Governor Cubero dated Laguna, March 12. Miranda urged that something be done about Zuñi soon or else all the west would soon be in tumult. Cubero's reply was the abandonment of Zuñi. Roque Madrid led an escort of forty soldiers to withdraw Father Garaicoechea to Santa Fé. The three years of Spanish efforts to maintain a resident missionary at Zuñi thus ended in failure under most inauspicious circumstances. Indeed, the western pueblos, relatively far from the centers of Spanish settlement, continued to enjoy the considerable degree of aloofness which they have retained to this day.

In August, 1703, Cubero heard no happy news. Don Diego de Vargas, having been cleared of all the charges made against him, was on his way back to Santa Fé to assume his old post as governor of the province. According to some contemporary accounts, he manifested his fear of revenge by making a hasty departure from the province by a circuitous route, feigning an Indian campaign to allay suspicions. According to his own assertion, he retired to Mexico with permission of the viceroy. At least he did not meet Vargas on the way. He had been appointed previously to the governorship of Maracaibo and Grita; but he did not live to take over his new duties, for he died in Mexico in 1704. Thus ended the six year Cubero interlude, during which New Mexico witnessed no significant

changes, while the Reconqueror underwent perhaps the darkest days of his entire career, only to emerge undaunted.

Little is known of Vargas' activities in Mexico City from the time of his arrival there in the summer of 1700 to the spring of 1703. Besides successfully defending himself in courts, and subsequently obtaining the necessary viceregal authorization to resume the governorship, it is quite likely that he was devoting much of his time to recuperating his private fortunes both in Spain and Mexico, on which he had drawn heavily in the royal service during his first term as governor of New Mexico. Among other matters, Vargas was taking steps to have his *encomienda* grant put into effect, for nothing as yet had been done about it in Mexico City. Finally, in the spring of 1703, he received from the viceroy a validation of this grant issued by the Spanish king four years before, but still subject to final review and approval in Madrid. As was indicated in an earlier chapter, the *encomienda* was never to be made effective. From later documents we know that Vargas was to take no further steps after his return to Santa Fé to put his *encomienda* into operation. With this matter seemingly settled, Vargas drew up a will in Mexico City on June 1, 1703, and a week later started for New Mexico.¹⁵ He was accompanied by his two creole sons, the royal officer Captain Juan Manuel de Vargas Pimentel, the eldest, serving in the capacity of adjutant, and Alonso, and a relative named Don Antonio Maldonado Zapata.

The Pacificator, five months on the road, reached Santa Fé on November 10, 1703. If he anticipated any troubles on the part of his vindictive predecessor it was groundless, for Cubero had withdrawn from the province long before. Three weeks after his reestablishment in the old Palace of the Governors, Vargas sent a report to the viceroy describing conditions in New Mexico, accompanied by a justification of his own first term as governor, and a comparison of the situation in the province as he had left it, with conditions as he now

¹⁵ Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 308. This will has not yet turned up either in Mexico or Spain.

found them.¹⁶ He denounced Cubero for his inefficiency and ignorance of frontier problems. Among the acts of his predecessor, none caused him more dismay than the virtual abandonment of the villa of Santa Cruz, which had cost him so much effort to build. To Vargas the villa was essential to the very life of the province:

. . . as a frontier post for transit and a parade ground for the operations . . . [of] the men at arms of this fort and . . . [for security against] the nations of the plains . . . the Apaches and the Yutes; and also [so that] those who inhabit the mountain glens and other places [might be] defended and secured by retiring with their flocks and herds to the said Town, as was done in the revolt of the year ninety-six . . .¹⁷

The residents of Santa Cruz on many occasions prior to the revolt had requested permission to move, which Vargas had persistently refused for reasons cited above. Now the town was deserted and in ruins, and the blame was placed not so much on the settlers as on Cubero, who had permitted its abandonment.

After painting a picture of the flourishing Villa of Santa Fé under his direction, Vargas now described Santa Fé as having deteriorated only to a slightly lesser degree than Santa Cruz. Cubero had let the settlers scatter into outlying sections, thereby nullifying the strategic importance of the capital as a bulwark of defense on the frontier. With the men dispersed, the presidio was ineffective and the villa without defense. The state of the church was described as abhorrent to a devout Catholic Spaniard. Conditions in New Mexico were described by Vargas as in every respect "haphazard and exposed to any misfortune." He accused Cubero of a deliberate attempt to destroy all of his constructive work, for even land grants had been annulled and generally left in such confusion that he found himself smothered under petitions

¹⁶ Report of Governor Vargas, Santa Fé, December 1, 1703; endorsement of the *cabildo*, Santa Fé, December 2, 1703. S.F.A. The latter document was translated by Twitchell in *Spanish Archives*, II, 117-126, doc. 94a, and "The Justification of Don Diego de Vargas," *Old Santa Fe*, I (July, 1914), 57-65.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

and pleas: ". . . so that nothing stands as a fixed grant given by the privilege of conquest and the prerogative of his Majesty through the said Most Excellent Conde de Galve and the Royal Council."¹⁸

Having drawn up this report, Vargas demanded an endorsement by the *cabildo*, and that body, which followed the weather vane, complied with a complete justification of his acts as governor and captain general during his first term, humiliatingly retracting all the charges it had previously preferred against him, and inditing a strong denunciation of Cubero's acts as governor of the province. The *cabildo* confirmed Vargas' statement with respect to Santa Cruz and Santa Fé, and it beheld the safety of the entire province in jeopardy. To quote its own words:

The pernicious consequences which follow from the depopulation and ruin of the two *Villas* already manifest themselves clearly and openly: especially if there should be any rising or revolt among the Indians, this Province would have no place where the inhabitants could take refuge and the said Indians would succeed in their evil designs and his Majesty would lose this Royal Possession . . . And it is not easy to restore what is once lost without immense effort and expense to the royal exchequer; and this necessitates beginning the restoration with urgency at this time, especially when we have the experience we are now going through of the plot executed by the apostates of the Zuñi Province in killing the three Spaniards who were there . . .¹⁹

The *cabildo* spoke bitterly of Cubero's selfish unconcern for the safety of the settlers, especially with regard to the manner in which he hastily deserted New Mexico upon hearing of the approach of Vargas, leaving it to its own resources at a time of extreme peril. It blamed Cubero alone for the charges previously preferred against Vargas:

. . . and this said *cabildo* . . . also declares that the said Governor D. Pedro Rodríguez Cubero . . . in all of the time of his government was solely [occupied] in drinking and writing papers with no reason whatever . . . ascribing faults and crimes to those who had not committed them, like that which he attributed to the said Sr. Marqués, . . . for the false charges unjustly made against him outside the term of

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

his *residencia* . . . were made up, hatched, and invented by the said D. Pedro Rodríguez Cubero.²⁰

Thus, through the above instruments, did Vargas quickly restore himself to absolute power in New Mexico and at the same time insure political unity and stability. But the Reconqueror was not to live out his second term as governor; the return to his old post was to be but for a few months.

Shortly after Vargas' return Father Garaicoechea undertook to persuade him to establish a mission again among the Zuñis. But neither Vargas nor the Father Custodian Fray Juan Álvarez deemed the time opportune. More immediate Indian problems occupied the attention of the Spaniards. Early in 1704 some Moquis were discovered to be engaged in subversive activities at Taos, and rumors of widespread revolt again ran through the land. The ever-hostile Moquis, the chief conspirers, had held a great council in the valley of La Piedra Alumbre attended by Tewas of San Ildefonso and San Juan, Moquis, and Navahos. Vargas made a tour of inspection of the various pueblos. Indians of each pueblo were questioned and reassured, and all fear of rebellion quickly subsided.²¹

This brings us to Vargas' last campaign. In the spring of 1704 the grizzled, hard-riding old campaigner, despite his sixty years, undertook an expedition into the Sandía mountains to root out the marauding Faraon Apaches, who were harassing the settlers along the Río Grande valley in and around Bernalillo and Alameda, some forty-five miles to the south of Santa Fé. The town of Bernalillo was chosen as military headquarters and base of operations for the campaign. Fifty Spanish officers and soldiers, supplied and provisioned, and a troop of Tewa, Pecos, and Keres Indian warriors, all well armed, were designated to participate in the expedition.²² The Spanish

²⁰ *Ibid.* Of the six *cabildo* members who signed this statement of loyalty to Governor Vargas, now often referred to as the Señor Marqués, three were of those who had signed the bitter charges against him during the post-*residencia* period: namely, Antonio de Aguilera Ysasy, Antonio Lucero de Godoy, and Francisco Romero de Pedraza.

²¹ Escalante's "Noticias."

²² The entries in Vargas' journal during his last campaign, as found in the Santa Fé Archive, were published in English translation by Twitchell in *Spanish Archives*, II, 127-133, and "The Last Campaign of General de Vargas, 1704," *Old Santa Fe*, I (July, 1914), 66-72.

force set out from Santa Fé under command of Governor Vargas on March 27, at about ten o'clock in the morning. The night was spent at Cochití, and next day, at noon, Vargas reached Bernalillo. Some undescribed epidemic seems to have accompanied the expedition, for on the previous day one of the soldiers was sent back to Santa Fé very ill, and now several more were ordered back to the villa because of sickness. On the 30th Vargas took muster of his men in anticipation of the expedition which was set for the following day.²³ The plan was to move on to Alameda, thence to deploy to ambuscade the enemy.

On the Sunday designated, after Mass, the war drum was sounded, the soldiers gathered, armed and mounted, and Vargas, now addressed by his men as the Marqués, accompanied by his officers and chaplain Fray Juan de Garaicoechea, sallied forth at the head of his little army. Having reached the woods between the Río Grande and the Sierra de Sandía, four leagues distant, a halt was called; thirty Indian spies were sent out under the command of their native war captain José Naranjo to reconnoiter the mountainside. The following day, at about eight o'clock in the morning, two of the spies returned. They had climbed to the summits of the sierra and had spied in every direction with great care, but found only traces indicating Apaches on the move along the river.

Vargas immediately proceeded for five leagues along the trail indicated, to the abandoned ranch of one Ortega. Here, in mid-afternoon, Captain Naranjo and his spies notified the Marqués of their scouting; the tracked enemy were plainly leading their horses and rabble along the edge of the mountain toward a canyon exit. The expedition pressed on to the abandoned farm of Valencia, where all pitched camp for the night. The following day, April 1, they pushed on a distance of two leagues to a point "between the Río del Norte and the Sierra of Tajique, one of the pueblos of the salt marshes," whence at three o'clock in the afternoon Naranjo departed with forty Indians to reconnoiter the watering-place at the entrance of the Plain of the Inferno adjoining the Sierra of Taj-

²³ The complete muster roll, as contained in S.F.A., may be found in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 129.

ique. On April 2, at nine o'clock in the morning, Vargas hastened on in pursuit, following the fresh trail of the enemy along the edge of the Río Grande. After a pursuit of four leagues he called a halt. Here the expedition came to an abrupt end, for the Marqués had become deathly ill. He was taken back to Bernalillo where, realizing that death was near, he drew up his last will and testament, and received the sacrament of Extreme Unction.

Vargas died at Bernalillo on April 8, 1704. On August 4, 1704, the royal fiscal in Mexico City reported the news to the Spanish king in the following message:

Sir: The lieutenant general of New Mexico, Juan Páez Hurtado, in a letter of April 15 of this year notified me of the death of the Governor, Marquis of La Nava de Barcinas, Don Diego de Vargas Zapata y Luján, on the 8th day of said month, while on campaign against the Apache Indians, caused by a serious accident.²⁴

The exact cause of the Reconqueror's death is still unknown.²⁵

Vargas' last will and testament reveals much of the Reconqueror's character. Through the detailed description of his

²⁴ Report of the royal fiscal, Mexico City, August 4, 1704, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

Most writers, without factual foundation, insist on giving this date as April 4. In so doing, Coan, Hackett, Bailey, and others, are merely continuing an error started some fifty years ago by Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 227, who hazarded the date.

Vargas signed his will on April 7 ("Made in the town of Bernalillo on the seventh day of the month of April, in the year one thousand seven hundred and four . . .," Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 308). In addition to the document first cited above, a second contemporary document in the Santa Fé Archive, cited in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 231, doc. 823, gives the date as April 8 on the testimony of Lorenzo Madrid. The only valid controversy would be between the dates April 7 and 8, the 7th being the date attributed by Escalante in his "Noticias," and by Ignacio López de Zárate in his *memorial* to the king, Madrid, 1705, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

²⁵ The documents are virtually unanimous in stating that Vargas died from "a serious accident." No contemporary documents have yet been uncovered which reveal further details. According to an engraving posthumously superimposed on the Vargas portrait described in Chapter I, above, Vargas met his death "while attempting to rescue the sacred vessels at the siege of Bernalillo in the year 1704." This statement probably has an element of truth, that is, in the general sense that he embarked on his last campaign for the purpose as quoted. According to an account from the oral tradition of New Mexico, Vargas died at Bernalillo of indigestion after eating some eggs which made him sick. "Noticias que Da Juan Candelaria Vecino de esta villa de San Francisco Xavier de Albuquerque de edad

estate, it affords a glimpse into the courtly life in wilderness surroundings which transpired in the governor's miniature Palace of baked mud in Santa Fé. With true Catholic devotion Vargas first dictated a profession of faith in all the teachings of the Church, and commended his soul "to God Who created it with the price of His precious blood," and his body "to the earth from which it was made." He then made elaborate plans for his funeral, which revealed his nostalgic attachment to pomp and splendor:

. . . I desire and it is my will that a Mass be said while the corpse is present in the church of this town of Bernalillo, and afterwards the same shall be taken to the Villa of Santa Fé and placed and suspended in my bed selected as a bier and in the same to be taken to the church of the said town of Santa Fé and buried in said church at the principal altar under the platform where the priest stands; this I ask as a favor, said bier to be covered with honest woollen cloth and buried according to military rites and the title ceremonies and privileges of Castile, leading [sic] two horses covered with the same cloth as the bier.²⁶

In the tradition of nobility, he provided that on the day of his funeral fifty measures of maize and twelve head of cattle should be distributed among the poor of Santa Fé. The corpse was to remain before the altar nine days prior to burial, and provision was made for nine Masses to be offered during that time, as well as for one hundred candles for the bier, and fifty for the altar and for the religious assisting in the cere-

de 84 años nació el año de 1692," *New Mexico Historical Review*, IV (July, 1929), 285-286. It will be recalled that several of the soldiers became very sick on Vargas' last campaign, and the cause of Vargas' illness may have been the same. Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, 133, suggests that he might have died of pneumonia. Finally, he may have died from *tabardillo*, or fever. On several occasions during the decade of the 1690's, Vargas speaks in his journal of having had attacks of *tabardillo*, which he refers to in one instance as "my grave illness" (Vargas' journal, Santa Fé, March 8, 1696), and from which it appears that he nearly died on one occasion (Gabriel del Castillo to Vargas, Parral, February 26, 1696). The general definition of *tabardillo* is 'highly dynamic fever.' However, early records identify it with what the Indians called *cocoliztli*, an epidemic disease which, along with smallpox, often took a heavy toll of lives among the natives.

²⁶ The will of Don Diego de Vargas, Bernalillo, April 7, 1704, S.F.A., translated in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 301-310; inventory of Vargas' estate, Santa Fé, April 20, 1704, S.F.A., cited in *ibid.*, II, 133.

monies. The parochial fee for this was to be paid with two large baskets of chocolate and other goods from his estate.

The will then turned to the settlement of financial debts. Vargas was indebted to the royal treasury in Mexico City for two years' salary in advance, at the rate of 2,000 pesos per annum. For the satisfaction of this debt he pledged in partial payment two young Negro lackeys, for whom he had paid 660 pesos, and a mulatto woman slave, the wife of one of the above mentioned lackeys. All the soldiers and officers of the presidio were to be paid their advance salaries. Sums owed to him by his loyal lieutenant Alfonso Rael de Aguilar and his kinsman Don Antonio Maldonado Zapata were cancelled. Provisions of the will also provided for settlement of a long list of debts "relative to the great quantities of supplies" which had passed into Santa Fé, and also El Paso, during his second administration. For the purpose of meeting the debts, in part, valuable silverware and jewelry were to be auctioned by Don Juan Páez Hurtado, whom Vargas had appointed as executor of his estate as well as *ad interim* governor to succeed him. These included a formidable array of silver—dishes, platters, bowls, tankards, knives, spoons, forks, and six candlesticks with his coat of arms—one pair of pearl earrings with eight fine emeralds, each earring worth 500 pesos, and two diamond rings valued together at 500 pesos.

The goods, clothing, and trappings left to his three illegitimate American born children, besides two thousand pesos in cash to be divided equally among them, to his kinsman Don Antonio Maldonado Zapata, and to his close friend Don Juan Páez Hurtado, reveal among other things the regal wardrobe of the proud Reconqueror:

. . . I leave to the said Don Juan and Don Alonzo de Vargas the two saddles which I have used; also two pairs of pistols, with the holsters; the banners of Anselm and Saint Michael the Great, with the covers and cushions; two cloth suits which I have worn, one whitish and the other blue, with gold buttons, covered with flesh color, and the whitish one with its waist-coat and trousers of brown cloth, adorned with flounces of gold and silver; this I leave to my son, Don Juan Manuel, and the other to my said son, Don Alonzo, together with a jacket of blue brocade, and a pair of trousers of blue plush and enough cloth of silk gogram for another pair; and furthermore of the piece of camlet cloth which I have assigned, each one of my sons

will make a new suit of cloth, a coat and two pairs of trousers, lined with the color of their selection of the listed cloth in the warehouse, with silk buttons, and the jackets lined with the same listed cloth; in the same manner I leave them six shirts, embroidered with the best of lace, three to each one; two jerkins with eaten-moth laces, one to each; and of the neckties which I have commonly used, I leave two to each one of my said sons; further, four pairs of stockings of *genoba*, two pairs to each, and I leave to my said son, Don Alonzo, one pair of blue silk stockings; embroidered with gold, and the pair which are silver curled to my son, Don Juan; I leave them four pairs of bed-sheets, two to each, with the embroidered pillow-cases; I leave them four yards of fine linen, to each of my two said sons; to my said son, Don Alonzo, I leave my two cloaks, one of fine native cloth, and the other of gold color, lined with serge; to my said son, Don Juan, I leave the choice of the color of the cloak lined with serge; I also leave them three pairs of drawers, to each one, and one full piece of fine linen to be used by them for handkerchiefs; and I leave to them the selection, to be taken to their mother and sister, a dress pattern of fine camlet cloth, with the lining of the listed cloth which they may like the best, and a pattern of petticoats of scarlet cloth from England, with the silk and trimmings; one silk mantle with fringe, for each one; furthermore, I leave them the two trunks which I have; and to my said son, Don Alonzo, I leave my fine sword hilt, and to my said son, Don Juan, I leave my small sword; and each one to have a leathern jacket, the one I have used and another from the warehouse; in the same manner to take to the General at Parral one leathern jacket of blue color and the stockings and gloves which I ordered to be made; I also leave to them my leather case, large elbow chair and eight ready mules, selected to the satisfaction of my slave, the Negro Andrés, who, for having rendered me good service with his great love and good will ever since the year 'ninety-one, by this clause, I give him liberty, with the understanding that he shall take my said sons to the City of Mexico and remain with them such time as he may see fit, and to whom will be given and provided a saddle and two mules to his satisfaction, with a gun, cover, cushions, bridle, reins and saddle-bag, hat, jacket and a pair of trousers of cloth, and, in the same manner will be given to my said sons one hundred pounds of chocolate and sugar and twelve measures of wheat-made dried bread, stockings, shoes, soap and hats for the said journey, which they will make two months after my death, or with the messenger who may take this notice of my death, and in their company will go Don Antonio Maldonado Zapata, to whom I give four mules for pack animals and two saddle mules, fifty pounds of chocolate and fifty of sugar, four measures of wheat, six pairs of shoes, six bundles of tobacco, six dollars' worth of soap and two hats in order that he may accompany my two sons . . . to my said Lieutenant-general and compadre, Don Juan Páez Hurtado . . . my black hat embellished with blue and white feathers

and my silver-laced cloak, lined with blue plush, and a new jerkin with program and silk lace and my gold cane.²⁷

The will left in full effect the testament Vargas had made in Mexico City the year previous. Among other things this earlier will provided for the transfer of the royal title of Marquis of La Nava de Barcinas and his inherited estate to his legitimate heirs in Spain.²⁸ Shortly before the moment of his death Vargas dictated a codicil to his will containing the following request:

. . . . I desire and it is my will to have five hundred Masses, two hundred applied to the Holy Virgin of Remedies, my protectress, for the benefit of my soul, and three hundred for the souls of the poor who died in the conquest of this Kingdom . . .²⁹

The Reconqueror's body was laid to rest under the main altar of the church in Santa Fé, in compliance with his wishes.³⁰

²⁷ Twitchell's translation, *ibid.*, I, 304-306.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 307-308; *memorial* of Ignacio López de Zárate to the king, Madrid, 1705, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

²⁹ Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, I, 309.

³⁰ Escalante's "Noticias."

EPILOGUE

The Pueblo Indian revolt of 1680, the reconquest, and the post-reconquest reorganization of society in New Mexico marked an important turning point in the history of the northern province. Many commentators fail to recognize the change which came over the land; generalizations which apply to the earlier era do not hold true in the same sense in the later period. The Golden Age of the Franciscan missions in New Mexico had come to an end; for even though the missions were again to play an important rôle, never were they restored to the predominance enjoyed prior to 1680. In the economic life of the province, a salaried military garrison at Santa Fé took the place of the *encomendero*-soldiers of pre-1680 days, and this marked the death knell of the *encomienda* system, which was never again to be revived. Henceforth the military phase of viceregal and provincial policy (owing primarily to the increasing violence of Apache and Comanche pressure), accompanied by greater emphasis upon permanent and self-supporting civilian settlements, took precedence over missionary enterprise. Furthermore, the crusading spirit of the Spanish Crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico were a part, gave place to a growing secular spirit.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713, the chaotic conditions in Spain—a nation which already had been undergoing economic, political, and spiritual decline for over half a century—left little time for much attention to the New Mexico frontier. Nevertheless, in the decade following the death of the Reconqueror, the distant outpost was further strengthened and its permanence was assured. In this work three of Vargas' trusted lieutenants were to play a prominent part as governors of the province—Juan Páez Hurtado, Antonio Valverde, and Félix Martínez. Petty political rivalries sprouting during Cubero's governorship frequently plagued the government for the next two decades, due in great part to the intrigue of the self-seeking opportunist Valverde. In later days turning against the interests of his former leader, Valverde became the embodiment of all such injustices as had

aroused the democratic spirit of the *cabildo*, the mouthpiece of the common man, during the closing years of the seventeenth century. Of prime consequence, however, was the fact that the work inaugurated by Vargas was successfully carried on, and New Mexico lived to see better days.

The spread of settlement was significant of progress. Santa Fé, Santa Cruz de la Cañada, Bernalillo, and other Spanish towns and hamlets, old and new, became permanent settlements. In 1706 Albuquerque was founded. By 1744 there were 536 Spanish families in upper New Mexico. Santa Fé, the metropolis, had a population of 127 resident families. By the middle of the century the frontier of Spanish habitation had advanced up the Chama and Ojo Caliente Rivers as far as Ojo Caliente and Abiquiú. Ranches and hamlets dotted the fertile upper Río Grande Valley from Taos in the northeast to the region below Isleta to the south. On the sites of haciendas of the pre-1680 period, and near the mission establishments (and sometimes replacing temporary missions), rural Spanish settlements sprang up. The Spanish village of Tomé, formerly the hacienda of Tomé Domínguez, was an example of the first type of development; Valencia, Galisteo, and Abiquiú were examples of the latter process. Eloquent testimony of Vargas' good judgment as a town founder, or refounder, was the growth of the villa of Santa Cruz, commonly known as La Cañada. Despite the early objection of settlers to the region, it developed into one of the most flourishing centers of Spanish occupation in the region. By the end of the century the three largest concentrations of population were Santa Cruz, Santa Fé, and Albuquerque.

Clear evidence that upper New Mexico was "the bulwark of New Spain," and its advancing frontier of settlement, was the remarkable growth of the El Paso district. Prior to 1680 the region was a struggling missionary outpost. The refugees of the Pueblo Revolt were the first permanent settlers there in any large numbers. In 1692 the Spanish population of the district was about 1,000, with perhaps an equal number of Indians in the various missions and colonies. When Vargas moved north to reoccupy upper New Mexico in 1693, many

of the people went with him; but El Paso, too, remained permanently secure as a center. By the second half of the eighteenth century it was not only a significant economic link between upper New Mexico and New Vizcaya, but, under the protective wings of the northern outpost, it was a point from which an advance moved southward to meet a frontier of settlement approaching northward from New Vizcaya. In 1773 El Paso, with a population of 9,863, including Indians and whites, was a recognized agricultural and ranching center. It was rapidly becoming a great commercial focal point on the frontier.¹

A word must be said about the social and economic development. By the end of the eighteenth century the Spanish population of New Mexico, exclusive of the El Paso region, totalled over 15,000, occupying themselves in agriculture, stock raising, handicrafts, and barter. Of livestock, sheep formed the chief element. Horses and cattle were also raised, but the former were always scarce in the province on account of the number sold to and stolen by the wild Indians. All industries and occupations tended toward a goal of trade and barter. Each summer the people met the Comanches and other tribes of the plains at Taos, where a grand fair was held. Some trade was done at other frontier points, as well as between citizens and Pueblo Indians. At the end of the year the New Mexicans went in caravans to attend the January fair at Chihuahua. The departure and return of the caravans were great annual events. As yet there was no trade with other Europeans in Louisiana or Texas, other than a small amount of illicit traffic attempted by French traders.

The history of Spanish culture in New Mexico during the eighteenth century was not very different from that of the seventeenth. The social and religious activities continued as before. Always, it must be emphasized, New Mexico was an isolated frontier community, its people living simple village and rural life. Aside from labors in town and countryside, there were the Church festivals, Masses, marriages, baptisms,

¹ Hackett, *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico*, III, 506-509.

and military parades and exercises. The colonists often assembled publicly and privately in dances, prayers, penitential processions, *velorios* for the dead, and burials. During betrothal, marriage, and baptismal celebrations there was feasting, drinking, dancing, and singing of popular songs and ballads. A few French manners and customs, such as the quadrille, were introduced—a bit of Bourbonism routed to New Spain from Old Spain. News was received from the outside world when the caravans returned from Old Mexico, or whenever a newspaper or visitor arrived from Mexico City, once in three or four months, sometimes not that often. Of literary activities we know very little, outside of the abundant official or semi-official documents, reports, and historical narratives. Of artistic work there is evidence that in some fields of handicraft art had developed, such as in painting, filigree work, fancy needle work, and in the art of wooden statuary. In general the life of the province was the usual provincial Spanish life of far removed frontiers. Through long isolation, Spanish folk tradition became fixed.

Meanwhile the Franciscan Indian missions were restored to stability and permanency, and new ones were established. The increasing violence of attack by hostile Plains Indians caused much sorrow and disappointment for the missionaries; they attributed the decline of the Christian Indian population to fierce raiders and to the refusal of the governors to provide adequate military protection for the missions. Despite these and other obstacles, the general view that "the last few years of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century constituted a period of retrogression for the missions of New Mexico"² is not borne out by the facts. The missionary work carried on during the Vargas period has been fully discussed, and from that time to the middle of the century progress was continuous. The only difference was that missionary activity was partially obscured by new military problems. Of the twenty-one missionaries in the province in 1706, sixteen were in upper New Mexico serving 8,840 Christian Indians in

² Hackett, *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico*, III, 23.

eleven missions and seven *visitas*.³ In 1708 the total of missionaries was augmented to thirty-four;⁴ new missions and *visitas* were established, and activities were expanded among the Spanish settlements. Between 1705 and 1710 Zuñi, Pojoaque, and Isleta were resettled.⁵ The total number of missionaries remained the same until the middle of the century; but by 1744 the twenty-four resident missionaries in upper New Mexico were serving seventeen Indian missions and four *visitas*.⁶ The missions had passed beyond the pioneering period, and by now they had assumed a permanent status equivalent to regular parishes.

Efforts were made to reconvert the fickle Moquis, and to win the pagan Navahos and Apaches. Several thousand Moquis were induced to abandon their heathen surroundings and move to established Indian missions. Plains Indians gave up their nomadic existence and were settled for a time at the missions of *genízaros* at Valencia, several leagues south of Isleta, and at Abiquiú. By 1750 there were approximately 17,500 Christianized Indians in the upper Río Grande region, and the number of Indian missions with resident missionaries had increased to twenty-two. This was the peak of eighteenth century mission development.⁷ Several decades later the status was essentially the same.⁸ The work had not lapsed; it had

³ Report of Fray Juan Alvarez, custodian of the custodia of San Pablo, Nambé, January 12, 1706, in *ibid.*, III, 372-378. The missions were: Pecos, Taos, San Juan, San Ildefonso, Nambé, Cochiti, San Felipe, Santa Ana, San Diego de Jémez, Acoma, and Alona (Zuñi). The *visitas*: Picurías, Santa Clara, Tesuque, Santo Domingo, La Alameda, Sia, Laguna. The number of Christian Indians in the missions "is being increased from day to day by those who are coming down from the mountains where they live among the heathen and apostates." *Ibid.*

⁴ *Informe* of Fray Juan de la Cruz, Commissary General of the Franciscan Order in New Spain, Mexico City, January 1, 1712, A.G.I., *Guadalajara*, legajo 142.

⁵ Escalante's "Noticias."

⁶ Hackett, *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico*, III, 398-412.

⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 26-32, 391-412, 438-468, 502-503; H. W. Kelly, "The Franciscan Missions of New Mexico, 1740-1760," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XV (October, 1940), 362-363.

⁸ When Bishop Tamarón made his visitation of upper New Mexico in the 1760's, there were two resident Franciscan friars at Santa Fé, one at Santa Cruz, and one at Albuquerque, and a resident Franciscan missionary at each of the following twenty Indian missions: Sandía, Santo Domingo, Pecos, Galisteo, Nambé, Picurías, Taos, San

simply been completed, for the surrounding Apache barrier could not be peacefully penetrated. A definite retrogression set in toward the close of the century; but the missions continued to play a splendid rôle on the New Mexico frontier. "From 1539 to 1850 about three hundred Franciscans . . . labored among the Indians of New Mexico and northern Arizona."⁹

New Mexico was spared during the eighteenth century any such conflict between civil and ecclesiastical authorities as had rocked the province prior to 1680. The obstacles to mission progress in the last half of the eighteenth century—besides the indirect forces of a growing secular spirit, with the complete ascendancy of the local civil authorities, which in some cases weakened the respect of the Indians for the friars—were: the free entry of pagan and apostate Plains Indians into the Christian pueblos during the trading season, which had a bad influence on the neophytes; their bloody raids on the pueblos during the rest of the year; and the fundamental factors of geographical and Indian barriers.

Frontier problems revolved pretty much around non-conformist and absolutely uncontrollable Indians. As we have seen, New Mexico served as an outer rim of defense which facilitated the development of the interior settlements and other northern frontier areas of New Spain. When the Spaniards reoccupied the region in the last decade of the seventeenth century, the fundamental problem was to control the Pueblo Indians. This was accomplished by Vargas. After Vargas' time the Pueblo Indians, with the exception of the Moquis, became an integral part of the Spanish community. Meanwhile, the southern frontier of New Mexico became co-exten-

Juan, Abiquiú (*genízaros*), Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Cochiti, San Felipe, Santa Ana, Sia, Jemez, Isleta, Laguna, Acoma and Zuñi. Tesuque and Pojoaque were *visitas*. In the El Paso district there were six Franciscan friars and three secular clergymen: four resided at El Paso, and one each at San Lorenzo, Senecú, Isleta, Socorro, and Carrizal (the secular clergy were at El Paso and Carrizal). Vito Alessio Robles, ed., *Demostración del Vastísimo Obispado de la Nueva Vizcaya—1765, por Pedro Tamarón y Romeral*, Mexico, 1937, 327-360.

⁹ Zephyrin Engelhardt, *Missions and Missionaries of California*, San Francisco, 1908, I, 15.

sive with the northern borders of New Vizcaya and Sonora, and henceforth New Mexico assumed greater strategic importance in the broad problem of frontier defense. The task of defending the Indian pueblos and the Spanish towns against the growing incursions of the Plains Indians became the paramount military problem of the eighteenth century.¹⁰

During the first half of the century the Apaches, Navahos, and Utes intensified their raids on the Christian Indian pueblos and the Spanish settlements, and a new menace appeared from the east: the warlike, hard-riding Comanches. As the Comanches advanced westward, they pushed the Apaches before them until the latter were dangerously overrunning the peaceful settlements of the upper Río Grande. In combating this danger, expeditions penetrated far into the surrounding lands, and new regions were explored for the first time.¹¹ The emergence of the Comanches in the western plains area coincided with French expansion beyond the Mississippi in the early eighteenth century. By 1739 French traders had passed through the Comanche barrier. The Frenchmen supplied the Comanches with guns, and as a result their raids on New Mexico became more formidable. This explains the policy in New Mexico of hostility toward the French traders: it was a part of the program of establishing peace on the frontier in the 1740's and 1750's.¹²

The year 1763 saw vast changes on the continent of North America, and King Charles III attempted to solve new imperial problems by evolving new policies. In the northeast Spain fell heir to French Louisiana. Bound up with the acquisition was direct contact with encroaching British traders, and the control of erstwhile hostile Indians from the Great Lakes to the Gulf. The government adopted the policy which France had employed there—the use of Indian agents to develop the

¹⁰ Alfred B. Thomas, *The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778*, Coronado Historical Series, XI, Albuquerque, 1940.

¹¹ Thomas, *After Coronado*, *passim*.

¹² Thomas, *The Plains Indians and New Mexico*, Introduction; Charles W. Hackett, "Policy of the Spanish Crown Regarding French Encroachments from Louisiana, 1721-1762," *New Spain and the Anglo-American West*, Los Angeles, 1932, 107-145.

fur trade, make alliances, and distribute presents. In east Texas Indian agents replaced the missions, which were abandoned and moved to San Antonio. In the northwest a Russian menace appeared on the horizon, and Spanish soldiers and Franciscan friars occupied California. "The third problem, continental in extent, was the defense of the North Mexican frontier against Indian attack, a fifteen hundred mile arc that swung between the Gulfs. Behind this was the heart of Spain's North American empire—Mexico."¹³ This thin line of Spanish settlements running from Gulf to Gulf supported the superstructure of the Spanish empire north of the Río Grande. At the apex of this line lay New Mexico, "the bulwark of New Spain."

The province suffered long-sustained barbarian attack, rapine, and murder. The crafty Plains Indians were friendly only during the trading season. By 1776 frontier conditions were such that the Spanish Crown united the entire northern frontier under a single defense administration, with Teodoro de Croix in command. His lieutenant Don Juan Bautista de Anza ably handled the Indian barricade in the key province of New Mexico.¹⁴ All in all, it is quite likely that Spain saved the Pueblo Indians from extermination. Thomas writes,

Apache, Comanche and Ute, riding with the other three horsemen, drouth, famine and disease, bade fair to destroy the Pueblo. For them the Spaniards came as saviors. Against starvation the padre's prayer and Spanish grain supported them; barbarian inroads met the steel of Spanish courage. The unwritten record of this heroic defense of New Mexico is limned with Spanish blood that alone saved the distinctive Pueblo Southwest and dulled the edge of surrounding savagery.¹⁵

And as for the permanence of the Spanish communities which Vargas had refounded, Thomas continues,

In spite of the failure of the authorities in the past to provide adequate defense against Indian invasion [by wild mountain and plains

¹³ Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, viii.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*; *Idem*, *Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783*, Norman, 1941.

¹⁵ Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, 84.

tribes], though the possibility of such an achievement is highly doubtful in view of the geographical barriers and the low level of Indian civilization in the area, the genius of Spanish colonization had dotted northern New Spain with cities and towns, introduced extensive mining developments, created a cattle range industry, and extended, by the heroic efforts of the padres, the civilizing work of the Church. In the wake of these European cultural forces flowed trade and commerce.¹⁶

"*The Land of Poco Tiempo.*" The Plains Indian menace, combined with the new international problems on the northern frontier after 1763, made impossible any further extension of religion and expansion of settlement in New Mexico. The outposts of settlement became more or less fixed until the middle of the nineteenth century, when pioneer settlers advanced northward as far as the fertile San Luis valley of southern Colorado, where Spanish-Mexican settlements still carry on an idyllic existence.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, New Mexico constituted a real and powerful link between the United States and Mexico. The economic character of these Spanish communities served as a magnet which was a determining factor in hastening the westward advance of the enterprising and acquisitive Anglo-American frontiersmen, just as the economic attraction of Spanish Louisiana had hastened the advance of the trans-Allegheny frontier to the banks of the Mississippi a half-century earlier. The significance of the Santa Fé trade, made possible because of the existence of permanent Spanish settlements in New Mexico, is well known.

Since the American occupation in 1848 many changes have taken place, some of them of transcendent importance—political, social, educational, industrial, and linguistic. But even so, a great part of New Mexico has remained substantially Spanish in blood, religion, language and tradition.¹⁷ In New Mexico Spanish institutions and Spanish culture took deep

¹⁶ Thomas, *Teodoro de Croix*, 65-66. For an appreciation of the difficulty of the Apache problem, see J. P. Dunn, *Massacres of the Mountains. A History of the Indian Wars of the Far West*, New York, 1886.

¹⁷ See W. W. H. Davis, *El Gringo, or New Mexico and Her People*, New York, 1857.

root. This distant corner of the old Spanish empire, now a part of the United States, is even yet a community nearly half Spanish.¹⁸ The Spanish folk culture which persists, static but undying, is an integral part of the very soul of the region. Thus retaining many of its original elements, the region is to this day of real importance for the study of cultural fusion. It is also a rich field for the study of comparative Spanish philology, folklore, and tradition.¹⁹ Among the Pueblo Indians the Spanish-Catholic tradition is still very much in evidence. To this day the Catholic mission churches are one of the most characteristic features of the Pueblos. In local government many of them yet maintain their Spanish pueblo organization. The permanent establishment of amicable relations with the Pueblo Indians was accomplished by the Spaniards in the reconquest and post-reconquest periods, and when the United States invaded the region, the Pueblo Indians already had been living peacefully side by side with Europeans for many generations.²⁰ Also, Spain modified and gave lasting character to the economy of the region.²¹ In fine, Anglo-American civilization in New Mexico has been enriched by Spain's indelible imprint.

It is in the light of these developments that the Spanish

¹⁸ In 1848, the year of the United States occupation, the population was estimated at 60,000, predominantly New Mexican Spanish. In 1910, out of a total population of 327,301, the New Mexican Spanish element reached 175,000. According to the United States census of 1930 the population of New Mexico was 423,317, and the Spanish-speaking element has continued to increase with the growth of the State. The Spanish-speaking population constitutes a loyal, non-political element: distinctively American.

¹⁹ See especially Aurelio M. Espinosa, "Spanish Folk-Lore in New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, I, (April, 1926), 135-155, and the many references to the *Journal of American Folklore*, etc., cited therein; *Idem*, *Estudios sobre el español de Nuevo México*, Buenos Aires, 1930; J. Manuel Espinosa, *Spanish Folk-Tales from New Mexico*, Memoirs of the American Folk-Lore Society, XXX, New York, 1937; and Bolton, *Wider Horizons of American History*, 55-106.

²⁰ With regard to Pueblo Indian land policy Brayer writes: "Since 1848 the United States has been developing a policy designed to protect the Pueblo Indian and his property. This long period of controversy has finally produced a policy not unlike that which was founded by the Spanish crown." Herbert O. Brayer, *Pueblo Indian Land Grants of the "Río Abajo," New Mexico*, Albuquerque, 1939, 31.

²¹ See H. Bernstein, "Spanish Influence in the United States: Economic Aspects," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XVIII (February, 1938), 43-65.

reconquest and refounding of New Mexico in the last decade of the seventeenth century assumes its true significance in the history of Spain's action in colonial North America. When in the year 1712 the then ruling governor of New Mexico initiated the celebration in honor of the reconquest and refounding of the province, the Santa Fé Fiesta which is held there annually to this day, it was a tribute to Don Diego de Vargas, the Reconqueror, for he was "not merely the soul, but the body, of the enterprise."²²

²² William H. Prescott's words in describing Cortés, conqueror of Old Mexico.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRINCIPAL ARCHIVES CITED

- A.G.I. — Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain.
A.G.N. — Archivo General y Público de la Nación, Mexico City, D.F.
B.L. — Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California.
B.N.M. — Biblioteca Nacional, Mexico City, D.F.
B.N.S. — Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Spain.
C.L. — Coronado Library, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
H.L. — Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
L.C. — Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
N.L. — Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois.
S.F.A. — Santa Fé Archives, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Only the most important manuscripts that were used are listed here. The various legajos, or bundles of documents, referred to below, contain hundreds of shorter documents related to the larger groups listed, and not contained in them. They are all important, but the separate listing of all these reports, letters, memoranda, etc., would require a separate volume for complete cataloguing.

- I A.G.I., *Audiencia de Guadalajara*, legajos 139-142. Films and photostats in C.L. and L. C.

1. Legajo 139.

"Testimonio de Todos los autos sobre el Reconocimiento mandado hacer de Una Mina de Azogue en la Sierra azul de las Provincias de la nueva Mexico; y la entrada que hizo Dⁿ Diego de Bargas a la Conquista que Consiguio de la Reducion de los Apostatas de la Villa de Sta Fee y algunos Pueblos de Su Contorno. Año de 1692." Fols. 520.

- "Zacatecas. A.S.M. Mayo a 16 de 1693. Dⁿ Diego de Bargas Zapata y Lujan. Informe a Vtra Mag^d sobre la restauracion y conquista de la Nueva Mexico y sus Provincias que ha hecho a su costa . . ." Fols. 22.
- "Testim^o de las cartas y mandam^{tos} del ex^{mo} Señor Virrey Conde de Galve con acuerdo de la R¹ Junta de guerra y haz^{da} en Rep^{ta} de las suias y con vista de los dos testimonios de los autos de Guerra de la conquista del R^{no} de la nueva mex^o que yo Don Diego de Bargas Zapata Luxan Ponze de leon Gov^{or} y cappⁿ General de dho R^{no} y Probinçias y castellano de su fuerza y presidio p^r Su Mag^d Restauré y Conquisté a mi costa nuebamente a su R¹ corona y de dhas cartas ordenes y ordenes y mandam^{to} consta la aclamaz^{on} de dha Conquista y p^r las mias lo confirmado de sus ynformes y Resuelto en dha R¹ Junta con Vista de ellas las dhas ordenes." Fols. 51.
- "Gobierno. Año 1693. 2^{as} noticias. Testimonio del segundo quaderno en que Prosigue la restauración reducción y Conquista del Reyno de la nueva Mexico Sus Provincias de Zuñi y Moqui y Peñol de Acoma. Por dⁿ Diego de Vargas Su Gov^{or} y Capⁿ General—y las Providencias en esta corte de Mexico dadas Por el ex^{mo} señor Virrey conde de Galve Con Aquerdo de Junta Gen^l." Fols. 379.
2. Legajo 140.
- "Gobierno. Año De 1694. Testimonio De Autos Dela Ultima Enttrada y conquiztta que hizo Don Diego de Vargas Zapatta Lujan Ponçe de Leon Gov^{or} y cappⁿ Gen^l de las Provincias de la Nueva Mex^{co} a ellas y su Villa de Sancta Fee y Providencias Sobre ttodo dadas Por el Ex^{mo} señor Conde de Galve Virrey Gov^{or} y Cappⁿ g^l de esta Nueva España." Fols. 371.
- "Gobierno. Año de 1695. Testimonio de autos de la Guerra operaciones y Campañas executadas por Don Diego de Vargas Lujan y Zapata Ponze de Leon Gover^{or} de la nueva Mex^{co} Sobre la Conquista de aquel Reyno." Fols. 763.
3. Legajo 141.
- "Gobierno Año de 1697. Testimonio de los tres Pedimientos que Remitió el Governador de la nueva Mexico Dn Diego de Bargas Zapata lujan Ponce de Leon al exmo señor Obispo Virrey Dn Juan Ortega Montañes; con Inzercion de las Juntas Consultas y Decretos y Demas

Proveimientos de dho Exmo Sor Dados en este Particular sobre lo q se Expressa . . ." Fols. 511.

"Gobierno Año de 1697. 6º Quano. Testimonio de los autos de grra que a fulminado el Gral Don Diego de Vargas Sapata Lujan Ponse de Leon govor y Cappⁿ Gral del Reino de la Nueva Mexico." Fols. 217.

"Gno. Año de 1698. Autos sobre la contradiccion echa por Parte de don Diego de Vargas Sapata y Luján governador y capitan general de la Nueva Mexico a la Presentación de las Rs Cédulas en que Su Magd hizo mrd de aquel gno al Castellano don Pedro Rodríguez Cubero." Fols. 20.

(This legajo also contains many important orders and notes of the king to the viceroy of New Spain and to Vargas, royal cédulas, memoranda, and *consultas* of the Council of the Indies, reports of the Council of the Indies to the king, letters of the viceroy to the king, petitions of Vargas and Valverde to the king, and other related documents for the period 1685-1700.)

4. Legajo 142.

"Sup^{or} Gobierno. Año de 1702. Nuevo Mex^{co}. Testimonio del Noveno quaderno de los autos sobre las Pretensiones del capⁿ; Dⁿ Antonio de Valverde Cosio De que Sele de el Passo al R^l titulo en que Su Mag^d fue Servido hacerle merced de Nombrarle por Capitan del Presidio del Passo del Rio del Norte en la nueva Mexico y otros puntos tocantes al sueldo que deve Gozar; y sobre la alcaidia mayor que Pretendé de dho Passo del Norte conforme a cedula de Su Mag^d." Fols. 170.

(This legajo also contains numerous important letters to the king from the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, the viceroys of New Spain, and the audiencia of Mexico pertaining to Vargas' post-*residencia*, etc.; notes of the king to the Council of the Indies, royal cédulas, and dispatches to the viceroy of New Spain; printed memorial of Vargas to the king; reports notifying the viceroy and the king of Vargas' death; reports on the New Mexico missions; documents pertaining to the succession to the title of Marquis of la Nava de Barcinas which had been conferred upon Vargas, and other related documents for the period 1697-1754.)

II A.G.N., *Provincias Internas*, tomo 35, *Historia*, tomos 37-39, *Vínculos*, tomo 14. Photostatic copies of the *Historia* manu-

scripts in C.L., typewritten copies of the *Historia* and *Provincias Internas* manuscripts in B.L. and L.C. For reference to *Historia*, tomo 2, see B.N.M., below.

1. *Provincias Internas*, tomo 35.

"Los Cinquenta Soldados de la Nueva Mex^{co} Con Dⁿ Pedro Reneros su Gov^{or} que fue por la Paga de sus Sueldos." Fols. 156.

2. *Historia*, tomo 37.

"El Capⁿ Dⁿ Juan Fernand^z de la Fuente: Autos sobre la union de Armas de las Prov^s de Sinaloa, Sonora y Paso del Rio del Norte." Fols. 46.

"Autos y deligenzias q en Cumplimiento de la Carta Original, q en ellos Consta, del Ex^{mo} Señor Virrey Conde de Galve, hiço y rremite a su grandeza, en su superior Gobierno, a la Ciu^d y Corte de Mex^{co} Reyno de la Nueva Spaña el Govern^{or} y Capp^{an} General del R^{no} de la Nueva Mex^{co} por su Magestad. Año de 1691." Fols. 77.

"Autos de Guerra de la Camp^a Y Conq^{ta} del R^{no} de la Nu^a Mexico q mediante el favor Divino y a su Costa a Conseguido Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Luján Ponze de León Govern^{or} y Capittan Gen^l su tierra Provinz^s de dho Reyno y Castellano de su fuerza y Presidio por su Magestad. Año de 1692." Fols. 138.

"Pareceres de los capnes de la Nueva Viscaya que han dado de Mandato del ex^{mo} S. Conde de Galve Virrey de la Nueva España Sobre la Entrada a la Restaurass^{on} que Pretende hacer el Gor y Capⁿ Gen^l del Paso y provinzia de la Nueva Mex^{co} que remite el Gov^{or} y Capⁿ Gen^l de la Nueva Viscaya a su Ex^a." Fols. 10.

"Autos de posesion de las iglesias y conventos asi en este pueblo del Paso del Rio del Norte como en los demas de su distrito, pedidos por el M.R.P. Fr. Francisco de Vargas, siendo Custodio de este Reyno en el mes de agosto de 1691." Fols. 69.

"Testimonio de la visita y lista personal de los vecinos que para pobladores del Reyno nuevamente conquistado de la Nueva Mexico y su villa de Santa Fe se hallan vivir en este pueblo del Paso del Rio del Norte y en su distrito, hechos para remitir al Excelentisimo Señor Conde de Galve, por don Diego de Vargas Zapata." Fols. 35.

3. *Historia*, tomo 38.

"Quince Mandamientos de este Superior Gobierno Dirigidos para la Restauracion del Reyno de la Nueva Mexico fha por Dⁿ Diego de Vargas Zapata y Lujan Marques de la Naba de Bracinas [sic]." Fols. 107.

"Testimonio de los Auttos de Guerra de la reconq^{ta} del Rey^{no} y Provinz^s de la nueva Mex^{co} fhos por el Sor Gener^l Don Diego de Vargas Zapatta Lujan Ponze de leon Gov^{or} y Capittan Gener^l deste Rey^{no} y Provinz^{as} de la nueva Mex^{co} su nuevo Restaurador Conq^{or} y Reconquistador y Poblador en el Castellano de Sus fuerzas y Presidios por su Mag^d. Año de 1693-1694." Fols. 176.

4. *Historia*, tomo 39.

"Testim^o de los Autos de Guerra de la Reconq^{ta} de este R^{no} de la Nueva Mexico guerras y Campañas seguidas y triumphos de las Victorias conseguidas por fuerza de Armas mediante el favor Divino por el Sor Gen^l Dⁿ Diego de Vargas Zapata lujan ponze de leon dignissimo y meritisimo Gover^{or} y Capⁿ gen^l de este feliz R^{no} de la nueva Mexico su nuebo restaurador y conq^{or} a su costa y reconq^{or} y poblador en el y Castellano de sus fuerzas y Presos por su Mag^d de los quales haze remision al Ex^{mo} Sor Conde de Galbe Virrey gov^{or} y Capⁿ Gen^l de este R^{no} de la nueva España y Prest^e de la R^l Aud^a de la Ciudad de Mex^{co} y a los S^{res} oydores y Ministros de ella. Año de 1694." Fols. 148.

"Testim^o sacado a la letra de los Auttos originales de la Reconq^{ta} y Victorias que mediantte El favor Divino a Conseguido En este R^{no} de la Nu^a Mex^{co} El Sor Gener^l de ste R^{no} de la Nu^a Mex^{co} su nu^o Conq^{or} a su Costa y rreconq^{or} y Poblador y Castellano de sus fuerzas y Presidios por su Mag^d de los quales haze Remision al Ex^{mo} Sor Virrey Conde de Galve y a los Señores Ministros de la R^l Junta de Haz^{da} para que Les Conste Las operaciones triumphos y Victorias adquiridas por dho Sor Gov^{or} y Capⁿ Gen^l. Año de 1694." Fols. 132.

"Testim^o de los Auttos de guerra de las Campañas guerras Sangrientas Victorias y triumphos q mediante el fauor Diuino a Conseguido en este Reyno de la Nu^a Mex^{co} paziphicaz^{on} de el Sor Gen^l Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Lujan Ponze de leon meritiss^{mo} dig^{no} Gov^{or} y Capⁿ Gen^l de dho R^{no} de la nu^a Mex^{co} su nu^o Restaurador conq^{or} a su costa y rreconq^{or} y Poblador en el Y

Castellano de sus fuerxas y Presidios por su Mag^d. Año de 1694." Fols. 82.

"Testim^o de los Auttos que se han hecho en Prosecuzⁿ de los Pueblos y doctrinas que Possess^{on} de ellas dadas a los Ministros doctrin^{os} en este Reyn^o de la Nu^a Mex^{co} por el Sor Gen^l Don Diego de Vargas Zapatta Lujan Ponze de Leon dig^{mo} y meritissimo Gov^r de ste Reyn^o de la nu^a Mex^{co} Su nu^o Restaurador Conq^{or} a su costa y Reconq^{or} y Castell^o de sus fuerzas y Presidios por su Mag^d de los quales haze Remiss^{on} al Ex^{mo} Sor Virrey Conde de Galue y a los Señores Ministros de la R^l audiencia de la ciud^d de Mex^{co} para que a su Grandeza Le conste Lo obrado en este dho Reyno. Año de 1696." Fols. 35.

"Testim^o de los Auttos q se han hecho en este R^{no} de la nu^a Mex^{co} en q consta de la Nu^a Villa y Poblazon fundada por el Sor Gov^{or} Capⁿ Gener^l Don Diego de Vargas Zapatta Lujan Ponze de Leon su nu^o Restaurad^{or} conq^{or} y rreconq^{or}. Y asi mesmo Consta en dhos Auttos de las quart^a y quatro familias que de orden del Ex^{mo} Sor Virrey Conde de Galvez vinieron g^s en razon en esta Villa de Sta fee del R^l de Zacatecas. Año de 1695." Fols. 52.

"Pettizion q presentaron Los Vez^{os} Mexicanos de la Villa nueva de Sta Cruz en 25 de Sep^e de 1695 a^s Al Sr Gov^r y Capⁿ Gen^l de este R^{no} y prov^{as} de la nueva Mex^{co} Don Diego de Vargas Zapatta lujan Ponze de leon y Su Señoria haze Remision de ella al Ex^{mo} Señor Virrey Conde de Galve y señores Ministros de la R^l hacienda y guerra de la Ciu^d de Mex^{co}." Fols. 7.

"Pettizion Press^{da} pr la Vez^d originaria de este Reyno a su Señoria de que haze Remision al ex^{mo} Sr Virrey Conde de Galue en 9 de N^e de 1695 a^s." Fols. 4.

"Diligenzias que por nottizia que dieron los apaches de la Rancheria que entro en el Pu^o de Picuries diziendo Venia Una Jente blanca y Rubia ttierra adentro Rettirando los Apaches a estas parttes Matando a los que hallavan cuya carta Recivio el Sr Gov^{or} y Capⁿ Gen^l de este R^{no} y prov^{as} de la nueva Mex^{co} y su Señoria la Remitte el Ex^{mo} Sr Virrey conde de Galbe y a los Señores Ministros de su R^l Junta de Haz^{da} y guerra de la corte de Mexico. En 8 de N^e de 1695 a." Fols. 8.

5. *Vínculos*, tomo 14.

"Marquéz de Vargas. Varios cuadernos con relación a Nuevo México." Fols. 310.

(This group of documents contains copies of testimony, proceedings, and other papers relating to the charges brought against Vargas by Governor Cubero and the *cabildo* of Santa Fé, for the period 1697-1702; also a long itemized list of the sums granted to Vargas by the royal treasury, and the purchases made by him, during his governorship, drawn up by the Royal Tribunal of Accounts, Mexico City, 1702.)

III B. L.

1. *Documentos para la historia de Nuevo México*, II. MS.
2. Ellison, Samuel. *History of New Mexico*. Santa Fé, 1884. MS. Published in the *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIII (January, 1938), 1-13.
3. *New Mexico Cédulas*. MS.
(See also A.G.N., above.)

IV B.N.M., legajos 3-4. Photostatic copies in L.C. These two legajos contain hitherto unused documents, some original and others early copies, which throw new light on the refounding of the New Mexico missions and the causes of the Pueblo Indian Revolt of 1696. They also contain early copies of official government records for the period 1692-1704, not accessible elsewhere, which fill important gaps in the reconquest story. The Franciscan correspondence cited below is all original; translations are in preparation for publication.

1. Legajo 3.

[Escalante, Fray Silvestre Vélez de.] Noticias de lo acaecido en la Custodia de la Conversión de San Pablo de la Provincia de el Santo Evangelio de N.S.P.S. Francisco en el Nuevo Méjico, sacadas de los papeles que se guardan en el Archivo de Gobierno de la Villa de Santa Fé, empiezan desde el año de 1679. MS. (This is the complete Escalante manuscript heretofore known only through the incomplete copy in A.G.N., *Historia*, tomo 2, and anonymously referred to as "Este quaderno se cree ser obra de un religioso de la Provincia del Santo Evangelio," and "Restauración del Nuevo México por Don Diego de Vargas Zapata." The latter title is based on the fact that the incomplete copy cited begins abruptly in the middle of Vargas' first expedition into New Mexico. The incomplete manuscript was published in *Documentos para la historia de México*, Third Series, I, Mexico, 1856, 113-208.)

2. Legajo 4.

"Nueva México. Don Diego de Vargas, Gobernador, sobre la competencia de jurisdicción con los Religiosos." (Year 1692.)

(Early copies of official correspondence and reports for the period March-October, 1693, pertaining to the preliminaries of the colonizing expedition sent from Mexico City to New Mexico under the patronage of Viceroy Conde de Galve in 1693.)

(Franciscan correspondence and reports of the New Mexico *custodia*, sent to Mexico by the father custodian Fray Francisco de Vargas, in seven *cuadernos*. Years 1695-1696.)

"Informazion que tiene siete testtigos de que no saben los religiosos de esta Custodia las lenguas y que fueron los motivos de Alzarse los Indios el año de 1680." (Year 1699.)

"Nuevo Mexico. Año de 1699. En 9 Quadernos." (Official papers pertaining to the Vargas-Valverde litigations for the period 1699-1700.)

V B.N.S., MSS. 2822-2823. Photostatic copy in L.C.

Villagutierre y Sotomayor, Juan de. Historia de la conquista, pérdida, y restauración de el Reyno y provincias de la Nueva México en la América septentrional. MS. 2 vols. Fols. 1-449, and 1-444. (There is another copy of this manuscript in the Biblioteca de Palacio, Madrid, MS. 1229.)

VI C.L. See A.G.I. and A.G.N., above.

VII H.L. The Ritch Collection. (See Preface, above.)

VIII L.C. See A.G.I., A.G.N., B.N.M., and B.N.S., above.

IX N.L.

Rosa Figueroa, Fray Francisco Antonio de la. Bezerro General Menológico y Chronológico de todos los religiosos que de las tres parcialidades conviene a saber Padres de España, Hijos de Provincia, y Criollos ha avido en esta Sta Prova del Sto Evango desde su fundación hasta el preste año de 1764 . . . 2 parts. Mexico, 1764. MS.

X S.F.A. Catalogued in Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, cited below.

PRINTED WORKS

Not all of the secondary works which were useful in the preparation of this volume are included here. Only those which have a special bearing on the subject are listed. In the latter sense this bibliography is complete. The most important for the story of Don Diego de Vargas and the reconquest and refounding of New Mexico are the works of López de Zárate, Bancroft, Twitchell, Pérez Balsera, Bloom and Espinosa. For an evaluation of these works see the Preface above.

ALTAMIRA Y CREVEA, RAFAEL. *Historia de España*. 4 vols. Barcelona, 1901-1911.

ÁLVAREZ Y BAENA, JOSÉ ANTONIO. *Hijos de Madrid ilustre en santidad, dignidad, armas, ciencias y artes*. 4 vols. Madrid, 1789-1791.

ARRICIVITA, JUAN DOMINGO. *Crónica seráfica y apostólica del Colegio de propaganda fide de la Santa Cruz de Querétaro en la Nueva España*. Mexico, 1792.

BAILEY, JESSIE B. *Diego de Vargas and the Reconquest of New Mexico*. Albuquerque, 1940.

BALLESTEROS Y BERETTA, ANTONIO. *Historia de España y su influencia en la historia universal*. 9 vols. Barcelona, 1918-1941.

BALLESTEROS ROBLES, LUIS. *Diccionario biográfico matritense*. Madrid, 1912.

BANCROFT, HUBERT HOWE. *History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888*. San Francisco, 1889.

History of Mexico. 6 vols. San Francisco, 1883-1887.

History of the North Mexican States and Texas. 2 vols. San Francisco, 1884-1889.

BANDELIER, ADOLPH F. A. "Documentary History of the Río Grande Pueblos of New Mexico," Papers of the School of American Archaeology, Number 13. Lancaster, Pa., 1910.

"Final Report of Investigations among the Indians of the Southwestern United States, carried on mainly in the years from 1880 to 1885," Papers of the Archaeological Institute of America, American Series, III, IV. Cambridge, 1890-1893.

BENAVIDES, ALONSO DE. *The Memorial of Fray Alonso de Benavides, 1630*. Tr. by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer. Chicago, 1916.

BLOOM, LANSING B. "Fray Estévan de Perea's *Relación*," *New Mexico Historical Review*, VIII (July, 1933), 211-235.

- "Notes and Comments," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 170-171.
- "The Governors of New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 152-157.
- "The Royal Order of 1620," *New Mexico Historical Review*, V (July, 1930), 288-298.
- "The Vargas Encomienda," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIV (October, 1939), 360-417.
- "When was Santa Fé founded?" *New Mexico Historical Review*, IV (April, 1929), 188-194.
- "Who Discovered New Mexico?" *New Mexico Historical Review*, XV (April, 1940), 101-132.
- BLOOM, LANSING B. and THOMAS C. DONNELLY. *New Mexico History and Civics*. Albuquerque, 1933.
- BLOOM, LANSING B. and LYNN B. MITCHELL. "The Chapter Elections in 1672," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIII (January, 1938), 85-119.
- BOLTON, HERBERT EUGENE. *Guide to materials for the History of the United States in the Principal Archives of Mexico*. Washington, D. C., 1913.
- Rim of Christendom. A Biography of Eusebio Francisco Kino*. New York, 1936.
- The Spanish Borderlands, a Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest*. New Haven, 1921.
- Wider Horizons of American History*. New York, 1939.
- BOLTON, HERBERT EUGENE and THOMAS MAITLAND MARSHALL. *The Colonization of North America, 1492-1783*. New York, 1920.
- BOLTON, HERBERT EUGENE and MARY ROSS. *The Debatable Land, A Sketch of the Anglo-Spanish Contest for the Florida Country*. Berkeley, 1925.
- BRAYER, HERBERT O. *Pueblo Indian Land Grants of the "Rio Abajo," New Mexico*. The University of New Mexico Bulletin, Historical Series, I, Albuquerque, 1939.
- CASTAÑEDA, CARLOS E. *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936*. 7 vols. Austin, 1936-.
- CAVO, ANDRÉS. *Los Tres Siglos de Méjico durante el Gobierno Español hasta la Entrada del Ejército Trigarante*. Publicada con Notas y Suplemento en 1836 por el Licenciado D. Carlos de Bustamente. Jalapa, 1870.

COAN, CHARLES F. *A History of New Mexico*. 3 vols. New York, 1925.

"De Vargas," *Dictionary of American Biography*, Dumas Malone, ed., New York, 1928-1937, V, 260.

CORONADO HISTORICAL SERIES. GEORGE P. HAMMOND, ed. Coronado Cuarto Centennial Publications, 1540-1940. 12 vols. Albuquerque, 1940—.

DANTIN CERECEDA, JUAN, ed. *Exploradores y conquistadores de Indias, relatos geográficos*. Madrid, 1922.

DAVIS, W. W. H. *El Gringo, or New Mexico and her People*. New York, 1857.

The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico. Doylestown, Pa., 1869.

Diccionario hispano-americano. Barcelona, n.d.

Documentos del Archivo General de la Villa de Madrid, interpretados y coleccionados por D. Vicente Domingo Palacio, Archivero de este Ayuntamiento. 4 vols. Madrid, 1909.

Documentos para la historia de México. First Series, III, Mexico, 1853, and Third Series, I, Mexico, 1856.

DUNN, WILLIAM EDWARD. "Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States, 1678-1702," in *University of Texas Bulletin*, No. 1705, Austin, January 20, 1917.

Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana. Hijos de J. Espasa, editores. Barcelona.

ENGELHARDT, ZEPHYRIN. *Missions and Missionaries of California*. 4 vols. San Francisco, 1908-1915.

ESCUDERO, JOSÉ A. *Noticias Estadísticas de Sonora y Sinaloa, compiladas y amplificadas para la comisión de estadística militar*. Mexico, 1849.

ESPINOSA, FRAY ISIDRO FÉLIX DE. *Crónica Apostólica y Seráfica de Todos los Colegios de Propaganda Fide de Esta Nueva España*. Mexico, 1746.

ESPINOSA, J. MANUEL. "Diary of Vargas' Expedition into Colorado, 1694," *Colorado Magazine*, XVI (May, 1939), 1-11.

First Expedition of Vargas into New Mexico, 1692. Coronado Historical Series, X, Albuquerque, 1940.

"Governor Vargas in Colorado," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XI (April, 1936), 179-187.

"Memoir of a Kentuckian in New Mexico, 1848-1884," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIII (January, 1938), 1-13.

"New Light on the History of the Reconquest of New Mexico," *Mid-America*, n.s. XXII (October, 1940), 262-277.

"Notes on the Lineage of Don Diego de Vargas, Reconqueror of New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 112-120.

"Population of the El Paso District in 1692," *Mid-America*, n.s. XXIII (January, 1941), 61-84.

"The Legend of Sierra Azul," *New Mexico Historical Review*, IX (April, 1934), 113-158.

"The Recapture of Santa Fé, New Mexico, by the Spaniards—December 29-30, 1693," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XIX (November, 1939), 443-463.

"The Virgin of the Reconquest of New Mexico," *Mid-America*, n.s. VII (April, 1936), 79-87.

FREJES, FRANCISCO. *Historia breve de la conquista de los estados independientes del imperio Mejicano*. Guadalajara, 1878.

GRANT, BLANCHE C. *Taos Indians*. Taos, 1925.

HACKETT, CHARLES WILSON, ed. *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and approaches thereto, to 1773*. Collected by Adolph F. A. Bandelier; Spanish texts and English translations. 3 vols. Washington, D. C., 1923-1937.

"Otermín's Attempts to Reconquer New Mexico, 1681-1682," *Old Santa Fe*, III (January and April, 1916), 44-84, 103-132.

"The Causes for the Failure of Otermín's Attempt to Reconquer New Mexico, 1681-1682," *The Pacific Ocean in History*. New York, 1917.

The Pueblo Revolt of 1680. 2 vols. Coronado Historical Series, VIII-IX, Albuquerque, 1942.

"The Retreat of the Spaniards from New Mexico in 1680, and the Beginnings of El Paso," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XVI (October, 1912, and January, 1913), 137-168, 259-276.

"The Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in 1680," *The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, XV (October, 1911), 93-147.

The Uprising of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, 1680-1682. Ph.D. dissertation. MS., University of California, 1917.

HALLENBECK, CLEVE. *Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca: The Journey and Route of the First European to cross the Continent of North America*. Glendale, Calif. 1940.

HAMMOND, GEORGE P. *Don Juan de Oñate and the Founding of New Mexico*. Santa Fe, 1926.

- HAMMOND, GEORGE P. and AGAPITO REY. *Narratives of the Coronado Expedition*. Coronado Historical Series, II, Albuquerque, 1940.
- HANKE, LEWIS. "The 'Requerimiento' and its Interpreters," *Revista de Historia de América*, No. 1 (March, 1938), 1-10.
The First Social Experiments in America; A Study in the Development of Spanish Indian Policy in the Sixteenth Century. Cambridge, 1935.
- HEWETT, EDGAR LEE. *Ancient Life in the American Southwest*. New York, 1930.
- HODGE, FREDERICK WEBB. "French Intrusion toward New Mexico in 1695," *New Mexico Historical Review*, IV (January, 1929), 72-76.
 ed. *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin No. 30, parts I and II. Washington, D. C., 1907-1910.
History of Hawikuh New Mexico. Los Angeles, 1937.
 "The Six Cities of Cibola, 1581-1680," *New Mexico Historical Review*, I (October, 1926), 478-488.
 "The Enchanted Mesa," *Century Magazine*, LVI (May, 1898), 15-31.
 "The Verification of a Tradition," *American Anthropologist*, X (September, 1897), 299-302.
- HUGHES, ANNE E. "The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement in the El Paso District," University of California Publications in History, I. Berkeley, 1914.
- HULL, DOROTHY. "Castaño de Sosa's Expedition to New Mexico in 1590," *Old Santa Fe*, III (October, 1916), 307-332.
- ICAZA, FRANCISCO A. DE. *Conquistadores y pobladores de Nueva España*. 2 vols. Madrid, 1923.
- KELLY, H. W. "Franciscan Missions of New Mexico, 1740-1760," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XV (October, 1940), 345-368; XVI (January and April, 1941), 41-69, 148-183.
- KUBLER, GEORGE. *The Religious Architecture of New Mexico. In the Colonial Period and since the American Occupation*. The Taylor Museum, Colorado Springs, 1940.
- LEONARD, IRVING A., ed. and tr. *The Mercurio Volante of Don Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora. An Account of the First Expedition of Don Diego de Vargas into New Mexico in 1692*. Quivira Society, III, Los Angeles, 1932.

- LÓPEZ DE ZÁRATE VARGAS Y PIMENTEL, DIEGO. *Breve descripción genealógica de la ilustre quanto antiquíssima casa de los Vargas de Madrid* . . . Madrid, 1740.
- LUMMIS, CHARLES FLETCHER. *A New Mexico David*. New York, 1891.
The Spanish Pioneers and the California Missions. Chicago, 1929.
- MAAS, P. OTTO. *Los órdenes religiosos de España y la Colonización de América, en la segunda parte del siglo XVIII*. Barcelona, 1929.
Misiones de Nuevo Méjico, Documentos del Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla) publicados por primera vez y anotados. Madrid, 1929.
Viajes de misioneros Franciscanos a la conquista del Nuevo México. Sevilla, 1915.
- MECHAM, J. LLOYD. *Francisco de Ibarra and Nueva Vizcaya*. Durham, N. C., 1927.
"The Second Spanish Expedition to New Mexico: an account of the Chamuscado-Rodríguez Entrada of 1581-1582," *New Mexico Historical Review*, I (July, 1926), 265-291.
- MESONERO Y ROMANOS, RAMÓN DE. *El antiguo Madrid*. Madrid, 1861.
- MUNSON, ESTHER M. *Aboriginal Economic Geography of the Hopi*. M.A. thesis. MS., University of California, 1933.
- "Noticias que Da Juan Candelaria Vecino de esta villa de San Francisco Xavier de Albuquerque de edad de 84 años nació el año de 1692," *New Mexico Historical Review*, IV (July, 1929), 285-287.
- O'GORMAN, EDMUNDO. "Sobre la naturaleza bestial del indio americano," *Filosofía y Letras*, Mexico, I (January-June, 1941), 141-158, 305-315.
- PARSONS, ELSIE CLEWS. *Pueblo Indian Religion*. 2 vols. Chicago, 1939.
The Pueblo of Jémez. New Haven, 1925.
- PÉREZ BALSERA, JOSÉ. *Laudemus viros gloriosos et parentes nostros in generatione sua*. Madrid, 1931.
- POSADAS, ALONSO DE. "Informe a S. M. sobre las tierras de Nuevo Méjico, Quivira y Teguayo, c. 1686." In Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Diego de Peñalosa y su descubrimiento del reino de Quivira*. Madrid, 1882.

- PRESCOTT, WILLIAM H. *History of the Conquest of Mexico*. 2 vols. New York, 1843.
- PRIESTLEY, HERBERT INGRAM. *José de Gálvez, Visitor-General of New Spain, 1765-1771*. University of California Publications in History, V. Berkeley, 1916.
The Coming of the White Man. New York, 1929.
- PRINCE, L. BRADFORD. *A Concise History of New Mexico*. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.
Historical Sketches of New Mexico from the Earliest Records to the American Occupation. New York, 1883.
Spanish Mission Churches of New Mexico. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1915.
The Franciscan Martyrs of 1680. Historical Society of New Mexico, No. 7. Santa Fe, 1906.
- READ, BENJAMIN M. *Illustrated History of New Mexico*. Santa Fe, 1912.
- Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*. 4 vols. Madrid, 1756.
- RIVA PALACIO, VICENTE. *México a través de los siglos*. 5 vols. Mexico, 1887-1889.
- ROBLES, ANTONIO DE. "Diario de sucesos notables." In *Documentos para la historia de Mexico*, III. Mexico, 1853.
- ROBLES, VITO ALESSIO. *Francisco de Urdiñola y el norte de la Nueva España*. Mexico, 1931.
- SARAVIA, ATANASIO G. *Los misioneros muertos en el norte de Nueva España*. Durango, 1920.
- SAUER, CARL. *The Road to Cibola*. Ibero-Americana: 3. Berkeley, 1932.
- SCHOLES, FRANCE V. *Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650*. New Mexico Historical Society Publications in History, VII, Albuquerque, 1937.
 "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (April, 1935), 71-111.
 "Problems in the Early Ecclesiastical History of New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, VII (January, 1932), 32-74.
 "The First Decade of the Inquisition in New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review*, X (July, 1935), 195-241.

"The Supply Service of the New Mexican Missions in the Seventeenth Century," *New Mexico Historical Review*, V (January, April, October, 1930), 93-115, 186-210, 386-404.

"Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XII (January and October, 1937), 134-174, 380-452; XIII (January, 1938), 63-84; XV (July and October, 1940), 249-268, 369-417; XVI (January, April, July, 1941), 15-40, 184-205, 313-327.

SIGÜENZA Y GÓNGORA, DON CARLOS DE. See Leonard, Irving A.

The Catholic Encyclopedia. 15 vols. New York, 1913.

THOMAS, ALFRED BARNABY. *After Coronado, Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727*. Norman, Okla., 1935.

Forgotten Frontiers, A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787. Norman, Okla., 1932.

"Spanish Expeditions into Colorado," *Colorado Magazine*, I (November, 1924), 289-300.

The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778. Coronado Historical Series, XI, Albuquerque, 1940.

TWITCHELL, RALPH EMERSON. *Old Santa Fe, the Story of New Mexico's Ancient Capital*. Santa Fé, 1925.

Spanish Colonization in New Mexico in the Oñate and De Vargas Periods. Historical Society of New Mexico, No. 22. Santa Fé, 1919.

"The Justification of Don Diego de Vargas, 1704," *Old Santa Fe*, II (July, 1915), 57-65.

"The Last Campaign of General de Vargas, 1704," *Old Santa Fe*, II (July, 1915), 66-72.

The Leading Facts of New Mexican History. 5 vols. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1911-1914.

"The Pueblo Revolt of 1696," *Old Santa Fe*, III (October, 1916), 333-373.

"The Reconquest of New Mexico, 1691-1692. Extracts from the Journal of General Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Luján Ponce de León," *Old Santa Fe*, I (January and April, 1914), 288-307, 420-435.

The Spanish Archives of New Mexico. 2 vols. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1914.

VETANCURT, AUGUSTIN DE. *Teatro Mexicano*. 4 vols. Mexico, 1698.

Teatro Mexicano. New edition, 4 vols. Mexico, 1870-1871.

Menologio Franciscano de los varones mas señalados que con sus vidas ejemplares, perfección religiosa, ciencia, predicación evangélica, en su vida y muerte ilustraron la provincia del santo evangelio de Mexico. Bound with the Fourth Part of the *Teatro Mexicano*. Mexico, 1870-1871.

VILLAGRÁ, GASPAR PÉREZ DE. *Historia de la Nueva México*. Alcalá, 1610. Tr. by Gilberto Espinosa. Quivira Society, IV, Los Angeles, 1933.

WAGNER, H. R. *The Spanish Southwest*. 2 vols. Albuquerque, 1937.

WINSHIP, GEORGE PARKER. ed. and tr. *The Coronado Expedition, 1540-1542*. U. S. Bureau of American Ethnology, 14th Annual Report, part I. Washington, D. C., 1896.

ZAMACOIS, NICETO. *Historia de Méjico*. 16 vols. Barcelona, 1877-1885.

ZAVALA, SILVIO A. *La Encomienda Indiana*. Madrid, 1935.

Las Instituciones Jurídicas en la Conquista de América. Madrid, 1935.

INDEX

- Abiquiú, 364, 367.
- Acevedo, Fray Antonio de, missionary at Nambé, 227; at Santa Fé, 230.
- Ácoma, pueblo, 20, 248, 252, 253, 259, 275; mission beginnings at, 11; during independence, 23, 57; plot at, 80, 85; description of, 88-91; campaign against, 274-277.
- Adelantado*, 5, 319.
- Ágreda, Mother María de Jesús de, 12; *see also Lady in Blue*.
- Agriculture, 9, 10, 14, 16, 34, 35, 42, 50, 56, 131, 140, 181, 184, 185, 191, 275, 302, 303, 365; agricultural implements, 222, 337.
- Agua Escondida, 133.
- Aguatuví, pueblo, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 182, 348, 349.
- Aguilera Isasy, Antonio de, 317.
- Alameda, 132, 134, 298, 303, 356, 357.
- Alamillo, 107, 134.
- Albuquerque, 54, 58, 364.
- Alcaldías*, reestablishment of, 210, 222.
- Alday, Martín de, 108, 109.
- Almazán, *see* Anaya Almazán.
- Alona, 93, 94, 104, 105, 106, 347.
- Alonso, Indian governor of Nambé, 77.
- Alpuente, Fray Juan, on expedition of 1693, 129; at San Ildefonso mesa, 164, 168; chaplain on expedition into Colorado, 190, 196; missionary at Sia, 211, 216; at Pecos, 229, 230, 232; at Santa Fé, 235; at Nambé, 247; instructs rebel prisoners, 254, 259; chaplain on expedition beyond Nambé, 265; at El Embudo de Cochití, 267.
- Altamira, Rafael, quoted, 2.
- Alvarado, Fray Tomás de, 345.
- Álvarez, Fray Juan, custodian of the New Mexico missions, 329, 343, 345, 356.
- Anaya, Cristóbal de, abandoned farm of, 83, 84, 134, 136, 139, 140, 144, 147; son of, 75.
- Anaya Almazán, Francisco de, (the elder), 132, 155, 169, 171; death of, 181, 238.
- Anaya Almazán, Francisco de, (the younger), *alcalde mayor* of Pecos, 210; instructions to, 245; withdraws missionaries to Santa Fé, 247; reports rebel concentration near Taos, 265.
- Andrés, Santo Domingo Indian, 143.
- Anián, Strait of, 6.
- Antonio, Indian war captain of Walpi, 100, 101.
- Antonio of Picuríes, Indian leader, 77, 79, 279, 286; killed, 287.
- Anza, Juan Bautista de, 370.
- Apaches, 8, 23, 34, 35, 41, 46, 50, 53, 54, 60, 61, 78, 86, 90, 91, 94, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 131, 133, 138, 140, 144, 151, 163, 170, 177, 178, 182, 183, 200, 208, 218, 229, 252, 286, 287, 294, 304, 347, 354, 357, 363, 367, 369; —del Acho, 196, 337; —de Chilmo, 39, 275, 297, 337; —de los Chipaynes, 227; —Colorados, 106; —Conejeros, 227; —Coninas, 80, 100, 103, 179, 182, 275; —de Cuartelejo, 288; —Faraones, 69, 70, 80, 93, 95, 147, 236, 252, 253, 297, 337, 349, 350, 356; —de Gila, 34, 36, 37, 275, 297; —de Jicarilla, 337, 350; —de los Llanos (of the Buffalo Plains), 177, 183, 192, 204,

- 337, 350; —del Mechón, 179;
—del Río Colorado, 137, 140,
169, 170; —Salineros, 94, 104,
297; —de Trementina, 337.
- Apodaca, Francisco de, 239, 251.
- Arbizu, Fray José de, 241, 260;
missionary at San Cristóbal,
230, 233, 235, 242; at Santa
Cruz, 235; martyrdom of, 246,
271.
- Archuleta, Juan de, 245, 246.
- Archibeca, Juan, *see* L'Archevê-
que, Jean.
- Arias de Quirós, Diego, 154, 155,
317.
- Arroyo Hondo, 194.
- Arroyo Seco, 58.
- Atajo del Embudo, 81.
- Atotonilco, 220, 269.
- Atrisco, 303.
- Autos de guerra*, 81, 82.
- Ayeta, Fray Francisco de, 20, 21,
22.
- Ayre, del, slope of, 254.
- Baca, Ignacio, abandoned hacien-
da of, 134.
- Bacuachito, 37.
- Bahamonte, Fray Antonio, on ex-
pedition of 1693, 129.
- Banner, Royal, 52, 61, 65, 100,
131, 139, 190, 207, 210.
- Baptisms of Indians, 9, 11, 12,
70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 86, 91, 93, 97, 101,
102, 110, 140, 141, 142, 170,
199, 200, 218, 348.
- Barroso, Fray Cristóbal Alonso,
on Vargas' first expedition in-
to New Mexico, 52, 63, 79,
88, 97.
- Benavides, Fray Alonso de, 11,
12.
- Bernalillo, 139, 200, 249, 255,
364; refounding of, 227; har-
assed by Apaches, 356; scene of
Vargas' death, 358.
- Bernardino, cacique of Taos, 283.
- Black Mesa, *see* San Ildefonso,
mesa of.
- Black Robes, *see* Jesuits.
- Bloom, Lansing B., quoted, 11.
- Blue Mountain, *see* Sierra Azul.
- Bolsas, Antonio, Tanos leader, 62,
67, 142, 149, 151, 152, 153,
154, 158, 161; execution of,
161.
- Bolton, Herbert E., quoted, xviii,
10.
- Books, in early New Mexico, 43,
93, 110, 247, 262, 286.
- Buenaventura, Fray, *see* Contreras.
- Buffalo Hunt, 196-197.
- Cabezón, Agustín el, Zuñi Indian
guide, 105, 106.
- Cabildo* of Santa Fé, described,
15; temporary headquarters at
El Paso, 21; returns to Santa
Fé, 131, 139, 141; demands
reoccupation of Santa Fé, 152;
distributes grain, 161; recom-
mends reappointment of Var-
gas, 165, 174, 175, 310; re-
warded by Vargas, 173; reports
to the viceroy, 187, 268, 270-
271; ambitions of, 313-314;
makes charges against Vargas,
312, 337; makes charges
against Valverde, 315-316, 324-
325; praises Cubero, 337;
agents of, in Madrid and Mex-
ico City, 316, 336; retracts
charges against Vargas, 355;
makes charges against Cubero,
355-356.
- Cabildo abierto*, 155; members of,
listed, 155.
- Cachina, Indian leader, 250.
- Calatrava, Order of, 26, 27.
- Camino Real, 53, 58, 108, 285.
- Campa, Antonio de la, 206, 212,
269.
- Captives, Spanish and mestizo, set

- free, 87, 105, 109-110, 283;
held by Apaches, 272; Indian
captives, *see* Servitude.
- Carbonel, Fray Antonio, on expe-
dition of 1693, 129; mission-
ary at San Felipe, 211; at Coch-
ití, 213, 216, 241; at Nambé,
230, 241; at Taos, 230; at San-
ta Fé, 235; martyrdom of, 246,
271.
- Caripicado, Pecos Indian leader,
killed, 279.
- Carretas, 123.
- Carrizal, 368.
- Casa Fuerte, 270.
- Casas Grandes, 44, 119, 123, 148,
212; presidio, 322.
- Casas Reales*, *see* Palace of the
Governors.
- Castillo, Gabriel del, governor of
New Vizcaya, 257, 271, 290.
- Catiti, Alonso, Indian leader, 22,
23, 143.
- Cattle Raising, *see* Livestock.
- Cebolleta Mesa, 106.
- Cerrillos, Los, mining camp, 227,
253; settlers withdraw to Santa
Fé, 247.
- Cerro Colorado, refuge of Keres,
75, 82, 84, 85, 101, 116, 136,
140, 141.
- Cerro Colorado, near Sierra Azul,
40, 46, 80, 81, 102.
- Cerro Gordo, presidio, 50, 178,
322.
- Chama River, 169, 173, 194, 197,
274, 364.
- Charles II, King, 29, 33, 66, 81,
117, 332.
- Chavarría, Fray Diego de, mis-
sionary at Taos, 230, 254, 298,
345; at Santa Fé, 234, 259; on
Ácoma campaign, 275; recom-
mends Valverde, 329.
- Chávez, Fernando Durán de, 57;
alcalde mayor of Bernalillo,
244, 245, 249, 255, 261, 344-
345, 346.
- Chihuahua, 6, 20.
- Chillo, Juan, Indian leader of San-
ta Clara, 253, 279; surrenders,
286.
- Chilmos, *see* Apaches de Chilmo.
- Chimayó, 224, 226, 233, 253,
260.
- Chimayó Mountains, rebel refuge,
233, 234, 251-252, 256, 258,
260.
- Chínapa, 36, 37.
- Chupaderos, Aguaje de los, 94,
104.
- Church and State, 16, 17, 41-43,
307, 342-347.
- Cíbola, 5.
- Cisneros, Jiménez de, *see* Jiménez
de Cisneros.
- Clothing, 9, 13, 65, 66, 68, 74,
115, 124, 128, 146, 187, 206,
208, 263, 296, 304, 305, 337,
360-362.
- Cochití, El Embudo de, *see* El
Embudo de Cochití.
- Cochití, La Ciénega de, *see* La
Ciénega de Cochití.
- Cochití, La Cieneguilla de, *see* La
Cieneguilla de Cochití.
- Cochití, mesa of, 82, 83, 140,
170, 178, 179; capture of, 179-
180; captives, natives executed,
property seized, 180.
- Cochití, Pueblo Viejo de, 56, 57,
84, 137, 139, 184, 262; natives
of, 23, 40, 173, 185, 199, 208,
342; mission reestablished,
213; population of, 216; hos-
tages set free, 219; placed un-
der *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222;
religious articles of mission re-
covered, 262; *see also* Revolt.
- Cocomataques, 36.
- Colina, Fray Agustín de, 43.
- Colonists, led by Vargas to New

- Mexico, 113, 114, 119, 120, 123, 128, 129, 130, 176; from Mexico City, 118, 124-128, 166-167, 173, 176, 188-190, 225-226; led to New Mexico by Juan Páez Hurtado, 227, 239; rewarded by the Crown, 176; petitions of, 228, 257, 268, 270, 297.
- Colorado, 34, 190; Vargas expedition into, 193-198.
- Colorado River, in Arizona, 6; in New Mexico, 196.
- Comanches, 363, 369.
- Conchos, 294; district of, 129, 295; San Francisco de, presidio, 44, 50, 322.
- Conchos River, 6.
- Coninas, *see* Apaches Coninas.
- Contreras, Fray Buenaventura de, on expedition of 1693, 129; with supply train, 178.
- Contreras y Arraiz, Doña María Margarita de, 28.
- Conversion of Indians, *see* Franciscans.
- Corpus Christi de la Isleta de Tigua, church of, El Paso district, 41.
- Corral, Fray Juan Antonio del, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at San Felipe, 216; at Santa Fé, 249.
- Cortés del Rey, Juan, 129.
- Corvera, Fray Francisco, at El Paso, 42; chaplain of Vargas' first expedition into New Mexico, 52, 59, 62, 64, 66, 69, 70, 88, 97, 98, 108, 110; on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at San Ildefonso, 211, 216, 217, 218, 230, 231, 233, 347; at Santa Cruz, 235; martyrdom of, 246, 271.
- Coscomates, 202.
- Cotache, 123, 212.
- Council of the Indies, 15.
- Council of War, called by Vargas on petition of the settlers, 257-258.
- Cristóbal, Indian governor on the Cerro Colorado, 84-85, 141.
- Cristóbal Yope, Indian governor of San Lázaro, San Cristóbal, 137, 138, 140, 142, 145, 147, 163, 252, 255; reported killed, 280.
- Croix, Teodoro de, 370.
- Cruzate, Domingo Jironza Petriz de, *see* Jironza.
- Cuartelejo, 270.
- Cubero, Pedro Rodríguez, appointed governor of New Mexico, 308; biographical sketch, 311; conducts Vargas' *residencia*, 311-312; and Valverde, 325-326, 329; and Vargas, 326, 327, 337; controversy with the missionaries, 341, 342-347; dealings with the western pueblos, 341-342, 347-352; withdrawal from New Mexico, 352; death of, 352; charges against, by Vargas and the *cabildo*, 353-356.
- Cubero Creek, 342.
- Cuencame, presidio, 44, 322.
- Culebra Creek, 196.
- Cuma, Camino de, near Santa Fé, 149.
- Cuniju, Luis, Indian leader, testimony of, 250-251; executed, 253-254.
- Cusiguriachi, Santa Rosa de, 119.
- Cuyamungué, pueblo, 76, 77, 164, 169, 190-191, 260, 296; resettlement of, 210; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.
- Damas, 315, 316, 328, 336.
- Daza, Fray Juan, on expedition of 1693, 129; with supply train, 257.
- Deaths, of Spaniards, from acci-

- dents, 133, 181; from exposure, 155, 162; in battle, 162, 180, 205, 238-239, 267, 269; in epidemics, 238, 239, 269; in revolts, 246, 247, 248, 250-251, 351; *see also* Martyrdoms.
- Desertions, 147, 166, 189, 190, 238, 239, 284.
- Diaguillo, Indian leader of Nambé, 250, 251, 279.
- Diego, Don, Indian leader of Pecos, 250; hanged, 250.
- Diego, Indian war captain at Jacona, 77.
- Diego, Jémez Indian leader, 203, 204.
- Diez, Fray José, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at Tesuque, 213, 216, 217, 230, 231, 232; biographical note, 213; at Santa Fé, 235; at Tesuque, 240; withdraws to Mexico, 298.
- Disease, 12, 238, 269, 357, 359.
- Domingo, Indian war captain at Santa Clara, 77.
- Domingo, Indian governor of Tesuque, 63, 64, 67, 72, 75, 138, 142, 145, 148, 164, 167, 171, 231, 232, 244, 245, 247, 252, 255, 256, 258; on campaign against rebels beyond Nambé, 265, 266; discovers Naranjo's refuge, 267; instrumental in surrender of rebel chieftain of San Juan, 278.
- Domínguez de Mendoza, Juan, abandoned hacienda of, 53, 54.
- Domínguez, José, 254, 316.
- Domínguez, Tomé, 364, *see also* Tomé.
- Dominguillo, Indian leader of Tesuque, 184, 185.
- Doña Ana, 110.
- Doña Damiana, abandoned hacienda of, 136, 137, 173.
- Doña Luisa, abandoned hacienda of, 54.
- Doña María, abandoned hacienda of, 133.
- Durango, 113, 114, 118, 119, 123, 187, 212, 221, 227, 330.
- Ebzequebe, Indian leader, 278.
- Echevarría, Fray Diego de, *see* Chavarría.
- Education of Indians, *see* Franciscans, Mission System, Pueblo Indians.
- El Alamo, abandoned farm of, 148, 199, 247, 253, 255.
- El Chiquito, Indian leader, 34, 39.
- Ellison, Samuel, quoted, xvii.
- El Embudo, east of San Juan, rebel refuge, 167, 278, 279, 280; rebel tribes at, 167.
- El Embudo de Cochití, near the Chama River, 169, 173, 265, 275; rebel tribes at, 168, 173; battle at, 267-268.
- El Morro, 92, 106.
- El Paso, location of, 20; withdrawal of the New Mexico settlers to, 20-21; establishment of presidio, 21, 34; importance of, 21, 325, 365; temporary capital, 21, 32; economic conditions at, 34, 50, 114, 115, 116, 118, 271; Indian warfare at, 35-40; missions and missionaries at, 21, 41-43; celebration at, 109; population of, 114-115, 129, 364; church of, 41, 109.
- El Perrillo, 53, 133.
- El Pozo, 88, 89, 90.
- El Sigua, Indian leader of Santa Clara, 167.
- El Siguagueri, Indian leader of Santa Clara, 167.
- El Tegua, Indian leader of San Cristóbal, 167.
- El Zepe, Indian leader of Cochití, 163, 180, 184, 211, 252, 255.
- Enchanted Mesa, 89, 276.
- Encomienda system, 4, 13-14, 18,

- 19, 118, 318, 319, 320, 321, 363.
- Entretenimiento, Aguaje del, 94, 104.
- Escalante, *see* Vélez de Escalante.
- Espeleta, Francisco, Moqui Indian leader, 102, 103, 348, 349.
- Espeleta, Fray José de, 102, 345.
- Esterio Largo, 51, 131.
- Estévan, San Felipe Indian, 57.
- Estufas*, description of, 8, 18, 22, 153, 154, 217.
- Fajardo, Miguel, 226.
- Famine, 228.
- Faraon Apaches, *see* Apaches Faraones.
- Farfán, Fray Francisco, 124, 126, 127, 166, 167, 173, 178, 188, 190, 201, 205, 208, 209, 225.
- Felipe, Indian governor of Pecos, 247, 250, 279, 350.
- Felipe, Taos Indian, 282; surrenders religious articles, 282-283.
- Fernández de la Fuente, Juan, 36, 37, 38, 39, 239, 274.
- Folklore, 6-7, 26, 27-28, 37-38, 46, 89, 153, 233, 236, 241, 245, 366, 372.
- Food, provisions, 9, 13, 34, 50, 51, 52, 56, 63, 72, 73, 87, 90, 101, 128, 130, 132, 133-134, 137, 138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 151, 154, 161, 177, 180, 184, 217, 282, 283, 284, 286, 288, 302, 337; *see also* Grain, Livestock.
- Forzados*, 126, 189.
- Franciscans, 6, 17, 32, 38, 42, 47, 53; Golden Age of Missions in New Mexico, 9-15; number of, in New Mexico, 9, 11, 12, 15, 118, 129, 216, 230, 342, 366, 367, 368; number of missions and *visitas* in New Mexico, 9, 12, 34, 35, 41, 102, 211, 216, 221, 224, 230, 260, 298, 301, 367, 368; missions and missionaries in the El Paso district, 20, 342, 368; missions in Texas, 12, 21; establishment of Province of Santo Evangelio, 214; establishment of the Custodia of the Conversion of San Pablo, 11; military defense of the missions, 13-14, 230-242; support of missions, 14, 176, 182, 200, 340; loss of the missions, 19-22; controversy with Vargas, 42-43; on Vargas' first expedition into New Mexico, 52; on expedition of 1693, 129; reestablishment of New Mexico missions, 210-212, 213-219, 224, 227; native population of missions, 12, 19, 216; debts of, cancelled, 260; review of status of the missions from 1694 to 1696, 298-300; status of the missions in the eighteenth century, 366-368; controversy with Cubero, 341, 342-347; *see also* Baptisms, Church and State, Land Grants, Mission Herds, Mission System, New Mexico, Pueblo Indians, Revolt, Vargas, Diego de.
- Francisco, Indian governor of Jacona, surrenders, 296.
- Francisco, Indian war captain at San Ildefonso, 77, 145, 153.
- Fray Cristóbal, 53, 133, 167.
- Fray García, Ancón de, 52, 130, 131, 148.
- Frenchmen, 47, 128, 189, 190, 227, 229, 350, 369.
- Fresnillo, 119, 120, 123, 129.
- Galisteo, 72, 83, 155, 233, 303, 364.
- Galisteo, Arroyo de, 58, 72.
- Gallo, San Pedro del, presidio, 44, 50, 322.
- Galve, Conde de, viceroy of New Spain, 31, 117, 224, 312.

- Garaicochea, Fray Juan de, missionary at Zuñi, 347, 348, 351, 352, 356; chaplain on Vargas' last campaign, 357.
- García Jurado, José, 315, 317, 324; agent of the *cabildo* of Santa Fé in Mexico City, 336; places charges against Vargas, 336-339; praises Cubero, 338.
- García Marín, Fray José, missionary at Santa Clara, 213, 216, 230; biographical note, 213; at Santa Fé, 234, 247; at Santa Cruz, 242; at Pecos, 247.
- General Junta, *see* Junta General.
- Genízaro, defined, 105; 367, 368.
- Gerónimo, Indian lieutenant governor of Taos, 283.
- Godínez, Antonio, 226.
- Gómez, Francisco, 152; abandoned hacienda of, 224.
- González Calderón, Juan, 318-319.
- Governor's Palace, *see* Palace of the Governors.
- Grain, 118, 128, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 147, 148, 151, 154, 161, 178, 257, 295, 337; seized from hostile pueblos, 170, 173, 176, 177, 180, 181, 188, 193, 194, 198, 201, 202, 209, 262, 274, 282, 283, 286, 304; *see also* Food.
- Gran Teguayo, 8.
- Granillo, Luis, 51, 72, 87, 130, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 155, 209, 219; makes land survey, 224-225; member of council of war, 258; on Taos campaign, 282; consulted on conditions at Santa Cruz, 297-298.
- Gregorio, Indian governor of Pojoaque, 77.
- Griego, Juan, Indian leader of San Juan, 185, 278, 279, 283, 284; surrenders, 286; aids in Picuríes campaign, 287.
- Grola, Santiago, 189.
- Guadalajara, 81, 120.
- Guadalupe, near El Paso, 35, 41.
- Guadalupe, near Mexico City, 126, 128.
- Guadiana, *see* Durango.
- Guerra, Fray Antonio, 41, 46.
- Guíqui, Alonso, Indian governor of Santo Domingo, 247; testimony of, 253; execution of, 253-254.
- Gutiérrez de Figueroa, Antonio, 316.
- Halona, *see* Alona.
- Hano, pueblo, 57.
- Hidalgo, Pedro, 60.
- Hopi, *see* Moqui.
- Horses, mules, 16, 34, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 72, 73, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95, 102, 103, 104, 106, 115, 120, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 159, 160, 168, 169, 171, 173, 177, 178, 180, 184, 187, 192, 193, 200, 205, 208, 231, 245, 255, 260, 262, 271, 288, 337, 365.
- Hueco Mountains, 41.
- Huerta, Toribio de, 32-33, 40, 46.
- Hurtado, Juan Páez, *see* Páez Hurtado.
- Hurtado, Martín, 105, 262.
- Infielos*, 241.
- Inquisition, Holy Office of the, 17, 213.
- Inscription Rock, *see* El Morro.
- Isleta, El Paso district, 20, 50, 51, 128; population of, 114.
- Isleta, upper New Mexico, 11, 19, 32, 77, 88, 137, 179, 367.
- Jaca, Indian leader, 22.
- Jacona, pueblo, 57, 77, 198; re-

- fuge of natives of, 164, 169; resettlement of, 210; population of, 216; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.
- Janos, 36, 38, 39, 337; district, 36, 239; presidio, 36, 38, 44, 77, 247.
- Jémez, abandoned pueblo of, 142, 143; natives of, 19, 23, 57, 69, 70, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 135, 136, 139, 140, 144, 163, 170, 173, 178, 184, 185, 189, 199, 200, 204, 208, 248; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; testimony of Jémez captive, 274; *see also* Revolt.
- Jémez, mesa of, 84, 85, 87, 140, 143; dwellings on, 85; natives of, 86, 142, 199, 200; capture of, 200; captives and property of, seized, 200, 201, 202.
- Jémez, San Diego de, mesa of, 237; mission of, 224; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; soldiers stationed at, 234-235.
- Jémez, San Juan de, mesa of, 216, 224; mission of, 224; soldiers stationed at, 234.
- Jesuits, 3, 28, 36-37, 40, 47, 344, 345, 346.
- Jesús, Fray Juan de, martyred in revolt of 1680, 19, 185; remains of, recovered at Jémez, 202-203.
- Jesús María, Fray Domingo de, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at Pecos, 230, 236, 347; withdraws to Mexico, 298.
- Jesús María y Casañas, Fray Francisco de, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at San Diego de Jémez, 211, 230, 232, 236; at Bernalillo, 235, 242; martyrdom of, 250-251, 271; biographical sketch of, 251; bones of, recovered, 259, 271.
- Jiménez de Cisneros, Fray Al-(f)onso, missionary at Cochití, 230, 232, 236, 244-245; at Bernalillo, 235; returns to Cochití, 243; legend of his escape from Cochití, 245.
- Jirón, Rafael Téllez, *see* Téllez Jirón.
- Jironza Petriz de Cruzate, Domingo, 20, 32, 33, 40, 64, 109, 116, 117, 120, 132, 291, 292.
- Jocomes, 36, 39.
- Jongopavi, *see* Shongopovi.
- Jorge, Antonio, 57, 155, 172, 192, 200, 203, 205; *alcalde mayor* of the villa of Santa Cruz, 226; death of, 238.
- José, Indian of Cuyamungué, 184.
- José, Indian governor of Santa Fé, 63, 70, 149, 152, 153, 154; wife of, 70; commits suicide, 160-161.
- José, Indian governor of Santo Domingo, 143.
- Josefillo, 138.
- Josefillo, "the Spaniard," Indian of Taos, 79, 80.
- Juan, Indian leader of Cochití, 83.
- Juan, Indian governor of Cuyamungué, 77.
- Juan, Indian governor of Pecos, *see* Juan de Ye.
- Juan de Ye, Indian governor of Pecos, 140, 142, 144, 151; and Apaches, 177, 183, 184; on Taos expedition, 190, 192, 193, 196, 198.
- Juárez, 20.
- Jumanos, 12, 21, 350.
- Junta General de Hacienda, described, 45; decisions of, 35-36, 45-46, 112-114, 117-118, 124, 126, 162, 175-176, 212-213, 219-220, 263-264, 291-296, 302-303, 331-332, 337-338.
- Keres, 11, 22, 23, 57, 69, 70, 75, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 107,

- 132, 134, 135, 139, 140, 163,
170, 173, 178, 179, 184, 185,
186, 188, 199, 200, 208, 253,
341-342, 356; list of Keres
pueblos, 57, *see also* Revolt.
- Kiakima, 93, 106, 179, 351; var-
iants in spelling of, 93.
- Kino, Eusebio, S.J., 40.
- Kivas, *see* *Estufas*.
- La Bajada Trail, 58, 142, 145.
- La Cañada, *see* Santa Cruz de la
Cañada.
- La Cebolleta, 106.
- La Ciénega de Cochití, 134, 136,
144.
- La Cieneguilla, 58, 142, 179, 184,
199, 219.
- La Cieneguilla de Cochití, 83,
137, 140, 145, 147, 163, 178,
342.
- La Conquistadora*, *see* Our Lady
of the Conquest.
- La Cruz de Anaya, 53.
- Ladders, 66, 152, 157, 159, 172.
- Lady in Blue*, 11-12; *see also*
Ágreda, Mother María de Jesús
de.
- Laguna, near Ácoma, 23, 342,
347, 351, 352.
- La Junta, 21.
- La Laguna, near Zacatecas, 128,
189.
- La Nava de Barcinas, marquisate
of, 29, 121, 339, 340, 358, 362.
- Land Grants, 110, 222, 224, 225,
226, 227; land disputes, 16,
41-42, 354-355.
- La Nueva Conversión de Nuestro
Padre San Francisco de los
Mansos, mission, 41.
- La Puebla, 205.
- La Purísima Concepción, 107.
- La Salineta, 51, 131.
- La Salle Expedition, 47, 189.
- Lara, Miguel de, 249, 274, 280,
281, 284; victory over Jémez,
258-259, 261; on Cochití cam-
paign, 262.
- L'Archevêque, Jean, 189.
- Las Bocas, 58, 142.
- Las Boquillas, 179.
- Las Cruces, 44, 133.
- Las Peñas Coloradas, rebel refuge,
169.
- Las Peñuelas, near Zuñi, 92.
- Las Peñuelas, on road to Santa Fé,
53, 133.
- Las Salinas, near Moqui, 102.
- Las Salinas, in the Piro country,
8, 18, 252.
- Laws of the Indies, 4, 59, 174,
175, 257, 290-291, 292, 293,
301, 302-303, 316, 319.
- Ledesma, Fray Clemente de, pro-
vincial of the province of Santo
Evangelio, 296.
- Ledesma, José de, attorney of
Valverde in Mexico City, 327;
presents case in behalf of Val-
verde, 328-330.
- Letters, from Vargas to Indian
governors, 135, 182-183, 186;
from Indian governors to Var-
gas, 135, 199, 245, 248-249.
- Livestock, sheep, fowl, 14, 16,
34, 50, 51, 57, 94, 99, 118,
131, 133, 137, 138, 146, 160,
166, 169, 171, 178, 180, 181,
182, 185, 187, 200, 206, 212,
218, 220, 222, 227, 231, 255,
262, 263, 273, 295, 304, 305,
337, 365; *see also* Food, Mis-
sion Herds.
- Llerena, *see* Sombrerete.
- López, Diego, 61.
- López, Luis, abandoned hacienda
of, 133, 134.
- López Naranjo, José, *alcalde may-
or* of Zuñi, 348.
- López Olguín, Juan, 138, 194;
alcalde mayor of San Diego de
Jémez, 251; death of, 251.
- López de Zárate, Diego José, xv.

- López de Zárate, Ignacio, son-in-law of Vargas, 29; royal official, 309.
- Lorenzo, Indian governor of Picuríes, 72, 79, 138, 142, 185, 279, 280, 286, 288.
- Lorenzo, Indian of Sia, 132, 134.
- Los Cerrillos, *see* Cerrillos, Los.
- Los Patos, 180.
- Los Pedernales, 274.
- Los Quelites, stream of, 89.
- Loyola, Marcos de, S.J., 36, 37.
- Lucero de Godoy, Antonio, 155, 317, 345.
- Lucero de Godoy, Francisco, 56, 75, 142, 168.
- Lucero de Godoy, Juan Dios, 108, 155.
- Luján, Doña Aldonza de, 27.
- Luján, Luis, 345.
- Luján, Matías, makes land survey, 224-225.
- Luján, Miguel, 70, 144, 147, 148, 153, 156, 157; death of, 180, 238.
- Luna, Diego de, 51, 155.
- Madrid, 26, 27, 28, 121, 317, 319, 322, 330, 332, 333.
- Madrid, José, 105, 261.
- Madrid, Lorenzo, *cabildo* member, 258, 316.
- Madrid, Lorenzo, former *encomendero* in New Mexico, 115.
- Madrid, Roque, military leader on Vargas' first expedition into New Mexico, 50, 51, 53, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 73, 85, 90, 104, 108, 109; military leader on the colonizing expedition of 1693, 130, 132, 134, 137, 142, 147, 148, 149, 168; member of *cabildo abierto*, 155; in battle of Santa Fé, 158; military activities, 170, 172, 177, 178, 179, 234, 284, 296; *alcalde mayor* of Santa Cruz, 244, 245, 246, 254, 264, 265, 286; member of council of war, 258; testifies against Valverde, 316, 330.
- Magdalena, Aguaje de la, 94, 104.
- Malacate, Antonio, Keres Indian leader, 75, 83, 84, 116, 132, 134, 136, 140, 143, 163.
- Maldonado, Fray Lucas, 20.
- Maldonado Zapata, Antonio, 353, 360, 361.
- Mancera, Marquis of, viceroy of New Spain, 30.
- Mansos, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 110, 148, 291, 294, 345.
- Marín, Fray José García, *see* García Marín.
- Márquez, Francisco, 71.
- Martín, Luis, 155, 345, 346.
- Martínez, Félix, 328; governor of New Mexico, 363.
- Martyrdoms, 15, 19-20, 185-186, 246, 250-251, 271.
- Mateo, Indian leader of Ácoma, 90, 91, 107.
- Matta, Fray Pedro, missionary at Sia, 230, 232, 242; at Bernalillo, 235; on Ácoma campaign, 275; assists the custodian, 299; recommends Valverde, 329.
- Maturana, Diego de, 209, 222, 269, 271.
- Media anata*, 321, 339.
- Medical assistance, 17, 123, 261.
- Medical supplies, 206, 212, 305, 306.
- Mejía, hacienda of, 54, 56, 70, 84, 86, 88, 303.
- Mejía, José, 124.
- Meline, James F., quoted, xvi.
- Mendoza-López expedition, 21.
- Mercurio Volante*, 110-111, 121-122.
- Mestizos, 110, 129, 156, 157, 305.
- Mexico City, xiv, xv, 3, 9, 21, 29, 30, 44, 45, 46, 47, 81, 174,

- 175, 214, 219, 263, 324, 325, 330, 331, 333, 340; celebrates Vargas' victories, 82, 83, 124, 126.
- Michoacán, 31, 298.
- Miguel, Indian governor of Aguatúvi, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 104, 182.
- Mines, 9, 38, 40, 44, 46, 47, 81, 102, 103, 119, 126, 166, 168, 183, 223-224, 226, 227, 239, 337.
- Miranda, Fray Antonio, missionary at Laguna, 347.
- Miranda, Paraje de, 80, 285.
- Mishongnovi, pueblo, 101.
- Mission Herds, 16, 231, 237, 241, 244-245, 299, 300, 337, 352.
- Mission System, described, 10, 12-13, 18, 211, 214-215, 217-219; *visitas*, described, 211; *see also* Franciscans.
- Missions, *see* Franciscans, Mission System.
- Mizquía, Lázaro de, 171; *alcalde mayor* of Taos, 254; escapes death in revolt of 1696, 254; on Cochiti campaign, 267; writes letter to the viceroy, 268, 270; ordered to report to the viceroy, 295.
- Monroy Mondragón, Sebastián de, 60.
- Montoya, Antonio, 155.
- Montoya, Diego de, 155.
- Monzaval, Fray Manuel de, Franciscan Commissary General, 263, 271; exhorts missionaries of New Mexico, 264.
- Moqui, 8, 11, 20, 23, 33, 37, 40, 46, 57, 80, 81, 87, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 105, 110, 119, 136, 166, 170, 179, 182, 186, 248, 252, 347, 348, 349, 351, 352, 356, 367.
- Moraga, abandoned hacienda of, 191.
- Moreno, Fray Antonio, 213; pastor at Santa Cruz, 226; at Nambé, 230; martyrdom of, 246, 271.
- Mosquitos, Aguaje de los, *see* Chupaderos, Aguaje de los.
- Moxsonavi, *see* Mishongnovi.
- Mules, *see* Horses.
- Muñiz, Fray Miguel, on Vargas' first expedition into New Mexico, 52, 64, 72, 88.
- Muñoz de Castro, Fray Juan, on expedition of 1693, 129; natives of San Juan request him for their pastor, 153; vice-custodian and commissary of the Holy Office, 181-182, 203; presented with a petition from the missionaries, 210; pastor at Santa Fé, 213; biographical note, 213.
- Munier, Pedro, 189.
- Nambé, pueblo, 57, 76, 77, 151, 164, 167, 177; resettlement of, 209-210; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.
- Naranjo, Indian leader of Santa Clara, 142, 185, 251, 252, 253, 255, 266, 267, 279, 286; killed, 268, 272, 275.
- Naranjo, José, Indian leader, 357.
- Naranjo, Pedro, Indian leader of San Felipe, 345.
- Narváez Valverde, Fray José, on expedition of 1693, 129; biographical note, 261.
- Nasas River, 123, 269.
- Nativity River, 92.
- Navahos, 11, 67, 137, 140, 148, 163, 199, 202, 252, 265, 266, 269, 284, 297, 337, 349, 350, 351, 356, 367, 369.
- Navarro, Fray Blas, missionary at Picuríes, 230, 231, 235, 298; at Santa Fé, 234; escapes from San Juan, 246; instructs rebel pris-

- oners, 254; chaplain on campaign beyond Nambé, 266; on Taos campaign, 281, 285.
- Negroes, 129.
- New Galicia, 5, 115, 119, 175, 176, 187.
- New Mexico, discovery and settlement, 5-9; administration taken over by the Crown, 9-10; Golden Age of Franciscan missions, 9-15; establishment of a bishopric discussed, 13; civil government and society in the seventeenth century, 15-17; — in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 361-371; Inquisition established, 17; revolt of 1680, 17-20; withdrawal of settlers to El Paso, 20-21; Pueblo independence, 21-23; attempts at reconquest, 32-33; El Paso district, 20-21, 33-43, 50-51, 364-365; reconquest and refounding of, 49ff.; royal aid for support of, 14, 114, 118, 122, 175, 187, 212, 219, 229, 263, 293, 295, 339-340; importance of, in frontier defense, 291, 292, 294, 364, 368, 369, 370; *see also* Cubero, *Encomienda* System, Franciscans, Junta General de Hacienda, Laws of the Indies, Population, Pueblo Indians, Revolt, Santa Fé, Servitude, Vargas, Diego de.
- New Spain, xiii, xiv, 3, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 29, 30, 35, 40, 45, 46, 47, 110, 112, 122, 257, 366, 368.
- New Vizcaya, 5, 21, 32, 35, 36, 43-44, 47, 49, 50, 54, 81, 115, 118, 119, 129, 165, 174, 175, 176, 187, 204, 209, 269, 273, 315-316, 319, 322, 336, 365, 369.
- Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, church in El Paso, 41, 109.
- Nuestra Señora de la Conquista, *see* Our Lady of the Conquest.
- Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción de los Piros del Socorro, church of, 41.
- Nuestra Señora del Rosario, chapel of, 153.
- Obregón, Fray Antonio, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at San Lázaro and San Cristóbal, 212; at Santa Cruz, 230, 248, 298; recommends Valverde, 329.
- Ojeda, Bartolomé de, Indian governor of Sia, 20, 134, 163, 164, 179, 185, 199, 248, 249, 261; on Ácoma campaign, 276.
- Ojito de Salamayuca, 35.
- Ojito de Zuñi, 92, 105.
- Ojo Caliente River, 197, 364.
- Olguín, José, 157, 179, 230.
- Olguín, Juan, *see* López Olguín.
- Oñate, Juan de, 6, 9, 52, 88, 92, 131, 320, 343, 344.
- Oraibi, pueblo, 20, 102, 103, 348.
- Ortega, abandoned hacienda of, 357.
- Ortega, Tiburcio de, reports on conditions at El Paso, 271.
- Ortiz, Nicolás, 226, 326.
- Otermín, Antonio de, 19, 32, 40, 291, 292, 345.
- Our Lady of Aranzazú, painting of, recovered at Taos, 282-283.
- Our Lady of the Assumption, 342.
- Our Lady of the Conquest, 24, 116, 152; novena in honor of, 153.
- Our Lady of Guadalupe, 68, 342.
- Our Lady of La Macana, 343.
- Our Lady of Remedies, 52, 96, 110, 139, 207, 239, 254, 322, 362.
- Oxen, 51, 185, 239, 263, 304, 337.

- Pacheco, Francisco, Indian governor of Taos, 79, 80, 153, 185, 186, 192, 193, 196; submission of, 284-285.
- Padilla, José, 51.
- Páez Hurtado, Juan, in charge of the reinforcements from Parral, 51, 52, 71, 72; on Pecos campaign, 73; wounded, 108; *justicia mayor* at El Paso, 131; Vargas' agent in Mexico, 187, 204, 206, 212, 220-221; leads colonists to New Mexico, 222, 227; accusations against, 328, 330; executor of Vargas' estate, 360; beneficiary in Vargas' will, 361-362; governor of New Mexico, 360, 363.
- Palace of the Governors, Santa Fé, xiii, 66, 152, 157, 161, 188, 253, 317, 337, 353.
- Paraje de la Laguna de Acoma, 275.
- Paraje del Muerto, 53, 133.
- Paraje del Muerto, near Taos, 79.
- Paraje del Río Puerco, 275.
- Pardiñas, Juan Isidro de, governor of New Vizcaya, 44, 49, 54.
- Paredes, Conde de, viceroy of New Spain, 31.
- Paredes, Fray José de, 345.
- Parral, presidio, 34, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 82, 113, 114, 118, 119, 123, 128, 130, 166, 205, 209, 212, 221, 222, 229, 263, 269, 290, 294, 305.
- Pasairi, Sebastián, Indian of Santo Domingo, testimony of, 255.
- Pasaje, presidio, 50, 123.
- Pastor, Luis Gerónimo, 316.
- Patronato Real*, *see* Church and State.
- Paul III, Pope, 216.
- Paz Bustillos, Juan de, 226.
- Pecos, pueblo, 23, 60, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74-75, 78, 80, 82, 86, 140, 147, 148, 163, 170, 182, 232, 292, 350, 356; trade at, 177, 204; population of, 73, 216; mission reestablished, 210; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; mission property withdrawn, 260; visited by missionaries from Santa Fé, 299.
- Pecos River, 236.
- Peinado, Fray Alonso, 11.
- Peña Larga, 106.
- Perea, Fray Estévan de, 11, 346.
- Perucho, rebel Indian leader, 252.
- Philip V, King, 332, 335.
- Picuríes, pueblo, 23, 67, 69, 70, 78, 79, 80, 84, 85, 135, 136, 137, 142, 144, 151, 163, 164, 184, 185, 190, 191, 193, 231, 235; number of dwellings at, 79; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; missionary assigned to, 227; soldiers stationed at, 234; mission property withdrawn, 237-238; flight of natives, 280, 286, 287-288; testimony of Picuríes captive, 287; campaign against, 287-288; captives of, 288; *see also* Revolt.
- Picurí, Luis el, *see* Tupatú, Luis.
- Picuríes, Luis, *see* Tupatú, Luis.
- Piedra Alumbre, Valle de la, 274, 356.
- Pimas, 36, 38, 39, 40.
- Pimentel de Prado, Beatriz, wife of Vargas, 28.
- Pimería Alta, 47.
- Piros, 8, 16, 18, 23, 79, 80, 107, 234, 301.
- Pius V, Pope, 294.
- Pojoaque, pueblo, 57, 76, 77, 164, 168, 250, 267; number of dwellings at, 76; resettlement of, 219; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.

- Ponce de León, Don Pedro, 29.
- Popé, Taos Indian leader, 22, 23.
- Population of New Mexico, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 33, 73, 114, 129, 186, 188, 189-190, 216, 222, 238, 291, 294, 305, 341, 364, 365, 366, 372; *see also* Deaths.
- Presidios, 21, 32, 34, 39, 44, 46, 50, 115, 117, 118, 120, 176, 263, 294, 322, 323; distribution of soldiers of Santa Fé presidio, 231-232, 234, 237.
- Prieto, Fray Jerónimo, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at San Juan, 212, 216, 218, 230, 233; at Santa Cruz, 235, 242; withdraws to Mexico, 298.
- Puaray, 56, 135.
- Pueblo Indians, location of, 8; list of pueblos, 57; social and cultural organization before the Spanish conquest, 8-9; women, 267, 268; pagan religious ceremonies, 18, 22, 186, 218; war dances, 85, 100, 206; war songs, 60, 158, 172, 206, 232; literacy of, 13, 57, 59, 132, 135, 168, 182-183, 245; political organization of, after the Spanish conquest, 10, 82-83, 208, 210, 222, 372; pueblos loyal to the Spaniards in the revolt of 1696, 244, 292; loyal pueblos promised rewards, 292, 295; reoccupy their pueblos after the revolt of 1696, 296, 297, 303-304; dispersion of, 23, 297, 303-304, 341-342, 352; *see also* Baptisms, Franciscans, Laws of the Indies, Mission System, Revolt, Servitude.
- Puerco River, 88, 89, 275.
- Querétaro, 81.
- Querétaro, Santa Cruz de, Franciscan College of, 129, 213, 298; importance of, 215.
- Quevedo, Francisco de, works of, recovered at Zuñi, 93.
- Quintana, Luis de, 61.
- Quivira, 183, 229.
- Rael de Aguilar, Alfonso, civil and military secretary on Vargas' first expedition into New Mexico, 61; *alcalde mayor* of Los Cerrillos, 247; withdraws settlers of Los Cerrillos to Santa Fé, 247; jailed by Cubero, 327; debt of, cancelled, 360.
- Ramírez, Fray José, missionary at San Felipe, 230; at Bernalillo, 232; death of, 242-243.
- Ramírez de Salazar, Francisco, 39.
- Recopilación de leyes de las Indias*, *see* Laws of the Indies.
- Remedies, Our Lady of, *see* Our Lady of Remedies.
- Reneros de Posada, Pedro, 32.
- Repartimiento*, 32, 303; *see* *Encomienda* System.
- Requerimiento*, 59, 235, 241, 290.
- Residencia*, described, 308; *see also* Vargas, Diego de.
- Revolt, of Pueblo Indians, in 1680, xiii, 17-20, 21, 98-99; in 1696, 229-230, 230-243, 244-255, 256-288.
- Río, Juan del, 155.
- Río Grande, 6, 8, 11, 16, 18, 20, 51, 52, 53, 56, 69, 76, 86, 105, 107, 108, 130, 133, 134, 138, 172, 179, 181, 190, 191, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 205, 230, 254, 255, 261, 267, 357.
- Robledito, *see* Robledo.
- Robledo, 50, 51, 53, 109, 132, 134.
- Rodríguez, José, 317.
- Rodríguez, Sebastián, 50, 239.
- Romero, Felipe, abandoned hacienda of, 134, 167.
- Romero, José Antonio, 316.

- Romero de Pedraza, Francisco, 155, 317, 344.
- Rosario, 81.
- Roybal, Ignacio, 246, 257.
- Ruiz de Casares, Juan, 60, 70, 144, 169, 171, 178, 205; makes land survey, 224-225; member of council of war, 258; consulted on conditions at Santa Cruz, 297-298.
- Sáenz, Ambrosio, abandoned hacienda of, 140, 144, 147.
- Saint Francis of Assisi, 26.
- Salado River, 41.
- Salas, Sebastián de, 226.
- Salazar, Agustín, Indian of Santa Fé, 157.
- Saldúa, Juan de, agent of Cubero in Mexico City, 327; appointed captain of the presidio of El Paso, 327; presents case against Valverde, 327-328.
- Salina Mountains, *see* Sierra de las Salinas.
- Saline Apaches, *see* Apaches Salineros.
- Saline Province, *see* Las Salinas, in the Piro Country.
- Salvatierra, Juan María de, S.J., 36.
- San Antonio, Fray Salvador de, custodian of the New Mexico missions, 116, 117, 118, 130, 154, 344, 347; on expedition of 1693, 129, 139; presents petition to Vargas, 151-152; departs for El Paso, 213.
- San Antonio de Senecú, church of, El Paso district, 41.
- San Antonio Mountain, 196, 197.
- San Antonio River, 196, 197, 232.
- San Bartolomé, Valle de las Bocas de, 123.
- San Buenaventura, 44, 137.
- Sánchez de Cepeda, Alonso, 27.
- San Cristóbal, pueblo, 57, 67, 78, 164, 167, 169, 177, 178, 191, 303; location of, 78; number of dwellings in, 78; resettlement of, 210; missionaries assigned to, 212; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; expulsion of natives from, 225; hostility of, 229, 232, 233; mission property withdrawn, 237-238; missionaries murdered at, 246; *see also* Revolt.
- Sandía, 56, 134, 135, 138, 252, 297, 356.
- Sandía Mountains, 106, 253, 356, 357.
- San Diego, 108, 132, 133, 178.
- San Diego, mission, El Paso district, 41.
- San Diego del Monte, *see* Jémez, San Diego de.
- San Felipe, pueblo, 23, 56, 57, 69, 70, 73, 84, 135, 136, 137, 140, 144, 147, 163, 178, 179, 182, 188, 292; population of, 216; mission reestablished, 216; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.
- San Francisco de los Mansos, church of, 35.
- San Gabriel, 6.
- Sangre de Cristo Range, 58.
- San Ildefonso, pueblo, 57, 77, 81, 142, 145, 163; resettlement of, 210; population of, 216; mission reestablished, 211, 217; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; soldiers stationed at, 234; mission property withdrawn, 237-238; *see also* Revolt.
- San Ildefonso, mesa of, rebel refuge, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 177, 184, 185, 189, 191, 198, 205, 206; list of tribes reported


- gathered there, 164, 165, 185; submission of, 207-208.
- San Isidro Labrador, patron saint of Madrid, 26.
- San Juan de los Caballeros (—de los Teguas), pueblo, 57, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 78, 80, 135, 137, 144, 169, 208, 218, 233; resettlement of, 210; population of, 216; mission reestablished, 216; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; soldiers stationed at, 234; mission property withdrawn, 237-238.
- San Lázaro, pueblo, 57, 63, 67, 78, 135, 164, 167, 169, 177, 178, 191, 208, 217, 303; location of, 78, 225; number of dwellings in, 78; resettlement of, 210; missionary assigned to, 212; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; expulsion of natives from, 225; hostility of, 229.
- San Lorenzo, *real* de, 41, 128; church at, 41; population of, 114.
- San Luis Valley, Colorado, 196, 371.
- San Marcial, 53.
- San Marcos, 83, 84, 134, 148, 180.
- San Marcos, Cerro de, 168, 224.
- San Miguel, church of, 152, 153.
- San Sebastián, 269.
- Santa Ana, pueblo, 22, 23, 57, 75, 83, 84, 86, 135, 140, 141, 147, 163, 164, 178, 179, 182, 185, 188, 292; made a *visita*, 211; population of, 216; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; established as a mission, 224.
- Santa Clara, pueblo, 11, 57, 63, 164, 169, 170, 177, 208; number of dwellings in, 77; resettlement of, 210; population of, 216; mission reestablished, 213, 217; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; mission property removed, 237-238.
- Santa Cruz de la Cañada, 16, 78, 234; refounding of, 225-226; campaign headquarters, 257, 260, 280; conditions in, 354; growth of, 364.
- Santa Cruz River, 78, 224.
- Santa Fé, mission beginnings at, 11, 14; founded as capital of New Mexico, 15, 16; description of, 16-17, 60, 62, 66, 159-160, 354; abandoned, 19; destruction of the archives, xvii, 22; plans for recapture of, 35, 36, 40, 46, 54; peaceful submission of, 64, 65, 66; population of, 16, 364; political life of, 17, 307ff.; entry into, 149; battle of, 151-162; punishment of rebels of, 161-162; establishment of presidio at, 117-118, 166, 322, 323, 363; missionaries and settlers withdrawn to, 235, 247; distribution of grain and supplies at, 161, 198, 305; *see also* New Mexico.
- Santa Fé River, 58, 179.
- Santa María, Fray Agustín de, 20.
- Santa Rosa, Cotachè de, *see* Cotache.
- Santa Teresa de Jesús, 26; works of, recovered at Zuñi, 93.
- Santiago, Order of, 26, 27.
- Santo Domingo, pueblo, 11, 23, 52, 56, 57, 58, 69, 71, 75, 82, 83, 84, 134, 137, 139, 144, 145, 148, 163, 185, 189, 199, 342; mission reestablished at, 213, 216; population of, 216; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; *see also* Revolt.
- Saxette, Miguel, Indian governor of San Juan de los Caballeros, surrenders, 278; testimony of,

- 278-279; pardoned, 279; on mission to the enemy, 279-280.
- Scholes, France V., quoted, 14, 17.
- Sebastián, Indian war captain of Jémez, 85.
- Senecú, El Paso district, 20, 50, 51, 128; population of, 114.
- Senecú, upper New Mexico, 105, 107, 108.
- Seris, 36.
- Servitude, Indian, 162, 174, 175, 181, 186, 204, 208, 218, 288, 296-297, 302-303, 316; *see also* Laws of the Indies.
- Shongopovi, pueblo, 101, 102, 103.
- Sia, pueblo, 23, 32, 33, 57, 64, 84, 109, 116, 117, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 144, 163, 164, 178, 179, 182, 185, 188, 249, 292, 345; mission re-established, 211; population of, 216; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.
- Sierra, Fray Antonio de, on expedition of 1693, 129.
- Sierra Azul, 8, 32-33, 37-38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 102, 103, 117, 165-166, 190, 224; *see also* Cerro Colorado.
- Sierra de Gila, 34, 36, 37, 39.
- Sierra de la Magdalena, 106, 107.
- Sierra de las Peñuelas, 108.
- Sierra de las Salinas, 106.
- Sierra de la Urraca, 142.
- Sierra del Muerto, 108.
- Sierra de los Ladrones, 106, 107, 140.
- Sierra de los Organos, 41, 52.
- Sierra del Socorro, 107.
- Sierra de Tajique, 357.
- Sierra Florida, 41.
- Sierra Ladrón, *see* Sierra de los Ladrones.
- Sierra Negra, 41.
- Sierra Nevada, 41.
- Sierra Prieta, 102, 106.
- Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, xiv, xviii, 49, 96, 121; *see also* *Mercurio Volante*.
- Sinaloa, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 47.
- Sobaipujares, 39.
- Sobas, 36.
- Socorro, El Paso district, 20, 41, 50, 51; population of, 114.
- Socorro, upper New Mexico, 107, 132, 134, 140.
- Socorro Mountains, *see* Sierra del Socorro.
- Sombrerete, 113, 114, 118, 119, 123, 128, 129, 176, 187, 206, 212, 221, 239, 305, 316, 322.
- Sonora, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 47, 77, 148, 291, 336, 369.
- Spain, crusading spirit of, 1-2, 24, 26, 363; work of colonization and civilization in America, 2; concept of culture, 2, 214-216; colonial administration and Indian policy, 3-4; early English interpretations of, 3-4; ages of greatness, 24; during reign of Charles II, 29, 363.
- Sumas, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 41, 46, 291, 294, 301.
- Supply Train, 16-17, 18, 178, 201, 257.
- Tabalaopa, 166, 178.
- Tajique, 252.
- Tajique, Sierra de, *see* Sierra de Tajique.
- Talpujagua, 31.
- Tamaluapa, Valle de, 295.
- Tamarón y Romeral, Pedro, 367.
- Tampico, 296.
- Tanos, 11, 23, 57, 60, 61, 62, 67, 69, 70, 72, 78, 80, 84, 85, 135, 136, 137, 142, 144, 145, 148, 151, 163, 164, 168, 169, 177, 190, 204, 234, 296, 352;

- list of pueblos, 57; location of pueblos, 225; *see also* Revolt.
- Taos, pueblo, 8, 22, 23, 69, 78, 79, 80, 86, 142, 144, 163, 164, 184, 185, 191, 192, 193, 196, 198, 202; plot revealed by natives of, 80, 85; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222; missionaries assigned to, 227; soldiers stationed at, 231-232, 234; condition of mission church at, 264; campaign against, 281-285; submission of, 284-285; *see also* Revolt.
- Taos Mountains, 79, 192, 193, 281, 282.
- Tapia, Cristóbal de, 56, 87.
- Tapia, Pedro de, 60, 137, 145, 148, 162.
- Tarahumares, 294.
- Tejas, 183, *see also* Texas.
- Téllez Jirón, José, 155, 239.
- Téllez Jirón, Rafael, 54, 84, 104, 108.
- Témpano, Francisco, Piro Indian, testimony of, 252-253; set free, 254.
- Tesuque, pueblo, 57, 63, 67, 76, 135, 151, 164, 167, 169, 170, 208, 292; number of dwellings at, 76; resettlement of, 209; population of, 216; mission re-established, 213, 217; placed under *alcaldía* jurisdiction, 222.
- Teutila, 30, 31.
- Tewas, 9, 23, 57, 59, 62, 67, 69, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 144, 145, 148, 151, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 178, 180, 184, 185, 190, 204, 356; list of pueblos, 57; *see also* Revolt.
- Texas, 11, 12, 20, 21, 47, 183, 213, 370.
- Third Order of Saint Francis, 222.
- Thomas, Alfred B., quoted, 370, 371.
- Tirso de Molina, Spanish dramatist, 28.
- Tiwas, 11, 23, 77, 80, 234, 301, 345.
- Tlascalans, 295.
- Tomás, Indian leader of San Cristóbal, 280.
- Tomé, 364.
- Tompiros, 18.
- Torrecilla, Doña Antonio, 127, 128.
- Trade, between New Mexico and New Spain, 16, 336, 365; Indian trade, 9, 16, 133-134, 137, 139, 143, 144, 147, 153, 177, 179, 183, 192, 197, 198, 204, 211, 227, 228, 234, 286, 302, 365.
- Trades and Crafts, 62, 189-190, 366.
- Trampas River, 281, 285, 286.
- Trizio, Fray Miguel, missionary at Santo Domingo, 213, 216; at San Juan de Jémez, 230, 232, 242, 247; at Bernalillo, 235.
- Treviño, Juan Bautista, 344.
- Truchas River, 177, 287.
- Trujillo, Mateo, 246, 248.
- Tupatú, Luis, Indian leader, 22, 23, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 79, 99, 138, 142, 145, 147, 153, 165; visits Vargas, 68; clothes worn by, 68; named Indian governor, 82.
- Ulibarri, Juan de, 245; inspects damage done in the revolt of 1696, 246-247; at Zuñi, 351.
- Urioste, Martín de, 258, 328.
- Utes, 23, 177, 179, 182, 194, 196, 197, 232, 238, 248, 252, 275, 337, 354, 369.
- Val, Fray Juan, 20.
- Valdés, José, 226.
- Valencia, Juan de, 51; abandoned *estancia* of, 53, 357, 364, 367.

- Valle, José del, 226.
Vallejo, Manuel, 226.
Valverde Cossio, Antonio, captain of the presidio of Santa Fé, 258; in campaign beyond Nambé, 265, 266; on Ácoma campaign, 276; on Taos campaign, 282, 283; charges against, by *cabildo* and Cubero, 315-317, 324-326, 327-328; credentials, 322, 329; in Spain, 320-323; captain of the El Paso presidio, 323, 324, 331; litigations, 327-332; governor of New Mexico, 363; biographical sketch, 316, 322.
Varela, Diego, 56, 73, 179.
Vargas, Alonso de, illegitimate son of Governor Vargas, 30, 353, 360, 361.
Vargas, Eusebio de, 179, 194, 200, 201, 202, 239.
Vargas, Fray Francisco de, vice-custodian and custodian of the New Mexico missions, 35, 213, 298, 299; obtains reports on the missions, 216, 230, 232, 243; at Santa Ana, 230; requests military protection for the missions, 231, 234, 236; instructions to, 249, 296; requests military escort for withdrawal of mission property, 260; reports to Commissary General on status of the missions, 271; obtains sheep for the missions, 300; seeks additional missionaries, 300-301; speaks in behalf of Governor Vargas, 313.
Vargas, Francisco de, Licentiate, 26.
Vargas, Francisco de, Royal Councilor, 27-28.
Vargas, Garci Pérez de, 26.
Vargas, Gutierre de, 27.
Vargas, Juan de, 26.
Vargas, María Teresa de, illegitimate daughter of Governor Vargas, 30.
Vargas, Mariana de, 326.
Vargas, Sebastián de, S.J., 28.
Vargas y Pimentel, Juan Manuel de, illegitimate son of Governor Vargas, 30, 113; in Spain, 309, 321, 324; returns to America, 324; in Mexico City, 326; in New Mexico, 353; mentioned in his father's will, 360, 361.
Vargas y Pimentel, María Isabel, legitimate daughter of Governor Vargas, 29; assumes title of Marchioness of La Nava de Barcinas, 29, 339.
Vargas Zapata, Lorenzo de, 27.
Vargas Zapata y Luján, Alonso de, 28.
Vargas Zapata y Luján Ponce de León, Diego de, the Reconqueror, xiii; lineage of, 25-28; family estate of, 27, 121; full baptismal name of, 28; marriage of, 28; attends university of Valladolid, 28; military service in Europe, 28; portrait of, 30; sets out for America, 29; illicit marriage of, 30, 321; *alcalde mayor* of Teutilla, 31; *justicia mayor* and *alcalde mayor* of Talpujagua, 31; appointed governor of New Mexico, 31-32; character, qualities, and ability of, 31-33, 150, 188; campaign in Sonora and Sinaloa, 39-40; first expedition into New Mexico, 32-48, 50-111; directs reconquest and recolonization of New Mexico, 112-243, 272-306; addresses the natives, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 76, 79, 83, 84, 86, 91, 96, 97, 101, 140, 158, 193, 203, 285; colonization plans of, 81, 115-116, 166, 175-176, 204, 238,


- 297, 298; inspects damage done in revolt of 1696, 247-248; concern for the missionaries, 260-261; seeks honors and higher appointment, 121, 165, 309, 317-319; protests Cubero's appointment, 310-311; *residencia* of, 308, 311-314, 324-340; placed in confinement, 313-314; placed in irons, 327; receives royal honors, 319-320; in Mexico City, 332, 333, 353; charges against, by Cubero and the *cabildo*, 312, 332, 333; sends *memorial* to the king, 333-335; granted an *encomienda*, 318-321, 353; exoneration of, 339-340; returns to New Mexico, 353; denounces Cubero, 354-355; last campaign of, 356-358; injury of, 123; illness of, 133, 257, 358; death of, 358-359; wills of, 353, 358-362.
- Velasco, Cristóbal de, 124, 126, 127.
- Velasco Pacheco, Fray Fernando, 152.
- Vélez de Escalante, Fray Silvestre, xv, xviii, 351.
- Venegas Ponce de León, Doña Inés, 27.
- Ventura, Zuñi Indian, 85, 89, 90, 92, 179, 181, 182, 183.
- Villagrà, Gaspar de, 88.
- Villagutierre y Sotomayor, Juan de, xv, 319.
- Virgen del Rosario, 152; *see also* Nuestra Señora del Rosario.
- Virgin of Guadalupe, *see* Our Lady of Guadalupe.
- Visitas*, *see* Franciscans, Mission System.
- Wagons and Carts, 50, 51, 65, 87, 118, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 148, 166, 178, 187, 188, 201, 202, 222.
- Walpi, pueblo, 99, 101, 352.
- Weapons, Armor, Ammunition, 34, 51, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 71, 78, 82, 85, 95, 120, 124, 130, 131, 133, 137, 138, 139, 151, 156, 157, 159, 160, 168, 171, 172, 173, 180, 192, 197, 205, 208, 229, 245, 259, 296; list of weapons at the El Paso presidio, 120.
- Xavier, Francisco, 61.
- Xenome, Diego, Indian leader of Nambé, testimony of, 251-252; execution of, 253-254.
- Yerba del Manso, 132.
- Yunque, 225.
- Zacatecas, 81, 113, 114, 118, 119, 121, 128, 129, 176, 187, 189, 190, 204, 212, 220, 221, 239, 305.
- Zavaleta, Fray Juan de, on expedition of 1693, 129; missionary at Taos, 230, 298; at Santa Fé, 234.
- Zeinos, Fray Diego, on expedition of 1693, 129, 158; missionary at Pecos, 210, 212, 216, 229.
- Zervir, Diego, 87, 178, 239.
- Zuñi, pueblo, 8, 11, 18, 20, 23, 33, 80, 81, 87, 90, 92, 94, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 117, 118, 151, 170, 179, 182, 185, 186, 248, 252, 342, 367; description of, 93; religious articles and books found at, 93, 110; testimony of Zuñi spies, 273; mission established at, 347; revolt at, 351-352; abandonment of the mission, 352.
- Zuñi River, 94.

[illegible][illegible]

F799 .E77

Crusaders of the Rio Grande; the story

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00024 6316